damages claim in Florida

2002See Marinelli, 608 So.2d at 834 (concluding that the aggravation instruction which allows a jury to assess the damages based on any aggravation of the preexisting condition is insufficient against any risk of confusion without also reading the concurrent cause instruction). 649 So.2d at 887 . [9] See also Jost v. Ahmad, 730 So.2d 708, 711 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1998) ("Based on the record facts, we agree that the trial court should give the `aggravation' instruction in conjunction with the `concurrent cause' instruction if requested by any party."), review denied, 743 So.2d 508 (Fla.1999); Esancy (hold

1995See Marinelli, 608 So.2d at 834 (concluding that the aggravation instruction which allows a jury to assess the damages based on any aggravation of the preexisting condition is insufficient against any risk of confusion without also reading the concurrent cause instruction).

2026See, e.g., Mitchell v. Northstar Panama City Beach, Inc., 171 So. 3d 833 , 833–34 (Fla. 5 1st DCA 2015); Rodriguez v. Thompson, 235 So. 3d 986, 988 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017); Cellular Warehouse, 957 So. 2d at 665 ; Viets v. Am.

2022See Cellular Warehouse, Inc. v. GH Cellular, LLC, 957 So. 2d 662 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (finding that a damages claim for failure to make payments under the terms of a contract was liquidated whereas damages for lost business profits, stolen assets, and operating expenses were 8 unliquidated since they were not established by the parties’ agreement and instead required testimony to ascertain the amount).

2026See, e.g., Mitchell v. Northstar Panama City Beach, Inc., 171 So. 3d 833 , 833–34 (Fla. 5 1st DCA 2015); Rodriguez v. Thompson, 235 So. 3d 986, 988 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017); Cellular Warehouse, 957 So. 2d at 665 ; Viets v. Am.

2026See, e.g., Mitchell v. Northstar Panama City Beach, Inc., 171 So. 3d 833 , 833–34 (Fla. 5 1st DCA 2015); Rodriguez v. Thompson, 235 So. 3d 986, 988 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017); Cellular Warehouse, 957 So. 2d at 665 ; Viets v. Am.

2025See id. (“[L]iquidated damages may exist in a contractual setting ‘when a specific sum of money has been expressly stipulated or agreed to by the parties for recovery by either party following a breach of the contract by the other.’”) (citation omitted).

2025Haywood responds that Cornelius’s offer of judgment is unenforceable under section 768.79 because the statute applies only to “civil action[s] for damages.” “We have de novo review of orders concerning section 768.79 and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442.” Lyons v. Chamoun, 96 So. 3d 456, 457 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012).

2024It is this "verdict amount" that can be "includ[ed] . . . in the final judgment" as part of the approved "procedure" of "entering the amount of the jury verdict in the final judgment and retaining jurisdiction to consider an amendment of the pleadings to add the bad faith claim." Id. at 1219, 1230 (emphasis added) (explaining that this "approach . . . appropriately addresses how the parties can review that jury determination of the extent of the damages for error prior to it being used in the subsequent bad faith litigation as an element of damages" (emphasis added)).

2022See Volusia County v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So. 2d 126, 130 (Fla. 2000) (standard of appellate review 17 applicable to grant of summary judgment is de novo); Headley, 215 So. 3d at 5 (“Issues of statutory interpretation are subject to de novo review.”).

2022More specifically, the defendants argued: Florida follows the common-law rule that “a party must have been legally married to the injured person at the time of the injury in order to assert a claim for loss of consortium.” Fullerton v. Hosp[.] Corp[.] of Am[.], 660 So. 2d 389, 390 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (citing Tremblay v. Carter, 390 So. 2d 816, 817 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980) (holding that when an accident occurs prior to the existence of a relationship of husband and wife, a person cannot acquire the right to claim a loss of consortium when a person subsequently marries the injured party)); Kelly v. Ge

2022More specifically, the defendants argued: Florida follows the common-law rule that “a party must have been legally married to the injured person at the time of the injury in order to assert a claim for loss of consortium.” Fullerton v. Hosp[.] Corp[.] of Am[.], 660 So. 2d 389, 390 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (citing Tremblay v. Carter, 390 So. 2d 816, 817 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980) (holding that when an accident occurs prior to the existence of a relationship of husband and wife, a person cannot acquire the right to claim a loss of consortium when a person subsequently marries the injured party)); Kelly v. Ge

2022See Mercantil Bank, N.A. v. Pazmino, 262 So. 3d 826, 828 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019) (“We review a judgment on the pleadings de novo.”); Headley v. City of Miami, 215 So. 3d 1, 5 (Fla. 2017) (“Issues of statutory interpretation are subject to de novo review.”).

2022See Mercantil Bank, N.A. v. Pazmino, 262 So. 3d 826, 828 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019) (“We review a judgment on the pleadings de novo.”); Headley v. City of Miami, 215 So. 3d 1, 5 (Fla. 2017) (“Issues of statutory interpretation are subject to de novo review.”).

2022See Volusia County v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So. 2d 126, 130 (Fla. 2000) (standard of appellate review 17 applicable to grant of summary judgment is de novo); Headley, 215 So. 3d at 5 (“Issues of statutory interpretation are subject to de novo review.”).

2013DuPont De Nemours & Co., 761 So.2d 306, 313 (Fla.2000) (“A damages claim ... affirms the contract, and thus ratifies the terms of the agreement.”).

2008P. Forms 1.940 (ejectment complaint), 1.938 (unlawful-detainer complaint), 1.947 (eviction complaint); Bailey v. Bailey, 114 So.2d 804, 805 (Fla. 1st DCA 1959) (outlining the elements of an ejectment claim); Partridge v. Partridge, 940 So.2d 611 , 613 n. 2 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (substantially similar); Glover, supra §§ 4.03-.05 (describing ejectment, unlawful detainer, and tenant removal). [8] Notwithstanding its apparent ability to file an unlawful-detainer or tenant-removal claim in county court, V-Strategic did not do so and, instead, specifically designated the claim and filed papers as a su

2006In the seminal case of Calumet Co. v. Oil City Corp., 114 Fla. 531 , 154 So. 141, 142 (1934), the Florida Supreme Court explained: Where the main object of a contract is to secure the development of land by the drilling of test well (sic) for oil and gas on it, to the end that it may be determined whether the land contains oil or gas, and where the nature and character of the drilling to be done is left almost entirely to the good faith, judgment, discretion, and skill of the one undertaking to drill the test wells contracted for, so that the performance of the contract requires some personal

2006In the seminal case of Calumet Co. v. Oil City Corp., 114 Fla. 531 , 154 So. 141, 142 (1934), the Florida Supreme Court explained: Where the main object of a contract is to secure the development of land by the drilling of test well (sic) for oil and gas on it, to the end that it may be determined whether the land contains oil or gas, and where the nature and character of the drilling to be done is left almost entirely to the good faith, judgment, discretion, and skill of the one undertaking to drill the test wells contracted for, so that the performance of the contract requires some personal

2005See, e.g., Stanford Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Frazier, 158 Fla. 135 , 27 So.2d 906 (1946); Pidcock-Jones Co. v. Watson, 141 Fla. 376 , 193 So. 305 (1940). [2] Given that some evidence relevant to joint life expectancies is necessary to a damages claim under section 768.21(2), the remaining inquiry concerns whether substantial competent evidence in this regard was presented by the plaintiff.

2005See, e.g., Stanford Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Frazier, 158 Fla. 135 , 27 So.2d 906 (1946); Pidcock-Jones Co. v. Watson, 141 Fla. 376 , 193 So. 305 (1940). [2] Given that some evidence relevant to joint life expectancies is necessary to a damages claim under section 768.21(2), the remaining inquiry concerns whether substantial competent evidence in this regard was presented by the plaintiff.

2005See Noack v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 859 So.2d 608 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003).

2003In Morgan v. Campbell, 816 So.2d 251, 253-54 (Fla. 2d DCA *816 2002), dismissal was appropriate where the plaintiff lied about prior injuries and treatment.

2003Similarly, in Savino v. Florida Drive In Theatre Management, Inc., 697 So.2d 1011, 1012 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), we held that the trial court properly dismissed a claim where the plaintiff lied in discovery about his educational background, a matter critical to the damages claim.

2003In re Polypropylene Carpet Antitrust Litigation, 178 F.R.D. 603, 618 (N.D.Ga.1997)(emphasis deleted).

2002See Marinelli, 608 So.2d at 834 (concluding that the aggravation instruction which allows a jury to assess the damages based on any aggravation of the preexisting condition is insufficient against any risk of confusion without also reading the concurrent cause instruction). 649 So.2d at 887 . [9] See also Jost v. Ahmad, 730 So.2d 708, 711 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1998) ("Based on the record facts, we agree that the trial court should give the `aggravation' instruction in conjunction with the `concurrent cause' instruction if requested by any party."), review denied, 743 So.2d 508 (Fla.1999); Esancy (hold