19 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1978–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Melosh v. Meloshgreen2 sentences2001See Melosh v. Melosh, 125 N.J. 2001See Melosh v. Melosh, 125 N.J. | 4 | 4 |
Picogna v. Board of Education of Township of Cherry Hillgreen1 sentence2024See, e.g., id. at 399 ; Hill v. N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Travellers International, A.G. And Windsor, Inc. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.green1 sentence2022Under New York law, “the new business rule is not a per se rule forbidding the award of lost profits damages to new businesses, but rather an evidentiary rule that creates a higher ‘level of proof needed to achieve reasonable certainty as to the amount of damages.’” Int’l Telepassport Corp. v. USFI, Inc., 89 F.3d 82 , 86 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting Travellers Int’l, A.G. v. Trans World Airlines, 41 F.3d 1570, 1579 (2d Cir. 1994)); see also Blinds to Go (U.S.) Inc., v. Times Plaza Dev., L.P., 931 N.Y.S.2d 105 , 108 (App. Div. 2011) (noting that “[i]n the case of a ‘new business,’ there generally ‘d | 1 | 1 |
Thomsen v. Mercer-Charlesgreen2 sentences2013Ibid. ■ Finding the relevant statutory language ambiguous, the Court said: Despite the Association’s protestations to the contrary, the language at issue is susceptible to more than one interpretation____The issue is whether the setoff applies to the entire amount payable on the person’s loss, thereby reducing or perhaps eliminating the person’s claim of damages before he or she need turn to the Association for satisfaction of the remainder, or whether the solvent insurer’s payment is applied directly to the statutory maximum that the Association may pay on a “covered claim.” Under the latter 2013Thus, the latter interpretation substantially minimizes tort victims’ ability to recover them damages. [Id. at 207-08, 901 A.2d 303 ], In analyzing the question, the Court turned to the Act’s legislative history, remedial purpose, and precedents from other jurisdictions interpreting comparable sections of their version of the law, which is based on the Post-Assessment Property and Liability Insurance Guaranty Association Model Act (Model Act) drafted by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC). | 1 | 1 |
Ocasio v. Amtrakgreen2 sentences2006See Ocasio [ v. Amtrak, 299 N.J.Super. 139, 160 , 690 A. 2d 682 (App.Div.1997) (evidence of drug abuse highly probative of damages claim)]. 2006See Ocasio [ v. Amtrak, 299 N.J.Super. 139, 160 , 690 A. 2d 682 (App.Div.1997) (evidence of drug abuse highly probative of damages claim)]. | 1 | 1 |
Jzm v. Smmgreen2 sentences1995NOTES [1] This opinion supersedes the decision delivered from the Bench on October 23, 1995. [2] DiTrolio v. Antiles, 142 N.J. 253 , 662 A. 2d 494 (1995); Circle Chevrolet v. Giordano, Halleran & Ciesla, 142 N.J. 280 , 662 A. 2d 509 (1995); Mystic Isle Development Corp. v. Perskie & Nehmad, 142 N.J. 310 , 662 A. 2d 523 (1995); Mortgageling Corp. v. Commonwealth Land Title, 142 N.J. 336 , 662 A. 2d 536 (1995). [3] See, Circle Chevrolet, supra, and Mystic Isle, supra . [4] Plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint to include a damages claim, which brought the matter to this present juncture, was 1995Super. at 646, 545 A. 2d 249 . | 1 | 1 |
Kuzmiak v. Brookchestergreen1 sentence1978See Kuzmiak v. Brookchester, 33 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Canesi Ex Rel. Canesi v. Wilson
green
2 sentences2005Howard, supra, 172 N.J. at 549 , 800 A.2d 73 (citing Canesi, supra, 158 N.J. at 505 , 730 A.2d 805 ). 2005Howard, supra, 172 N.J. at 549 , 800 A.2d 73 (citing Canesi, supra, 158 N.J. at 505 , 730 A.2d 805 ). | 2 | 2002–2005 |
Teilhaber v. Greene
green
2 sentences2005More specifically, [t]o establish a prima facie ease for medical negligence premised on a theory of liability for lack of informed consent, a plaintiff must show “(1) the physician failed to comply with the [reasonably-prudent-patient] standard for disclosure; (2) the undisclosed risk occurred and harmed the plaintiff; (3) a reasonable person under the circumstances would not have consented and submitted to the operation or surgical procedure had he or she been so informed; and (4) the operation or surgical procedure was a proximate cause of plaintiffs injuries.” [ Howard, supra, 172 N.J. at 5 2005More specifically, [t]o establish a prima facie ease for medical negligence premised on a theory of liability for lack of informed consent, a plaintiff must show “(1) the physician failed to comply with the [reasonably-prudent-patient] standard for disclosure; (2) the undisclosed risk occurred and harmed the plaintiff; (3) a reasonable person under the circumstances would not have consented and submitted to the operation or surgical procedure had he or she been so informed; and (4) the operation or surgical procedure was a proximate cause of plaintiffs injuries.” [ Howard, supra, 172 N.J. at 5 | 2 | 2002–2005 |
Zirger v. General Accident Insurance
green
2 sentences2002Moreover, we said that GA “could not be collaterally estopped from relitigating the damages question because its interests and Filsaime’s were not sufficiently similar to conclude that Filsaime’s litigation of the damages claim provided adequate representation of [GA]’s interest in minimizing its ultimate liability under the UIM endorsement.” Ibid. 2002Moreover, we said that GA "could not be collaterally estopped from relitigating the damages question because its interests and Filsaime's were not sufficiently similar to conclude that Filsaime's litigation of the damages claim provided adequate representation of [GA]'s interest in minimizing its ultimate liability under the UIM endorsement." Ibid. | 2 | 2002–2002 |
International Telepassport Corporation v. Usfi, Inc.
green
1 sentence2022Under New York law, “the new business rule is not a per se rule forbidding the award of lost profits damages to new businesses, but rather an evidentiary rule that creates a higher ‘level of proof needed to achieve reasonable certainty as to the amount of damages.’” Int’l Telepassport Corp. v. USFI, Inc., 89 F.3d 82 , 86 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting Travellers Int’l, A.G. v. Trans World Airlines, 41 F.3d 1570, 1579 (2d Cir. 1994)); see also Blinds to Go (U.S.) Inc., v. Times Plaza Dev., L.P., 931 N.Y.S.2d 105 , 108 (App. Div. 2011) (noting that “[i]n the case of a ‘new business,’ there generally ‘d | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Mindgames, Inc. v. Western Publishing Company, Inc.
green
1 sentence2022Nonetheless, “[a]brogation of the ‘new business’ rule does not produce a free-for-all”; the business’s inexperience “enters into judicial consideration of the damages claim not as a rule but as a factor in applying the standard.” Id. at 658 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Cummings
green
2 sentences2011Cf. State v. Cummings, 321 N.J.Super. 154, 170 , 728 A. 2d 307 (App.Div.) (in the context of *963 a petition for post-conviction relief, holding that a petitioner cannot rely on bald assertions, but must support his claims with certifications, affidavits, or other proof), certif. denied, 162 N.J. 199 , 743 A. 2d 852 (1999). 2011Cf. State v. Cummings, 321 N.J.Super. 154, 170 , 728 A. 2d 307 (App.Div.) (in the context of *963 a petition for post-conviction relief, holding that a petitioner cannot rely on bald assertions, but must support his claims with certifications, affidavits, or other proof), certif. denied, 162 N.J. 199 , 743 A. 2d 852 (1999). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Gerbec v. United States
green
1 sentence2005Because the Master had included non-physical personal injury type losses as part of the damages claim, the court in Gerbec, supra, remanded the matter to determine what amounts, if any, might be excludable as income under I.R.C. § 104(a)(2). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Howard v. University of Medicine & Dentistry
green
2 sentences2005More specifically, [t]o establish a prima facie ease for medical negligence premised on a theory of liability for lack of informed consent, a plaintiff must show “(1) the physician failed to comply with the [reasonably-prudent-patient] standard for disclosure; (2) the undisclosed risk occurred and harmed the plaintiff; (3) a reasonable person under the circumstances would not have consented and submitted to the operation or surgical procedure had he or she been so informed; and (4) the operation or surgical procedure was a proximate cause of plaintiffs injuries.” [ Howard, supra, 172 N.J. at 5 2005More specifically, [t]o establish a prima facie ease for medical negligence premised on a theory of liability for lack of informed consent, a plaintiff must show “(1) the physician failed to comply with the [reasonably-prudent-patient] standard for disclosure; (2) the undisclosed risk occurred and harmed the plaintiff; (3) a reasonable person under the circumstances would not have consented and submitted to the operation or surgical procedure had he or she been so informed; and (4) the operation or surgical procedure was a proximate cause of plaintiffs injuries.” [ Howard, supra, 172 N.J. at 5 | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Ostrowski v. Azzara
green
2 sentences2000Next, relying on Ostrowski v. Azzara, 111 N.J. 429 , 443 n. 5, 545 A. 2d 148 (1988), the judge further noted that "comparative negligence is generally viewed as a liability doctrine rather than a damages doctrine." He also found that because the decedent traveled to New Jersey at least two times a week, her presence in this state was not fortuitous. 2000Next, relying on Ostrowski v. Azzara, 111 N.J. 429 , 443 n. 5, 545 A. 2d 148 (1988), the judge further noted that "comparative negligence is generally viewed as a liability doctrine rather than a damages doctrine." He also found that because the decedent traveled to New Jersey at least two times a week, her presence in this state was not fortuitous. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
State v. Stevens
green
2 sentences1997Cf. State v. Stevens, 115 N.J. 289, 308 , 558 A.2d 833 (1989) (quoting State v. West, 29 N.J. 327, 335 , 149 A.2d 217 (1959)) (“That evidence is shrouded with unsavory implications is no reason for exclusion when it is a significant part of the proof’); State v. Radziwil, 235 N.J.Super. 557, 566-67 , 563 A.2d 856 (App.Div.1989) (“[WJhile the evidence of defendant’s habitual intoxication [whenever he went to a particular bar] undoubtedly cast him in a bad light in the eyes of the jury, this prejudice to defendant did not outweigh the probative value of the evidence [to show that defendant was i 1997Cf. State v. Stevens, 115 N.J. 289, 308 , 558 A.2d 833 (1989) (quoting State v. West, 29 N.J. 327, 335 , 149 A.2d 217 (1959)) (“That evidence is shrouded with unsavory implications is no reason for exclusion when it is a significant part of the proof’); State v. Radziwil, 235 N.J.Super. 557, 566-67 , 563 A.2d 856 (App.Div.1989) (“[WJhile the evidence of defendant’s habitual intoxication [whenever he went to a particular bar] undoubtedly cast him in a bad light in the eyes of the jury, this prejudice to defendant did not outweigh the probative value of the evidence [to show that defendant was i | 1 | 1997–1997 |
STATE BY COMMISSIONER OF TRANSP. v. Stulman
green
2 sentences1997In State v. Stulman, 136 N.J.Super. 148 , 345 A.2d 329 (App.Div.1975), the court specifically considered a damages claim based on the loss of visibility. 1997In State v. Stulman, 136 N.J.Super. 148 , 345 A.2d 329 (App.Div.1975), the court specifically considered a damages claim based on the loss of visibility. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
State v. West
green
2 sentences1997Cf. State v. Stevens, 115 N.J. 289, 308 , 558 A.2d 833 (1989) (quoting State v. West, 29 N.J. 327, 335 , 149 A.2d 217 (1959)) (“That evidence is shrouded with unsavory implications is no reason for exclusion when it is a significant part of the proof’); State v. Radziwil, 235 N.J.Super. 557, 566-67 , 563 A.2d 856 (App.Div.1989) (“[WJhile the evidence of defendant’s habitual intoxication [whenever he went to a particular bar] undoubtedly cast him in a bad light in the eyes of the jury, this prejudice to defendant did not outweigh the probative value of the evidence [to show that defendant was i 1997Cf. State v. Stevens, 115 N.J. 289, 308 , 558 A.2d 833 (1989) (quoting State v. West, 29 N.J. 327, 335 , 149 A.2d 217 (1959)) (“That evidence is shrouded with unsavory implications is no reason for exclusion when it is a significant part of the proof’); State v. Radziwil, 235 N.J.Super. 557, 566-67 , 563 A.2d 856 (App.Div.1989) (“[WJhile the evidence of defendant’s habitual intoxication [whenever he went to a particular bar] undoubtedly cast him in a bad light in the eyes of the jury, this prejudice to defendant did not outweigh the probative value of the evidence [to show that defendant was i | 1 | 1997–1997 |
State v. Radziwil
green
2 sentences1997Cf. State v. Stevens, 115 N.J. 289, 308 , 558 A.2d 833 (1989) (quoting State v. West, 29 N.J. 327, 335 , 149 A.2d 217 (1959)) (“That evidence is shrouded with unsavory implications is no reason for exclusion when it is a significant part of the proof’); State v. Radziwil, 235 N.J.Super. 557, 566-67 , 563 A.2d 856 (App.Div.1989) (“[WJhile the evidence of defendant’s habitual intoxication [whenever he went to a particular bar] undoubtedly cast him in a bad light in the eyes of the jury, this prejudice to defendant did not outweigh the probative value of the evidence [to show that defendant was i 1997Cf. State v. Stevens, 115 N.J. 289, 308 , 558 A.2d 833 (1989) (quoting State v. West, 29 N.J. 327, 335 , 149 A.2d 217 (1959)) (“That evidence is shrouded with unsavory implications is no reason for exclusion when it is a significant part of the proof’); State v. Radziwil, 235 N.J.Super. 557, 566-67 , 563 A.2d 856 (App.Div.1989) (“[WJhile the evidence of defendant’s habitual intoxication [whenever he went to a particular bar] undoubtedly cast him in a bad light in the eyes of the jury, this prejudice to defendant did not outweigh the probative value of the evidence [to show that defendant was i | 1 | 1997–1997 |
State v. Radziwil
green
2 sentences1997Cf. State v. Stevens, 115 N.J. 289, 308 , 558 A.2d 833 (1989) (quoting State v. West, 29 N.J. 327, 335 , 149 A.2d 217 (1959)) (“That evidence is shrouded with unsavory implications is no reason for exclusion when it is a significant part of the proof’); State v. Radziwil, 235 N.J.Super. 557, 566-67 , 563 A.2d 856 (App.Div.1989) (“[WJhile the evidence of defendant’s habitual intoxication [whenever he went to a particular bar] undoubtedly cast him in a bad light in the eyes of the jury, this prejudice to defendant did not outweigh the probative value of the evidence [to show that defendant was i 1997Cf. State v. Stevens, 115 N.J. 289, 308 , 558 A.2d 833 (1989) (quoting State v. West, 29 N.J. 327, 335 , 149 A.2d 217 (1959)) (“That evidence is shrouded with unsavory implications is no reason for exclusion when it is a significant part of the proof’); State v. Radziwil, 235 N.J.Super. 557, 566-67 , 563 A.2d 856 (App.Div.1989) (“[WJhile the evidence of defendant’s habitual intoxication [whenever he went to a particular bar] undoubtedly cast him in a bad light in the eyes of the jury, this prejudice to defendant did not outweigh the probative value of the evidence [to show that defendant was i | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Mortgagelinq Corp. v. Commonwealth Land Title Insurance
green
2 sentences1995NOTES [1] This opinion supersedes the decision delivered from the Bench on October 23, 1995. [2] DiTrolio v. Antiles, 142 N.J. 253 , 662 A. 2d 494 (1995); Circle Chevrolet v. Giordano, Halleran & Ciesla, 142 N.J. 280 , 662 A. 2d 509 (1995); Mystic Isle Development Corp. v. Perskie & Nehmad, 142 N.J. 310 , 662 A. 2d 523 (1995); Mortgageling Corp. v. Commonwealth Land Title, 142 N.J. 336 , 662 A. 2d 536 (1995). [3] See, Circle Chevrolet, supra, and Mystic Isle, supra . [4] Plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint to include a damages claim, which brought the matter to this present juncture, was 1995NOTES [1] This opinion supersedes the decision delivered from the Bench on October 23, 1995. [2] DiTrolio v. Antiles, 142 N.J. 253 , 662 A. 2d 494 (1995); Circle Chevrolet v. Giordano, Halleran & Ciesla, 142 N.J. 280 , 662 A. 2d 509 (1995); Mystic Isle Development Corp. v. Perskie & Nehmad, 142 N.J. 310 , 662 A. 2d 523 (1995); Mortgageling Corp. v. Commonwealth Land Title, 142 N.J. 336 , 662 A. 2d 536 (1995). [3] See, Circle Chevrolet, supra, and Mystic Isle, supra . [4] Plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint to include a damages claim, which brought the matter to this present juncture, was | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Mystic Isle Development Corp. v. Perskie & Nehmad
green
2 sentences1995NOTES [1] This opinion supersedes the decision delivered from the Bench on October 23, 1995. [2] DiTrolio v. Antiles, 142 N.J. 253 , 662 A. 2d 494 (1995); Circle Chevrolet v. Giordano, Halleran & Ciesla, 142 N.J. 280 , 662 A. 2d 509 (1995); Mystic Isle Development Corp. v. Perskie & Nehmad, 142 N.J. 310 , 662 A. 2d 523 (1995); Mortgageling Corp. v. Commonwealth Land Title, 142 N.J. 336 , 662 A. 2d 536 (1995). [3] See, Circle Chevrolet, supra, and Mystic Isle, supra . [4] Plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint to include a damages claim, which brought the matter to this present juncture, was 1995NOTES [1] This opinion supersedes the decision delivered from the Bench on October 23, 1995. [2] DiTrolio v. Antiles, 142 N.J. 253 , 662 A. 2d 494 (1995); Circle Chevrolet v. Giordano, Halleran & Ciesla, 142 N.J. 280 , 662 A. 2d 509 (1995); Mystic Isle Development Corp. v. Perskie & Nehmad, 142 N.J. 310 , 662 A. 2d 523 (1995); Mortgageling Corp. v. Commonwealth Land Title, 142 N.J. 336 , 662 A. 2d 536 (1995). [3] See, Circle Chevrolet, supra, and Mystic Isle, supra . [4] Plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint to include a damages claim, which brought the matter to this present juncture, was | 1 | 1995–1995 |
DiTrolio v. Antiles
green
2 sentences1995NOTES [1] This opinion supersedes the decision delivered from the Bench on October 23, 1995. [2] DiTrolio v. Antiles, 142 N.J. 253 , 662 A. 2d 494 (1995); Circle Chevrolet v. Giordano, Halleran & Ciesla, 142 N.J. 280 , 662 A. 2d 509 (1995); Mystic Isle Development Corp. v. Perskie & Nehmad, 142 N.J. 310 , 662 A. 2d 523 (1995); Mortgageling Corp. v. Commonwealth Land Title, 142 N.J. 336 , 662 A. 2d 536 (1995). [3] See, Circle Chevrolet, supra, and Mystic Isle, supra . [4] Plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint to include a damages claim, which brought the matter to this present juncture, was 1995NOTES [1] This opinion supersedes the decision delivered from the Bench on October 23, 1995. [2] DiTrolio v. Antiles, 142 N.J. 253 , 662 A. 2d 494 (1995); Circle Chevrolet v. Giordano, Halleran & Ciesla, 142 N.J. 280 , 662 A. 2d 509 (1995); Mystic Isle Development Corp. v. Perskie & Nehmad, 142 N.J. 310 , 662 A. 2d 523 (1995); Mortgageling Corp. v. Commonwealth Land Title, 142 N.J. 336 , 662 A. 2d 536 (1995). [3] See, Circle Chevrolet, supra, and Mystic Isle, supra . [4] Plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint to include a damages claim, which brought the matter to this present juncture, was | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Circle Chevrolet Co. v. Giordano, Halleran & Ciesla
red
2 sentences1995NOTES [1] This opinion supersedes the decision delivered from the Bench on October 23, 1995. [2] DiTrolio v. Antiles, 142 N.J. 253 , 662 A. 2d 494 (1995); Circle Chevrolet v. Giordano, Halleran & Ciesla, 142 N.J. 280 , 662 A. 2d 509 (1995); Mystic Isle Development Corp. v. Perskie & Nehmad, 142 N.J. 310 , 662 A. 2d 523 (1995); Mortgageling Corp. v. Commonwealth Land Title, 142 N.J. 336 , 662 A. 2d 536 (1995). [3] See, Circle Chevrolet, supra, and Mystic Isle, supra . [4] Plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint to include a damages claim, which brought the matter to this present juncture, was 1995NOTES [1] This opinion supersedes the decision delivered from the Bench on October 23, 1995. [2] DiTrolio v. Antiles, 142 N.J. 253 , 662 A. 2d 494 (1995); Circle Chevrolet v. Giordano, Halleran & Ciesla, 142 N.J. 280 , 662 A. 2d 509 (1995); Mystic Isle Development Corp. v. Perskie & Nehmad, 142 N.J. 310 , 662 A. 2d 523 (1995); Mortgageling Corp. v. Commonwealth Land Title, 142 N.J. 336 , 662 A. 2d 536 (1995). [3] See, Circle Chevrolet, supra, and Mystic Isle, supra . [4] Plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint to include a damages claim, which brought the matter to this present juncture, was | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.