9 Utah opinions name it 2 courts 1995–2014 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
V-1 Oil Co. v. Department of Environmental Qualitygreen2 sentences2014Evaluating the requirements of due process in a particular context requires a balancing of three factors: "the private interest that will be affected by the official action"; "the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards"; and "the Government's interest, including the functions involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail." Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976); 2001Quality, 939 P.2d 1192, 1196 (Utah 1997) (quoting identical language). | 3 | 3 |
Mathews v. Eldridgegreen2 sentences2014Evaluating the requirements of due process in a particular context requires a balancing of three factors: "the private interest that will be affected by the official action"; "the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards"; and "the Government's interest, including the functions involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail." Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976); 2014Evaluating the requirements of due process in a particular context requires a balancing of three factors: "the private interest that will be affected by the official action"; "the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards"; and "the Government's interest, including the functions involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail." Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976); | 1 | 9 |
Color Country Management v. Labor Commissiongreen2 sentences2012Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976); see also Color Country Mgmt. v. Labor Comm'n, 2001 UT App 370, ¶ 34 , 38 P.3d 969 (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 , 96 S.Ct. 893 ), aff'd sub nom. 2012Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976); see also Color Country Mgmt. v. Labor Comm'n, 2001 UT App 370, ¶ 34 , 38 P.3d 969 (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 , 96 S.Ct. 893 ), aff'd sub nom. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Utah. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Morrissey v. Brewer
green
2 sentences2010In re Arnovick, 2002 UT 71, ¶ 16 , 52 P.3d 1246 (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 , 96 S.Ct. 893 ). ¶ 20 The United States Supreme Court has made clear that "`[d]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.'" Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334 , 96 S.Ct. 893 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 , 92 S.Ct. 2593 , 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972)). 2001In Smith , the Court stated: [The] "identification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail." Id. at 848-49 , 97 S.Ct. at 2112 (q | 2 | 2001–2010 |
Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform
green
2 sentences2001In Smith, the Court stated: [The] "identification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail." Id. at 848-49, 97 S.Ct. at 2112 (quo 2001In Smith , the Court stated: [The] "identification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail." Id. at 848-49 , 97 S.Ct. at 2112 (q | 2 | 2001–2001 |
Angel Investors, LLC v. Garrity
green
2 sentences2014An appellate court has "discretion to not address an inadequately briefed argument" that is "asserted without the support of legal reasoning or authority." See Angel Investors, LLC v. Garrity, 2009 UT 40, ¶¶ 35-36 , 216 P.3d 944 . 2014An appellate court has "discretion to not address an inadequately briefed argument" that is "asserted without the support of legal reasoning or authority." See Angel Investors, LLC v. Garrity, 2009 UT 40, ¶¶ 35-36 , 216 P.3d 944 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
In Re Arnovick
green
2 sentences2010In re Arnovick, 2002 UT 71, ¶ 16 , 52 P.3d 1246 (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 , 96 S.Ct. 893 ). ¶ 20 The United States Supreme Court has made clear that "`[d]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.'" Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334 , 96 S.Ct. 893 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 , 92 S.Ct. 2593 , 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972)). 2010In re Arnovick, 2002 UT 71, ¶ 16 , 52 P.3d 1246 (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 , 96 S.Ct. 893 ). ¶ 20 The United States Supreme Court has made clear that "`[d]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.'" Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334 , 96 S.Ct. 893 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 , 92 S.Ct. 2593 , 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972)). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.