substitute procedural requirement (Kansas) · Go Syfert
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substitute procedural requirement in Kansas

11 Kansas opinions name it 2 courts 1988–2024 2 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Kansas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (0)

CaseFollowedCited
No positive-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kansas.

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kansas. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (7)

CaseCitedYears
Mathews v. Eldridge green
scotus · 1976
2 sentences

2024The Mathews factors are: "First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative 9 burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail." Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 .

2024Factor 3: State Interests Finally, courts must consider the "Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail." Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 .

91988–2024
In Re JLD green
kanctapp · 1990
2 sentences

2011In re J.L.D., 14 Kan.App.2d 487, 490 , 794 P.2d 319 (1990), this court stated: "When the State seeks to terminate the relationship between a parent and child, it must do so by fundamentally fair procedures that meet the requisites of due process." First, we must consider "the private interests that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interests through the procedures used and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and, finally, the government's interest, including the function involved and the fisc

2011In re J.L.D., 14 Kan.App.2d 487, 490 , 794 P.2d 319 (1990), this court stated: "When the State seeks to terminate the relationship between a parent and child, it must do so by fundamentally fair procedures that meet the requisites of due process." First, we must consider "the private interests that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interests through the procedures used and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and, finally, the government's interest, including the function involved and the fisc

22011–2011
Dixon v. Love green
scotus · 1977
2 sentences

1988Ed. 2d 18 , 96 S. Ct. 893 (1976), the United States Supreme Court set forth the factors which must be considered: ‘First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures *215 used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.’ “In applying the Eldridge factors, the U. S. S

1988Ed. 2d 18 , 96 S. Ct. 893 (1976), the United States Supreme Court set forth the factors which must be considered: ‘First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures *215 used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.’ “In applying the Eldridge factors, the U. S. S

21988–1997
Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs. of Durham Cty. green
scotus · 1981
2 sentences

1990In Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 27-31 , 68 L.Ed.2d 640 , 101 S.Ct. 2153 (1981), the Mathews criteria were used to determine if an indigent parent was entitled to counsel to satisfy due process.

1990In Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 27-31 , 68 L.Ed.2d 640 , 101 S.Ct. 2153 (1981), the Mathews criteria were used to determine if an indigent parent was entitled to counsel to satisfy due process.

21990–1990
Santosky v. Kramer green
scotus · 1982
1 sentence

2024In Santosky, the United States Supreme Court explained: "[T]wo state interests are at stake in parental rights termination proceedings—a parens patriae interest in preserving and promoting the welfare of the child and a fiscal and administrative interest in reducing the cost and burden of such proceedings." Santosky, 455 U.S. at 766 .

12024–2024
Patterson v. New York green
scotus · 1977
2 sentences

2021The Court of Appeals did not explain its rationale for applying this balancing test, and neither party discusses which framework should apply here. 6 The other framework applies mainly in criminal cases and was set out by the United States Supreme Court in Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 , 97 S. Ct. 2319 , 53 L.

2021The Court of Appeals did not explain its rationale for applying this balancing test, and neither party discusses which framework should apply here. 6 The other framework applies mainly in criminal cases and was set out by the United States Supreme Court in Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 , 97 S. Ct. 2319 , 53 L.

12021–2021
MacKey v. Montrym green
scotus · 1979
2 sentences

1997Ed. 2d 18 , 96 S. Ct. 893 (1976): “[D]ue process [analysis] generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; *804 and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” The Eldridge test has been applied in det

1997Ed. 2d 18 , 96 S. Ct. 893 (1976): “[D]ue process [analysis] generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; *804 and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” The Eldridge test has been applied in det

11997–1997

Statutes the citing opinions construe

KS § K.S.A. § 38-2269 (3) KS § K.S.A. § 8-1001 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

CA 104 (1978–2025) IL 83 (1979–2025) TX 68 (1987–2025) WA 66 (1979–2025) CT 52 (1979–2025) NJ 50 (1978–2026) MI 46 (1978–2026) OH 40 (1981–2026) ME 38 (1981–2023) MN 35 (1983–2026) PA 33 (1976–2025) ID 32 (1980–2026) TN 32 (1993–2024) MD 31 (1977–2023) NY 31 (1978–2025) OR 29 (1976–2026) IA 23 (1979–2023) NM 23 (1983–2025) MA 22 (1982–2023) LA 22 (1985–2022) NC 18 (1981–2026) NH 17 (1980–2021) WI 16 (1978–2024) DC 16 (1978–2024) ND 15 (1988–2022) AZ 13 (1983–2025) CO 12 (1977–2022) WV 12 (1978–2002) KS 11 (1988–2024) IN 11 (1980–2020) AK 11 (1983–2024) UT 9 (1995–2014) OK 8 (1996–2018) NE 7 (1990–2021) AR 7 (1987–2012) FL 7 (1986–2024) RI 7 (1990–2015) VA 6 (1992–2025) DE 5 (1989–2019) KY 5 (2005–2024) HI 5 (1996–2023) MO 5 (1986–2019) MT 4 (1984–2016) NV 4 (1987–2021) VT 3 (2015–2021) GA 3 (1986–2008) SD 2 (1986–2011) SC 2 (1996–1998)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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