damages claim in Texas

2010N.Y. 2001)(an interim award which adjudicated a portion of a damages claim and ordered the payment of that sum is final even though liability and potential damages issues remained to be resolved with respect to the remainder of the same claim; court held that an arbitration award that fully disposes of a separate and independent claim is final for purposes of confirmation under the FAA even if other claims remain pending); Hart Surgical, Inc. v. Ultracision, Inc., 244 F.3d 231 (1st Cir. 2001)(holding that an award which finally and definitely disposes of a separate independent claim may be con

2010See e.g., Zeiler v. Deitsch, 500 F.3d 157, 168 (2nd Cir.2007) (eight interim orders issued by arbitration panel were resolution of separate and independent claim and subject to confirmation even though the orders did not dispose of all claims submitted to arbitration); The Home Insurance Company v. RHA/Pennsylvania Nursing Homes, Inc., 127 F.Supp.2d 482, 490 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (an interim award which adjudicated a portion of a damages claim and ordered the payment of that sum is final even though liability and potential damages issues remained to be resolved with respect to the remainder of the sa

2010N.Y. 2001)(an interim award which adjudicated a portion of a damages claim and ordered the payment of that sum is final even though liability and potential damages issues remained to be resolved with respect to the remainder of the same claim; court held that an arbitration award that fully disposes of a separate and independent claim is final for purposes of confirmation under the FAA even if other claims remain pending); Hart Surgical, Inc. v. Ultracision, Inc., 244 F.3d 231 (1st Cir. 2001)(holding that an award which finally and definitely disposes of a separate independent claim may be con

2010See e.g., Zeiler v. Deitsch, 500 F.3d 157, 168 (2nd Cir.2007) (eight interim orders issued by arbitration panel were resolution of separate and independent claim and subject to confirmation even though the orders did not dispose of all claims submitted to arbitration); The Home Insurance Company v. RHA/Pennsylvania Nursing Homes, Inc., 127 F.Supp.2d 482, 490 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (an interim award which adjudicated a portion of a damages claim and ordered the payment of that sum is final even though liability and potential damages issues remained to be resolved with respect to the remainder of the sa

2025The Stevens Court held that a qui tam relator under the federal False Claims Act can have Article III standing as a partial assignee of 3 the government’s damages claim, because “the assignee of a claim has standing to assert the injury in fact suffered by the assignor.” Id. at 773 (emphasis added); accord id. at 771–74 (reiterating that this holding was conditioned on an “injury in fact,” not merely on some violation of law).

2025The Stevens Court held that a qui tam relator under the federal False Claims Act can have Article III standing as a partial assignee of 3 the government’s damages claim, because “the assignee of a claim has standing to assert the injury in fact suffered by the assignor.” Id. at 773 (emphasis added); accord id. at 771–74 (reiterating that this holding was conditioned on an “injury in fact,” not merely on some violation of law).

2010See e.g., Zeiler v. Deitsch, 500 F.3d 157, 168 (2nd Cir.2007) (eight interim orders issued by arbitration panel were resolution of separate and independent claim and subject to confirmation even though the orders did not dispose of all claims submitted to arbitration); The Home Insurance Company v. RHA/Pennsylvania Nursing Homes, Inc., 127 F.Supp.2d 482, 490 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (an interim award which adjudicated a portion of a damages claim and ordered the payment of that sum is final even though liability and potential damages issues remained to be resolved with respect to the remainder of the sa

2010See e.g., Zeiler v. Deitsch, 500 F.3d 157, 168 (2nd Cir.2007)(eight interim orders issued by arbitration panel were resolution of separate and independent claim and subject to confirmation even though the orders did not dispose of all claims submitted to arbitration); The Home Insurance Company v. RHA/Pennsylvania Nursing Homes, Inc., 127 F.Supp.2d 482, 490 (S.D.N.Y.2001)(an interim award which adjudicated a portion of a damages claim and ordered the payment of that sum is final even though liability and potential damages issues remained to be resolved with respect to the remainder of the same

2010See e.g., Zeiler v. Deitsch, 500 F.3d 157, 168 (2nd Cir.2007) (eight interim orders issued by arbitration panel were resolution of separate and independent claim and subject to confirmation even though the orders did not dispose of all claims submitted to arbitration); The Home Insurance Company v. RHA/Pennsylvania Nursing Homes, Inc., 127 F.Supp.2d 482, 490 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (an interim award which adjudicated a portion of a damages claim and ordered the payment of that sum is final even though liability and potential damages issues remained to be resolved with respect to the remainder of the sa

2010See e.g., Zeiler v. Deitsch, 500 F.3d 157, 168 (2nd Cir.2007)(eight interim orders issued by arbitration panel were resolution of separate and independent claim and subject to confirmation even though the orders did not dispose of all claims submitted to arbitration); The Home Insurance Company v. RHA/Pennsylvania Nursing Homes, Inc., 127 F.Supp.2d 482, 490 (S.D.N.Y.2001)(an interim award which adjudicated a portion of a damages claim and ordered the payment of that sum is final even though liability and potential damages issues remained to be resolved with respect to the remainder of the same

2006Rio Grande Valley Sugar Growers, Inc. v. Campesi , 592 S.W.2d 340 , 342 n.2 (Tex. 1979); Hamilton v. Tex. Oil & Gas Corp. , 648 S.W.2d 316, 321 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

2003Rio Grande Valley Sugar Growers, Inc. v. Campesi, 592 S.W.2d 340 , 342 n. 2 (Tex.1979); Hamilton v. Tex. Oil & Gas Corp., 648 S.W.2d 316, 321 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

2025HSG may find some support in Stevens, to whatever extent Texas’s standing doctrine “parallels the federal test for Article III standing.” Heckman v. Williamson County, 369 S.W.3d 137, 154 (Tex. 2012); cf. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs. v. Grassroots Leadership, Inc., 717 S.W.3d 854 , 866–73 (Tex. 2025).

2025HSG may find some support in Stevens, to whatever extent Texas’s standing doctrine “parallels the federal test for Article III standing.” Heckman v. Williamson County, 369 S.W.3d 137, 154 (Tex. 2012); cf. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs. v. Grassroots Leadership, Inc., 717 S.W.3d 854, 866–73 (Tex. 2025).

2025The TMFPA, by contrast, cannot “reasonably [be] regarded as effecting a partial assignment of the State’s damages claim,” id., because the Texas Supreme Court has held that “the TMFPA employs a penalty scheme and is not an ‘action for the recovery of damages.’” In re Xerox, 555 S.W.3d 518, 534 (Tex. 2018) (emphasis added); compare id. at 533 (explaining the TMFPA “does not use the terms ‘harm,’ ‘damages,’ ‘overpayment,’ ‘loss,’ ‘actual damages,’ ‘unauthorized amount,’ ‘compensation,’ or any other words that imply a loss measure or require the State to prove an actual loss”) with 31 U.S.C. § 37

2025The TMFPA, by contrast, cannot “reasonably [be] regarded as effecting a partial assignment of the State’s damages claim,” id., because the Texas Supreme Court has held that “the TMFPA employs a penalty scheme and is not an ‘action for the recovery of damages.’” In re Xerox, 555 S.W.3d 518, 534 (Tex. 2018) (emphasis added); compare id. at 533 (explaining the TMFPA “does not use the terms ‘harm,’ ‘damages,’ ‘overpayment,’ ‘loss,’ ‘actual damages,’ ‘unauthorized amount,’ ‘compensation,’ or any other words that imply a loss measure or require the State to prove an actual loss”) with 31 U.S.C. § 37

2014See Glattly v. Air Starter Components, Inc., 332 S.W.3d 620, 635-36 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. denied).

2014See Glattly v. Air Starter Components, Inc., 332 S.W.3d 620 , 635–36 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. denied).

2010City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 822 (Tex. 2005).

2010City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 822 (Tex.2005).

2002See Cosgrove v. Grimes, 774 S.W.2d 662, 666 (Tex.1989); Ballesteros v. Jones, 985 S.W.2d 485, 489 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1998, pet. denied).

2002See Cosgrove v. Grimes , 774 S.W.2d 662, 666 (Tex. 1989).

2022See Lara, 52 S.W.3d at 185 (concluding that claims for declaratory and injunctive relief were moot, but the damages claim was not).

2009Id. at 185 .

2026Further, we can infer that the trial court’s remand judgment awarded damages to Puente rather than her estate representative because the trial court sought to follow the Texas Supreme Court’s instructions, by entering the judgment which the trial court should have entered when it signed its 3 The trial court did not grant the application for a writ of scire facias, which was overruled by operation of law. 4 A decedent’s estate “is not a legal entity and may not properly sue or be sued as such.” Belt v. Oppenheimer, Blend, Harrison & Tate, Inc., 192 S.W.3d 780, 786 (Tex. 2006).

2025Novartis’s argument is similarly imperiled by Sprint Communications Co., L.P. v. APCC Services, Inc., 554 U.S. 269 (2008), which expanded the standing-by- assignment doctrine outlined in Stevens.

2025Res., 162 F.3d 195, 199 (2d Cir. 1998). 15 APP296 a claim has standing to assert the injury in fact suffered by the assignor.” Stevens, 529 U.S. at 773.17 It added, the “FCA can reasonably be regarded as effecting a partial assignment of the Government’s damages claim.” Id.;18 see also Sprint Commc’ns Co., L.P. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 286 (2008) (citing Stevens as holding “that an assignee can sue based on his assignor’s injuries”); United States, ex rel.

2025See id. at 850– 51 (setting forth three-part test to determine whether defamation claimant is limited-purpose public figure and concluding candidate for constable was limited-purpose public figure in context of defamation claims concerning his fitness for office (citing Neely v. Wilson, 418 S.W.3d 52 , 70 4 Silva’s claims are for defamation per se, so the damages requirement is not at issue here.

2025The State’s argument also cannot be squared with the Court’s reasoning in TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez: [I]f the law of Article III did not require plaintiffs to demonstrate a “concrete harm,” Congress could authorize virtually any citizen to bring a statutory damages suit against virtually any defendant who 5 That the Court meant what it said is also clear from subsequent decisions observing that Stevens “justif[ied] qui tam actions based on a partial assignment of the Government’s damages claim and a ‘well nigh conclusive’ tradition of such actions in English and American courts dating back to

2025Polansky v. Exec, Health Res., Inc., 599 U.S. 419, 425 (2023) (“The FCA . . . effects a partial assignment of the Government’s own damages claim.” (cleaned up)).19 Stevens next addressed the federal limitation of jurisdiction under the Constitution to “Cases” or “Controversies” historically amenable to the judicial process. 529 U.S. at 774.

2025Polansky v. Exec, Health Res., Inc., 599 U.S. 419, 425 (2023) (“The FCA . . . effects a partial assignment of the Government’s own damages claim.” (cleaned up)).19 Stevens next addressed the federal limitation of jurisdiction under the Constitution to “Cases” or “Controversies” historically amenable to the judicial process. 529 U.S. at 774.

2025HSG, for its part, accuses Novartis of citing no authority holding that the State cannot assign standing to remedy a sovereign interest, HSG Br. 25, but ignores both Stevens and TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413 (2021): “[T]he public interest that private entities comply with the law cannot be converted into an individual right by a statute that denominates it as such, and that permits all citizens (or, for that matter, a subclass of citizens who suffer no distinctive concrete harm) to sue.” Id. at 428-29 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Novartis Br. 22; see also PhRMA Amicus Br.

2025HSG, for its part, accuses Novartis of citing no authority holding that the State cannot assign standing to remedy a sovereign interest, HSG Br. 25, but ignores both Stevens and TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413 (2021): “[T]he public interest that private entities comply with the law cannot be converted into an individual right by a statute that denominates it as such, and that permits all citizens (or, for that matter, a subclass of citizens who suffer no distinctive concrete harm) to sue.” Id. at 428-29 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Novartis Br. 22; see also PhRMA Amicus Br.

2025See Tooke, 197 S.W.3d at 346 .

2025Res., 162 F.3d 195, 199 (2d Cir. 1998). 15 APP296 a claim has standing to assert the injury in fact suffered by the assignor.” Stevens, 529 U.S. at 773.17 It added, the “FCA can reasonably be regarded as effecting a partial assignment of the Government’s damages claim.” Id.;18 see also Sprint Commc’ns Co., L.P. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 286 (2008) (citing Stevens as holding “that an assignee can sue based on his assignor’s injuries”); United States, ex rel.

2025See, e.g., Stroud v. Stroud, 733 S.W.2d 619, 620, 621 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987, no writ) (when mother sought public aid, statute “assigned” to the State “the right to collect child support payments”); Tex. Labor Code § 417.001(b) (Texas workers’ compensation subrogation law assigns insurers the right to “enforce the liability of the third party in the name of the injured employee or the legal beneficiary”); PNC Mortgage v. Howard, 668 S.W.3d 644, 648 (Tex. 2023) (under workers’ compensation laws, the employee’s claim “is transferred to the carrier,” and subrogation grants an insurer “standing to

2025See In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579, 593 (Tex. 2015) (“Defamation per se refers to statements that are so obviously harmful that general damages may be presumed.”). 5 (Tex. 2013))).

2025See id. at 850– 51 (setting forth three-part test to determine whether defamation claimant is limited-purpose public figure and concluding candidate for constable was limited-purpose public figure in context of defamation claims concerning his fitness for office (citing Neely v. Wilson, 418 S.W.3d 52 , 70 4 Silva’s claims are for defamation per se, so the damages requirement is not at issue here.

2024See also id.

2023Acme Iron & Metal Co. v. Republic Waste Servs. of Tex., Ltd., No. 03-17-00664-CV, 2018 WL 6519581 , at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 12, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Ibe v. Jones, 836 F.3d 516, 529 (5th Cir. 2016)).