substitute procedural requirement in California

2025A petitioner’s rights at a section 1172.6 resentencing hearing are grounded in “procedural due process rights to a full and fair opportunity to contest the People’s opposition to his resentencing petition.” (See People v. Robinson, supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at p. 873, citing People v. Schell (2022) 84 Cal.App.th 437, 444.) “Factors relevant to this inquiry take into account: ‘First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute

2024(People v. Schell, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 444.) In evaluating whether Robinson’s due process rights were violated at the section 1172.6 hearing, we consider “ ‘[T]he private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and [third], the [g]overnment’s interest, including the function involved and 19 the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.’ (

2021More specifically, identification of the dictates of due process generally requires consideration of (1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action, (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through 20 the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards, (3) the dignitary interest in informing individuals of the nature, grounds and consequences of the action and in enabling them to present their side of the story before a responsible governmental official, and (4) the governmental interest, including the

2021More specifically, identification of the dictates of due process generally requires consideration of (1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action, (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through 20 the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards, (3) the dignitary interest in informing individuals of the nature, grounds and consequences of the action and in enabling them to present their side of the story before a responsible governmental official, and (4) the governmental interest, including the

2022Courts have a ‘“duty to uphold a statute unless its unconstitutionality clearly, positively, and unmistakably appears; all presumptions and intendments favor its validity.”’” (Otto, at pp. 209-210; accord, Washington, at p. 469.) The Otto court identified four factors for courts to consider in determining what process is due an alleged SVP: “(1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; (3) the governm

2022In calibrating which procedural protections a particular situation demands, courts traditionally consider the following factors: “(1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; (3) the government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail; and (4) the dignitary interest in informing individua

1993Mathews v. Eldridge (1976) 424 U.S. 319, 334-335 [ 47 L.Ed.2d 18, 33 , 96 S.Ct. 893 ], offers a widely applicable method of analysis: “identification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrat

1993Mathews v. Eldridge (1976) 424 U.S. 319, 334-335 [ 47 L.Ed.2d 18, 33 , 96 S.Ct. 893 ], offers a widely applicable method of analysis: “identification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrat

2021Generally, courts analyze federal due process claims by balancing three factors: “First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” (Mathews v. Eldridge (1976) 424 U.S. 329 , 335.) Due process analysis under the Cali

2021When we consider procedural due process claims under the California Constitution, we weigh four factors: “ ‘(1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; (3) the government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail; and (4) the dignitary interest in informing individuals of the nature, grou

2025In Moore, our Supreme Court applied a four-factor balancing test from Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471 , 481 to determine “‘what process is due’ a potential civil committee.” (Moore, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 819 .) The four factors are “(1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; (3) the government’s interest, including the function 3 involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the

2022Courts have a ‘“duty to uphold a statute unless its unconstitutionality clearly, positively, and unmistakably appears; all presumptions and intendments favor its validity.”’” (Otto, at pp. 209-210; accord, Washington, at p. 469.) The Otto court identified four factors for courts to consider in determining what process is due an alleged SVP: “(1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; (3) the governm

2017"Due process requires notice before a dismissal of a case may be entered." ( Lee v. Placer Title Co. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 503 , 510, 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 572 ; see Cordova v. Vons Grocery Co. (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 1526 , 1531, 242 Cal.Rptr. 605 ; see also Wilson v. Sunshine Meat & Liquor Co . (1983) 34 Cal.3d 554 , 561, fn. 7, 194 Cal.Rptr. 773 , 669 P.2d 9 .) For, if a plaintiff's case is dismissed without due process, that party's right of access to the courts is infringed.

2017"Due process requires notice before a dismissal of a case may be entered." ( Lee v. Placer Title Co. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 503 , 510, 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 572 ; see Cordova v. Vons Grocery Co. (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 1526 , 1531, 242 Cal.Rptr. 605 ; see also Wilson v. Sunshine Meat & Liquor Co . (1983) 34 Cal.3d 554 , 561, fn. 7, 194 Cal.Rptr. 773 , 669 P.2d 9 .) For, if a plaintiff's case is dismissed without due process, that party's right of access to the courts is infringed.

2017"Due process requires notice before a dismissal of a case may be entered." ( Lee v. Placer Title Co. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 503 , 510, 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 572 ; see Cordova v. Vons Grocery Co. (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 1526 , 1531, 242 Cal.Rptr. 605 ; see also Wilson v. Sunshine Meat & Liquor Co . (1983) 34 Cal.3d 554 , 561, fn. 7, 194 Cal.Rptr. 773 , 669 P.2d 9 .) For, if a plaintiff's case is dismissed without due process, that party's right of access to the courts is infringed.

2017"Due process requires notice before a dismissal of a case may be entered." ( Lee v. Placer Title Co. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 503 , 510, 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 572 ; see Cordova v. Vons Grocery Co. (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 1526 , 1531, 242 Cal.Rptr. 605 ; see also Wilson v. Sunshine Meat & Liquor Co . (1983) 34 Cal.3d 554 , 561, fn. 7, 194 Cal.Rptr. 773 , 669 P.2d 9 .) For, if a plaintiff's case is dismissed without due process, that party's right of access to the courts is infringed.

2009The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not guarantee to the citizen of a state any particular form or method of procedure.' [Citation.]" ( In re Parker (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1453, 1462 [ 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 167 ].) (14) The measure of due process that is due in civil proceedings, including proceedings under the SVPA, is a complex determination that depends upon several factors: "(1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or

2009The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not guarantee to the citizen of a state any particular form or method of procedure.' [Citation.]" ( In re Parker (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1453, 1462 [ 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 167 ].) (14) The measure of due process that is due in civil proceedings, including proceedings under the SVPA, is a complex determination that depends upon several factors: "(1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or

1992We disagree. (5) In analyzing a due process claim, we apply a "flexible balancing standard" that considers (1) the private interest that the official action will affect; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; (3) the dignity interest in informing individuals of the nature, grounds, and consequences of the action and in enabling them to present their side of the story before a responsible governmental official; and (4) the governmental interest, including the functi

1992We disagree. (5) In analyzing a due process claim, we apply a "flexible balancing standard" that considers (1) the private interest that the official action will affect; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; (3) the dignity interest in informing individuals of the nature, grounds, and consequences of the action and in enabling them to present their side of the story before a responsible governmental official; and (4) the governmental interest, including the functi

2023(See Vasquez, supra, 27 Cal.App.5th at p. 81 [“confinement for 31 17 years awaiting trial caused a significant deprivation of liberty”].) However, the record does not indicate that the risk of erroneous deprivation of Kerins’s liberty interest is anything more than slight.

2023(See Vasquez, supra, 27 Cal.App.5th at p. 81 [“confinement for 31 17 years awaiting trial caused a significant deprivation of liberty”].) However, the record does not indicate that the risk of erroneous deprivation of Kerins’s liberty interest is anything more than slight.

2014(See U.S. v. Carta (1st Cir. 2010) 592 F.3d 34, 37 [Fifth Amendment's due process clause did not require a jury trial to commit “sexually dangerous person" under federal law]; United States v. Sahhar (9th Cir. 1990) 917 F.2d 1197, 1206-1207 , cert. den. (1991) 499 U.S. 963 [ 111 S.Ct. 1591 ] [Fifth Amendment's due process clause does not require a jury trial in federal civil commitment proceedings of an incompetent criminal defendant]; McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, supra, 403 U.S. at p. 543 (plur. opn. of Blackmun, J.) [a jury 12 trial is not a necessary element of the fundamental fairness guarant

1986While the reestablishment of Moore’s conservatorship unquestionably intruded upon his liberty interests (see Conservatorship of Roulet (1979) 23 Cal.3d 219, 223-228 [ 152 Cal.Rptr. 425 , 590 P.2d 1 ]), the reestablishment procedures employed numerous checks against the risk of erroneous intrusion.

2014Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 , 96 S.Ct. 893, 903 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976)." (Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex (1979) 442 U.S. 1, 13 [ 99 S.Ct. 2100 ].) "[I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, in

2014Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 , 96 S.Ct. 893, 903 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976)." (Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex (1979) 442 U.S. 1, 13 [ 99 S.Ct. 2100 ].) "[I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, in

2002(See Civil Service Assn. v. City and County of San Francisco (1978) 22 Cal.3d 552, 561 [ 150 Cal.Rptr. 129 , 586 P.2d 162 ].)” ( Ramirez, supra, 25 Cal.3d at pp. 268-269.) One private interest plainly affected by appointment of a conservator is the conservatee’s right to liberty.

2002(See Civil Service Assn. v. City and County of San Francisco (1978) 22 Cal.3d 552, 561 [ 150 Cal.Rptr. 129 , 586 P.2d 162 ].)” ( Ramirez, supra, 25 Cal.3d at pp. 268-269.) One private interest plainly affected by appointment of a conservator is the conservatee’s right to liberty.

2000"This flexible balancing standard considers '"(1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action, (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards, (3) the [dignity] interest in informing individuals of the nature, grounds and consequences of the action and in enabling them to present their side of the story before a responsible governmental official, and (4) the governmental interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burden

2000"This flexible balancing standard considers '"(1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action, (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards, (3) the [dignity] interest in informing individuals of the nature, grounds and consequences of the action and in enabling them to present their side of the story before a responsible governmental official, and (4) the governmental interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burden

1998Neither have they been generally used in military trials.” (Id., at p. 543 [ 91 S.Ct. at p. 1985 ].) Because due process is a flexible concept that varies with the particular situation, “[t]o determine what procedural protections the Constitution requires in a particular case, we weigh several factors: ‘First, the private *562 interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an. erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, i

1998Neither have they been generally used in military trials.” (Id., at p. 543 [ 91 S.Ct. at p. 1985 ].) Because due process is a flexible concept that varies with the particular situation, “[t]o determine what procedural protections the Constitution requires in a particular case, we weigh several factors: ‘First, the private *562 interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an. erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, i

2010In reaching its conclusion, the court in Allen discussed four relevant factors in evaluating whether a defendant has a due process right to testify; “ ‘(1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; (3) the government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail; and (4) the dignitary interest

2010In reaching its conclusion, the court in Allen discussed four relevant factors in evaluating whether a defendant has a due process right to testify; “ ‘(1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; (3) the government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail; and (4) the dignitary interest

1998Neither have they been generally used in military trials.” (Id., at p. 543 [ 91 S.Ct. at p. 1985 ].) Because due process is a flexible concept that varies with the particular situation, “[t]o determine what procedural protections the Constitution requires in a particular case, we weigh several factors: ‘First, the private *562 interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an. erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, i

1998Neither have they been generally used in military trials." ( Id., at p. 543 [ 91 S.Ct. at p. 1985 ].) Because due process is a flexible concept that varies with the particular situation, "[t]o determine what procedural protections the Constitution requires in a particular case, we weigh several factors: `First, the private *562 interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, i

2025In Moore, our Supreme Court applied a four-factor balancing test from Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471 , 481 to determine “‘what process is due’ a potential civil committee.” (Moore, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 819 .) The four factors are “(1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; (3) the government’s interest, including the function 3 involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the

2008It reiterated: “ ‘[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.’ Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 481 [ 33 L.Ed.2d 484 , 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2600 ] (1972).” (Id. at p. 334.) “[T]he Court set forth three factors that normally determine whether an individual has received the ‘process’ that the Constitution finds ‘due’: [][] ‘First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or subs

2014(See U.S. v. Carta (1st Cir. 2010) 592 F.3d 34, 37 [Fifth Amendment's due process clause did not require a jury trial to commit “sexually dangerous person" under federal law]; United States v. Sahhar (9th Cir. 1990) 917 F.2d 1197, 1206-1207 , cert. den. (1991) 499 U.S. 963 [ 111 S.Ct. 1591 ] [Fifth Amendment's due process clause does not require a jury trial in federal civil commitment proceedings of an incompetent criminal defendant]; McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, supra, 403 U.S. at p. 543 (plur. opn. of Blackmun, J.) [a jury 12 trial is not a necessary element of the fundamental fairness guarant

1992It does not extend the protection of constitutional provisions which bear no relevant relationship to the proceedings." (People v. Superior Court (Williams), supra, 233 Cal.App.3d at p. 488 .) Tilbury set out three factors to be weighed when determining whether a particular set of procedural safeguards affords adequate due process: “ ‘[F]irst, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute safeguards; and finally, the Governm

1992The central purpose of dependency proceedings is to protect the *Page 138 welfare and best interests of the child, not to punish the parent. ( In re Malinda S., supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 384 ; Collins v. Superior Court (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 47 , 52-53 [ 141 Cal.Rptr. 273 ].) Although a parent has substantial private interests at stake in a section 300 proceeding, including the loss of custody of the child and significant injury to personal dignity ( In re Malinda S., supra, at pp. 383-384; Lois R. v. Superior Court (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 895 , 901-902 [ 97 Cal.Rptr. 158 ] ), "`. . . [t]he interest s

1992The central purpose of dependency proceedings is to protect the *Page 138 welfare and best interests of the child, not to punish the parent. ( In re Malinda S., supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 384 ; Collins v. Superior Court (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 47 , 52-53 [ 141 Cal.Rptr. 273 ].) Although a parent has substantial private interests at stake in a section 300 proceeding, including the loss of custody of the child and significant injury to personal dignity ( In re Malinda S., supra, at pp. 383-384; Lois R. v. Superior Court (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 895 , 901-902 [ 97 Cal.Rptr. 158 ] ), "`. . . [t]he interest s

1988More specifically, “ ‘identification of the dictates of due process generally requires consideration of (1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action, (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards, (3) the dignitary interest in informing individuals of the nature, grounds and consequences of the action and in enabling them to present their side of the story before a responsible governmental official, and (4) the governmental interest, including the

1988More specifically, “ ‘identification of the dictates of due process generally requires consideration of (1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action, (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards, (3) the dignitary interest in informing individuals of the nature, grounds and consequences of the action and in enabling them to present their side of the story before a responsible governmental official, and (4) the governmental interest, including the

2023(See Matter of Ellison (2016) 305 Kan. 519 , 531–532, 535 [adopting Barker test to evaluate delay of 1,705 days between probable cause hearing and trial under Kansas’s SVP Act]; Morel v. Wilkins (Fla. 2012) 84 So.3d 226, 246 [applying Barker to evaluate 10-year pretrial delay under Florida’s SVP Act]; cf. In re Commitment of Beyer (2006) 287 Wis.2d 1 , 25–31 [implicitly adopting Barker in evaluating due process violation for 22-month delay between filing of annual examination and probable cause hearing]; Com. v. Blake (2009) 454 Mass. 267 , 279–280 (conc. opn. of Ireland, J.) [discussing relev