damages claim in California

2025(See Covalt, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 939 [award of damages based on the plaintiffs’ fear that electric and magnetic fields arising from powerlines would cause them physical harm “would be inconsistent with the [PUC’s] conclusion . . . that the available evidence does not support a reasonable belief that [such] fields present a substantial risk of physical harm” (italics omitted)].) We note that limitations on a public utility’s liability have long been upheld by courts.5 “Limitations on liability are properly included in tariffs as a subject clearly within the PUC’s regulatory powers. [Citatio

2025(See Covalt, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 939 [award of damages based on the plaintiffs’ fear that electric and magnetic fields arising from powerlines would cause them physical harm “would be inconsistent with the [PUC’s] conclusion . . . that the available evidence does not support a reasonable belief that [such] fields present a substantial risk of physical harm” (italics omitted)].) We note that limitations on a public utility’s liability have long been upheld by courts.5 “Limitations on liability are properly included in tariffs as a subject clearly within the PUC’s regulatory powers. [Citatio

2025(See Covalt, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 939 [award of damages based on the plaintiffs’ fear that electric and magnetic fields arising from powerlines would cause them physical harm “would be inconsistent with the [PUC’s] conclusion . . . that the available evidence does not support a reasonable belief that [such] fields present a substantial risk of physical harm” (italics omitted)].) We note that limitations on a public utility’s liability have long been upheld by courts.5 “Limitations on liability are properly included in tariffs as a subject clearly within the PUC’s regulatory powers. [Citatio

2025(See Covalt, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 939 [award of damages based on the plaintiffs’ fear that electric and magnetic fields arising from powerlines would cause them physical harm “would be inconsistent with the [PUC’s] conclusion . . . that the available evidence does not support a reasonable belief that [such] fields present a substantial risk of physical harm” (italics omitted)].) We note that limitations on a public utility’s liability have long been upheld by courts.5 “Limitations on liability are properly included in tariffs as a subject clearly within the PUC’s regulatory powers. [Citatio

2025(See Covalt, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 939 [award of damages based on the plaintiffs’ fear that electric and magnetic fields arising from powerlines would cause them physical harm “would be inconsistent with the [PUC’s] conclusion . . . that the available evidence does not support a reasonable belief that [such] fields present a substantial risk of physical harm” (italics omitted)].) We note that limitations on a public utility’s liability have long been upheld by courts.5 “Limitations on liability are properly included in tariffs as a subject clearly within the PUC’s regulatory powers. [Citatio

2025(See Covalt, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 939 [award of damages based on the plaintiffs’ fear that electric and magnetic fields arising from powerlines would cause them physical harm “would be inconsistent with the [PUC’s] conclusion . . . that the available evidence does not support a reasonable belief that [such] fields present a substantial risk of physical harm” (italics omitted)].) We note that limitations on a public utility’s liability have long been upheld by courts.5 “Limitations on liability are properly included in tariffs as a subject clearly within the PUC’s regulatory powers. [Citatio

2025(See Covalt, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 939 [award of damages based on the plaintiffs’ fear that electric and magnetic fields arising from powerlines would cause them physical harm “would be inconsistent with the [PUC’s] conclusion . . . that the available evidence does not support a reasonable belief that [such] fields present a substantial risk of physical harm” (italics omitted)].) We note that limitations on a public utility’s liability have long been upheld by courts.5 “Limitations on liability are properly included in tariffs as a subject clearly within the PUC’s regulatory powers. [Citatio

2025(See Covalt, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 939 [award of damages based on the plaintiffs’ fear that electric and magnetic fields arising from powerlines would cause them physical harm “would be inconsistent with the [PUC’s] conclusion . . . that the available evidence does not support a reasonable belief that [such] fields present a substantial risk of physical harm” (italics omitted)].) We note that limitations on a public utility’s liability have long been upheld by courts.5 “Limitations on liability are properly included in tariffs as a subject clearly within the PUC’s regulatory powers. [Citatio

2017(Compare Hernandez v. Hillsides, Inc. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 272, 286 [ 97 Cal.Rptr.3d 274 , 211 P.3d 1063 ] [citing Katzberg for the proposition “it is an open question whether the state constitutional privacy provision, which is otherwise self-executing and serves as the basis for injunctive relief, can also provide direct and sole support for a damages claim”] with Clausing v. San Francisco Unified School Dist. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1224, 1238 [ 271 Cal.Rptr. 72 ] [holding there is no cause of action for damages under art.

2017(Compare Hernandez v. Hillsides, Inc. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 272, 286 [ 97 Cal.Rptr.3d 274 , 211 P.3d 1063 ] [citing Katzberg for the proposition “it is an open question whether the state constitutional privacy provision, which is otherwise self-executing and serves as the basis for injunctive relief, can also provide direct and sole support for a damages claim”] with Clausing v. San Francisco Unified School Dist. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1224, 1238 [ 271 Cal.Rptr. 72 ] [holding there is no cause of action for damages under art.

2017(Id. at p. 1619.) The reasoning in Selma has been undermined by the more recent opinions discussed above, most importantly the Supreme Court's statement—contrary to Selma— that the State's interest in groundwater is "a nonproprietary, regulatory one." (City of Barstow, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1237, fn. 7 .) State of California criticized the reasoning of Selma and the authorities on which it relies, and for the same reasons we agree Selma is unpersuasive.

2017(Id. at p. 1619.) The reasoning in Selma has been undermined by the more recent opinions discussed above, most importantly the Supreme Court's statement—contrary to Selma— that the State's interest in groundwater is "a nonproprietary, regulatory one." (City of Barstow, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1237, fn. 7 .) State of California criticized the reasoning of Selma and the authorities on which it relies, and for the same reasons we agree Selma is unpersuasive.

2017(Compare Hernandez v. Hillsides, Inc. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 272, 286 [ 97 Cal.Rptr.3d 274 , 211 P.3d 1063 ] [citing Katzberg for the proposition “it is an open question whether the state constitutional privacy provision, which is otherwise self-executing and serves as the basis for injunctive relief, can also provide direct and sole support for a damages claim”] with Clausing v. San Francisco Unified School Dist. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1224, 1238 [ 271 Cal.Rptr. 72 ] [holding there is no cause of action for damages under art.

2017(Compare Hernandez v. Hillsides, Inc. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 272, 286 [ 97 Cal.Rptr.3d 274 , 211 P.3d 1063 ] [citing Katzberg for the proposition “it is an open question whether the state constitutional privacy provision, which is otherwise self-executing and serves as the basis for injunctive relief, can also provide direct and sole support for a damages claim”] with Clausing v. San Francisco Unified School Dist. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1224, 1238 [ 271 Cal.Rptr. 72 ] [holding there is no cause of action for damages under art.

2019No similar procedural and evidentiary base is required where 'the attorney fee was not the cause of action but an incident to it.' " [Citation.]' " ( Monster LLC v. Superior Court (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1214 , 1228, 219 Cal.Rptr.3d 814 ( Monster LLC ).) Attorneys' fees claims forming part of a damages claim must be decided by a jury if the right to a jury exists, because that right encompasses the right to have the jury try and determine issues of fact, including " 'the assessment of damages.' " ( Monster LLC , supra , 12 Cal.App.5th at p. 1225 , 219 Cal.Rptr.3d 814 .) Otherwise, they generally

2019No similar procedural and evidentiary base is required where 'the attorney fee was not the cause of action but an incident to it.' " [Citation.]' " ( Monster LLC v. Superior Court (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1214 , 1228, 219 Cal.Rptr.3d 814 ( Monster LLC ).) Attorneys' fees claims forming part of a damages claim must be decided by a jury if the right to a jury exists, because that right encompasses the right to have the jury try and determine issues of fact, including " 'the assessment of damages.' " ( Monster LLC , supra , 12 Cal.App.5th at p. 1225 , 219 Cal.Rptr.3d 814 .) Otherwise, they generally

2018This principle is demonstrated in Northrop Corp. v. Chaparral Energy, Inc. (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 725 , 727, 214 Cal.Rptr. 173 ( Northrop ), in which a lessor filed an unlawful detainer action and sought, in addition to the restitution of the premises, unpaid rent plus reasonable rental value until the lessee vacated the premises.

2018This principle is demonstrated in Northrop Corp. v. Chaparral Energy, Inc. (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 725 , 727, 214 Cal.Rptr. 173 ( Northrop ), in which a lessor filed an unlawful detainer action and sought, in addition to the restitution of the premises, unpaid rent plus reasonable rental value until the lessee vacated the premises.

2017(See Sheehan v. San Francisco 49ers, Ltd. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 992, 998 ; Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Association (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 35-37 .) Therefore, the trial court did not err in granting summary adjudication on 41 Julian’s cause of action for damages against the school defendants under article I, sections 1, 2, 3, and 7.

2009These two sources of privacy protection “are not unrelated” under California law. ( Shulman, supra, 18 Cal.4th 200, 227 ; accord, Hill, supra, 7 Cal.4th 1, 27 ; but see Katzberg v. Regents of University of California (2002) 29 Cal.4th 300, 313, fn. 13 [ 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 482 , 58 P.3d 339 ] [suggesting it is an open question whether the state constitutional privacy provision, which is otherwise self-executing and serves as the basis for injunctive relief, can also provide direct and sole support for a damages claim].) Such privacy principles provide the framework for our analysis, as follows.

2026(Gil, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at p. 743 [“ ‘As to tort claims, the question of whether to award attorney[] fees turns on the language of the contractual attorney[] fee provision . . . .’ ”].) We therefore conclude that, under the plain language of the settlement agreement’s fees provision, fees may be awarded on YCS’s negligent misrepresentation cause of action because it was necessary for the County to enforce the agreement’s damages waiver in response to the $6 million in damages that YCS sought on that cause of action.

2025The cases upon which plaintiffs rely -- Clifford v. Ruocco (1952) 39 Cal.2d 327, 329 , Torr v. United Railroads of San Francisco (1921) 187 Cal. 505, 509 (Torr), Gallentine, supra, 248 Cal.App.2d at pages 153-155 and Chinnis v. Pomona Pump Co. (1940) 36 Cal.App.2d 633 , 642-643 -- are factually distinguishable because they do not involve a failure to prove a damages claim. 6 II Plaintiffs further contend that because the verdict did not compensate them for the property damage proximately caused by defendants, the trial court erred in denying their motion for a new trial.

2025Code, § 945.4), and as a general rule, the Government Claims Act does not “impose any requirements for nonpecuniary actions, such as those seeking injunctive, specific or declaratory relief.” (Loehr v. Ventura County Community College Dist. (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 1071, 1081 .) Some cases have held that the claim presentation requirement does not apply “where a damages claim is incidental to a claim for other relief, such as mandamus or injunctive relief.” (Bates v. Franchise Tax Bd. (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 367, 385 [collecting and discussing cases].) Other cases have rejected this approach, poin

2025Code, § 945.4), and as a general rule, the Government Claims Act does not “impose any requirements for nonpecuniary actions, such as those seeking injunctive, specific or declaratory relief.” (Loehr v. Ventura County Community College Dist. (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 1071, 1081 .) Some cases have held that the claim presentation requirement does not apply “where a damages claim is incidental to a claim for other relief, such as mandamus or injunctive relief.” (Bates v. Franchise Tax Bd. (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 367, 385 [collecting and discussing cases].) Other cases have rejected this approach, poin

2025(See Tashakori v. Lakis (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1003 , 1011– 1012 [claim for equitable easement properly construed as a claim for declaratory relief]; Marlow v. Campbell (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 921, 927 [declaratory relief generally available in property disputes involving an actual controversy].) Nothing in this body of law requires a claim for declaratory relief to be tied to another cause of action, as its only prerequisite is for the parties to have an actual dispute, which is readily satisfied here despite Cherednychenko’s perplexing claim to the contrary.

2025Code, § 945.4), and as a general rule, the Government Claims Act does not “impose any requirements for nonpecuniary actions, such as those seeking injunctive, specific or declaratory relief.” (Loehr v. Ventura County Community College Dist. (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 1071, 1081 .) Some cases have held that the claim presentation requirement does not apply “where a damages claim is incidental to a claim for other relief, such as mandamus or injunctive relief.” (Bates v. Franchise Tax Bd. (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 367, 385 [collecting and discussing cases].) Other cases have rejected this approach, poin

2025Code, § 945.4), and as a general rule, the Government Claims Act does not “impose any requirements for nonpecuniary actions, such as those seeking injunctive, specific or declaratory relief.” (Loehr v. Ventura County Community College Dist. (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 1071, 1081 .) Some cases have held that the claim presentation requirement does not apply “where a damages claim is incidental to a claim for other relief, such as mandamus or injunctive relief.” (Bates v. Franchise Tax Bd. (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 367, 385 [collecting and discussing cases].) Other cases have rejected this approach, poin