Hill motion in Georgia

2013See Hernandez-Lopez v. State, 319 Ga. App. 662, 664 (1) ( 738 SE2d 116 ) (2013).2 Here, the officer based the stop on the information he received from the LPR system, as well as his personal observation of the vehicle’s tag to confirm that the 1 We note that, at the hearing on Hill’s motion to suppress, the issue of whether the LPR system can be utilized to perform random checks of motorists otherwise lawfully driving on the roadway was neither raised nor addressed. 2 See also New York v. Class, 475 U. S. 106, 114 (III) (B) (106 SC 960, 89 LE2d 81) (1986) (there is no reasonable expectation of

2013See also New York v. Class, 475 U. S. 106, 114 (III) (B) ( 106 SCt 960 , 89 LE2d 81) (1986) (there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in objects which are required by law to be placed in plain view from the exterior of an automobile); United States v. Wilcox, 415 Fed.

2013See Hernandez-Lopez v. State, 319 Ga. App. 662, 664 (1) ( 738 SE2d 116 ) (2013).2 Here, the officer based the stop on the information he received from the LPR system, as well as his personal observation of the vehicle’s tag to confirm that the 1 We note that, at the hearing on Hill’s motion to suppress, the issue of whether the LPR system can be utilized to perform random checks of motorists otherwise lawfully driving on the roadway was neither raised nor addressed. 2 See also New York v. Class, 475 U. S. 106, 114 (III) (B) (106 SC 960, 89 LE2d 81) (1986) (there is no reasonable expectation of

2013See also New York v. Class, 475 U. S. 106, 114 (III) (B) ( 106 SCt 960 , 89 LE2d 81) (1986) (there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in objects which are required by law to be placed in plain view from the exterior of an automobile); United States v. Wilcox, 415 Fed.

2012See Stewart, supra, 310 Ga. App. at 553 (1) (concluding that the relevant interval was the time that elapsed between the defendant’s arrest and the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to dismiss).

2012See id. (concluding that the relevant interval was the time that elapsed between the defendant’s arrest and the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to dismiss).

2025The waiver inquiry has two distinct requirements: first, the “waiver must be voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception,” and, second, it must be “made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.” Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 US 370, 382-83 (2010) (citation and quotation marks omitted). “[T]rial courts are to use a totality-of-the-circumstances test to determine whether a juvenile knowingly and voluntarily waived his constitutional rig

2025See White v. State, 291 Ga. 7, 8 (2) ( 727 SE2d 109 ) (2012) (“An appellate court is required to review for plain error an alleged jury instruction error to which no objection was raised at trial, provided the enumeration of error is properly enumerated and argued on appeal.” (emphasis supplied)). 13 nor are we aware of any controlling authority requiring such an instruction.

2025See White v. State, 291 Ga. 7, 8 (2) ( 727 SE2d 109 ) (2012) (“An appellate court is required to review for plain error an alleged jury instruction error to which no objection was raised at trial, provided the enumeration of error is properly enumerated and argued on appeal.” (emphasis supplied)). 13 nor are we aware of any controlling authority requiring such an instruction.

2025Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the trial court committed clear and obvious error in this case by failing to expressly instruct the jury at the outset that a felon prohibited from possessing a firearm may use a firearm in self-defense, and Hill’s claim fails at the second prong of plain-error review.4 See Williams, 316 Ga. at 310 (1) (b) (“We need not analyze all four prongs because the appellant has 4 Of course, in light of our decision here, trial courts would be well served to give such an instruction moving forward, where warranted, or risk reversal on appeal. 15 failed to establish t

2025Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the trial court committed clear and obvious error in this case by failing to expressly instruct the jury at the outset that a felon prohibited from possessing a firearm may use a firearm in self- defense, and Hill’s claim fails at the second prong of plain-error 15 review.4 See Williams, 316 Ga. at 310 (1) (b) (“We need not analyze all four prongs because the appellant has failed to establish that the trial court clearly or obviously erred[.]” (citation and punctuation omitted)). 3.

2025The waiver inquiry has two distinct requirements: first, the “waiver must be voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception,” and, second, it must be “made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.” Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 US 370, 382-83 (2010) (citation and quotation marks omitted). “[T]rial courts are to use a totality-of-the-circumstances test to determine whether a juvenile knowingly and voluntarily waived his constitutional rig

2023See Hill, supra, 234 Ga. App. at 175 (1) (“We . . . disagree with the [S]tate’s argument that the assistant solicitor who handled Hill’s plea proceeding was the prosecuting officer ‘actually handling the proceedings[.]’”). 11 for the State who handled the first prosecution had actual knowledge of the facts supporting the charge allegedly subject to a plea in bar.” Nicely, supra, 305 Ga. App. at 388 (1); see also Billups v. State, 228 Ga. App. 804, 806-808 (1) (b)-(c) ( 493 SE2d 8 ) (1997) (concluding that a defendant need only show that the prosecution knew of the facts and evidence underlying

2023See Hill, supra, 234 Ga. App. at 175 (1) (“We . . . disagree with the [S]tate’s argument that the assistant solicitor who handled Hill’s plea proceeding was the prosecuting officer ‘actually handling the proceedings[.]’”). 11 for the State who handled the first prosecution had actual knowledge of the facts supporting the charge allegedly subject to a plea in bar.” Nicely, supra, 305 Ga. App. at 388 (1); see also Billups v. State, 228 Ga. App. 804, 806-808 (1) (b)-(c) ( 493 SE2d 8 ) (1997) (concluding that a defendant need only show that the prosecution knew of the facts and evidence underlying

2023See Hill, supra, 234 Ga. App. at 175 (1) (“We . . . disagree with the [S]tate’s argument that the assistant solicitor who handled Hill’s plea proceeding was the prosecuting officer ‘actually handling the proceedings[.]’”). 11 for the State who handled the first prosecution had actual knowledge of the facts supporting the charge allegedly subject to a plea in bar.” Nicely, supra, 305 Ga. App. at 388 (1); see also Billups v. State, 228 Ga. App. 804, 806-808 (1) (b)-(c) ( 493 SE2d 8 ) (1997) (concluding that a defendant need only show that the prosecution knew of the facts and evidence underlying

2023See Hill, supra, 234 Ga. App. at 175 (1) (“We . . . disagree with the [S]tate’s argument that the assistant solicitor who handled Hill’s plea proceeding was the prosecuting officer ‘actually handling the proceedings[.]’”). 11 for the State who handled the first prosecution had actual knowledge of the facts supporting the charge allegedly subject to a plea in bar.” Nicely, supra, 305 Ga. App. at 388 (1); see also Billups v. State, 228 Ga. App. 804, 806-808 (1) (b)-(c) ( 493 SE2d 8 ) (1997) (concluding that a defendant need only show that the prosecution knew of the facts and evidence underlying

2023See Hill, supra, 234 Ga. App. at 175 (1) (“We . . . disagree with the [S]tate’s argument that the assistant solicitor who handled Hill’s plea proceeding was the prosecuting officer ‘actually handling the proceedings[.]’”). 11 for the State who handled the first prosecution had actual knowledge of the facts supporting the charge allegedly subject to a plea in bar.” Nicely, supra, 305 Ga. App. at 388 (1); see also Billups v. State, 228 Ga. App. 804, 806-808 (1) (b)-(c) ( 493 SE2d 8 ) (1997) (concluding that a defendant need only show that the prosecution knew of the facts and evidence underlying

2023See Hill, supra, 234 Ga. App. at 175 (1) (“We . . . disagree with the [S]tate’s argument that the assistant solicitor who handled Hill’s plea proceeding was the prosecuting officer ‘actually handling the proceedings[.]’”). 11 for the State who handled the first prosecution had actual knowledge of the facts supporting the charge allegedly subject to a plea in bar.” Nicely, supra, 305 Ga. App. at 388 (1); see also Billups v. State, 228 Ga. App. 804, 806-808 (1) (b)-(c) ( 493 SE2d 8 ) (1997) (concluding that a defendant need only show that the prosecution knew of the facts and evidence underlying

2022See OCGA § 9-2-44 (a) (“the pendency of a former action shall not abate” a later lawsuit for the same cause of action “if the first action is so defective that no recovery can possibly be had”); Dobson v. Truscon Steel Co., 70 Ga. App. 574, 575 ( 28 SE2d 870 ) (1944) (holding that the pendency of a prior lawsuit did not abate a second suit for the same cause of action where the court lacked jurisdiction over the first lawsuit).

2022See id.

2020See Holmes v. State, 306 Ga. 524, 528 (2) ( 832 SE2d 392 ) (2019) (vacating order denying motion for new trial on the general grounds and remanding to the trial court because the record showed that the trial court failed to reweigh the evidence as the “thirteenth juror,” as required under OCGA §§ 5-5-20 and 5-5-21).

2020“Whether to grant a motion for mistrial is within the trial court’s sound discretion, and the trial court’s exercise of that discretion will not be disturbed on appeal unless a mistrial is essential to preserve the defendant’s right to a fair trial.” Billings v. State, 293 Ga. 99, 106 (7) ( 745 SE2d 583 ) (2013) (citation and 22 punctuation omitted).

2020“Whether to grant a motion for mistrial is within the trial court’s sound discretion, and the trial court’s exercise of that discretion will not be disturbed on appeal unless a mistrial is essential to preserve the defendant’s right to a fair trial.” Billings v. State, 293 Ga. 99, 106 (7) ( 745 SE2d 583 ) (2013) (citation and 22 punctuation omitted).

2019OCGA § 9-15-14 (c) provides that attorney fees shall not be assessed “as to any claim or defense which the court determines was asserted by said attorney or party in a good faith attempt to establish a new theory of law in Georgia if such new theory of law is based on some recognized precedential or persuasive authority.” (Emphasis supplied.) See Doster v. Bates, 266 Ga. App. 194, 195 (1) ( 596 SE2d 699 ) (2004) (because attorney fee awards are not allowed as part of damages under common law, OCGA § 9-15-14’s fee provision must be strictly construed against such an award).

2019OCGA § 9-15-14 (c) provides that attorney fees shall not be assessed “as to any claim or defense which the court determines was asserted by said attorney or party in a good faith attempt to establish a new theory of law in Georgia if such new theory of law is based on some recognized precedential or persuasive authority.” (Emphasis supplied.) See Doster v. Bates, 266 Ga. App. 194, 195 (1) ( 596 SE2d 699 ) (2004) (because attorney fee awards are not allowed as part of damages under common law, OCGA § 9-15-14’s fee provision must be strictly construed against such an award).

2019Id. ; see also Fun Fit Enterprises v. Halpern Enterprises , 273 Ga. App. 685 , 686, 616 S.E.2d 466 (2005) (in an absence of any explanation for a 57-day delay from receipt of a trial court's notice concerning an appellant's costs to the payment of those costs, the trial court erred in denying a motion to dismiss the appeal).

2019Id. ; see also Fun Fit Enterprises v. Halpern Enterprises , 273 Ga. App. 685 , 686, 616 S.E.2d 466 (2005) (in an absence of any explanation for a 57-day delay from receipt of a trial court's notice concerning an appellant's costs to the payment of those costs, the trial court erred in denying a motion to dismiss the appeal).

2014See Hill, 547 U. S. at 580-581 (II) (“[Clarence] Hill’s challenge appears to leave the State free to use an alternative lethal injection procedure.

2014See Hill, 547 U. S. at 580-581 (II) (“[Clarence] Hill’s challenge appears to leave the State free to use an alternative lethal injection procedure.

2014State v. James, 292 Ga. 440, 441 (2) ( 738 SE2d 601 ) (2013).

2014State v. James, 292 Ga. 440, 441 (2) ( 738 SE2d 601 ) (2013).

2013See Hernandez-Lopez v. State, 319 Ga. App. 662, 664 (1) ( 738 SE2d 116 ) (2013).2 Here, the officer based the stop on the information he received from the LPR system, as well as his personal observation of the vehicle’s tag to confirm that the 1 We note that, at the hearing on Hill’s motion to suppress, the issue of whether the LPR system can be utilized to perform random checks of motorists otherwise lawfully driving on the roadway was neither raised nor addressed. 2 See also New York v. Class, 475 U. S. 106, 114 (III) (B) (106 SC 960, 89 LE2d 81) (1986) (there is no reasonable expectation of

2013See Hernandez-Lopez v. State, 319 Ga. App. 662, 664 (1) ( 738 SE2d 116 ) (2013).2 Here, the officer based the stop on the information he received from the LPR system, as well as his personal observation of the vehicle’s tag to confirm that the 1 We note that, at the hearing on Hill’s motion to suppress, the issue of whether the LPR system can be utilized to perform random checks of motorists otherwise lawfully driving on the roadway was neither raised nor addressed. 2 See also New York v. Class, 475 U. S. 106, 114 (III) (B) (106 SC 960, 89 LE2d 81) (1986) (there is no reasonable expectation of

2012“The burden of determining the cause of the defendant’s absence was on [his] counsel, not on the trial judge.” [Cit.] “[Hill] voluntarily absented [himself] from the court since [he] was free on bail and clearly knew the proceedings had begun ....” [Cits.] Estep v. State, 238 Ga. App. 170, 172 (1) ( 518 SE2d 176 ) (1999).

2012“The burden of determining the cause of the defendant’s absence was on [his] counsel, not on the trial judge.” [Cit.] “[Hill] voluntarily absented [himself] from the court since [he] was free on bail and clearly knew the proceedings had begun ....” [Cits.] Estep v. State, 238 Ga. App. 170, 172 (1) ( 518 SE2d 176 ) (1999).

2012(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Howard, supra, 307 Ga. App. at 827 (2) (c).

2012(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Howard, supra, 307 Ga. App. at 827 (2) (c).

2012Compare Gravitt v. State, 301 Ga. App. 131, 137 (2) ( 687 SE2d 150 ) (2009).

2012Compare Gravitt v. State, 301 Ga. App. 131, 137 (2) ( 687 SE2d 150 ) (2009).

2011See Billingslea, 311 Ga. App. at 493 (2). 2.

2007This is correct, since Hill could “be convicted only once for the death of each victim.” Diamond v. State, 267 Ga. 249, 251 (3) (b) ( 477 SE2d 562 ) (1996) (where defendant was convicted of three counts of felony murder and three counts of DUI vehicular homicide, the latter were vacated by operation of law).

2007This is correct, since Hill could “be convicted only once for the death of each victim.” Diamond v. State, 267 Ga. 249, 251 (3) (b) ( 477 SE2d 562 ) (1996) (where defendant was convicted of three counts of felony murder and three counts of DUI vehicular homicide, the latter were vacated by operation of law).