substitute procedural requirement in Maine

2023Comm'n, 1998 ME 271 , | 15, 723 A.2d 412 ; see Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (“[T]he specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural

2021The Law Court's decision in Balian is based on the long established rules for deciding as applied procedural due process challenges, stating that: "[t]he United Sates Supreme Court has set forth three factors to assess whether the state violated an individual's right to due process: [f]irst, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function inv

2021The Law Court's decision in Balian is based on the long established rules for deciding as applied procedural due process challenges, stating that: "[t]he United Sates Supreme Court has set forth three factors to assess whether the state violated an individual's right to due process: [f]irst, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function inv

2021The Law Court's decision in Balian is based on the long established rules for deciding as applied procedural due process challenges, stating that: "[t]he United Sates Supreme Court has set forth three factors to assess whether the state violated an individual's right to due process: [f]irst, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function inv

2020Three factors must be considered in determining whether a due process violation occurred: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. 11 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 ; accord In re A.M., 2012 ME 118, ¶ 15 , 55 A.3d

1993In re Randy Scott B., 511 A.2d 450, 452-53 (Me.1986) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 , 96 S.Ct. 893, 902-03 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976)).

2000Balian, 1999 ME 8, ¶ 10 , 722 A.2d at 367 (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 , 96 S.Ct. 893 (1976)). [¶ 20] With respect to the first Mathews factor, Seider’s property interest in her professional license is at stake. 7 See Balian, 1999 ME 8, ¶ 11 , 722 A.2d at 367 ; (due process protections implicated in proceeding to take disciplinary action against doctor’s license); Board of Overseers of the Bar v. Lefebvre, 1998 ME 24, ¶ 15 , 707 A.2d 69, 73 (due process protections implicated in hearing to suspend attorney’s license). [¶ 21] With respect to the second Mathews factor, we have stated that “

2000Balian, 1999 ME 8, ¶ 10 , 722 A.2d at 367 (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 , 96 S.Ct. 893 (1976)). [¶ 20] With respect to the first Mathews factor, Seider’s property interest in her professional license is at stake. 7 See Balian, 1999 ME 8, ¶ 11 , 722 A.2d at 367 ; (due process protections implicated in proceeding to take disciplinary action against doctor’s license); Board of Overseers of the Bar v. Lefebvre, 1998 ME 24, ¶ 15 , 707 A.2d 69, 73 (due process protections implicated in hearing to suspend attorney’s license). [¶ 21] With respect to the second Mathews factor, we have stated that “

2020Three factors must be considered in determining whether a due process violation occurred: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. 11 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 ; accord In re A.M., 2012 ME 118, ¶ 15 , 55 A.3d

2020Three factors must be considered in determining whether a due process violation occurred: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. 11 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 ; accord In re A.M., 2012 ME 118, ¶ 15 , 55 A.3d

2020See Mehlhorn v. Derby, 2006 ME 110, ¶ 11 , 905 A.2d 290 . 14 We share the court’s “confiden[ce] that the Secretary of State and the Attorney General, both constitutional officers, will implement the Secretary’s procedure.” 22 interest, including the function involved and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.

2020See Mehlhorn v. Derby, 2006 ME 110, ¶ 11 , 905 A.2d 290 . 14 We share the court’s “confiden[ce] that the Secretary of State and the Attorney General, both constitutional officers, will implement the Secretary’s procedure.” 22 interest, including the function involved and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.

2017Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976); In re M.P., 2015 ME 138, ¶ 31 , 126 A.3d 718 ; Hale v. Petit, 438 A.2d 226, 231-32 (Me. 1981). [¶ 16] There is no dispute that declaring Beal’s property a dangerous building affects an important private property interest or that the Town has an interest in limiting use of or eliminating dangerous buildings.

2015Ed. 2d 18 , 96 S. Ct. 893 ( 1976), requires consideration ofthree distinct factors: "First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail." Wilkinson, 545 U.S. 209,224-225 (2005) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319

2015The Supreme Court has noted that notice of the factual grounds for action and an opportunity for rebuttal "are among the most important procedural mechanisms for purposes of avoiding erroneous deprivations." Wilkinson, 545 U.S. 209, 226 (2005).

2014The Eldridge factors assess: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. /d. at~ 26 (citing Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 355). "[W]hile persons imprisoned for crime enjoy many protections of the Constitutio

2012Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 , 96 S.Ct. 893 ; see In re Kristy Y., 2000 ME 98, ¶ 6 , 752 A.2d 166 . [¶ 16] “[A] parent of a child has a fundamental right to parent that child and to maintain a parental relationship free from state interference absent a court finding that the parent is, in some respect, unfit and State involvement in the parental relationship is necessary to avoid harm to the child.” In re Cody T., 2009 ME 95, ¶ 25 , 979 A.2d 81 .

2012Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 , 96 S.Ct. 893 ; see In re Kristy Y., 2000 ME 98, ¶ 6 , 752 A.2d 166 . [¶ 16] “[A] parent of a child has a fundamental right to parent that child and to maintain a parental relationship free from state interference absent a court finding that the parent is, in some respect, unfit and State involvement in the parental relationship is necessary to avoid harm to the child.” In re Cody T., 2009 ME 95, ¶ 25 , 979 A.2d 81 .

2012Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 , 96 S.Ct. 893 ; see In re Kristy Y., 2000 ME 98, ¶ 6 , 752 A.2d 166 . [¶ 16] “[A] parent of a child has a fundamental right to parent that child and to maintain a parental relationship free from state interference absent a court finding that the parent is, in some respect, unfit and State involvement in the parental relationship is necessary to avoid harm to the child.” In re Cody T., 2009 ME 95, ¶ 25 , 979 A.2d 81 .

2012Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 , 96 S.Ct. 893 ; see In re Kristy Y., 2000 ME 98, ¶ 6 , 752 A.2d 166 . [¶ 16] “[A] parent of a child has a fundamental right to parent that child and to maintain a parental relationship free from state interference absent a court finding that the parent is, in some respect, unfit and State involvement in the parental relationship is necessary to avoid harm to the child.” In re Cody T., 2009 ME 95, ¶ 25 , 979 A.2d 81 .

2001In re Heather C., 2000 ME 99, ¶ 22 , 751 A.2d 448, 454 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976)).

2001In re Heather C., 2000 ME 99, ¶ 22 , 751 A.2d 448, 454 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976)).

2000See In re Kafia M., 1999 ME 195, ¶ 21 , 742 A.2d 919, 926 (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35 , 96 S.Ct. 893 ). [Identification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the a

2000See In re Kafia M., 1999 ME 195, ¶ 21 , 742 A.2d 919, 926 (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35 , 96 S.Ct. 893 ). [Identification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the a

1999Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976); see also Fichter, 604 A.2d at 437 (Me.1992) (applying Eldridge factors to due process challenge to denial of permit by Board of Environmental Protection). [¶ 11] With respect to the first Eldridge factor, Balian’s property interest in his professional license and his financial resources are at stake. 6 See Lefebvre, 1998 ME 24, ¶ 15 , 707 A.2d 69, 73 (due process protections implicated in hearing to suspend attorney’s license); Board of Registration in Med. v. Fiorica, 488 A.2d 1371, 1375 (Me.1985) (due process prote

1999Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976); see also Fichter, 604 A.2d at 437 (Me.1992) (applying Eldridge factors to due process challenge to denial of permit by Board of Environmental Protection). [¶ 11] With respect to the first Eldridge factor, Balian's property interest in his professional license and his financial resources are at stake. [6] See Lefebvre, 1998 ME 24, ¶ 15 , 707 A.2d 69, 73 (due process protections implicated in hearing to suspend attorney's license); Board of Registration in Med. v. Fiorica, 488 A.2d 1371, 1375 (Me. 1985) (due process pr

1999Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976); see also Fichter, 604 A.2d at 437 (Me.1992) (applying Eldridge factors to due process challenge to denial of permit by Board of Environmental Protection). [¶ 11] With respect to the first Eldridge factor, Balian’s property interest in his professional license and his financial resources are at stake. 6 See Lefebvre, 1998 ME 24, ¶ 15 , 707 A.2d 69, 73 (due process protections implicated in hearing to suspend attorney’s license); Board of Registration in Med. v. Fiorica, 488 A.2d 1371, 1375 (Me.1985) (due process prote

1999Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976); see also Fichter, 604 A.2d at 437 (Me.1992) (applying Eldridge factors to due process challenge to denial of permit by Board of Environmental Protection). [¶ 11] With respect to the first Eldridge factor, Balian's property interest in his professional license and his financial resources are at stake. [6] See Lefebvre, 1998 ME 24, ¶ 15 , 707 A.2d 69, 73 (due process protections implicated in hearing to suspend attorney's license); Board of Registration in Med. v. Fiorica, 488 A.2d 1371, 1375 (Me. 1985) (due process pr

1992See also Porter v. Hoffman, 592 A.2d 482, 487 (Me.1991) (applies Eldridge factors to due process challenge of adoption proceedings); In re Charles Jason R., Jr., 572 A.2d 1080, 1081 (Me.1990) (applies Eldridge factors to challenged use of hearsay statements in child protection proceedings).

1992See also Porter v. Hoffman, 592 A.2d 482, 487 (Me.1991) (applies Eldridge factors to due process challenge of adoption proceedings); In re Charles Jason R., Jr., 572 A.2d 1080, 1081 (Me.1990) (applies Eldridge factors to challenged use of hearsay statements in child protection proceedings).