substitute procedural requirement in Tennessee

2022Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-405 (b). 5 In Keisling, the Court noted the three factors that should be considered in determining the procedural protections warranted by a particular situation: “(1) the private interest at stake; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of the interest through the procedures used and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally (3) the government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” 92 S.W.3d at 377 -78 (qu

2015I, § 8. 4 stake; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of the interest through the procedures used and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally (3) the government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Keisling v. Keisling, 92 S.W.3d 374, 377-78 (Tenn. 2002) (quoting State v. Culbreath, 30 S.W.3d 309, 317-18 (Tenn. 2000)).

2024Resp., 578 S.W.3d 421, 431 (Lee, J., concurring in part and not joining in part).11 Still, the chancery court chose to address the argument on the merits and applied the balancing test the United States Supreme Court adopted in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (The Court balanced “the private interest that will be affected by the official action; [and] the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards,” against “the Government’s interest, including the function involv

2008The Mathews balancing test looks to: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. 9 Id. at 335 .

2022Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-405 (b). 5 In Keisling, the Court noted the three factors that should be considered in determining the procedural protections warranted by a particular situation: “(1) the private interest at stake; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of the interest through the procedures used and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally (3) the government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” 92 S.W.3d at 377 -78 (qu

2015See Keisling, 92 S.W.3d at 377–88 (noting that in determining what process is due, the court must consider: “(1) the private interest at stake; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of the interest through the procedures used and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally (3) the government‟s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail”).

2003State v. Culbreath, 30 S.W.3d 309, 317-18 (Tenn. 2000) (citing Wilson, 984 S.W.2d at 902 ); see also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974) (recognizing the need for “mutual accommodation between institutional needs and objectives and the provisions of the Constitution that are of general application”).

2003State v. Culbreath, 30 S.W.3d 309, 317-18 (Tenn.2000) (citing Wilson, 984 S.W.2d at 902 ); see also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 , 94 S.Ct. 2963 , 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974) (recognizing the need for “mutual accommodation between institutional needs and objectives and the provisions of the Constitution that are of general application”).

2012Determining whether due process requires an opportunity to present a claim involves considering “(1) the private interest at stake; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of the interest through the procedures used and the probable value, if 2 We note that this filing likewise falls outside the statutory limitations period. -4- any, of additional or substitute safeguards; and finally, (3) the government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Seals, 23 S.W.3d at 277 .

2005Seals further explains: In determining what procedural protections a particular situation demands, three factors must be considered: (1) the private interest at stake; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of the interest through the procedures used and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute safeguards; and finally, (3) the government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. 23 S.W.3d at 277 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.

2005Seals further explains: In determining what procedural protections a particular situation demands, three factors must be considered: (1) the private interest at stake; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of the interest through the procedures used and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute safeguards; and finally, (3) the government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. 23 S.W.3d at 277 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.

2005Acts ch. 207, §1; Burford, 845 S.W.2d at 206 . -8- In determining what procedural protections a particular situation demands, three factors must be considered: (1) the private interest at stake; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of the interest through the procedures used and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute safeguards; and finally, (3) the government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. 23 S.W.3d at 277 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 33

2024Resp., 578 S.W.3d 421, 431 (Lee, J., concurring in part and not joining in part).11 Still, the chancery court chose to address the argument on the merits and applied the balancing test the United States Supreme Court adopted in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (The Court balanced “the private interest that will be affected by the official action; [and] the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards,” against “the Government’s interest, including the function involv

2013Seals v. State, 23 S.W.3d 272, 277 (Tenn.2000) (citations omitted); cf. United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 790 , 97 S.Ct. 2044 , 52 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977) (explaining that due process embodies “fundamental conceptions of justice” and “the community’s sense of fair play and decency” (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 , 72 S.Ct. 205 , 96 L.Ed. 183 (1952))).

2013Seals v. State, 23 S.W.3d 272, 277 (Tenn.2000) (citations omitted); cf. United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 790 , 97 S.Ct. 2044 , 52 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977) (explaining that due process embodies “fundamental conceptions of justice” and “the community’s sense of fair play and decency” (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 , 72 S.Ct. 205 , 96 L.Ed. 183 (1952))).

2013Seals v. State, 23 S.W.3d 272, 277 (Tenn.2000) (citations omitted); cf. United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 790 , 97 S.Ct. 2044 , 52 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977) (explaining that due process embodies “fundamental conceptions of justice” and “the community’s sense of fair play and decency” (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 , 72 S.Ct. 205 , 96 L.Ed. 183 (1952))).

2013Seals v. State, 23 S.W.3d 272, 277 (Tenn.2000) (citations omitted); cf. United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 790 , 97 S.Ct. 2044 , 52 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977) (explaining that due process embodies “fundamental conceptions of justice” and “the community’s sense of fair play and decency” (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 , 72 S.Ct. 205 , 96 L.Ed. 183 (1952))).

2008Like the Petitioner here, the Alley petitioner argued that he was entitled to DNA testing because “[h]is right to life is paramount, the release of evidence for DNA testing is of exceptional value because it will provide the most accurate determination of [his] innocence, and there is no burden on the government.” Alley, 431 F. Supp. 2d at 801 (quotations omitted).

1997Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976); State v. Barnett, 909 S.W.2d 423, 426 (Tenn. 1995).