damages claim in Washington

2019Id. at 548-49 .

2019Id. at 548-49 .

2015Munro, 163 Wash. at 458 .

2015Munro, 163 Wash. at 458 .

2010The appellate court affirmed the jury's award of damages to a plaintiff raped by a work release inmate. ¶ 35 Although the $2 million award was ultimately vacated on other grounds, a plaintiff presented a psychiatrist with expertise in rape trauma syndrome during a damages hearing in Bagley v. Monticello Insurance Co., 430 Mass. 454 , 720 N.E.2d 813 (1999).

2010Ct. App. 1983), evidence of rape trauma syndrome was admissible and relevant to show “the nature of the trauma suffered by a rape victim, and factors that may aid or retard recovery.” The appellate court affirmed the jury’s award of damages to a plaintiff raped by a work release inmate. ¶35 Although the $2 million award was ultimately vacated on other grounds in Bagley v. Monticello Insurance Co., 430 Mass. 454 , 720 N.E.2d 813 (1999), a plaintiff presented a psychiatrist with expertise in rape trauma syndrome during a damages hearing.

2009CP at 288. ¶ 5 On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the grant of summary judgment and held that "allegations of economic loss due to the increased cost of surgery over the cost of more conservative treatment are sufficient to satisfy the damages requirement [of the CPA]." Ambach v. French, 141 Wash.App. 782, 790 , 173 P.3d 941 (2007).

2009App. 782, 790 , 173 P.3d 941 (2007).

2009CP at 288. ¶ 5 On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the grant of summary judgment and held that "allegations of economic loss due to the increased cost of surgery over the cost of more conservative treatment are sufficient to satisfy the damages requirement [of the CPA]." Ambach v. French, 141 Wash.App. 782, 790 , 173 P.3d 941 (2007).

2009CP at 288. ¶5 On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the grant of summary judgment and held that “allegations of economic loss due to the increased cost of surgery over the cost of more conservative treatment are sufficient to satisfy the damages requirement [of the CPA].” Ambach v. French, 141 Wn.

2007Turpen v. Johnson, 26 Wn.2d 716 , 175 P.2d 495 (1946); see 4 Tegland, supra, CR 52, at 265; see also Paine-Gallucci, 35 Wn.2d at 321 (recognizing that a trial court has discretion to permit a defaulting party to participate in a damages hearing).

2007Turpen v. Johnson, 26 Wn.2d 716 , 175 P.2d 495 (1946); see 4 Tegland, supra, CR 52, at 265; see also Paine-Gallucci, 35 Wn.2d at 321 (recognizing that a trial court has discretion to permit a defaulting party to participate in a damages hearing).

2026In Reid v. Pierce County, the Washington Supreme Court evaluated whether plaintiffs should be permitted to bring an action for damages based on a violation of article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution, which protects the right to privacy. 136 Wn.2d 195, 213 , 961 P.2d 333 (1998).

2026In Reid v. Pierce County, the Washington Supreme Court evaluated whether plaintiffs should be permitted to bring an action for damages based on a violation of article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution, which protects the right to privacy. 136 Wn.2d 195, 213 , 961 P.2d 333 (1998).

2023Stern argues that diminution in value and loss of use are alternative remedies, whose applicability is driven by whether the injury to the land is temporary or permanent. “ ‘Where the injury to land is temporary, the measure of damages is the diminished rental value if the property is to be rented, or the diminished value of its use if the property is to be used by the owner.’ ” Miotke v. City of Spokane, 101 Wn.2d 307, 332 , 678 P.2d 803 (1984) (quoting Barci v. Intalco Alum.

2023Stern argues that diminution in value and loss of use are alternative remedies, whose applicability is driven by whether the injury to the land is temporary or permanent. “ ‘Where the injury to land is temporary, the measure of damages is the diminished rental value if the property is to be rented, or the diminished value of its use if the property is to be used by the owner.’ ” Miotke v. City of Spokane, 101 Wn.2d 307, 332 , 678 P.2d 803 (1984) (quoting Barci v. Intalco Alum.

2018One of those exceptions is for "[c]laims provided by any law for monetary damages or compensation." RCW 36.70C.030(l)(c) ; e.g., Lakey v. Puget Sound Energy, Inc., 176 Wash.2d 909 , 928, 296 P.3d 860 (2013) (holding LUPA's exhaustion requirement does not apply to inverse condemnation claims for compensation). ¶ 80 The County acknowledges that because Maytown and the Port seek only monetary damages in this case, their action arguably falls within the language of LUPA's damages exception.

2018One of those exceptions is for "[c]laims provided by any law for monetary damages or compensation." RCW 36.70C.030(l)(c) ; e.g., Lakey v. Puget Sound Energy, Inc., 176 Wash.2d 909 , 928, 296 P.3d 860 (2013) (holding LUPA's exhaustion requirement does not apply to inverse condemnation claims for compensation). ¶ 80 The County acknowledges that because Maytown and the Port seek only monetary damages in this case, their action arguably falls within the language of LUPA's damages exception.

2018That Klinke prohibits a plaintiff from asserting equitable estoppel in a damages claim does not support the Byrds’ claim that plaintiffs seeking only damages are prohibited from filing equitable estoppel actions. 94 Wn.2d at 258-59 . 10 No. 50513-4-II Contrary to the Byrds’ argument, the holding in Greaves regarding equitable estoppel’s defensive nature applies outside the context of claims for damages.

2017Here, the proper inquiry for evaluating the Guthries’ motion to set aside the default judgment was whether substantial evidence supported a prima facie defense to the VanderStoeps’ damages claim, not whether substantial evidence supported the trial court’s damages award.3 The proper inquiry for the trial court was whether the Guthries were “able to demonstrate any set of circumstances that would, if believed, entitle the defendant to relief.” Ha, 182 Wn.

2016The trial court (1) disagreed that having four attorneys attend a motion hearing in December 2012 was duplicative; (2) deducted $114,229 in fees for unproductive time, including fees relating to the Port’s damages claim that was voluntarily dismissed; (3) disallowed a small amount for excessive time and an amount for excessive costs; (4) explained that it was awarding attorney fees relating to discovery even though it declined to award those fees as sanctions; (5) allowed a portion of fees incurred for preparation of the first trial because they carried over to the second trial; (6) found that

2012“Even if an instruction may be misleading, it will not be reversed unless prejudice is shown by the complaining party.” State v. Aguirre, 168 Wn.2d 350, 364 , 229 P.3d 669 (2010) (citing Keller v. City of Spokane, 146 Wn.2d 237, 249 , 44 P.3d 845 (2002)). ¶86 Here, we review the language of the trial court’s damages instruction under the de novo standard to determine whether it permitted Hickok-Knight to argue her theory of the case.

2012“Even if an instruction may be misleading, it will not be reversed unless prejudice is shown by the complaining party.” State v. Aguirre, 168 Wn.2d 350, 364 , 229 P.3d 669 (2010) (citing Keller v. City of Spokane, 146 Wn.2d 237, 249 , 44 P.3d 845 (2002)). ¶86 Here, we review the language of the trial court’s damages instruction under the de novo standard to determine whether it permitted Hickok-Knight to argue her theory of the case.

2012“Even if an instruction may be misleading, it will not be reversed unless prejudice is shown by the complaining party.” State v. Aguirre, 168 Wn.2d 350, 364 , 229 P.3d 669 (2010) (citing Keller v. City of Spokane, 146 Wn.2d 237, 249 , 44 P.3d 845 (2002)). ¶86 Here, we review the language of the trial court’s damages instruction under the de novo standard to determine whether it permitted Hickok-Knight to argue her theory of the case.

2012“Even if an instruction may be misleading, it will not be reversed unless prejudice is shown by the complaining party.” State v. Aguirre, 168 Wn.2d 350, 364 , 229 P.3d 669 (2010) (citing Keller v. City of Spokane, 146 Wn.2d 237, 249 , 44 P.3d 845 (2002)). ¶86 Here, we review the language of the trial court’s damages instruction under the de novo standard to determine whether it permitted Hickok-Knight to argue her theory of the case.

2012We also review the trial court’s refusal to give the susceptibility and aggravation instructions for an abuse of discretion: A trial court abuses its discretion in refusing to give an instruction where it adopted a view that “no reasonable person would have taken.” Kim v. Moffett, 156 Wn.

2002In Peerless Food Products, Inc. v. State, 119 Wn.2d 584, 597 , 835 P.2d 1012 (1992), the Supreme Court of Washington held that consequential damages are unavailable to a disappointed bidder on a public works project.

2002In Peerless Food Products, Inc. v. State, 119 Wn.2d 584, 597 , 835 P.2d 1012 (1992), the Supreme Court of Washington held that consequential damages are unavailable to a disappointed bidder on a public works project.

1996But the court did not address the issue of excusable neglect because it *266 granted review only on the issue of whether due process requires notice to a defaulting defendant of a damages hearing before entry of a default judgment. 105 Wn.2d at 171 .

1977Dominick v. Christensen, 87 Wn.2d 25 , 548 P.2d 541 (1976).

1977Dominick v. Christensen, 87 Wn.2d 25 , 548 P.2d 541 (1976).