damages clause in Virginia

2020See Rule 3:10(a) (allowing cross- claims); Rule 3:15 (stating that statutory interpleader proceedings “shall, to the extent not inconsistent with the governing statutes, be conducted in accordance with the Rules contained in this Part Three”); Settlement Funding, LLC v. Von Neumann-Lillie, 274 Va. 76, 78-79 (2007) (describing how the claimants in an interpleader suit had filed cross-claims against one another, 4 party has asserted, briefed, or argued on appeal a damages claim alleging a breach of contract.

2016“Specific performance is an equitable remedy, which may be considered by the trial court where the remedy at law is inadequate and the nature of the contract is such that specific enforcement of it will not result in great practical difficulties.” Id. (citing Thompson v. Commonwealth, 197 Va. 208, 212-13 , 89 S.E.2d 64, 67 (1955)).

2016“Specific performance is an equitable remedy, which may be considered by the trial court where the remedy at law is inadequate and the nature of the contract is such that specific enforcement of it will not result in great practical difficulties.” Id. (citing Thompson v. Commonwealth, 197 Va. 208, 212-13 , 89 S.E.2d 64, 67 (1955)).

2016Second, wife fails to acknowledge, let alone explain, why the damages clause, which immediately follows the isolated language she relies upon, does not establish that the parties’ intent in entering the contract was to ensure that she maintained a high level of health insurance coverage rather than barring husband from seeking a divorce for 20 years “The decision whether to grant specific performance of a contract is a matter submitted to the sound discretion of the trial court.” Chattin v. Chattin, 245 Va. 302, 306 , 427 S.E.2d *599 347, 350 (1993) (citing Griscom v. Childress, 183 Va. 42, 47

2016Second, wife fails to acknowledge, let alone explain, why the damages clause, which immediately follows the isolated language she relies upon, does not establish that the parties’ intent in entering the contract was to ensure that she maintained a high level of health insurance coverage rather than barring husband from seeking a divorce for 20 years “The decision whether to grant specific performance of a contract is a matter submitted to the sound discretion of the trial court.” Chattin v. Chattin, 245 Va. 302, 306 , 427 S.E.2d *599 347, 350 (1993) (citing Griscom v. Childress, 183 Va. 42, 47

2012See Vasquez v. Mabini, 269 Va. 155, 159-61 , 606 S.E.2d 809 (2005) (holding that the lower court abused its discretion by allowing expert testimony on damages where the testimony was based only on assumptions and statistics, which were not previously disclosed to opposing counsel in discovery).

2012See Vasquez v. Mabini, 269 Va. 155, 159-61 , 606 S.E.2d 809 (2005) (holding that the lower court abused its discretion by allowing expert testimony on damages where the testimony was based only on assumptions and statistics, which were not previously disclosed to opposing counsel in discovery).

1995See, e.g., Kamlar Corp. v. Haley, 224 Va. 669 (1983), and Gasque v. Mooers Motor Car Co., 227 Va. 154 (1984).

1992In Bragg v. Ives, 149 Va. 482 , 140 S.E. 656 (1927), we stated that “ ‘the term nuisance, in legal parlance, extends to everything that endangers life or health, gives offense to the senses, violates the laws of decency, or obstructs the reasonable and comfortable use of property.’ ” Id. at 497 , 140 S.E. at 660 (citation omitted).

1992In Bragg v. Ives, 149 Va. 482 , 140 S.E. 656 (1927), we stated that “ ‘the term nuisance, in legal parlance, extends to everything that endangers life or health, gives offense to the senses, violates the laws of decency, or obstructs the reasonable and comfortable use of property.’ ” Id. at 497 , 140 S.E. at 660 (citation omitted).