Hill standard in Texas

2020Prejudice Under the second prong, in the context of a defendant’s claim that his counsel’s ineffective assistance rendered his plea involuntary, the defendant must demonstrate a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985); see Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958, 1965 (2017) (holding that “Hill test” governs Padilla analysis); Miller, 548 S.W.3d at 499 ; Torres, 483 S.W.3d at 47 .

2018See Lee v. United States , --- U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 1958 , 1965, 198 L.Ed.2d 476 (2017).

2010See Sims, 98 S.W.3d at 295-96 .

2009See Sims , 98 S.W.3d at 295–96.

2009See Hollifield v. Hollifield, 925 S.W.2d 153, 155 (Tex. App.—Austin 1996, no writ); Clancy v. Zale Corp., 705 S.W.2d 820, 823 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.).

2009See Hollifield v. Hollifield , 925 S.W.2d 153, 155 (Tex. App.—Austin 1996, no writ); Clancy v. Zale Corp ., 705 S.W.2d 820, 823 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.).

2009See Hollifield v. Hollifield , 925 S.W.2d 153, 155 (Tex. App.—Austin 1996, no writ); Clancy v. Zale Corp ., 705 S.W.2d 820, 823 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.).

2009See Hollifield v. Hollifield, 925 S.W.2d 153, 155 (Tex. App.—Austin 1996, no writ); Clancy v. Zale Corp., 705 S.W.2d 820, 823 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.).

2017See Torres , 483 S.W.3d at 48 (listing "the trial court's admonishments" as factor to consider in determining prejudice under Hill standard); see also Kayode , 777 F.3d at 728-29 ("Warnings from a judge during a plea colloquy are not a substitute for effective assistance of counsel, and therefore have no bearing on the first Strickland prong.

2016Where ineffective assistance leads a petitioner to accept a plea bargain, a different result means that, but for counsel’s errors, [petitioner] would either have gone to trial or received a better plea bargain.”); United States v. Kayode, 777 F.3d 719, 724 (5th Cir.2014) (applying Hill test, and observing that habeas petitioner must "convince the court that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the circumstances”); United States v. Fugit, 703 F.3d 248, 260 (4th Cir.2012) ("[I]n order to prove prejudice in the guilty plea context, a person challenging his convicti

2015Missouri v. Frye, 132 S.Ct. 1399, 1408-9 (2012) (Hill test is not the only test for prejudice); Kovacs v. United States, 744 F.3d 44, 52 (2d Cir. 2014) (prejudice where showing that defendant would have continued to negotiate).

2015Missouri v. Frye, 132 S.Ct. 1399, 1408-9 (2012) (Hill test is not the only test for prejudice); Kovacs v. United States, 744 F.3d 44, 52 (2d Cir. 2014) (prejudice where -11- showing that defendant would have continued to negotiate).

2015No appellate court in Texas has ever ruled that a trial court erred in conducting a hearing on a defendant’s motion to dismiss charges on the basis they violated his constitutional rights. [*39] See, e.g., State v. Dinur, 383 S.W.3d 695, 698-99 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (trial court conducted hearing on appellant’s motion to dismiss charges against him on the basis of, among other things, selective prosecution); Rodriguez v. State, 283 S.W.3d 465, 471-72 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2009, pet. dism’d) (trial court conducted hearing on appellant’s claim, similar to claim of selec

2015No appellate court in Texas has ever ruled that a trial court erred in conducting a hearing on a defendant’s motion to dismiss charges on the basis they violated his constitutional rights. [*39] See, e.g., State v. Dinur, 383 S.W.3d 695, 698-99 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (trial court conducted hearing on appellant’s motion to dismiss charges against him on the basis of, among other things, selective prosecution); Rodriguez v. State, 283 S.W.3d 465, 471-72 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2009, pet. dism’d) (trial court conducted hearing on appellant’s claim, similar to claim of selec

2015No appellate court in Texas has ever ruled that a trial court erred in conducting a hearing on a defendant’s motion to dismiss charges on the basis they violated his constitutional rights. [*39] See, e.g., State v. Dinur, 383 S.W.3d 695, 698-99 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (trial court conducted hearing on appellant’s motion to dismiss charges against him on the basis of, among other things, selective prosecution); Rodriguez v. State, 283 S.W.3d 465, 471-72 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2009, pet. dism’d) (trial court conducted hearing on appellant’s claim, similar to claim of selec

2015No appellate court in Texas has ever ruled that a trial court erred in conducting a hearing on a defendant’s motion to dismiss charges on the basis they violated his constitutional rights. [*39] See, e.g., State v. Dinur, 383 S.W.3d 695, 698-99 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (trial court conducted hearing on appellant’s motion to dismiss charges against him on the basis of, among other things, selective prosecution); Rodriguez v. State, 283 S.W.3d 465, 471-72 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2009, pet. dism’d) (trial court conducted hearing on appellant’s claim, similar to claim of selec

2015No appellate court in Texas has ever ruled that a trial court erred in conducting a hearing on a defendant’s motion to dismiss charges on the basis they violated his constitutional rights. [*39] See, e.g., State v. Dinur, 383 S.W.3d 695, 698-99 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (trial court conducted hearing on appellant’s motion to dismiss charges against him on the basis of, among other things, selective prosecution); Rodriguez v. State, 283 S.W.3d 465, 471-72 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2009, pet. dism’d) (trial court conducted hearing on appellant’s claim, similar to claim of selec

2015No appellate court in Texas has ever ruled that a trial court erred in conducting a hearing on a defendant’s motion to dismiss charges on the basis they violated his constitutional rights. [*39] See, e.g., State v. Dinur, 383 S.W.3d 695, 698-99 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (trial court conducted hearing on appellant’s motion to dismiss charges against him on the basis of, among other things, selective prosecution); Rodriguez v. State, 283 S.W.3d 465, 471-72 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2009, pet. dism’d) (trial court conducted hearing on appellant’s claim, similar to claim of selec

2015Missouri v. Frye, 132 S.Ct. 1399, 1408-9 (2012) (Hill test is not the only test for prejudice); Kovacs v. United States, 744 F.3d 44, 52 (2d Cir. 2014) (prejudice where showing that defendant would have continued to negotiate).

2015Missouri v. Frye, 132 S.Ct. 1399, 1408-9 (2012) (Hill test is not the only test for prejudice); Kovacs v. United States, 744 F.3d 44, 52 (2d Cir. 2014) (prejudice where -11- showing that defendant would have continued to negotiate).

2020Prejudice Under the second prong, in the context of a defendant’s claim that his counsel’s ineffective assistance rendered his plea involuntary, the defendant must demonstrate a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985); see Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958, 1965 (2017) (holding that “Hill test” governs Padilla analysis); Miller, 548 S.W.3d at 499 ; Torres, 483 S.W.3d at 47 .

2017The Hill standard "requires an applicant to show a reasonable probability that counsel's errors affected the outcome of the plea proceedings, in the sense that, but for counsel's errors, the applicant would have rejected the plea bargain and instead pursued a trial." Torres , 483 S.W.3d at 47 (citing Hill , 474 U.S. at 59 , 106 S.Ct. at 370 ).

2020Prejudice Under the second prong, in the context of a defendant’s claim that his counsel’s ineffective assistance rendered his plea involuntary, the defendant must demonstrate a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985); see Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958, 1965 (2017) (holding that “Hill test” governs Padilla analysis); Miller, 548 S.W.3d at 499 ; Torres, 483 S.W.3d at 47 .

2017The Hill standard "requires an applicant to show a reasonable probability that counsel's errors affected the outcome of the plea proceedings, in the sense that, but for counsel's errors, the applicant would have rejected the plea bargain and instead pursued a trial." Torres , 483 S.W.3d at 47 (citing Hill , 474 U.S. at 59 , 106 S.Ct. at 370 ).

2016Under these facts, the trial court judge's decision to hold an evidentiary hearing on Hill’s motion to quash and dismiss was not an abuse of her discretion. . 150 S.W.3d 169 (Tex.Crim.App.2004). .

2016Id. at 172 . .

2026See In re Guardianship of Jones, 629 S.W.3d 921 , 924 (Tex. 2021) (per curiam) (explaining that although talismanic phrases are not required, “[a] statement like, ‘This judgment finally disposes of all parties and all claims and is appealable’, would leave no doubt about the court’s intention.” (quoting Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 206 )).

2023See Van Voris v. Team Chop Shop, LLC, 402 S.W.3d 915, 926 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, no pet.); Akin, 2007 WL 475406 , at *3; Rosen v. Nat’l Hot Rod Ass’n, No. 14-94-00775- CV, 1995 WL 755712 , at *7 n.1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 21, 1995, writ denied) (not designated for publication); Smith, 708 S.W.2d at 574–76.10 We begin our chronological review with Smith, in which the issue was first addressed. 9 Hill’s brief discusses a number of these cases.

2022See Crain, 315 S.W.3d at 48 ; see also Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 88-89 .

2022See Crain, 315 S.W.3d at 48 ; see also Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 88-89 .

2022Rather, she dismissed the indictments “because of the failure of Mr. Watkins to testify in this hearing.” Id. at 869 (emphasis added).

2021See Cantu v. State, 253 S.W.3d 273, 282 (Tex. Crim.

2021We balance the Barker factors with “common sense and sensitivity to ensure that charges are dismissed only when the evidence shows that a defendant’s actual and asserted interest in a speedy trial has been infringed.” Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 281 .

2017Johnson v. State, 169 S.W.3d 223, 231 (Tex. Crim.

2017Johnson v. State, 169 S.W.3d 223, 231 (Tex. Crim.

2016See City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 810 . • In reaching this conclusion, we reject Hill’s argument that a $48,000 hourly rate cannot be justified as “reasonable” and his attempt to mischaracterize the nature of the damages sought by -S & N. Neither Hill nor S & N presented evidence to the jury that an hourly rate times the number of hours worked was the proper method of calculating the reasonable value of services.