45 New Jersey opinions name it 3 courts 1990–2026 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Kimball Intern. v. Northfield Metalgreen2 sentences2026"Because the doctrine of judicial estoppel only applies when a court has accepted a party's position, a party ordinarily is not barred from taking an inconsistent position in successive litigation if the first action was concluded by a settlement." Kimball Int'l, 334 N.J. 2025However, under these circumstances, the doctrine of judicial estoppel, as opposed to collateral estoppel, "should be invoked only 'when a party's inconsistent behavior will otherwise result in a miscarriage of justice.'" Kimball Int'l, Inc. v. Northfield Metal Prods., 334 N.J. | 10 | 20 |
Cummings v. Bahrgreen2 sentences2018"The purpose of the judicial estoppel doctrine is to protect 'the integrity of the judicial 11 A-3485-16T1 process.'" Ibid. (quoting Cummings, 295 N.J. 2007In Ali , our Supreme Court summarized the doctrine of judicial estoppel: The purpose of the judicial estoppel doctrine is to protect "the integrity of the judicial process." Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J.Super. 374, 387 , 685 A. 2d 60 (App.Div.1996). | 5 | 12 |
cluster 716614green2 sentences2025Super. 596, 608 (App. Div. 2000) (quoting Ryan Operations G.P. v. Santiam-Midwest Lumber Co., 81 F.3d 355, 365 (3rd Cir. 1996)). 1996It is not, however, an independent requirement for application of the doctrine of judicial estoppel." Ryan Operations, supra, 81 F. 3d at 361 . | 3 | 4 |
Amratlal C. Bhagat v. Bharat A. Bhagat (068312)green2 sentences2022Bhagat v. Bhagat, 217 N.J. 22, 36 (2014). 2018Under the doctrine of judicial estoppel, "[a] party who advances a position in earlier litigation that is accepted and permits the party to prevail in that litigation is barred from advocating a contrary position in subsequent litigation to the prejudice of the adverse party." Bhagat, 217 N.J. at 36 . | 2 | 3 |
In the Matter of Thomas v. Cassidy, Debtor-Appellantgreen2 sentences2018Super. at 387 ). "[T]o be estopped [a party must] have convinced the court to accept its position in the earlier litigation." Id. at 606-07 (alteration in original) (quoting In re Cassidy, 892 F.2d 637, 641 (7th Cir. 1990)). 1990The doctrine of judicial estoppel, as an equitable doctrine, is subject to the court's sound discretion, Matter of Cassidy, 892 F. 2d 637, 642 (7th Cir.1990), and is applied only where there are present intentional inconsistencies. | 2 | 3 |
Eric G. Hanisko v. Billy Casper Golf Management, Inc.green2 sentences2026Super. 400, 412 (App. Div. 2000)). "[T]o be estopped a party must have convinced the court to accept its position in the earlier litigation." Hanisko v. Billy Casper Golf Mgmt., Inc., 437 N.J. 2020"The judicial estoppel doctrine is an extraordinary remedy which should be invoked only 'when a party's inconsistent behavior will otherwise result in a miscarriage of justice.'" Hanisko v. Billy Casper Gold Management, Inc., 437 N.J. | 2 | 2 |
JC Trapper, LLC v. City of Jersey Citygreen2 sentences2006City, supra, 21 N.J.Tax at 520 (citing JC Trapper v. Jersey City, 19 N.J. 2004JC Trapper v. Jersey City, 19 N.J.Tax 421, 436 (Tax 2001), aff'd, 20 N.J.Tax 239 (App.Div.2002). | 2 | 2 |
William Edwards v. Aetna Life Insurance Companygreen2 sentences2000See Edwards, supra, 690 F. 2d at 599 ; Konstantinidis, supra, 626 F. 2d at 939 . 2000See Edwards, supra, 690 F. 2d at 599 ; Konstantinidis, supra, 626 F. 2d at 939 . | 1 | 3 |
Kress v. La Villagreen2 sentences2026Under the doctrine of judicial estoppel, "[i]n order to protect the integrity of the court system, '[w]hen a party successfully asserts a position in a prior legal proceeding, that party cannot assert a contrary position in subsequent litigation arising out of the same A-3357-24 12 events.'" Id. at 142-43 (second alteration in original) (quoting Kress v. LaVilla, 335 N.J. 2006Kress v. La Villa, 335 N.J.Super. 400, 412 , 762 A.2d 682 (App.Div.2000), certif denied, 168 N.J. 289 , 773 A.2d 1153 (2001). | 1 | 2 |
McCurrie v. Town of Kearnygreen2 sentences2019McCurrie v. Town of Kearny, 174 N.J. 523, 533-34 (2002). 2012Town of Kearny v. Town of Kearny, 174 N.J. 523, 534 , 809 A.2d 789 (2002). | 1 | 2 |
Athanasios Konstantinidis and Vasiliki Konstantinidis, His Wife v. C. N. Chen, M. Dgreen2 sentences2007In Kimball, we held that, "`[a] settlement neither requires nor implies any judicial endorsement of either party's claim or theories, and thus a settlement does not provide the prior success necessary for judicial estoppel.'" Id. at 608, 760 A. 2d 794 (quoting Konstantinidis v. Chen, 626 F. 2d 933, 939 (D.C.Cir. 1980)). 2000See Edwards, supra, 690 F. 2d at 599 ; Konstantinidis, supra, 626 F. 2d at 939 . | 1 | 2 |
State v. Gonzalezgreen2 sentences2006“Since the purpose of the doctrine of judicial estoppel is to protect the integrity of the tribunal before which a party seeks to contest facts which he has previously [and successfully] admitted ..., it is that tribunal which should determine whether or not to invoke this doctrine.” New Jersey v. Gonzalez, 273 N.J. 1994This presumably would include the doctrine of judicial estoppel, discussed infra at 256-61, 641 A. 2d at 1068-71. [5] The part of this doctrinal formulation which requires "prejudice" to an "adverse party" reflects some confusion between the doctrines of judicial estoppel and equitable estoppel. | 1 | 2 |
STATE, DEPT. OF LAW v. Gonzalezgreen2 sentences2004Safety v. Gonzalez, 142 N.J. 618, 623 , 667 A. 2d 684 (1995), the Court concluded that, "because of the strong public policy of maintaining integrity in the casino industry, a casino employee may not present evidence contradicting his or her convictions." Likening a casino employee license revocation hearing to an attorney disciplinary proceeding, the Court reached the same conclusion based on the doctrine of judicial estoppel, a doctrine that "`bar[s] a party to a legal proceeding from arguing a position inconsistent with one previously asserted.'" Id. at 631-32 , 667 A. 2d 684 , (citing N.M. 2004Safety v. Gonzalez, 142 N.J. 618, 623 , 667 A. 2d 684 (1995), the Court concluded that, "because of the strong public policy of maintaining integrity in the casino industry, a casino employee may not present evidence contradicting his or her convictions." Likening a casino employee license revocation hearing to an attorney disciplinary proceeding, the Court reached the same conclusion based on the doctrine of judicial estoppel, a doctrine that "`bar[s] a party to a legal proceeding from arguing a position inconsistent with one previously asserted.'" Id. at 631-32 , 667 A. 2d 684 , (citing N.M. | 1 | 2 |
Newell v. Hudsongreen1 sentence2017"The doctrine of judicial estoppel is well entrenched in New Jersey's jurisprudence." Newell v. Hudson, 376 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
| In re L.A.G.green | 1 | 1 |
| Alternative System Concepts, Inc. v. Synopsys, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Garden State Fire & Cas. Co. v. Keefegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Garden State Fire & Casualty Co. v. Keefegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Elmer Ethridge v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gruber v. Board of Medical Examiners of Oregongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Netzley v. Celebrezzegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Netzley v. Celebrezzegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Vogel v. Red Star Express Linesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Chattin v. Cape May Greene, Inc.
green
2 sentences2007Chattin v. Cape May Greene, Inc., 243 N.J.Super. 590, 620 , 581 A. 2d 91 (App. Div.1990), aff'd o.b., 124 N.J. 520 , 591 A. 2d 943 (1991); Brown v. Allied Plumbing & Heating Co., 129 N.J.L. 442, 446 , 30 A. 2d 290 (Sup.Ct.), aff'd, 130 N.J.L. 487 , 33 A. 2d 813 (E. & A.1943); Bell Atl. 1994"The doctrine of judicial estoppel provides `that a party who, with knowledge of the facts, has assumed a particular position in judicial proceedings, and has succeeded in maintaining that position, is estopped to assume a position inconsistent therewith to the prejudice of the adverse party.'" Chattin v. Cape May Greene, Inc., 243 N.J. | 7 | 1994–2007 |
Brown v. Allied Plumbing & Heating Co.
neutral
2 sentences1990The doctrine of judicial estoppel provides "that a party who, with knowledge of the facts, has assumed a particular position in judicial proceedings, and has succeeded in maintaining that position, is estopped to assume a position inconsistent therewith to the prejudice of the adverse party." Brown v. Allied Plumbing & Heating Co., 129 N.J.L. 442, 446 , 30 A. 2d 290 (Sup.Ct. 1943), aff'd 130 N.J.L. 487 , 33 A. 2d 813 (E. & A. 1943) (emphasis added); see also Vogel v. Red Star Express Lines, 73 N.J. 1990The doctrine of judicial estoppel provides "that a party who, with knowledge of the facts, has assumed a particular position in judicial proceedings, and has succeeded in maintaining that position, is estopped to assume a position inconsistent therewith to the prejudice of the adverse party." Brown v. Allied Plumbing & Heating Co., 129 N.J.L. 442, 446 , 30 A. 2d 290 (Sup.Ct. 1943), aff'd 130 N.J.L. 487 , 33 A. 2d 813 (E. & A. 1943) (emphasis added); see also Vogel v. Red Star Express Lines, 73 N.J. | 6 | 1990–2007 |
Brown v. Allied Plumbing & Heating Co.
green
2 sentences1990The doctrine of judicial estoppel provides "that a party who, with knowledge of the facts, has assumed a particular position in judicial proceedings, and has succeeded in maintaining that position, is estopped to assume a position inconsistent therewith to the prejudice of the adverse party." Brown v. Allied Plumbing & Heating Co., 129 N.J.L. 442, 446 , 30 A. 2d 290 (Sup.Ct. 1943), aff'd 130 N.J.L. 487 , 33 A. 2d 813 (E. & A. 1943) (emphasis added); see also Vogel v. Red Star Express Lines, 73 N.J. 1990The doctrine of judicial estoppel provides "that a party who, with knowledge of the facts, has assumed a particular position in judicial proceedings, and has succeeded in maintaining that position, is estopped to assume a position inconsistent therewith to the prejudice of the adverse party." Brown v. Allied Plumbing & Heating Co., 129 N.J.L. 442, 446 , 30 A. 2d 290 (Sup.Ct. 1943), aff'd 130 N.J.L. 487 , 33 A. 2d 813 (E. & A. 1943) (emphasis added); see also Vogel v. Red Star Express Lines, 73 N.J. | 6 | 1990–2007 |
Chattin v. Cape May Greene, Inc.
green
2 sentences2007Chattin v. Cape May Greene, Inc., 243 N.J.Super. 590, 620 , 581 A. 2d 91 (App. Div.1990), aff'd o.b., 124 N.J. 520 , 591 A. 2d 943 (1991); Brown v. Allied Plumbing & Heating Co., 129 N.J.L. 442, 446 , 30 A. 2d 290 (Sup.Ct.), aff'd, 130 N.J.L. 487 , 33 A. 2d 813 (E. & A.1943); Bell Atl. 2007Chattin v. Cape May Greene, Inc., 243 N.J.Super. 590, 620 , 581 A. 2d 91 (App. Div.1990), aff'd o.b., 124 N.J. 520 , 591 A. 2d 943 (1991); Brown v. Allied Plumbing & Heating Co., 129 N.J.L. 442, 446 , 30 A. 2d 290 (Sup.Ct.), aff'd, 130 N.J.L. 487 , 33 A. 2d 813 (E. & A.1943); Bell Atl. | 6 | 1994–2007 |
Nm v. Jg
green
2 sentences2004Safety v. Gonzalez, 142 N.J. 618, 623 , 667 A. 2d 684 (1995), the Court concluded that, "because of the strong public policy of maintaining integrity in the casino industry, a casino employee may not present evidence contradicting his or her convictions." Likening a casino employee license revocation hearing to an attorney disciplinary proceeding, the Court reached the same conclusion based on the doctrine of judicial estoppel, a doctrine that "`bar[s] a party to a legal proceeding from arguing a position inconsistent with one previously asserted.'" Id. at 631-32 , 667 A. 2d 684 , (citing N.M. 2004Safety v. Gonzalez, 142 N.J. 618, 623 , 667 A. 2d 684 (1995), the Court concluded that, "because of the strong public policy of maintaining integrity in the casino industry, a casino employee may not present evidence contradicting his or her convictions." Likening a casino employee license revocation hearing to an attorney disciplinary proceeding, the Court reached the same conclusion based on the doctrine of judicial estoppel, a doctrine that "`bar[s] a party to a legal proceeding from arguing a position inconsistent with one previously asserted.'" Id. at 631-32 , 667 A. 2d 684 , (citing N.M. | 4 | 1995–2004 |
Guido v. Duane Morris LLP.
green
2 sentences2019Guido , 202 N.J. at 94 -95 , 995 A.2d 844 . 2019Guido , 202 N.J. at 94 -95 , 995 A.2d 844 . | 2 | 2019–2019 |
Levin v. Robinson, Wayne & La Sala
green
2 sentences2004Safety v. Gonzalez, 142 N.J. 618, 623 , 667 A. 2d 684 (1995), the Court concluded that, "because of the strong public policy of maintaining integrity in the casino industry, a casino employee may not present evidence contradicting his or her convictions." Likening a casino employee license revocation hearing to an attorney disciplinary proceeding, the Court reached the same conclusion based on the doctrine of judicial estoppel, a doctrine that "`bar[s] a party to a legal proceeding from arguing a position inconsistent with one previously asserted.'" Id. at 631-32 , 667 A. 2d 684 , (citing N.M. 2004Safety v. Gonzalez, 142 N.J. 618, 623 , 667 A. 2d 684 (1995), the Court concluded that, "because of the strong public policy of maintaining integrity in the casino industry, a casino employee may not present evidence contradicting his or her convictions." Likening a casino employee license revocation hearing to an attorney disciplinary proceeding, the Court reached the same conclusion based on the doctrine of judicial estoppel, a doctrine that "`bar[s] a party to a legal proceeding from arguing a position inconsistent with one previously asserted.'" Id. at 631-32 , 667 A. 2d 684 , (citing N.M. | 2 | 1995–2004 |
State v. Loyle
green
1 sentence2013Gautam v. De Luca, 215 N.J.Super. 388, 399 , 521 A.2d 1343 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 109 N.J. 39 , 532 A.2d 1107 (1987). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Darragh
green
1 sentence2013Gautam v. De Luca, 215 N.J.Super. 388, 399 , 521 A.2d 1343 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 109 N.J. 39 , 532 A.2d 1107 (1987). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Alampi v. Russo
green
2 sentences2013Relying on Alampi v. Russo, 345 N.J.Super. 360, 367 , 785 A.2d 65 (App.Div.2001), the trial judge granted defendant’s summary judgment motion, holding that plaintiffs’ “thesis for recovery undermine[d] the public policy expressed by the doctrine of judicial estoppel.” The motion judge also dismissed plaintiffs’ claim for emotional distress damages raised as part of this legal malpractice action, because plaintiffs had not presented expert testimony to support this form of relief. 2013Relying on Alampi v. Russo, 345 N.J.Super. 360, 367 , 785 A.2d 65 (App.Div.2001), the trial judge granted defendant’s summary judgment motion, holding that plaintiffs’ “thesis for recovery undermine[d] the public policy expressed by the doctrine of judicial estoppel.” The motion judge also dismissed plaintiffs’ claim for emotional distress damages raised as part of this legal malpractice action, because plaintiffs had not presented expert testimony to support this form of relief. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Gautam v. De Luca
green
2 sentences2013Gautam v. De Luca, 215 N.J.Super. 388, 399 , 521 A.2d 1343 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 109 N.J. 39 , 532 A.2d 1107 (1987). 2013Gautam v. De Luca, 215 N.J.Super. 388, 399 , 521 A.2d 1343 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 109 N.J. 39 , 532 A.2d 1107 (1987). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Light v. National Dyeing Printing Co.
green
1 sentence2009Eq. 506, 510 , 55 A. 2d 233 (Ch.1947). [22] For these reasons, we find it unnecessary to address the Resco defendants' additional arguments that: (a) the anti-suit injunction cannot stand because it is a prior restraint that infringes the speech and petition clauses of the First Amendment, and (b) Travelers' positions in Continental v. Resco and Honeywell v. Travelers are inconsistent and warrant application of the doctrine of judicial estoppel. [23] In re North Am. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
City of Atlantic v. California Avenue Ventures, LLC
green
1 sentence2006City, supra, 21 N.J.Tax at 520 (citing JC Trapper v. Jersey City, 19 N.J. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Tamburelli Properties Ass'n v. Borough of Cresskill
green
2 sentences2005It is "an equitable doctrine precluding a party from asserting a position in a case that contradicts or is inconsistent with a position previously asserted by the party in the case or a related legal proceeding." Tamburelli Properties v. Cresskill, 308 N.J.Super. 326, 335 , 705 A. 2d 1270 (App.Div.1998). *1156 Over a hundred years ago the United States Supreme Court set forth the fundamental precepts of the doctrine of judicial estoppel: It may be laid down as a general proposition that, where a party assumes a certain position in a legal proceeding, and succeeds in maintaining that position, 2005It is "an equitable doctrine precluding a party from asserting a position in a case that contradicts or is inconsistent with a position previously asserted by the party in the case or a related legal proceeding." Tamburelli Properties v. Cresskill, 308 N.J.Super. 326, 335 , 705 A. 2d 1270 (App.Div.1998). *1156 Over a hundred years ago the United States Supreme Court set forth the fundamental precepts of the doctrine of judicial estoppel: It may be laid down as a general proposition that, where a party assumes a certain position in a legal proceeding, and succeeds in maintaining that position, | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Davis v. Wakelee green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Scarano v. Central R. Co. Of New Jersey
green
2 sentences2005It is "an equitable doctrine precluding a party from asserting a position in a case that contradicts or is inconsistent with a position previously asserted by the party in the case or a related legal proceeding." Tamburelli Properties v. Cresskill, 308 N.J.Super. 326, 335 , 705 A. 2d 1270 (App.Div.1998). *1156 Over a hundred years ago the United States Supreme Court set forth the fundamental precepts of the doctrine of judicial estoppel: It may be laid down as a general proposition that, where a party assumes a certain position in a legal proceeding, and succeeds in maintaining that position, 2005The doctrine of estoppel [is] essentially set forth in Scarano v. Central Railroad [Co., 203 F. 2d 510 (3d Cir.1953)]. . . there is a five element test for judicial estoppel. . . . . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Ziegelheim v. Apollo green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Ali v. Rutgers
green
2 sentences2005However, judicial estoppel only applies if a party advocates a position in a judicial or administrative proceeding that is "contrary to a position it successfully asserted in the same or a prior proceeding." Ali v. Rutgers, 166 N.J. 280, 287 , 765 A. 2d 714 (2000) (quoting Kimball Int'l, Inc. v. Northfield Metal Prod., 334 N.J.Super 596, 608, 760 A. 2d 794 (App.Div. 2000)). 2005However, judicial estoppel only applies if a party advocates a position in a judicial or administrative proceeding that is "contrary to a position it successfully asserted in the same or a prior proceeding." Ali v. Rutgers, 166 N.J. 280, 287 , 765 A. 2d 714 (2000) (quoting Kimball Int'l, Inc. v. Northfield Metal Prod., 334 N.J.Super 596, 608, 760 A. 2d 794 (App.Div. 2000)). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| JC Trapper, L.L.C. v. City of Jersey City neutral | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| State v. Jenkins green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| International Telephone & Telegraph Corp. v. Envirco Services, Inc. green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| JAS. FALCONE PLUMBING & HEATING CO. INC. v. Pasquale green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Uricoli v. Police & Fire. Retirem. Sys. green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Masse v. BD. OF TRUSTEES, PUB. EMPLOYEES'RETIREMENT SYS. green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Robert Bower v. Terrence O'hara, Doris Sparks and Sparks Caribbean Investment, Inc. Appeal of Doris Sparks, Appeal of Terrence O'Hara green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Eaton v. Eaton green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Vogel v. Red Star Express Lines neutral | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Tabloid Lithographers, Inc. v. Israel green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Finley v. Kesling green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Hoffman v. First National Bank of Akron (In Re Hoffman) green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.