judicial estoppel doctrine in District of Columbia

2018Ct. Dec. 12, 2014) (noting that where the government urged the trial court to conclude that the defendants could not be deported following a conviction, the government would then be precluded by the doctrine of judicial estoppel ―from taking a contrary position in hypothetical future immigration hearings involving the defendants‖); cf. Mason v. United States, 956 A.2d 63, 65-66 (D.C. 2008) (judicially estopping a defendant who changed position in different proceedings concerning citizenship status and setting out three factors to be considered in applying judicial estoppel); Porter Novelli v.

2018Ct. Dec. 12, 2014) (noting that where the government urged the trial court to conclude that the defendants could not be deported following a conviction, the government would then be precluded by the doctrine of judicial estoppel "from taking a contrary position in hypothetical future immigration hearings involving the defendants"); cf. Mason v. United States , 956 A.2d 63 , 65-66 (D.C. 2008) (judicially estopping a defendant who changed position in different proceedings concerning citizenship status and setting out three factors to be considered in applying judicial estoppel); Porter Novelli v

2018Ct. Dec. 12, 2014) (noting that where the government urged the trial court to conclude that the defendants could not be deported following a conviction, the government would then be precluded by the doctrine of judicial estoppel ―from taking a contrary position in hypothetical future immigration hearings involving the defendants‖); cf. Mason v. United States, 956 A.2d 63, 65-66 (D.C. 2008) (judicially estopping a defendant who changed position in different proceedings concerning citizenship status and setting out three factors to be considered in applying judicial estoppel); Porter Novelli v.

2018Ct. Dec. 12, 2014) (noting that where the government urged the trial court to conclude that the defendants could not be deported following a conviction, the government would then be precluded by the doctrine of judicial estoppel "from taking a contrary position in hypothetical future immigration hearings involving the defendants"); cf. Mason v. United States , 956 A.2d 63 , 65-66 (D.C. 2008) (judicially estopping a defendant who changed position in different proceedings concerning citizenship status and setting out three factors to be considered in applying judicial estoppel); Porter Novelli v

2018See generally Ward v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 89 A.3d 115, 127-28 (D.C. 2014). 42 E.g., novel Fourth Amendment motions to suppress and Sixth Amendment claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. 38 imperiling a conviction that may be obtained after a bench trial, should it eventually be determined that denial of the jury trial demand was based on a flawed judgment on the deportation question.

2018See generally Ward v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. , 89 A.3d 115 , 127-28 (D.C. 2014).

2014Five, LLC, 56 A.3d 765, 780 (D.C. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2014Five, LLC, 56 A.3d 765, 780 (D.C.2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2008See Lassiter v. District of Columbia, 447 A.2d 456, 461 (D.C.1982) C‘[T]he claim is barred by the doctrine of judicial estoppel (or estoppel by oath)” (emphasis added)); Atkins v. United States, 283 A.2d 204 , 206 n. 4 (D.C.1971) (noting that “for estoppel to apply against a party to litigation that party must have asserted ... one position in litigation, and then switched his position” (emphasis added)).

2008See Lassiter v. District of Columbia, 447 A.2d 456, 461 (D.C.1982) C‘[T]he claim is barred by the doctrine of judicial estoppel (or estoppel by oath)” (emphasis added)); Atkins v. United States, 283 A.2d 204 , 206 n. 4 (D.C.1971) (noting that “for estoppel to apply against a party to litigation that party must have asserted ... one position in litigation, and then switched his position” (emphasis added)).

2015Estoppel may not cure or render harmless the deprivation of the jury trial right, but at a minimum it would serve a prudential purpose by encouraging the government to avail itself of expert government resources on immigration law and presenting them to the court and the defense before opposing a motion for jury trial. 42 persons who are “similarly situated.” Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 368 , 373- 74 (1886); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (noting that “equal protection of the laws” is a more specific safeguard encompassed within the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause); Smi

2015Estoppel may not cure or render harmless the deprivation of the jury trial right, but at a minimum it would serve a prudential purpose by encouraging the government to avail itself of expert government resources on immigration law and presenting them to the court and the defense before opposing a motion for jury trial. 42 persons who are “similarly situated.” Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 368 , 373- 74 (1886); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (noting that “equal protection of the laws” is a more specific safeguard encompassed within the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause); Smi

2013“The doctrine of judicial estoppel precludes a party from taking one position on an issue in the trial court and the opposite position on appeal.” Fairman v. District of Columbia, 934 A.2d 438, 443 (D.C.2007) (citations omitted).

2012In turn, under the “broader doctrine of ‘equitable estoppel,’” a “‘party with full knowledge of the facts, which accepts the benefits of a transaction, contract, statute, regulations or order may not subsequently take an inconsistent position to avoid the corresponding obligations or effects.’ ” Porter Novelli, supra, 817 A.2d at 188 (emphasis in original) (quoting Thoubboron v. Ford Motor Co., 809 A.2d 1204, 1212 (D.C.2002)).

2012Similarly, in Golden Pisces, the Ninth Circuit determined that the doctrine of judicial estoppel, “which precludes a party from gaining an advantage by taking contradictory positions at different stages of a judicial proceeding,” applied to the shipowner’s attempt to claim attorney’s fees because the shipowner “first argued to [its] advantage that the written contract was void ... and now seek[s], again to [its] advantage, to enforce a term from that same contract.” 495 F.3d at 1084 (internal quotation marks omitted).

2012Co., Inc. v. District of Columbia Contract Appeals Bd., 892 A.2d 380, 386 (D.C.2006) (recognizing that the doctrine of judicial estoppel can apply in the administrative context).

2006This court has also applied the doctrine of judicial estoppel in Allen v. Yates, 870 A.2d 39, 53 (D.C.2005); Spring Valley Wesley Heights Citizens Ass’n v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 644 A.2d 434 , 438 n. 6 (D.C.1994); Washington v. Washington Hosp.

2006Ctr., 579 A.2d 177, 189 (D.C.1990); and Lofchie v. Washington Square Ltd.

2002D.C. 69, 74, 626 F.2d 933, 938 (1980) (no District of Columbia court has ever adopted the judicial estoppel doctrine ... [and] the District’s cases evidence some hostility to the concept).

1994See Plough, Inc. v. Nat'l Academy of Sciences, 530 A.2d 1152 , 1159 n. 10 (D.C.1987).