damages clause in Arizona

2004In the instant case it would serve the purpose of judicial economy to permit the insurer to take this opportunity when all of the parties are involved and can present evidence to the court on the issue at one hearing. 158 Ariz. at 363 , 762 P.2d at 650 (emphasis added); see also H.B.H., 170 Ariz. at 329-30, 823 P.2d at 1337-38. ¶24 If the insurer intervenes, as here, but the trial court limits the damages hearing strictly to the issue of damages, then the resulting judgment against the insured has not yet been subjected fully to the Morris reasonableness test.

2004In the instant case it would serve the purpose of judicial economy to permit the insurer to take this opportunity when all of the parties are involved and can present evidence to the court on the issue at one hearing. 158 Ariz. at 363 , 762 P.2d at 650 (emphasis added); see also H.B.H., 170 Ariz. at 329-30, 823 P.2d at 1337-38. ¶24 If the insurer intervenes, as here, but the trial court limits the damages hearing strictly to the issue of damages, then the resulting judgment against the insured has not yet been subjected fully to the Morris reasonableness test.

2023P. 42(b)—which Arizona’s current Rule 42 mirrors, although not identically—and observed that “[a] preliminary finding on the question of liability may well make unnecessary the damages inquiry, and thus result in substantial saving of time of the Court and counsel and reduction of expense to the parties.” 34 F.R.D. 15, 20 (S.D.

2021Medlyn v. Kimble, 106 Ariz. 66, 68 (1970).

2021Strawberry Water Co. v. Paulsen, 220 Ariz. 401, 409, ¶ 21 (App. 2008).

2019Daou v. Harris, 139 Ariz. 353, 361 (1984); Tarnoff v. Jones, 17 Ariz. App. 240, 245 (1972). ¶7 The cross-claim alleged in conclusory fashion that Swartz “willfully, purposefully, and maliciously interfered with the Bank of America account with an evil mind in a vindictive manner to harm [the Association].” That allegation alone does not entitle the Association to punitive damages.

2019Daou v. Harris, 139 Ariz. 353, 361 (1984); Tarnoff v. Jones, 17 Ariz. App. 240, 245 (1972). ¶7 The cross-claim alleged in conclusory fashion that Swartz “willfully, purposefully, and maliciously interfered with the Bank of America account with an evil mind in a vindictive manner to harm [the Association].” That allegation alone does not entitle the Association to punitive damages.

2016Miscione v. Bishop, 130 Ariz. 371, 374-75 (App. 1981) (citation omitted). ¶27 We remand for the superior court to rule on any damages arising from the above causes of action on which the Trust defaulted and that were sustained by Gyro Stone for the period after June 4, 2007, the end of the startup period, based on the evidence presented at the damages hearing.

2014See Wolfinger, 206 Ariz. at 513, ¶ 41 , 80 P.3d at 792 .

2014See Wolfinger, 206 Ariz. at 513, ¶ 41 , 80 P.3d at 792 .

2014This Court has held, however, “that a pro se prisoner is deemed to have filed [her] notice of appeal at the time it is delivered, properly addressed, to the proper prison authorities to be forwarded to the clerk of the superior court.” Mayer v. State, 184 Ariz. 242, 245 , 908 P.2d 56, 59 (App. 1995).

2014This Court has held, however, “that a pro se prisoner is deemed to have filed [her] notice of appeal at the time it is delivered, properly addressed, to the proper prison authorities to be forwarded to the clerk of the superior court.” Mayer v. State, 184 Ariz. 242, 245 , 908 P.2d 56, 59 (App. 1995).

2014Coleman v. City of Mesa, 230 Ariz. 352, 355-56, ¶¶ 7-8 , 284 P.3d 863, 866-67 (2012). 2 The State also argued the complaint in the current case was barred by the applicable statute of limitations and A.R.S. § 31-201.01(L) (Supp. 2013), that Medley failed to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, that Medley could not assert a damages claim directly under the United States Constitution, and that Medley failed to exhaust her available administrative remedies prior to filing suit. 3 Medley’s notice of appeal was file stamped on October 28, 2013, thirty-five days after ent

2014Coleman v. City of Mesa, 230 Ariz. 352, 355-56, ¶¶ 7-8 , 284 P.3d 863, 866-67 (2012). 2 The State also argued the complaint in the current case was barred by the applicable statute of limitations and A.R.S. § 31-201.01(L) (Supp. 2013), that Medley failed to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, that Medley could not assert a damages claim directly under the United States Constitution, and that Medley failed to exhaust her available administrative remedies prior to filing suit. 3 Medley’s notice of appeal was file stamped on October 28, 2013, thirty-five days after ent

2013See, e.g., Schaffer, 105 Ariz. at 481 , 467 P.2d at 69 (recognizing that “there is gener ally more agreement that compensation is due where the limitation amounts to a complete destruction of the abutter’s practical access.”); Bilby, 87 Ariz. at 370-71 , 351 P.2d at 649-50 (noting that “an abutting property owner to a highway has an easement of ingress and egress to and from his property which constitutes a property right,” and that the right cannot be taken or damaged without just compensation); Thelberg, 87 Ariz. at 324 , 350 P.2d at 991 (“[Ejither the destruction or the material impairment

2013See, e.g., Schaffer, 105 Ariz. at 481 , 467 P.2d at 69 (recognizing that “there is gener ally more agreement that compensation is due where the limitation amounts to a complete destruction of the abutter’s practical access.”); Bilby, 87 Ariz. at 370-71 , 351 P.2d at 649-50 (noting that “an abutting property owner to a highway has an easement of ingress and egress to and from his property which constitutes a property right,” and that the right cannot be taken or damaged without just compensation); Thelberg, 87 Ariz. at 324 , 350 P.2d at 991 (“[Ejither the destruction or the material impairment

2013See, e.g., State Dep't of Highways, Div. of Highways, State of Colorado v. Interstate-Denver West, 791 P.2d 1119 (Colo. 1990); Keiffer v. King Cnty., 89 Wash.2d 369 , 572 P.2d 408 (1977); Brumer v. Los Angeles Cnty.

2013Concluding that such action by the county was compensable under the damages clause, the court reasoned that “it is generally held that á change in the established grade of a street, which injuriously affects the value of adjoining property, is ‘damage.’ The damage is to the easement of ingress and egress.” Id. at 371 , 351 P.2d at 650 (quoting Mosher, 39 Ariz. at 482 , 7 P.2d at 627 ).

2013Concluding that such action by the county was compensable under the damages clause, the court reasoned that “it is generally held that á change in the established grade of a street, which injuriously affects the value of adjoining property, is ‘damage.’ The damage is to the easement of ingress and egress.” Id. at 371 , 351 P.2d at 650 (quoting Mosher, 39 Ariz. at 482 , 7 P.2d at 627 ).

2013The State took the position that “controlling direct access to an interstate highway is an exercise of its police power, not eminent domain, and is not a taking of property so as to be compensable.” Id. at 480 , 467 P.2d at 68 . ¶ 24 Rejecting the owners’ argument that they were entitled to compensation under the Arizona Constitution, the supreme court determined that “[djirect access to a highway is not a private property right within” the damages clause.

2013The State took the position that “controlling direct access to an interstate highway is an exercise of its police power, not eminent domain, and is not a taking of property so as to be compensable.” Id. at 480 , 467 P.2d at 68 . ¶ 24 Rejecting the owners’ argument that they were entitled to compensation under the Arizona Constitution, the supreme court determined that “[djirect access to a highway is not a private property right within” the damages clause.

2013Concluding that such action by the county was compensable under the damages clause, the court reasoned that “it is generally held that á change in the established grade of a street, which injuriously affects the value of adjoining property, is ‘damage.’ The damage is to the easement of ingress and egress.” Id. at 371 , 351 P.2d at 650 (quoting Mosher, 39 Ariz. at 482 , 7 P.2d at 627 ).

2013Concluding that such action by the county was compensable under the damages clause, the court reasoned that “it is generally held that á change in the established grade of a street, which injuriously affects the value of adjoining property, is ‘damage.’ The damage is to the easement of ingress and egress.” Id. at 371 , 351 P.2d at 650 (quoting Mosher, 39 Ariz. at 482 , 7 P.2d at 627 ).

2013The court found the owners’ claim of harm to their access did not fall within the scope of the damages clause but rather was “within the true meaning of the constitutional provision a taking of the property.” Id. at 494 , 38 P.2d at 887 (emphasis added).

2013The court found the owners’ claim of harm to their access did not fall within the scope of the damages clause but rather was “within the true meaning of the constitutional provision a taking of the property.” Id. at 494 , 38 P.2d at 887 (emphasis added).

2003Auth. of the City of Augusta v. Boyd, 96 Ga.App. 705 , 101 S.E.2d 207, 210 (1957) (holding that a medical lien statute providing that the lienholder “may enforce said hen by an action against the person, firm, or corporation hable for such damages,” gave no right of action to proceed against the patient to whom services were rendered “but only against those liable to pay the patient damages”). ¶ 18 In short, the statute governing enforcement of the hen provides for an action only against those “liable for damages,” and only after the hen is “filed” in the county where suit is to be brought.

2003Auth. of the City of Augusta v. Boyd, 96 Ga.App. 705 , 101 S.E.2d 207, 210 (1957) (holding that a medical lien statute providing that the lienholder “may enforce said hen by an action against the person, firm, or corporation hable for such damages,” gave no right of action to proceed against the patient to whom services were rendered “but only against those liable to pay the patient damages”). ¶ 18 In short, the statute governing enforcement of the hen provides for an action only against those “liable for damages,” and only after the hen is “filed” in the county where suit is to be brought.

1999See id. at 331 , 823 P.2d at 1339 .

1999See id. at 331 , 823 P.2d at 1339 .

1986Corrigan, supra, 149 Ariz. at 565, n. 14 , 720 P.2d at 540, n. 14 .

1986Corrigan, supra, 149 Ariz. at 565, n. 14 , 720 P.2d at 540, n. 14 .