judicial estoppel doctrine in Montana

1999Fiedler, 266 Mont. at 140 , 879 P.2d at 679 (citing Mann, 258 Mont. at 243 , 852 P.2d at 614 ). ¶52 Sievers asserts that the doctrine of judicial estoppel bars Kenneth, Shirley, and Leo from taking the position that they did not have an interest in the trust property when Olga was living.

1999Fiedler, 266 Mont. at 140 , 879 P.2d at 679 (citing Mann, 258 Mont. at 243 , 852 P.2d at 614 ). ¶52 Sievers asserts that the doctrine of judicial estoppel bars Kenneth, Shirley, and Leo from taking the position that they did not have an interest in the trust property when Olga was living.

2021See Big Sky Civ. & Envtl., Inc. v. Dunlavy, 2018 MT 236, ¶ 30 , 393 Mont. 30 , 429 P.3d 258 (“Judicial estoppel is an equitable principle that bars a party from taking inconsistent positions of fact and law at different points in the same litigation[.]”).

2021See Big Sky Civ. & Envtl., Inc. v. Dunlavy, 2018 MT 236, ¶ 30 , 393 Mont. 30 , 429 P.3d 258 (“Judicial estoppel is an equitable principle that bars a party from taking inconsistent positions of fact and law at different points in the same litigation[.]”).

2008If incompatible positions are based not on chicanery, but only on inadvertence or mistake, judicial estoppel does not apply.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); Hefland v. Gerson, 105 F.3d 530 , 536 (9th Cir. 1997) (“Judicial estoppel seeks to prevent the deliberate manipulation of the courts; it is inappropriate, therefore, when a party’s prior position was based on inadvertence or mistake.”). ¶17 In Ibrahim , the court concluded that the party had made an honest mistake, and that the inconsistency in positions was not based on chicanery.

2008Clifton, concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that “Ninth Circuit precedent ... recognizes an exception to the judicial estoppel doctrine where a party advances a good faith, though legally incorrect position and later alters its position in subsequent litigation.”); Wyler Summit v. Turner Broadcasting System, 235 F.3d 1184, 1190 (9th Cir. 2000) (judicial estoppel requires “a knowing antecedent misrepresentation by the person or party alleged to be estopped”) (emphasis added); Johnson v. State of Oregon, 141 F.3d 1361, 1369 (9th Cir. 1998) (“Judicial estoppel applies when a party

2008Clifton, concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that “Ninth Circuit precedent ... recognizes an exception to the judicial estoppel doctrine where a party advances a good faith, though legally incorrect position and later alters its position in subsequent litigation.”); Wyler Summit v. Turner Broadcasting System, 235 F.3d 1184, 1190 (9th Cir. 2000) (judicial estoppel requires “a knowing antecedent misrepresentation by the person or party alleged to be estopped”) (emphasis added); Johnson v. State of Oregon, 141 F.3d 1361, 1369 (9th Cir. 1998) (“Judicial estoppel applies when a party

2002The District Court, citing Caekaert v. State Fund (1994), 268 Mont. 105, 115 , 885 P.2d 495, 501 (stating that under the doctrine of judicial estoppel, we do not permit litigants to assert inconsistent and contradictory positions in separate litigation), concluded that Claudia’s role as personal representative in Randolph’s estate was impermissibly inconsistent with and contradictory to her argument in this case. ¶20 We disagree that Claudia’s argument here is inconsistent with her role in Randolph’s estate.

2002The District Court, citing Caekaert v. State Fund (1994), 268 Mont. 105, 115 , 885 P.2d 495, 501 (stating that under the doctrine of judicial estoppel, we do not permit litigants to assert inconsistent and contradictory positions in separate litigation), concluded that Claudia’s role as personal representative in Randolph’s estate was impermissibly inconsistent with and contradictory to her argument in this case. ¶20 We disagree that Claudia’s argument here is inconsistent with her role in Randolph’s estate.

2002See Fiedler v. Fiedler (1994), 266 Mont. 133 , 879 P.2d 675 (concluding that the four elements were present where the appellant succeeded in asserting one factual position in the district court but adopted a contradictory factual position on appeal); also see Colwell v. Great Falls (1945), 117 Mont. 126, 139 , 157 P.2d 1013, 1019 (overruled on other grounds). ¶49 Although the four-part test may be helpful, it is not necessarily appropriate in every circumstance where a party adopts inconsistent factual positions injudicial proceedings.

2002See Fiedler v. Fiedler (1994), 266 Mont. 133 , 879 P.2d 675 (concluding that the four elements were present where the appellant succeeded in asserting one factual position in the district court but adopted a contradictory factual position on appeal); also see Colwell v. Great Falls (1945), 117 Mont. 126, 139 , 157 P.2d 1013, 1019 (overruled on other grounds). ¶49 Although the four-part test may be helpful, it is not necessarily appropriate in every circumstance where a party adopts inconsistent factual positions injudicial proceedings.