42 California opinions name it 3 courts 1954–2026 13 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Williams v. Superior Court of L. A. Cnty.green2 sentences2021A court must then balance these competing considerations. [Citation.] [¶] The Hill test, conceived in the context of a pleaded cause of action for invasion of privacy, has been applied more broadly, including to circumstances where litigation requires a court to reconcile asserted privacy interests with competing claims for access to third party contact information.” (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 552 .) The official information privilege and the related deliberative process privilege apply specifically to confidential information maintained by the government. 2021A court must then balance these competing considerations. [Citation.] [¶] The Hill test, conceived in the context of a pleaded cause of action for invasion of privacy, has been applied more broadly, including to circumstances where litigation requires a court to reconcile asserted privacy interests with competing claims for access to third party contact information.” (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 552 .) The official information privilege and the related deliberative process privilege apply specifically to confidential information maintained by the government. | 3 | 4 |
Pioneer Electronics (USA), Inc. v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2021In considering the first of the Hill factors—the nature of the disclosure—as discussed above, the order pertains, in part, to medical records, “which may contain ‘matters of great sensitivity going to the core of the concerns for the privacy of information about an individual.’ ” (Grafilo v. Soorani (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 497 , 507.) Further, the nature of the medical records at issue in this case—treatment records for a stigmatized condition— only heightens the need for “robust protection.” (Ibid. [“The privacy interest in psychiatric records is particularly strong and, in some respects, entit 2021In considering the first of the Hill factors—the nature of the disclosure—as discussed above, the order pertains, in part, to medical records, “which may contain ‘matters of great sensitivity going to the core of the concerns for the privacy of information about an individual.’ ” (Grafilo v. Soorani (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 497 , 507.) Further, the nature of the medical records at issue in this case—treatment records for a stigmatized condition— only heightens the need for “robust protection.” (Ibid. [“The privacy interest in psychiatric records is particularly strong and, in some respects, entit | 2 | 4 |
Lewis v. Superior Court of L. A. Cnty.green2 sentences2021The Hill framework In Hill, the California Supreme Court “articulated a two-part inquiry for determining whether the right to privacy under article I, section 1 has been violated.” (Lewis, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 571 , citing Hill, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 26 .) “First, the complaining party must meet three ‘ “threshold elements” . . . utilized to screen out claims that do not involve a significant intrusion on a privacy interest protected by the state constitutional privacy provision.’ [Citation.] The party must demonstrate ‘(1) a legally protected privacy interest; (2) a reasonable expectation 2021The Hill framework In Hill, the California Supreme Court “articulated a two-part inquiry for determining whether the right to privacy under article I, section 1 has been violated.” (Lewis, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 571 , citing Hill, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 26 .) “First, the complaining party must meet three ‘ “threshold elements” . . . utilized to screen out claims that do not involve a significant intrusion on a privacy interest protected by the state constitutional privacy provision.’ [Citation.] The party must demonstrate ‘(1) a legally protected privacy interest; (2) a reasonable expectation | 2 | 3 |
Fett v. Medical Board of Californiagreen2 sentences2019(See, e.g., Grafilo v. Cohanshohet (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 428 , 437, 243 Cal.Rptr.3d 807 ( Cohanshohet ) ); Fett , supra , 245 Cal.App.4th at pp. 224-225, 199 Cal.Rptr.3d 196 ; see also Lewis , supra , 3 Cal.5th at p. 575, 220 Cal.Rptr.3d 319 , 397 P.3d 1011 [recognizing that Courts of Appeal use good cause test for evaluating Medical Board's subpoenas for patient medical records].) As one court explained: " 'When the Medical Board seeks judicial enforcement of a subpoena for a physician's medical records, it cannot delve into an area of reasonably expected privacy simply because it wants assur 2019(See, e.g., Grafilo v. Cohanshohet (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 428 , 437, 243 Cal.Rptr.3d 807 ( Cohanshohet ) ); Fett , supra , 245 Cal.App.4th at pp. 224-225, 199 Cal.Rptr.3d 196 ; see also Lewis , supra , 3 Cal.5th at p. 575, 220 Cal.Rptr.3d 319 , 397 P.3d 1011 [recognizing that Courts of Appeal use good cause test for evaluating Medical Board's subpoenas for patient medical records].) As one court explained: " 'When the Medical Board seeks judicial enforcement of a subpoena for a physician's medical records, it cannot delve into an area of reasonably expected privacy simply because it wants assur | 1 | 2 |
Grafilo v. Cohanshohetgreen2 sentences2019(See, e.g., Grafilo v. Cohanshohet (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 428 , 437, 243 Cal.Rptr.3d 807 ( Cohanshohet ) ); Fett , supra , 245 Cal.App.4th at pp. 224-225, 199 Cal.Rptr.3d 196 ; see also Lewis , supra , 3 Cal.5th at p. 575, 220 Cal.Rptr.3d 319 , 397 P.3d 1011 [recognizing that Courts of Appeal use good cause test for evaluating Medical Board's subpoenas for patient medical records].) As one court explained: " 'When the Medical Board seeks judicial enforcement of a subpoena for a physician's medical records, it cannot delve into an area of reasonably expected privacy simply because it wants assur 2019(See, e.g., Grafilo v. Cohanshohet (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 428 , 437, 243 Cal.Rptr.3d 807 ( Cohanshohet ) ); Fett , supra , 245 Cal.App.4th at pp. 224-225, 199 Cal.Rptr.3d 196 ; see also Lewis , supra , 3 Cal.5th at p. 575, 220 Cal.Rptr.3d 319 , 397 P.3d 1011 [recognizing that Courts of Appeal use good cause test for evaluating Medical Board's subpoenas for patient medical records].) As one court explained: " 'When the Medical Board seeks judicial enforcement of a subpoena for a physician's medical records, it cannot delve into an area of reasonably expected privacy simply because it wants assur | 1 | 2 |
Cwynar v. City and County of San Franciscogreen2 sentences2004(See Hill, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 40 ; City of Santa Barbara, supra, 27 Cal.3d at pp. 128-134; CALHO, supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at pp. 460-461; cf. also Cwynar v. City and County of San Francisco (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 637, 660-663 [ 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 233 ].) The City has failed to advance adequate countervailing interests, so as to justify the privacy invasion in issue. e. Feasible and Effective Alternatives Had the City met its burden of articulating a countervailing governmental interest, we would then proceed to the next stage of the Hill analysis: “The plaintiff, in turn, may rebut a defendant’s 2004(See Hill, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 40 ; City of Santa Barbara, supra, 27 Cal.3d at pp. 128-134; CALHO, supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at pp. 460-461; cf. also Cwynar v. City and County of San Francisco (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 637, 660-663 [ 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 233 ].) The City has failed to advance adequate countervailing interests, so as to justify the privacy invasion in issue. e. Feasible and Effective Alternatives Had the City met its burden of articulating a countervailing governmental interest, we would then proceed to the next stage of the Hill analysis: “The plaintiff, in turn, may rebut a defendant’s | 1 | 2 |
People v. Rielgreen1 sentence2026(CALCRIM No. 200; People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1202 [trial counsel has no “duty to object simply to generate appellate issues” and “[s]ometimes, the best action an attorney can take regarding an available objection is not to make it”].) Since there is rational tactical purpose for failing to object to this portion of the instruction, 14 appellants’ claims are “more appropriately resolved in a habeas corpus proceeding.” (Mai, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 1009 .) III. | 1 | 1 |
The People v. Maigreen2 sentences2026(People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009 (Mai).) Here, the record is silent as to why Hill’s defense counsel and Garrett, who represented himself at trial, did not request this portion of the instruction be removed. 2026(CALCRIM No. 200; People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1202 [trial counsel has no “duty to object simply to generate appellate issues” and “[s]ometimes, the best action an attorney can take regarding an available objection is not to make it”].) Since there is rational tactical purpose for failing to object to this portion of the instruction, 14 appellants’ claims are “more appropriately resolved in a habeas corpus proceeding.” (Mai, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 1009 .) III. | 1 | 1 |
Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc.green1 sentence2022Because we decide Quaid has forfeited its appellate challenges to two other dispositive issues, it is unnecessary for us to consider whether it also forfeited its challenge to this defense. 11 “A petition under this title shall be heard in a summary way in the manner and upon the notice provided by law for the making and hearing of motions, except that not less than 10 days’ notice of the date set for the hearing on the petition shall be given.” (§ 1290.2.) 17 (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951, 972 (Engalla).) The petitioning party must also prove a prior demand and refusal to arbitrate under the agreemen | 1 | 1 |
OC Interior Services, LLC v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLCgreen1 sentence2022(Hill v. City Cab & Transfer Co. (1889) 79 Cal. 188, 191 , 21 P. 728 (Hill); [citations].) We describe this exception as the ‘Hill rule.’ ” (OC Interior Services, LLC v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 1318, 1328-1329 (OC Interior).) Appellants argue the trial court erred in “refusing to consider declaration testimony and discovery responses containing admissions by defendants showing the default was based on a fraud on the court and the default judgment awarded relief contrary to law. . . .” Appellants themselves describe their motion to vacate the 2015 default judgment as a dir | 1 | 1 |
Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2021(See Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 652, 657 [“The protection of [nonparty’s privacy right] should not be left entirely to the election of third persons who may have their own personal reasons for permitting or resisting disclosure of confidential information received from others”].) Further, it is also almost certain that many such patients would have strongly objected to the superior court’s disclosure order and would have desired to participate in the proceedings to protect against disclosure. 2021(See Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 652, 657 [“The protection of [nonparty’s privacy right] should not be left entirely to the election of third persons who may have their own personal reasons for permitting or resisting disclosure of confidential information received from others”].) Further, it is also almost certain that many such patients would have strongly objected to the superior court’s disclosure order and would have desired to participate in the proceedings to protect against disclosure. | 1 | 1 |
| Tom v. City and County of San Franciscogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Times Mirror Co. v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
Center v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2021In considering the first of the Hill factors—the nature of the disclosure—as discussed above, the order pertains, in part, to medical records, “which may contain ‘matters of great sensitivity going to the core of the concerns for the privacy of information about an individual.’ ” (Grafilo v. Soorani (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 497 , 507.) Further, the nature of the medical records at issue in this case—treatment records for a stigmatized condition— only heightens the need for “robust protection.” (Ibid. [“The privacy interest in psychiatric records is particularly strong and, in some respects, entit 2021In considering the first of the Hill factors—the nature of the disclosure—as discussed above, the order pertains, in part, to medical records, “which may contain ‘matters of great sensitivity going to the core of the concerns for the privacy of information about an individual.’ ” (Grafilo v. Soorani (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 497 , 507.) Further, the nature of the medical records at issue in this case—treatment records for a stigmatized condition— only heightens the need for “robust protection.” (Ibid. [“The privacy interest in psychiatric records is particularly strong and, in some respects, entit | 1 | 1 |
Catholic Mutual Relief Society v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2021(See id. at p. 538.) As this court observed in Board of Registered Nursing, the Supreme Court has cautioned that “[t]he permissible scope of discovery in general is not as broad with respect to nonparties as it is with respect to parties.” (Catholic Mutual Relief Society v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 358, 366, fn. 6 (Catholic Mutual Relief Society); see Board of Registered Nursing, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 1039, citing Catholic Mutual Relief Society, supra, at p. 366, fn. 6 .) 19 discretion and we call such action an ‘abuse’ of discretion.” ’ [Citation.] An order that implicitly or ex 2021(See id. at p. 538.) As this court observed in Board of Registered Nursing, the Supreme Court has cautioned that “[t]he permissible scope of discovery in general is not as broad with respect to nonparties as it is with respect to parties.” (Catholic Mutual Relief Society v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 358, 366, fn. 6 (Catholic Mutual Relief Society); see Board of Registered Nursing, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 1039, citing Catholic Mutual Relief Society, supra, at p. 366, fn. 6 .) 19 discretion and we call such action an ‘abuse’ of discretion.” ’ [Citation.] An order that implicitly or ex | 1 | 1 |
| Newport v. Hattongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Thompson v. Cookgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Planned Parenthood v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lantz v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Johnson v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Plaza Hollister Ltd. Partnership v. County of San Benitogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Marlenee v. Browngreen | 1 | 1 |
| Reeve v. Kennedygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Garrison v. Blanchardgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Doyle v. Hamptongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Follette v. Pacific Light & Power Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Illinois v. Wardlowgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Durazogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bailey v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Edward S.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn.
green
2 sentences2021(See Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 552, 556 (Williams) [stating that Hill applies to a discovery dispute that “requires a court to reconcile asserted privacy interests with competing claims for access”].) In applying the Hill test, “[t]he party asserting a privacy right must establish a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious.” ( Williams, supra, at p. 552 , citing Hill, supra, at pp. 35–37.) “The party seeking information may raise in response whatever legitim 2021(See Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 552, 556 (Williams) [stating that Hill applies to a discovery dispute that “requires a court to reconcile asserted privacy interests with competing claims for access”].) In applying the Hill test, “[t]he party asserting a privacy right must establish a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious.” ( Williams, supra, at p. 552 , citing Hill, supra, at pp. 35–37.) “The party seeking information may raise in response whatever legitim | 9 | 1995–2021 |
Hill v. City Cab & Transfer Co.
green
2 sentences2022(Hill v. City Cab & Transfer Co. (1889) 79 Cal. 188, 191 , 21 P. 728 (Hill); [citations].) We describe this exception as the ‘Hill rule.’ ” (OC Interior Services, LLC v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 1318, 1328-1329 (OC Interior).) Appellants argue the trial court erred in “refusing to consider declaration testimony and discovery responses containing admissions by defendants showing the default was based on a fraud on the court and the default judgment awarded relief contrary to law. . . .” Appellants themselves describe their motion to vacate the 2015 default judgment as a dir 2022(Hill v. City Cab & Transfer Co. (1889) 79 Cal. 188, 191 , 21 P. 728 (Hill); [citations].) We describe this exception as the ‘Hill rule.’ ” (OC Interior Services, LLC v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 1318, 1328-1329 (OC Interior).) Appellants argue the trial court erred in “refusing to consider declaration testimony and discovery responses containing admissions by defendants showing the default was based on a fraud on the court and the default judgment awarded relief contrary to law. . . .” Appellants themselves describe their motion to vacate the 2015 default judgment as a dir | 2 | 2017–2022 |
People v. Buza
green
2 sentences2021(Buza, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 685 .) Defendant asserts that Proposition 8 does not apply to his state search and seizure or informational privacy claims because King did not address the collection and analysis of DNA from an arrestee when the prosecutor later declines to file formal charges and it did not decide the Fourth Amendment issue “within the context of” his informational application of the Truth-in-Evidence provision in Proposition 8, which we discuss post, we need not separately analyze defendant’s privacy right contention under the Hill test. 57 privacy contention. 23 But we look to 2021(Buza, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 685 .) Defendant asserts that Proposition 8 does not apply to his state search and seizure or informational privacy claims because King did not address the collection and analysis of DNA from an arrestee when the prosecutor later declines to file formal charges and it did not decide the Fourth Amendment issue “within the context of” his informational application of the Truth-in-Evidence provision in Proposition 8, which we discuss post, we need not separately analyze defendant’s privacy right contention under the Hill test. 57 privacy contention. 23 But we look to | 2 | 2021–2021 |
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
green
2 sentences2021(Hill, at pp. 792-794.) It summarized Shotspotter as follows: 4 Under Nebraska’s Daubert/Schafersman jurisprudence, “the trial court acts as a gatekeeper to ensure the evidentiary relevance and reliability of an expert’s opinion” to “ensure that the courtroom door remains closed to ‘ “junk science” ’ that might unduly influence the jury, while admitting reliable expert testimony that will assist the trier of fact.” (Hill, supra, 288 Neb. at p. 792 , and fns. 39 and 40, citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993) 509 U.S. 579 and Schafersman v. Agland Coop (2001) 262 Neb. 215 .) 2021(Hill, at pp. 792-794.) It summarized Shotspotter as follows: 4 Under Nebraska’s Daubert/Schafersman jurisprudence, “the trial court acts as a gatekeeper to ensure the evidentiary relevance and reliability of an expert’s opinion” to “ensure that the courtroom door remains closed to ‘ “junk science” ’ that might unduly influence the jury, while admitting reliable expert testimony that will assist the trier of fact.” (Hill, supra, 288 Neb. at p. 792 , and fns. 39 and 40, citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993) 509 U.S. 579 and Schafersman v. Agland Coop (2001) 262 Neb. 215 .) | 2 | 2021–2021 |
Schafersman v. Agland Coop.
green
2 sentences2021(Hill, at pp. 792-794.) It summarized Shotspotter as follows: 4 Under Nebraska’s Daubert/Schafersman jurisprudence, “the trial court acts as a gatekeeper to ensure the evidentiary relevance and reliability of an expert’s opinion” to “ensure that the courtroom door remains closed to ‘ “junk science” ’ that might unduly influence the jury, while admitting reliable expert testimony that will assist the trier of fact.” (Hill, supra, 288 Neb. at p. 792 , and fns. 39 and 40, citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993) 509 U.S. 579 and Schafersman v. Agland Coop (2001) 262 Neb. 215 .) 2021(Hill, at pp. 792-794.) It summarized Shotspotter as follows: 4 Under Nebraska’s Daubert/Schafersman jurisprudence, “the trial court acts as a gatekeeper to ensure the evidentiary relevance and reliability of an expert’s opinion” to “ensure that the courtroom door remains closed to ‘ “junk science” ’ that might unduly influence the jury, while admitting reliable expert testimony that will assist the trier of fact.” (Hill, supra, 288 Neb. at p. 792 , and fns. 39 and 40, citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993) 509 U.S. 579 and Schafersman v. Agland Coop (2001) 262 Neb. 215 .) | 2 | 2021–2021 |
Sander v. State Bar of Cal.
green
2 sentences2021“Under longstanding common law and statutory principles, information obtained through a promise of confidentiality is not subject to the right of public access when the public interest would be furthered by maintaining confidentiality. [Citations.] This principle is currently reflected in Evidence Code section 1040, which provides a privilege to a public entity to refuse to disclose information acquired in confidence if ‘there is a necessity for preserving the confidentiality of the information that outweighs the necessity for disclosure.’ ” (Sander v. State Bar of California (2013) 58 Cal.4th 2021“Under longstanding common law and statutory principles, information obtained through a promise of confidentiality is not subject to the right of public access when the public interest would be furthered by maintaining confidentiality. [Citations.] This principle is currently reflected in Evidence Code section 1040, which provides a privilege to a public entity to refuse to disclose information acquired in confidence if ‘there is a necessity for preserving the confidentiality of the information that outweighs the necessity for disclosure.’ ” (Sander v. State Bar of California (2013) 58 Cal.4th | 2 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Hill
green
2 sentences2021(Hill, at pp. 792-794.) It summarized Shotspotter as follows: 4 Under Nebraska’s Daubert/Schafersman jurisprudence, “the trial court acts as a gatekeeper to ensure the evidentiary relevance and reliability of an expert’s opinion” to “ensure that the courtroom door remains closed to ‘ “junk science” ’ that might unduly influence the jury, while admitting reliable expert testimony that will assist the trier of fact.” (Hill, supra, 288 Neb. at p. 792 , and fns. 39 and 40, citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993) 509 U.S. 579 and Schafersman v. Agland Coop (2001) 262 Neb. 215 .) 2021(Hill, at pp. 792-794.) It summarized Shotspotter as follows: 4 Under Nebraska’s Daubert/Schafersman jurisprudence, “the trial court acts as a gatekeeper to ensure the evidentiary relevance and reliability of an expert’s opinion” to “ensure that the courtroom door remains closed to ‘ “junk science” ’ that might unduly influence the jury, while admitting reliable expert testimony that will assist the trier of fact.” (Hill, supra, 288 Neb. at p. 792 , and fns. 39 and 40, citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993) 509 U.S. 579 and Schafersman v. Agland Coop (2001) 262 Neb. 215 .) | 2 | 2021–2021 |
County of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles County Employee Relations Commission
green
2 sentences2020In Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1 (Hill), our Supreme Court "established a framework for analyzing constitutional invasion of privacy claims." (County of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles County Employee Relations Com. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 905, 926 ; see Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 552-553 [the Hill framework has been applied broadly in balancing privacy claims].) "If an obvious invasion of interest fundamental to personal autonomy is involved, then the compelling interest test applies. 2020In Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1 (Hill), our Supreme Court "established a framework for analyzing constitutional invasion of privacy claims." (County of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles County Employee Relations Com. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 905, 926 ; see Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 552-553 [the Hill framework has been applied broadly in balancing privacy claims].) "If an obvious invasion of interest fundamental to personal autonomy is involved, then the compelling interest test applies. | 2 | 2017–2020 |
In Re Zepeda
green
2 sentences2019The appellate court found the evidence was sufficient under the Hill standard, emphasizing "the location of the razor blades ... in 'an area easily accessible to both inmates' " and the fact "Zepeda was one of only two inmates who shared the cell." ( Zepeda , supra , 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 1499 , 47 Cal.Rptr.3d 172 .) "In addition, the plastic casings for the razor blades were found in the cell, indicating that alteration of the razor blades occurred there." ( Ibid. ) Here, the superior court attempted to distinguish Zepeda by claiming "the razor blades had been in the cell for days," whereas t 2019The appellate court found the evidence was sufficient under the Hill standard, emphasizing "the location of the razor blades ... in 'an area easily accessible to both inmates' " and the fact "Zepeda was one of only two inmates who shared the cell." ( Zepeda , supra , 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 1499 , 47 Cal.Rptr.3d 172 .) "In addition, the plastic casings for the razor blades were found in the cell, indicating that alteration of the razor blades occurred there." ( Ibid. ) Here, the superior court attempted to distinguish Zepeda by claiming "the razor blades had been in the cell for days," whereas t | 2 | 2019–2019 |
Kirchmeyer v. Phillips
green
2 sentences2019(See, e.g., Grafilo v. Cohanshohet (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 428 , 437, 243 Cal.Rptr.3d 807 ( Cohanshohet ) ); Fett , supra , 245 Cal.App.4th at pp. 224-225, 199 Cal.Rptr.3d 196 ; see also Lewis , supra , 3 Cal.5th at p. 575, 220 Cal.Rptr.3d 319 , 397 P.3d 1011 [recognizing that Courts of Appeal use good cause test for evaluating Medical Board's subpoenas for patient medical records].) As one court explained: " 'When the Medical Board seeks judicial enforcement of a subpoena for a physician's medical records, it cannot delve into an area of reasonably expected privacy simply because it wants assur 2019(See, e.g., Grafilo v. Cohanshohet (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 428 , 437, 243 Cal.Rptr.3d 807 ( Cohanshohet ) ); Fett , supra , 245 Cal.App.4th at pp. 224-225, 199 Cal.Rptr.3d 196 ; see also Lewis , supra , 3 Cal.5th at p. 575, 220 Cal.Rptr.3d 319 , 397 P.3d 1011 [recognizing that Courts of Appeal use good cause test for evaluating Medical Board's subpoenas for patient medical records].) As one court explained: " 'When the Medical Board seeks judicial enforcement of a subpoena for a physician's medical records, it cannot delve into an area of reasonably expected privacy simply because it wants assur | 2 | 2019–2019 |
Guillory v. Hill
green
2 sentences2019(Guillory I, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 243 .) At the close of evidence, the trial court granted Hill’s motion for a directed verdict (Code Civ. 2019(Guillory I, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 243 .) At the close of evidence, the trial court granted Hill’s motion for a directed verdict (Code Civ. | 2 | 2019–2019 |
Weeks v. Baker & McKenzie
green
1 sentence2026(Weeks v. Baker & McKenzie (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1128 , 1147–1148 [§ 3294 “applies to actions brought under FEHA”].) Urena moved to strike these allegations for being too conclusory and for relying on conduct that fell short of these statutory standards. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
In re Boyette
green
1 sentence2024(See In re Boyette, supra, 56 Cal.4th at pp. 889–890.) Because Hill asserts no other error, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Hill’s motion to discharge Juror No. 5 or in denying the motion for a new trial. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Thompson
green
1 sentence2024(People v. Thompson (2010) 49 Cal.4th 79, 140 .) DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Lopez
green
1 sentence2024Hill’s claim the evidence was insufficient to disprove he was a shoplifter fails because the prosecution was not required to make this showing. ( Lopez, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 276–277.) Finally, Hill initially contends in his opening brief that the trial court committed instructional error when it failed to give “an expanded burglary instruction that included the shoplifting elements.” In his reply brief, Hill acknowledges this argument is “untenable.” Here, we agree with Hill. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Neal v. Farmers Insurance Exchange
green
1 sentence2023Exchange (1978) 21 Cal.3d 910, 932 .) Therefore, we will reverse an order reducing damages on the ground that they were excessive only if the trial court abused its discretion. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| San Joaquin County Local Agency Formation Commission v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Kizer v. Sulnick
green
2 sentences2021(Kizer, supra, 202 Cal.App.3d at p. 435 .) 24 Kizer, supra, 202 Cal.App.3d at p. 439 was decided before Hill and thus did not apply the Hill framework. 2021(Kizer, supra, 202 Cal.App.3d at p. 435 .) 24 Kizer, supra, 202 Cal.App.3d at p. 439 was decided before Hill and thus did not apply the Hill framework. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court of Orange Cty. green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| John B. v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| DEPARTMENT, FAIR EMPLOYMENT AND HOUSING v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Bearman v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Long Beach City Employees Assn. v. City of Long Beach green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Wood v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Mendez v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Ombudsman Services of Northern California v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Moskowitz v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Palay v. SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES CTY. green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Harding Lawson Associates v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Hooser v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| El Dorado Savings & Loan Assn. v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Save Open Space Santa Monica Mountains v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| HINSHAW, WINKLER, DRAA, MARSH v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Binder v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Harris v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Belaire-West Landscape, Inc. v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Kahn v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Garstang v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Board of Medical Quality Assurance v. Gherardini green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| San Diego Trolley, Inc. v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.