substitute procedural requirement in West Virginia

2002In syllabus point five of Waite v. Civil Service Commission, 161 W.Va. 154 , 241 S.E.2d 164 (1977), this Court explained: The extent of due process protection affordable for a property interest requires consideration of three distinct factors: first, the private interests that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of a property interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administra

2002In syllabus point five of Waite v. Civil Service Commission, 161 W.Va. 154 , 241 S.E.2d 164 (1977), this Court explained: The extent of due process protection affordable for a property interest requires consideration of three distinct factors: first, the private interests that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of a property interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administra

1997Bowen v. Flowers, 155 W.Va. 389 , 184 S.E.2d 611 (1971). 4 The Supreme Court of the United States has outlined the following principles which must be considered when determining what procedural protections must constitutionally be afforded: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burde

1997Bowen v. Flowers, 155 W.Va. 389 , 184 S.E.2d 611 (1971). 4 The Supreme Court of the United States has outlined the following principles which must be considered when determining what procedural protections must constitutionally be afforded: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burde

1996McLendon v. Morton, 162 W.Va. 431 , 249 S.E.2d 919 (1978), is determined as follows: “The extent of due process protection affordable for a property interest requires consideration of three distinct factors: first, the private interests that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of a property interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or

1996McLendon v. Morton, 162 W.Va. 431 , 249 S.E.2d 919 (1978), is determined as follows: “The extent of due process protection affordable for a property interest requires consideration of three distinct factors: first, the private interests that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of a property interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or

1994In Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 , 105 S.Ct. 1487 , 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985), the Supreme Court addressed substantially the same factors with regard to the right of a pre-termination hearing.

1994In Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 , 105 S.Ct. 1487 , 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985), the Supreme Court addressed substantially the same factors with regard to the right of a pre-termination hearing.

1988But when we deal with a massive benefits program provided by Congress in which 800,000 claims per year are decided by 58 regional offices, and 36,000 claims are appealed to the BVA, it is simply not the sort of evidence that will permit a conclusion that the entire system is operated contrary to its governing regulations." 473 U.S. at 324 n. 11, 105 S.Ct. at 3191 n. 11, 87 L.Ed.2d at 235 n. 11.

1988But when we deal with a massive benefits program provided by Congress in which 800,000 claims per year are decided by 58 regional offices, and 36,000 claims are appealed to the BVA, it is simply not the sort of evidence that will permit a conclusion that the entire system is operated contrary to its governing regulations." 473 U.S. at 324 n. 11, 105 S.Ct. at 3191 n. 11, 87 L.Ed.2d at 235 n. 11.

1979Hawks v. Lazaro, W.Va., 202 S.E.2d 109 (1974), we considered the mental health law existing at that time, and found that it did not comport with the due process standards of Article III, Section 10.

1979Hawks v. Lazaro, _ W.Va. _, 202 S.E.2d 109 (1974), we considered the mental health law existing at that time, and found that it did not comport with the due process standards of Article III, Section 10.

1978Va. _, 233 S.E.2d 411 (1977), where, in the pertinent part of Syllabus Point 2, we stated: “First, the more valuable the right sought to be deprived, the more safeguards will be interposed.