damages claim in Massachusetts

2002In particular, Wasserman’s counsel advised Commerce of the Supreme Judicial Court’s decisions in Hazen Paper Co. v. USF&G, 407 Mass. 689 (1990), holding that an administrative enforcement order is a damages claim for purposes of liability insurance.

1998Liberty also asserted that Arrow’s failure to provide timely notice, despite knowledge of contamination since January of 1982, “has severely prejudiced our rights under the policy.” On May 28, 1991, Arrow’s present counsel wrote to Liberty, informing it that DEP had declared the site a “priority” site presenting an “imminent hazard,” and had ordered implementation of a “Short Term Measure.” Counsel also advised Liberty of the Supreme Judicial Court’s decisions in Hazen Paper Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar., 407 Mass. 689 (1990), holding that an administrative enforcement order is a damag

1983In discussing the damages for the violation of G.L.c. 186, § 15B, we said, "At a minimum, a landlord must have a reasonable, good faith belief that it is entitled to an amount deducted as `unpaid rent' under § 15B." McGrath, supra at 80 .

1983L. c. 186, § 15B, we said, “At a minimum, a landlord must have a reasonable, good faith belief that it is entitled to an amount deducted as ‘unpaid rent’ under § 15B.” McGrath, supra at 80 .

2023Section 8A, fifth par., precludes a landlord from recovering possession "if the amount found by the court to be due the landlord equals or is less than the amount found to be 3 due the tenant or occupant by reason of any counterclaim or defense under this section." "[A] tenant may retain possession only if two conditions are met: (1) the tenant prevails on a counterclaim or defense brought 'under this section'; and (2) the damages on that defense or counterclaim exceed the amount due the landlord." Meikle, 474 Mass. at 211 .

2018The thrust of that motion is that the plaintiffs do not have a claim for damages , both because (1) SORB's Web site publication did not violate procedural or substantive due process rights, and (2) even if such a violation occurred, the individual defendants have immunity *56 from a damages claim because the constitutional rights the defendants allegedly violated were not "clearly established." Harlow v. Fitzgerald , 457 U.S. 800 , 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727 , 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982).

2018The thrust of that motion is that the plaintiffs do not have a claim for damages , both because (1) SORB's Web site publication did not violate procedural or substantive due process rights, and (2) even if such a violation occurred, the individual defendants have immunity *56 from a damages claim because the constitutional rights the defendants allegedly violated were not "clearly established." Harlow v. Fitzgerald , 457 U.S. 800 , 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727 , 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982).

2000Unlike the facts presented in Fall River, 414 Mass. at 14-15 , where the Supreme Judicial Court found no express or implied right to indemnification in the parties’ contract, the provision at issue here is more specific.

1995The assessment for damages finding dated May 11, 1994, the day of the hearing, contains a note that says “notice sent.” The judgment dated May 12, 1994, one day after the hearing for Assessment of Damages, indicates that notice was sent in accord with Rule 77 (d), which rule states that mailing shall be “sufficient notice for all purposes for which notice of the entry of an order is required by these rules.” While 60(b) (6) relief has been afforded a party who did not receive notice of an entry of judgment of default, Chavoor v. Lewis, supra at 806-807 , the granting of such relief is addresse