damages hearing in Ohio

2024Noble v. Colwell, 44 Ohio St.3d 92, 96 (1989).

2016Noble v. Colwell, 44 Ohio St.3d 92, 96 (1989).

2024This is necessarily so because an appellant bears the burden of showing error by reference to matters in the record.” Knapp v. Edwards Laboratories, 61 Ohio St.2d 197, 199 , 400 N.E.2d 384 (1980), citing State v. Skaggs, 53 Ohio St.2d 162 , 372 N.E.2d 1355 (1978).

2011Adams (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 17 , 19 * * * . ‘When portions of the transcript necessary for resolution of assigned errors are omitted from the record, the reviewing court has nothing to pass upon and thus, as to those assigned errors, the court has no choice but to presume the validity of the lower court’s proceedings, and affirm.’ Knapp v. Edwards Laboratories (1980), 61 Ohio St.2d 197 , 200 * * * .” Chester v. Commsys, Inc. (April 7, 2000), Montgomery App. No. 17793. {¶ 65} Ihenacho’s brief does not comply with the appellate rules, and given the absence of a written transcript of the record o

2024Thus, he contends that Walker is inapposite because proximate cause was not at issue in the damages hearing. {¶ 23} While it is generally true that a defendant has the right to participate in a damages hearing and introduce evidence to minimize the damages, Craft v. Craft, 63 Ohio App.3d 499, 500 (9th Dist. 1989), the manner in which Morris seeks to mitigate his damages in this case is not appropriate.

2002At the damages hearing, the only question that remained was the amount of damages to be awarded. {¶ 16} "Even though a defendant is in default in pleadings, the defendant has a right to appear in person or by counsel at a hearing of the cause for the assessment of damages, to object to the introduction of evidence that is improper and to participate in the hearing to minimize the damages and the denial of this right is error." Craft v. Craft (1989), 63 Ohio App.3d 499 , 500 .

2026Case No. 25 MA 0045 –8– {¶29} A damages hearing is not necessary when the “‘damages claim is ‘liquidated’ or based on a readily ascertainable amount, such as an account.’” Bishop v. Bishop, 2025-Ohio-289, ¶ 39 (7th Dist.) (citations omitted).

2026Liquidated damages are those “‘that can be determined with exactness from the agreement between the parties or by arithmetical process or by the application of definite rules of law.’” Id., quoting Clark v. Enchanted Hills Comm. Assn., 2020-Ohio-553, ¶ 11 (4th Dist.) (quoting Huo Chin Yin v. Amino Prods.

2026See White Stag Aircraft Leasing United States LLC v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 2021-Ohio-1245, ¶ 14 (7th Dist.) (“the entry of default judgment with a damages hearing pending was not a final judgment; a Civ.R. 60(B) motion may only be directed to final judgments; and the motion was actually a motion to reconsider an interlocutory order which is not appealable”). {¶14} The trial court, therefore, did have authority to reconsider its order granting a default judgment in favor of Smith.

2026Snyder v. Swick, 2009-Ohio-5142 , ¶ 19; Sylvester v. User Friendly Phone Book, 2012-Ohio-5451, ¶ 22 (5th Dist.).

2026Liquidated damages are those “‘that can be determined with exactness from the agreement between the parties or by arithmetical process or by the application of definite rules of law.’” Id., quoting Clark v. Enchanted Hills Comm. Assn., 2020-Ohio-553, ¶ 11 (4th Dist.) (quoting Huo Chin Yin v. Amino Prods.

2025Rather, this damages amount was first raised in Maciejewski’s post-trial brief, where her counsel stated that she “is entitled to an amount of damages to compensate her for the loss of the use of her backyard, and counsel suggests the amount of $500.00 per month from the date of this action to the date of trial which totals $8,000.00.” This amount seemingly was based on mere speculation and lacked any factual basis. 9 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS State v. Harris, 2017-Ohio-5594, ¶ 43 (1st Dist.). “‘This court rules on assignments of error, not mere arguments.’” Hamid v. Univ.

2025Hunsche v. Loveland, 133 Ohio App.3d 535, 542 (1st Dist. 1999).

2025Co., Inc., 88 Ohio St.3d 376, 378 (2000) (plaintiff Stonehenge’s attorney’s fees were allowable as a claim for damages under the parties’ contract so they were properly submitted to the jury; defendant Beazer’s attorney’s fees were not awarded as part of a damages claim, but arose only after Beazer successfully defended itself against certain of Stonehenge’s contract claims so Beazer’s right to attorney’s fees vested only after the jury entered a verdict against Stonehenge and Beazer should have been allowed to Adams App. Nos. 23CA1166 and 23CA1167 26 present attorney’s fees at a posttrial hea

2025See also Thrasher Dinsmore & Dolan, LPA v. Ross, 2024-Ohio-1594 (8th Dist.) (affidavit by a partner from the firm, not the attorney who handled the underlying case, was sufficient to support summary judgment motion of law firm seeking unpaid attorney fees). {¶ 20} Based on the evidence presented at the damages hearing, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion by awarding PSE attorney fees in the amount of -8- $96,067.40, plus interest.

2024No. OT-18-041, 2020-Ohio-5553, ¶ 30 (explaining, “[i]t is within a trial court’s discretion to decide that a damages hearing is necessary,” and determining the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding appellee damages on summary judgment where the appellant had failed to present evidence contrary to the appellee’s accounting); WM Capital Partners, L.L.C. v. Beaver, 4th Dist.

2024In support, they cite Walker v. Insane Clown Posse, 2019-Ohio-5150, ¶ 31 (6th Dist.) for the proposition that it is error to consider proximate cause in a damages hearing following the entry of default judgment and that “[t]he trial court’s analysis in such a damages hearing is limited to the amount of damages incurred as a result of the injury.” {¶ 22} Morris, for his part, rightly concedes that the issue of liability was resolved through the default judgment.

2024In support, they cite Walker v. Insane Clown Posse, 2019-Ohio-5150, ¶ 31 (6th Dist.) for the proposition that it is error to consider proximate cause in a damages hearing following the entry of default judgment and that “[t]he trial court’s analysis in such a damages hearing is limited to the amount of damages incurred as a result of the injury.” {¶ 22} Morris, for his part, rightly concedes that the issue of liability was resolved through the default judgment.

2023The trial court judge, as the fact finder, reminded the parties it “will only consider those portions [of the evidence] that are relevant as it relates to damages.” “On the trial of a case, either civil or criminal, the weight to be given the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses are primarily for the trier of the facts.” State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230 , 227 N.E.2d 212, 213 (1967), paragraph one of the syllabus. {¶ 45} We find the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied appellant’s motion to continue the damages hearing for an unspecified period of time. {¶ 46} Appe

2023The trial court judge, as the fact finder, reminded the parties it “will only consider those portions [of the evidence] that are relevant as it relates to damages.” “On the trial of a case, either civil or criminal, the weight to be given the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses are primarily for the trier of the facts.” State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230 , 227 N.E.2d 212, 213 (1967), paragraph one of the syllabus. {¶ 45} We find the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied appellant’s motion to continue the damages hearing for an unspecified period of time. {¶ 46} Appe

2022Cuyahoga No. 109767, 2021-Ohio- 1410, at ¶ 21, 24 (after concluding that the trial court was permitted to revisit the merits of the contractual claim at the damages hearing, the panel concluded that “[t]he judgment of the trial court is reversed, and this matter is remanded to the trial court to address whether appellants are entitled to damages on their fraud and/or unjust enrichment claims and, if so, in what amount.”); Giancola v. Azem, 153 Ohio St.3d 594 , 2018-Ohio-1694 , 109 N.E.3d 1194, ¶ 1 (“The law-of-the-case doctrine provides that legal questions resolved by a reviewing court in a p

2022Cuyahoga No. 109767, 2021-Ohio- 1410, at ¶ 21, 24 (after concluding that the trial court was permitted to revisit the merits of the contractual claim at the damages hearing, the panel concluded that “[t]he judgment of the trial court is reversed, and this matter is remanded to the trial court to address whether appellants are entitled to damages on their fraud and/or unjust enrichment claims and, if so, in what amount.”); Giancola v. Azem, 153 Ohio St.3d 594 , 2018-Ohio-1694 , 109 N.E.3d 1194, ¶ 1 (“The law-of-the-case doctrine provides that legal questions resolved by a reviewing court in a p

2022The trial court then engaged in a damages analysis, consistent with Underwood's testimony at trial, to find appellant was entitled to $0 as the reasonable life of the carpet had nearly doubled when appellees vacated the property, the carpet was nearly twice as old as its reasonable life expectancy. "[I]n the context of a bench trial, reviewing courts 'afford broad leeway to the trial court in deciding the reliability of particular expert testimony' under Evid.R. 702." Levine I at ¶ 67, quoting Knott v. Revolution Software, Inc., 181 Ohio App.3d 519 , 2009-Ohio-1191, ¶ 46 (5th Dist.).

2022The trial court then engaged in a damages analysis, consistent with Underwood's testimony at trial, to find appellant was entitled to $0 as the reasonable life of the carpet had nearly doubled when appellees vacated the property, the carpet was nearly twice as old as its reasonable life expectancy. "[I]n the context of a bench trial, reviewing courts 'afford broad leeway to the trial court in deciding the reliability of particular expert testimony' under Evid.R. 702." Levine I at ¶ 67, quoting Knott v. Revolution Software, Inc., 181 Ohio App.3d 519 , 2009-Ohio-1191, ¶ 46 (5th Dist.).

2021Fairfield No. 12-CA-9, 2013-Ohio-563, ¶ 66 (“It is within the discretion of the trial court to determine whether further evidence is needed to support the plaintiff’s claim against the defaulting defendant”). {¶64} Moreover, despite his claim that he needed “more time for discovery,” a review of the record reveals Mr. Sailors had more than ample time to prepare for the second, rescheduled evidentiary hearing.