29 Ohio opinions name it 2 courts 2000–2024 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Clyde N. Griffith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.green2 sentences2024The doctrine of judicial estoppel “is an equitable doctrine that a court has discretion to invoke.” Id., citing Independence at ¶ 29 . {¶23} Here, Statler-Houchin is judicially estopped from raising her jurisdictional argument since she conceded the facts underlying the legal conclusion that Ohio was J.S.’s home state at the time she and Starr commenced this matter. 2020“The doctrine of judicial estoppel ‘forbids a party “from taking a position inconsistent with one successfully and unequivocally asserted by the same party in a prior proceeding.” ’ ” Griffith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (C.A.6, 1998), 135 F.3d 376, 380 , quoting Teledyne Industries, Inc. v. Natl. | 3 | 8 |
Advanced Analytics Laboratories, Inc. v. Kegler, Brown, Hill & Ritter, L.P.A.green2 sentences2022Judicial Estoppel {¶46} The doctrine of judicial estoppel “precludes a party from assuming a position in a legal proceeding inconsistent with a position taken in a prior action.” Advanced Analytics Laboratories, Inc. v. Kegler, Brown, Hill & Ritter, L.P.A., 148 Ohio App.3d 440 , 2002-Ohio-3328 , 773 N.E.2d 1081, ¶ 37 (10th Dist.), citing Bruck Mfg. 2022Judicial Estoppel {¶46} The doctrine of judicial estoppel “precludes a party from assuming a position in a legal proceeding inconsistent with a position taken in a prior action.” Advanced Analytics Laboratories, Inc. v. Kegler, Brown, Hill & Ritter, L.P.A., 148 Ohio App.3d 440 , 2002-Ohio-3328 , 773 N.E.2d 1081, ¶ 37 (10th Dist.), citing Bruck Mfg. | 3 | 5 |
Teledyne Industries, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Boardgreen2 sentences2001Labor Relations Bd. (C.A.6, 1990), 911 F.2d 1214 (setting out doctrine of judicial estoppel); Griffith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc . 2000“The doctrine of judicial estoppel ‘forbids a party “from taking a position inconsistent with one successfully and unequivocally asserted by the same party in a prior proceeding.’ ” Teledyne Indus., Inc. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. (6th Cir.1990), 911 F.2d 1214 , 1217. | 1 | 9 |
Fayette Drywall, Inc. v. Oettingergreen2 sentences2022Fayette Drywall, Inc. v. Oettinger, 2020-Ohio-6641 , 164 N.E.3d 556, ¶ 11 (2d Dist.).9 To apply the doctrine of judicial estoppel, one must show that his opponent took a contrary position, under oath, in a prior proceeding, and the prior position was accepted by the court. 2022Fayette Drywall, Inc. v. Oettinger, 2020-Ohio-6641 , 164 N.E.3d 556, ¶ 11 (2d Dist.).9 To apply the doctrine of judicial estoppel, one must show that his opponent took a contrary position, under oath, in a prior proceeding, and the prior position was accepted by the court. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Greer-Burger v. Temesi
green
2 sentences2022In order to apply the doctrine of judicial estoppel, the proponent must show that his opponent “(1) took a contrary position; (2) under oath in a prior proceeding; and (3) the prior position was accepted by the court.” Greer-Burger v. Temesi, 116 Ohio St.3d 324 , 2007-Ohio-6442 , 879 N.E.2d 174, ¶ 25 . 2022In order to apply the doctrine of judicial estoppel, the proponent must show that his opponent “(1) took a contrary position; (2) under oath in a prior proceeding; and (3) the prior position was accepted by the court.” Greer-Burger v. Temesi, 116 Ohio St.3d 324 , 2007-Ohio-6442 , 879 N.E.2d 174, ¶ 25 . | 8 | 2011–2022 |
Bruck Manufacturing Co. v. Mason
green
2 sentences2008Bruck v. Mason (1992), 84 Ohio App.3d 398 , 400 , 616 N.E.2d 1168 . {¶ 47} Upon review, we do not find that the doctrine of judicial estoppel applies. 2008Bruck v. Mason (1992), 84 Ohio App.3d 398 , 400 , 616 N.E.2d 1168 . {¶ 47} Upon review, we do not find that the doctrine of judicial estoppel applies. | 6 | 2007–2022 |
Harold M. Reynolds v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
green
2 sentences2020Labor Relations Bd. (C.A.6, 1990), 911 F.2d 1214 , 1217, quoting Reynolds v. Commr. of Internal Revenue (C.A.6, 1988), 861 F.2d 469, 472-473 . 2008Labor Relations Bd. (C.A.6, 1990), *Page 5 911 F.2d 1214 , 1217 , quoting Reynolds v. Commr. of Internal Revenue (C.A.6, 1988), 861 F.2d 469 , 472-473 . | 3 | 2007–2020 |
Smith v. Dillard Department Stores, Inc.
green
2 sentences2003Stores, Inc. (2000), 139 Ohio App.3d 525, 533 , 744 N.E.2d 1198 , quoting Teledyne Indus., Inc. v. NLRB (C.A.6, 1990), 911 F.2d 1214 , 1217. 2003Stores, Inc. (2000), 139 Ohio App.3d 525 , 533 , quoting Teledyne Indus., Inc. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. (C.A. 6, 1990), 911 F.2d 1214 , 1217 . | 2 | 2003–2003 |
Chrysler Group, L.L.C. v. Dixon
green
1 sentence2024Cuyahoga No. 104628, 2017-Ohio-1161, ¶ 16 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Independence v. Office of the Cuyahoga Cty. Executive (Slip Opinion)
green
2 sentences2021Executive, 142 Ohio St.3d 125 , 2014-Ohio-4650, ¶ 29 , citing Greer-Burger v. Temesi, 116 Ohio St.3d 324 , 2007-Ohio-6442 , ¶ 25. 2021Executive, 142 Ohio St.3d 125 , 2014-Ohio-4650, ¶ 29 , citing Greer-Burger v. Temesi, 116 Ohio St.3d 324 , 2007-Ohio-6442 , ¶ 25. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Goodson v. McDonough Power Equipment, Inc.
green
2 sentences2018Therefore, the doctrine of judicial estoppel does not apply to the instant case. {¶11} Houston further argues that Morales is estopped from claiming immunity under the “fellow servant” rule because he did not pursue an appeal of the Industrial Commission’s denial of his injury claim. {¶12} Collateral estoppel precludes the “relitigation in a second action of an issue or issues that have been actually and necessarily litigated and determined in a prior action.” Goodson v. McDonough Power Equip., Inc., 2 Ohio St.3d 193, 195 , 443 N.E.2d 978 (1983), citing Whitehead v. Gen. 2018Therefore, the doctrine of judicial estoppel does not apply to the instant case. {¶11} Houston further argues that Morales is estopped from claiming immunity under the “fellow servant” rule because he did not pursue an appeal of the Industrial Commission’s denial of his injury claim. {¶12} Collateral estoppel precludes the “relitigation in a second action of an issue or issues that have been actually and necessarily litigated and determined in a prior action.” Goodson v. McDonough Power Equip., Inc., 2 Ohio St.3d 193, 195 , 443 N.E.2d 978 (1983), citing Whitehead v. Gen. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Scioto Memorial Hospital Ass'n v. Price Waterhouse
green
1 sentence2013No. 90AP-1124 (Dec. 21, 1993), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 74 Ohio St.3d 474 (1996). {¶ 15} The Institute asserts the doctrine of judicial estoppel precludes Dr. Saha from pursuing the present litigation because Dr. Saha did not include his claim against the Institute as a potential asset when he filed a Chapter 13 voluntary bankruptcy petition in December 2010, nor did he amend his petition to include the subject case until after the Institute filed its motion to dismiss. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Dresher v. Burt
green
1 sentence2011Id. at 293 . {¶12} We note that the focus of Mr. and Mrs. Culgan’s argument is whether the judicial estoppel doctrine applies because they acquired property subsequent to the bankruptcy filing. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Michael Swanks v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
green
2 sentences2007Cir., 1997), 116 F.3d 582 , holding that the receipt of disability benefits did not preclude subsequent relief under the Americans with Disabilities Act, and, therefore, rejecting application of the doctrine of judicial estoppel. 2007Id. {¶ 24} Based upon the foregoing, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court, and the assignment of error of DYS is not well-taken. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Hildreth Mfg., L.L.C. v. Semco, Inc.
green
1 sentence2007Hildreth M/g., L.L.C. v. Semco, Inc. , 151 Ohio App.3d 693 , 2003-Ohio-741 ; Fraley v. Fraley , 2d Dist. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
State v. Burgess, Unpublished Decision (10-6-2006)
neutral
1 sentence2007The State argues that the doctrine of judicial estoppel should bar Nunez's argument. {¶ 5} In State v. Burgess , Montgomery App. No. 21315, 2006-Ohio-5309 , Burgess, like Nunez, successfully appealed his sentence because the trial court did not make the statutorily required findings of fact *Page 3 required findings of fact before imposing consecutive sentences, and we rejected the State's argument therein that Burgess was judicially estopped from challenging his sentence pursuant to Foster . {¶ 6} "`[W]here a party assumes a certain position in a legal proceeding, and succeeds in maintaining | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Coal Resources, Inc. v. Gulf & Western Industries, Inc.
green
1 sentence2001Hilliard , citing Coal Resources, Inc. v. Gulf Western Industries, Inc. (C.A.6, 1989), 865 F.2d 761 . | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.