Hill standard in Missouri

2024Further, for Hill’s claim of self-defense, “[d]eadly force is only justifiable when the defendant reasonably believes that such deadly force is necessary to protect himself from death, serious physical injury, or any forcible felony.” Kendrick, 550 S.W.3d at 124 (alteration in original) (quoting Bruner, 541 S.W.3d at 538 ).

2023Armour v. State, 741 S.W.2d 683, 689 (Mo. App. E.D. 1987) (holding plea counsel’s failure to investigate a witness did not prejudice the movant because the purported evidence from the witnesses’ testimonies would not have affected counsel’s plea recommendation). 9 Movant did not demonstrate prejudice under his claim of ineffectiveness of counsel because he did not show a reasonable probability he would have insisted on going to trial had plea counsel investigated Copeland or the security video.

2023Armour v. State, 741 S.W.2d 683, 689 (Mo. App. E.D. 1987) (holding plea counsel’s failure to investigate a witness did not prejudice the movant because the purported evidence from the witnesses’ testimonies would not have affected counsel’s plea recommendation). 9 Movant did not demonstrate prejudice under his claim of ineffectiveness of counsel because he did not show a reasonable probability he would have insisted on going to trial had plea counsel investigated Copeland or the security video.

2015As this Court clearly indicated in Barry v. State, 404 S.W.3d 338, 344 (Mo.App.S.D.2013), “a challenge to the sufficiency of an information is not a cognizable claim in a post-conviction relief proceeding ... [where] Movant’s claim could (and therefore should) have been raised on direct appeal.” Id. at 345 .

2015As this Court clearly indicated in Barry v. State, 404 S.W.3d 338, 344 (Mo.App.S.D.2013), “a challenge to the sufficiency of an information is not a cognizable claim in a post-conviction relief proceeding ... [where] Movant’s claim could (and therefore should) have been raised on direct appeal.” Id. at 345 .

2014Because Hill’s complaint with respect to 84.04(e) relates back to the “facts” included in the argument, we combine our response to Hill’s Rule 84.04 rule violation complaint. 13 ITT Commercial Fin., 854 S.W.2d at 381 (emphasis in original).

2010See Frye v. State, 311 S.W.3d 350, 358-59 (Mo.App.

2010See Frye v. State, 311 S.W.3d 350, 358-59 (Mo.App.

2010Thus, the Court applied the Hill standard without citation.” Id. at 368.

2010Thus, the Court applied the Hill standard without citation.” Id. at 368.

2007The second to last sentence states: “It was not the sentence to be imposed that concerned Dobbins — it was his eligibility for sentence reduction as to any sentence that was imposed.” Dobbins, 187 S.W.3d at 867 (emphasis added).

2007The second to last sentence states: “It was not the sentence to be imposed that concerned Dobbins — it was his eligibility for sentence reduction as to any sentence that was imposed.” Dobbins, 187 S.W.3d at 867 (emphasis added).

2007The Supreme Court has applied this standard in State v. Nunley, 980 S.W.2d 290, 292 (Mo. banc 1998); State v. Roll, 942 S.W.2d 370, 374 (Mo. banc 1997); and Coates v. State, 939 S.W.2d 912, 914 (Mo. banc 1997).

2007The Supreme Court has applied this standard in State v. Nunley, 980 S.W.2d 290, 292 (Mo. banc 1998); State v. Roll, 942 S.W.2d 370, 374 (Mo. banc 1997); and Coates v. State, 939 S.W.2d 912, 914 (Mo. banc 1997).

2007The Supreme Court has applied this standard in State v. Nunley, 980 S.W.2d 290, 292 (Mo. banc 1998); State v. Roll, 942 S.W.2d 370, 374 (Mo. banc 1997); and Coates v. State, 939 S.W.2d 912, 914 (Mo. banc 1997).

2007The Supreme Court has applied this standard in State v. Nunley, 980 S.W.2d 290, 292 (Mo. banc 1998); State v. Roll, 942 S.W.2d 370, 374 (Mo. banc 1997); and Coates v. State, 939 S.W.2d 912, 914 (Mo. banc 1997).

2007The Missouri Supreme Court adopted the Hill standard for the prejudice prong of an ineffectiveness claim on a plea of guilty in Hagan v. State, 836 S.W.2d 459, 463-64 (Mo. banc 1992) (questioned on other grounds by State v. Heslop, 842 S.W.2d 72, 75 (Mo. banc 1992)).

2007The Missouri Supreme Court adopted the Hill standard for the prejudice prong of an ineffectiveness claim on a plea of guilty in Hagan v. State, 836 S.W.2d 459, 463-64 (Mo. banc 1992) (questioned on other grounds by State v. Heslop, 842 S.W.2d 72, 75 (Mo. banc 1992)).

2007Coates, 939 S.W.2d at 914 .

2007The Supreme Court has applied this standard in State v. Nunley, 980 S.W.2d 290, 292 (Mo. banc 1998); State v. Roll, 942 S.W.2d 370, 374 (Mo. banc 1997); and Coates v. State, 939 S.W.2d 912, 914 (Mo. banc 1997).

2007The Missouri Supreme Court adopted the Hill standard for the prejudice prong of an ineffectiveness claim on a plea of guilty in Hagan v. State, 836 S.W.2d 459, 463-64 (Mo. banc 1992) (questioned on other grounds by State v. Heslop, 842 S.W.2d 72, 75 (Mo. banc 1992)).

2007The Missouri Supreme Court adopted the Hill standard for the prejudice prong of an ineffectiveness claim on a plea of guilty in Hagan v. State, 836 S.W.2d 459, 463-64 (Mo. banc 1992) (questioned on other grounds by State v. Heslop, 842 S.W.2d 72, 75 (Mo. banc 1992)).

2006A trial court is not required to instruct on a lesser included offense unless the jury has a basis to (1) acquit of the offense charged, and (2) convict of the lesser offense. § 556.046.2, RSMo 2000; State v. Pond, 131 S.W.3d 792, 793 (Mo. banc 2004).

2002See Fischer v. Fischer, 66 S.W.3d 43, 45 (Mo.App.2001).

2002See Fischer v. Fischer, 66 S.W.3d 43, 45 (Mo.App.2001).

2001See Juenger v. Brookdale Farms, 871 S.W.2d 629, 631 (Mo.App.1994).

2001Although raised in a post-final-judgment motion, Mr. Hill’s motion to set aside the paternity judgment on the basis of extrinsic fraud may be treated as an independent petition in equity if the substance of his motion was “sufficient to invoke the equitable powers of the court.” See Sprung v. Negwer Materials, Inc., 727 S.W.2d 883, 889 (Mo. banc 1987).

1996Leehy v. Supreme Express & Transfer Co., 646 S.W.2d 786, 790 (Mo. banc 1983), applied the Hill factors.

1996Leehy v. Supreme Express & Transfer Co., 646 S.W.2d 786, 790 (Mo. banc 1983), applied the Hill factors.

1996At that point, application of the Hill factors “should operate either ‘to solidify or dispel’ any presumption of availability arising from special relationships of a party and a witness, depending upon circumstances shown in evidence in a particular case.” Kampe, 906 S.W.2d at 802 .

1996At that point, application of the Hill factors “should operate either ‘to solidify or dispel’ any presumption of availability arising from special relationships of a party and a witness, depending upon circumstances shown in evidence in a particular case.” Kampe, 906 S.W.2d at 802 .