substitute procedural requirement in District of Columbia

2024See id. at 282 (“The Mathews v. Eldridge test . . . is applied to the generality of cases; the fundamental fairness of a particular procedure does not turn on the result obtained sufficient: (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action,” (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value . . . of additional or substitute procedural safeguards,” and (3) “the [g]overnment’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requiremen

2018We employ the test enunciated by the Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge to make a determination as to whether these safeguards built into the District's registration process are sufficient to protect the C.s' procedural due process rights: First , the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second , the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally , the [g]overnment's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative

2024See id. at 282 (“The Mathews v. Eldridge test . . . is applied to the generality of cases; the fundamental fairness of a particular procedure does not turn on the result obtained sufficient: (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action,” (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value . . . of additional or substitute procedural safeguards,” and (3) “the [g]overnment’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requiremen

2011The balancing test adopted in Mathews v. Eldridge “is applied to the generality of cases; the fundamental fairness of a particular procedure does not turn on the result obtained in any individual case.” Donnelly Associates v. District of Columbia Historic Preservation Review Board, 520 A.2d 270, 282 (D.C.1987) (emphasis added) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

1983Id. at 557 , 94 S.Ct. at 2975. [11] The government actually filed a motion to set a trial date which the court treated under the circumstances as a motion to reinstate. [12] The Court in Mathews v. Eldridge, supra, 424 U.S. at 335 , 96 S.Ct. at 903 , stated: [I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute

1983Id. at 557 , 94 S.Ct. at 2975. [11] The government actually filed a motion to set a trial date which the court treated under the circumstances as a motion to reinstate. [12] The Court in Mathews v. Eldridge, supra, 424 U.S. at 335 , 96 S.Ct. at 903 , stated: [I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute

2018However, “reputation alone, apart from some more tangible interests such as employment, is” insufficient by itself “to invoke the procedural protection of the Due Process Clause.” Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976). 21 and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976) (emphasis added).

1981See, e. g., Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, 397 U.S. at 263-271 , 90 S.Ct. at 1018-1022.

1978See, e. g., Goldberg v. Kelly, supra [ 397 U.S. 254 ], at 263-71, 90 S.Ct. 1011 , 25 L.Ed.2d 287 . [Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976).] See also Board of Curators of University of Missouri v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 , 98 S.Ct. 948, 958 , 55 L.Ed.2d 124 (1978) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

1978See, e. g., Goldberg v. Kelly, supra [ 397 U.S. 254 ], at 263-71, 90 S.Ct. 1011 , 25 L.Ed.2d 287 . [Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976).] See also Board of Curators of University of Missouri v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 , 98 S.Ct. 948, 958 , 55 L.Ed.2d 124 (1978) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

1978See, e. g., Goldberg v. Kelly, supra [ 397 U.S. 254 ], at 263-71, 90 S.Ct. 1011 , 25 L.Ed.2d 287 . [Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976).] See also Board of Curators of University of Missouri v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 , 98 S.Ct. 948, 958 , 55 L.Ed.2d 124 (1978) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

1978See, e. g., Goldberg v. Kelly, supra [ 397 U.S. 254 ], at 263-71, 90 S.Ct. 1011 , 25 L.Ed.2d 287 . [Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976).] See also Board of Curators of University of Missouri v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 , 98 S.Ct. 948, 958 , 55 L.Ed.2d 124 (1978) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).