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9 New York opinions name it 2 courts 2008–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Caristo v. Sanzonegreen2 sentences2014“Under the emergency doctrine, ‘ “when [a driver] is faced with a sudden and unexpected circumstance which leaves little or no time for thought, deliberation or consideration, or causes [the driver] to be reasonably so disturbed that [he or she] must make a speedy decision without weighing alternative courses of conduct, the [driver] may not be negligent if the actions taken are reasonable and prudent in the emergency context, provided the [driver] has not created the emergency” ’ (Caristo v Sanzone, 96 NY2d 172, 174 [2001] [citation omitted]; see Lifson v City of Syracuse, 17 NY3d 492, 497 [2 2014“Under the emergency doctrine, ‘ “when [a driver] is faced with a sudden and unexpected circumstance which leaves little or no time for thought, deliberation or consideration, or causes [the driver] to be reasonably so disturbed that [he or she] must make a speedy decision without weighing alternative courses of conduct, the [driver] may not be negligent if the actions taken are reasonable and prudent in the emergency context, provided the [driver] has not created the emergency” ’ (Caristo v Sanzone, 96 NY2d 172, 174 [2001] [citation omitted]; see Lifson v City of Syracuse, 17 NY3d 492, 497 [2 | 3 | 3 |
Stewart v. Kiergreen2 sentences2014“Under the emergency doctrine, ‘ “when [a driver] is faced with a sudden and unexpected circumstance which leaves little or no time for thought, deliberation or consideration, or causes [the driver] to be reasonably so disturbed that [he or she] must make a speedy decision without weighing alternative courses of conduct, the [driver] may not be negligent if the actions taken are reasonable and prudent in the emergency context, provided the [driver] has not created the emergency” ’ (Caristo v Sanzone, 96 NY2d 172, 174 [2001] [citation omitted]; see Lifson v City of Syracuse, 17 NY3d 492, 497 [2 2014“Under the emergency doctrine, ‘ “when [a driver] is faced with a sudden and unexpected circumstance which leaves little or no time for thought, deliberation or consideration, or causes [the driver] to be reasonably so disturbed that [he or she] must make a speedy decision without weighing alternative courses of conduct, the [driver] may not be negligent if the actions taken are reasonable and prudent in the emergency context, provided the [driver] has not created the emergency” ’ (Caristo v Sanzone, 96 NY2d 172, 174 [2001] [citation omitted]; see Lifson v City of Syracuse, 17 NY3d 492, 497 [2 | 3 | 3 |
Lifson v. City of Syracusegreen2 sentences2014“Under the emergency doctrine, ‘ “when [a driver] is faced with a sudden and unexpected circumstance which leaves little or no time for thought, deliberation or consideration, or causes [the driver] to be reasonably so disturbed that [he or she] must make a speedy decision without weighing alternative courses of conduct, the [driver] may not be negligent if the actions taken are reasonable and prudent in the emergency context, provided the [driver] has not created the emergency” ’ (Caristo v Sanzone, 96 NY2d 172, 174 [2001] [citation omitted]; see Lifson v City of Syracuse, 17 NY3d 492, 497 [2 2014“Under the emergency doctrine, ‘ “when [a driver] is faced with a sudden and unexpected circumstance which leaves little or no time for thought, deliberation or consideration, or causes [the driver] to be reasonably so disturbed that [he or she] must make a speedy decision without weighing alternative courses of conduct, the [driver] may not be negligent if the actions taken are reasonable and prudent in the emergency context, provided the [driver] has not created the emergency” ’ (Caristo v Sanzone, 96 NY2d 172, 174 [2001] [citation omitted]; see Lifson v City of Syracuse, 17 NY3d 492, 497 [2 | 3 | 3 |
ELRAC, Inc. v. Suerogreen2 sentences2013Hill’s claim for uninsured motorist benefits against the NYCTA, a self-insurer, is subject to the six-year statute of limitations of CPLR 213 (2) (see Matter of ELRAC Inc., v Suero, 38 AD3d 544, 545 [2007]; CPLR 213 [2]; see also Jenkins v State Farm Ins. 2013Hill’s claim for uninsured motorist benefits against the NYCTA, a self-insurer, is subject to the six-year statute of limitations of CPLR 213 (2) (see Matter of ELRAC Inc., v Suero, 38 AD3d 544, 545 [2007]; CPLR 213 [2]; see also Jenkins v State Farm Ins. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Smithgreen2 sentences2026Decisions from other state high courts applying Hill have suggested a similar convergence when a mistaken arrest occurs in the context of a street encounter ( see State v Smith , 102 Wash 2d 449, 453, 688 P2d 146, 149 [1984] [applying Hill but observing that "(i)n the context of this case, 'probable cause' means cause to believe that (the defendant) was the (person) named in the warrant"]; State v Sanders , 339 NW2d 557, 560 [Minn 1983] [citing the Hill rule but holding that the initial stop to ascertain the defendant's identity had to be justified by reasonable suspicion]). 2026Decisions from other state high courts applying Hill have suggested a similar convergence when a mistaken arrest occurs in the context of a street encounter ( see State v Smith , 102 Wash 2d 449, 453, 688 P2d 146, 149 [1984] [applying Hill but observing that "(i)n the context of this case, 'probable cause' means cause to believe that (the defendant) was the (person) named in the warrant"]; State v Sanders , 339 NW2d 557, 560 [Minn 1983] [citing the Hill rule but holding that the initial stop to ascertain the defendant's identity had to be justified by reasonable suspicion]). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Sandersgreen2 sentences2026Decisions from other state high courts applying Hill have suggested a similar convergence when a mistaken arrest occurs in the context of a street encounter ( see State v Smith , 102 Wash 2d 449, 453, 688 P2d 146, 149 [1984] [applying Hill but observing that "(i)n the context of this case, 'probable cause' means cause to believe that (the defendant) was the (person) named in the warrant"]; State v Sanders , 339 NW2d 557, 560 [Minn 1983] [citing the Hill rule but holding that the initial stop to ascertain the defendant's identity had to be justified by reasonable suspicion]). 2026Decisions from other state high courts applying Hill have suggested a similar convergence when a mistaken arrest occurs in the context of a street encounter ( see State v Smith , 102 Wash 2d 449, 453, 688 P2d 146, 149 [1984] [applying Hill but observing that "(i)n the context of this case, 'probable cause' means cause to believe that (the defendant) was the (person) named in the warrant"]; State v Sanders , 339 NW2d 557, 560 [Minn 1983] [citing the Hill rule but holding that the initial stop to ascertain the defendant's identity had to be justified by reasonable suspicion]). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Sorianogreen1 sentence2008While, unlike Hill’s challenge to the court’s accessorial liability charge, this objection was not preserved, reversal in the interest of justice is warranted (see People v Soriano, 36 AD3d 527, 529 [2007]). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Jenkins v. State Farm Insurance
green
2 sentences2013Co., 21 AD3d 529 [2005]). 2013Co., 21 AD3d 529 [2005]). | 2 | 2013–2013 |
Gwynn v. Soriano
green
1 sentence2019Partners , 96 AD3d 646 [1st Dept 2012]; Kat House Prods., LLC v Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker, LLP , 71 AD3d 580 [1st Dept 2010]). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Oxbow Calcining USA Inc. v. American Industrial Partners
green
1 sentence2019Partners , 96 AD3d 646 [1st Dept 2012]; Kat House Prods., LLC v Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker, LLP , 71 AD3d 580 [1st Dept 2010]). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Gaddy v. Eyler
green
1 sentence2018The defendants failed to meet their respective prima facie burdens of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident ( see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345 ; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957 ). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Toure v. Avis Rent a Car Systems, Inc.
green
1 sentence2018The defendants failed to meet their respective prima facie burdens of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident ( see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345 ; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957 ). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.