Hill analysis in Tennessee

2003In Ruff v. State, 978 S.W.2d 95, 96-97 (Tenn.1998), our supreme court applied the Hill analysis to determine whether an indictment for aggravated sexual battery was sufficient.

2003In Ruff v. State, 978 S.W.2d 95, 96-97 (Tenn.1998), our supreme court applied the Hill analysis to determine whether an indictment for aggravated sexual battery was sufficient.

2000"Generally stated, an indictment is valid if it provides sufficient information (1) to enable the accused to know the accusation to which answer is required, (2) to furnish the court adequate basis for the entry of a proper judgment, and (3) to protect the accused from double jeopardy." Hill, 954 S.W.2d at 727 (citations omitted); see Dykes, 978 S.W.2d at 530 (applying Hill analysis to pre-1989 crime).

1999In Dykes v. Compton, 978 S.W.2d 528 (Tenn. 1998), the Tenn essee Suprem e Court held that their Hill analysis extended to convictions under th e 1979 statutes. -2- The Tennessee Supreme Court overruled this Court’s Hill decision in State v. Hill, 954 S.W.2d 725 (Tenn. 1997).

2000"Generally stated, an indictment is valid if it provides sufficient information (1) to enable the accused to know the accusation to which answer is required, (2) to furnish the court adequate basis for the entry of a proper judgment, and (3) to protect the accused from double jeopardy." Hill, 954 S.W.2d at 727 (citations omitted); see Dykes, 978 S.W.2d at 530 (applying Hill analysis to pre-1989 crime).

1999In Dykes v. Compton, 978 S.W.2d 528 (Tenn. 1998), the Tenn essee Suprem e Court held that their Hill analysis extended to convictions under th e 1979 statutes. -2- The Tennessee Supreme Court overruled this Court’s Hill decision in State v. Hill, 954 S.W.2d 725 (Tenn. 1997).

2016Watson’s Carpet and Floor Coverings, Inc. v. McCormick, et al., 247 S.W.3d 169 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007), perm. app. denied (Tenn. May 14, 2007) (citing Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 479 (D.C.Cir.1983)) (“Since liability for civil conspiracy depends on the performance of some underlying tortious act, the conspiracy is not independently actionable; rather, it is a means for establishing vicarious liability for the underlying tort.”).

2016The point is that a friendship which will induce a man [i.e., Mr. Gannon] to plot and scheme, to secure informants, to seek documents furtively and to reach secret bargains . . . cannot reasonably be said to represent the mere pursuit of a corporate interest.” Even if we allow, arguendo, that Mr. Gannon did all of these things, Ms. Hill nonetheless must show, through the proffer of specific facts, that Mr. Gannon “would benefit personally from [Ms. Hill’s] discharge.” Thompson, 416 S.W.3d at 414 (citation omitted).

2013See Black, 75 S.W.3d at 424-25 .

2001Nonetheless, because a board’s decision is subject to judicial review under state law upon a sufficiently definite allegation that no evidence supports the decision, the Hill standard provides some guidance on how the scope of such a review m ight be defined in the co ntext of prison disciplinary boards. -13- Supreme Court has explained, “The scope of review under the common-law writ does not ordinarily extend to a redetermination of the facts found by the administrative body.” Cooper v. Williamson County Bd. of Educ., 746 S.W.2d 176, 179 (Tenn. 1987).

2001Nonetheless, because a board’s decision is subject to judicial review under state law upon a sufficiently definite allegation that no evidence supports the decision, the Hill standard provides some guidance on how the scope of such a review m ight be defined in the co ntext of prison disciplinary boards. -13- Supreme Court has explained, “The scope of review under the common-law writ does not ordinarily extend to a redetermination of the facts found by the administrative body.” Cooper v. Williamson County Bd. of Educ., 746 S.W.2d 176, 179 (Tenn. 1987).