judicial estoppel doctrine in Massachusetts

2012Paixao v. Paixao, 429 Mass. 307, 309 (1999); Basis Tech.

2000She contends that the hospital’s claim that MCS is not a scientifically reliable diagnosis is barred by the doctrine of judicial estoppel: the principle that “[a] party who has successfully maintained a certain position at a trial cannot in a subsequent trial between the same parties be permitted to assume a position relative to the same subject that is directly contrary to that taken at the first trial.” Paixao v. Paixao, 429 Mass. 307, 309 (1999), quoting East Cambridge Sav.

1998Doctrine of Judicial Estoppel The doctrine of judicial estoppel or “preclusion of inconsistent positions” “precludes a party from asserting a position in one legal proceeding which is contrary to a position it has already asserted in another.” Patriot Cinemas, Inc. v. General Cinema Corp, 834 F.2d 208, 212 (1st Cir. 1987).

1998Doctrine of Judicial Estoppel The doctrine of judicial estoppel or “preclusion of inconsistent positions” “precludes a party from asserting a position in one legal proceeding which is contrary to a position it has already asserted in another.” Patriot Cinemas, Inc. v. General Cinema Corp, 834 F.2d 208, 212 (1st Cir. 1987).

2021To be sure, in the Wiretap Application 1 Warrant, the affiants state, “[the pole camera] information, in conjunction with GPS and ‘ping’ location data, has been useful . . .” Id. (emphasis added).[26] In sum, the Commonwealth proved that, at the time of installation of the pole cameras at issue, the usefulness of the pole camera surveillance outweighed the invasion of Santana’s privacy resulting from the continuous monitoring of the exterior of his residence for 69 days (in the case of 15 – 17 Ames St.). --------------------------- [26] “Because [the Commonwealth] is not asserting an inconsist

2021Utils., 459 Mass. 807 , 818 (2011); see also Blanchette v. School Comm. of Westwood, 427 Mass. 176 , 184 (1998); Otis v. Arbella Mut.

2013“Application of the equitable principle of judicial estoppel to a particular case is a matter of discretion.” Id. at 640. “[I]tmaybe appropriate to resist application of judicial estoppel ‘when a parly’s prior position was based on inadvertence or mistake,’ ” id. at 642, quoting New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 753 (2001), “or where ‘the position adopted in the first suit was clearly wrong yet had been advanced in good faith by the party now sought to be estopped,’ ” id., quoting Chaveriat v. Williams Pipe Line Co., 11 F.3d 1420, 1428 (7th Cir. 1993). “[T]he mere fact” that Rago failed to

2013“Application of the equitable principle of judicial estoppel to a particular case is a matter of discretion.” Id. at 640. “[I]tmaybe appropriate to resist application of judicial estoppel ‘when a parly’s prior position was based on inadvertence or mistake,’ ” id. at 642, quoting New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 753 (2001), “or where ‘the position adopted in the first suit was clearly wrong yet had been advanced in good faith by the party now sought to be estopped,’ ” id., quoting Chaveriat v. Williams Pipe Line Co., 11 F.3d 1420, 1428 (7th Cir. 1993). “[T]he mere fact” that Rago failed to

2003Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine which precludes a party from asserting a position in one legal proceeding which is contrary to a position it has already asserted in another." Fay v. Federal National Mortgage Ass’n., 419 Mass. 782, 788 (1995) (judicial estoppel applies where a parly has successfully asserted an inconsistent position in a prior proceeding).

1996Putting to one side the viability and contours of the doctrine of judicial estoppel in Massachusetts, see generally Fay v. Federal National Mortgage Ass’n, 419 Mass. 782, 787-88 (1995), there is a palpable and material conflict between portions of the verified complaint and the affidavit of Robert M.

2007The “purpose [of the judicial estoppel doctrine] is to safeguard the integrity of the courts by preventing parties from improperly manipulating the machinery of the judicial system . . .’ ” Otis v. Arbella Mutual Insurance Co., 443 Mass. 634, 642 (2005), quoting Alternative Sys.

2005Otis v. Arbella Mutual Insurance Co., 443 Mass. 634, 640-41 (2005).

1998Larson v. Larson, 30 Mass. App. Ct. 418, 427-428 (1991).

1993See also Brown v. Quinn, 406 Mass. 641, 646 (1990); Larson v. Larson, 30 Mass. App. Ct. 418, 427-428 (1991).

2002Bank v. Wheeler, supra. Since the plaintiffs’ initial suit resulted in a settlement, the doctrine of judicial estoppel does not apply to this suit. 2 That being the case, the plaintiffs should have been permitted to raise their claim of negligence against the town.

2000Bank v. Wheeler, 422 Mass. 621, 623 (1996).

1994While the Supreme Judicial Court has not expressly announced its recognition of the doctrine of judicial estoppel, the general principle that “[a] party who has successfully maintained a certain position at a trial cannot in a subsequent trial between the same parties be permitted to assume a position relative to the same subject that is directly contrary to that taken at the first trial,” Gordon v. Lewitsky, 333 Mass. 379, 381 , (1955), has been applied in a variety of circumstances by our appellate courts.

1993L. c. 259, § 1, provides: “No action shall be brought: . . . [u]pon an agreement that is not to be performed within one year from the making thereof; [u]nless the . . . agreement ... is in writing and signed by the party to be charged therewith. . . .” 6 Compare Patriot Cinemas, Inc. v. General Cinema Corp., 834 F.2d 208, 215 (1st Cir. 1987) (“[I]t remains an open question whether the Massachusetts courts would employ judicial estoppel”), and Brown v. Gerstein, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 558 , 568 n.19 (1984) (“[T]he doctrine of judicial estoppel. . . has not yet been expressly recognized or defined by

1994While no Massachusetts appellate court has explicitly adopted the “doctrine of judicial estoppel” as such, the Court in Brown v. Quinn, 406 Mass. 641 (1990), held that a litigant was estopped from reversing his position on an issue he had asserted below.

1994Ass'n v. School Dist. of Orleans, 193 Neb. 675, 678 (1975): “A party who has taken a position with regard to procedure, which has been acted or relied upon by his adversary or the court, is estopped from taking an inconsistent position respecting the same ...” In referring to the doctrine of judicial estoppel, the Supreme Judicial Court in Brown, supra, also cited Patriot Cinemas, Inc. v. General Cinema Corp., 834 F.2d 208 (1987), where the court noted that, while the specific requirements of judicial estoppel are vague, it “should be employed when a litigant is ‘playing fast and loose with th

2015The Bank also urged that Souza’s claims fall before the doctrine of judicial estoppel (see note 3, supra). “[Tjhe doctrine of judicial estoppel prevents a mortgagor from challenging the ‘foreclosure of the same property that [sjhe surrendered in the Bankruptcy Court in exchange for the discharge of [her] debts.’” Id., quoting Ibanez v. U. S. Bank Nat'l Ass’n, 856 F. Supp. 2d 273, 275 (D.

2015Mass. 2012). “‘[Ejven were there a [plausible] claim, it does not belong to [the mortgagor]’ but instead to the bankruptcy trustee.” Id, quoting Ibanez, supra at 276 .

2013“Application of the equitable principle of judicial estoppel to a particular case is a matter of discretion.” Id. at 640. “[I]tmaybe appropriate to resist application of judicial estoppel ‘when a parly’s prior position was based on inadvertence or mistake,’ ” id. at 642, quoting New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 753 (2001), “or where ‘the position adopted in the first suit was clearly wrong yet had been advanced in good faith by the party now sought to be estopped,’ ” id., quoting Chaveriat v. Williams Pipe Line Co., 11 F.3d 1420, 1428 (7th Cir. 1993). “[T]he mere fact” that Rago failed to

2011We disagree. “ ‘The purpose of the doctrine [of judicial estoppel] is to prevent the manipulation of the judicial process by litigants.’ Canavan’s Case, 432 Mass. 304, 308 (2000).

2007Concepts, Inc. v. Synopsys, Inc., 374 F.3d 23, 33 (1st Cir. 2004).

2005Otis similarly contends that Meyer v. Wagner, 429 Mass. 410, 420 (1999), precludes the application of judicial estoppel to claims of legal malpractice.

2002Despite the phraseology of the complaint, the summary judgment record made out a case of joint liability, see Cram v. Northbridge, 410 Mass. 800 , 804 n.5 (1991), with Drake being responsible as a non-employee for negligent operation, and the town being liable for the independent negligence of its supervisory employee or employees under the theory of “retained control.” “[I]f the employer [of an independent contractor] retains the right to control the work in any of its aspects ... he must exercise that control with reasonable care for the safety of others, and he is liable for damages caused

1995The defendants, on the other hand, argue that the doctrine should be employed whenever a litigant is “playing fast and loose with the courts.” Patriot Cinemas, Inc. v. General Cinema Corp., 834 F.2d 208, 212 (1st Cir. 1987), quoting Scarano v. Central R.R., 203 F.2d 510, 513 (3d Cir. 1953).

1994See, Savage v. Blanchard, 148 Mass. 348, 349 (1889); Dominick v. Dominick, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 85, 88, 89, n. 2 (1984); Hubbard v. Peairs, 24 Mass. App. Ct. 372, 378-379 (1987); Correia v. Desimone, 34 Mass. App. Ct. 601 (1993).

1994See, Savage v. Blanchard, 148 Mass. 348, 349 (1889); Dominick v. Dominick, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 85, 88, 89, n. 2 (1984); Hubbard v. Peairs, 24 Mass. App. Ct. 372, 378-379 (1987); Correia v. Desimone, 34 Mass. App. Ct. 601 (1993).

1994Ass'n v. School Dist. of Orleans, 193 Neb. 675, 678 (1975): “A party who has taken a position with regard to procedure, which has been acted or relied upon by his adversary or the court, is estopped from taking an inconsistent position respecting the same ...” In referring to the doctrine of judicial estoppel, the Supreme Judicial Court in Brown, supra, also cited Patriot Cinemas, Inc. v. General Cinema Corp., 834 F.2d 208 (1987), where the court noted that, while the specific requirements of judicial estoppel are vague, it “should be employed when a litigant is ‘playing fast and loose with th

1994See, Savage v. Blanchard, 148 Mass. 348, 349 (1889); Dominick v. Dominick, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 85, 88, 89, n. 2 (1984); Hubbard v. Peairs, 24 Mass. App. Ct. 372, 378-379 (1987); Correia v. Desimone, 34 Mass. App. Ct. 601 (1993).

1993L. c. 259, § 1, provides: “No action shall be brought: . . . [u]pon an agreement that is not to be performed within one year from the making thereof; [u]nless the . . . agreement ... is in writing and signed by the party to be charged therewith. . . .” 6 Compare Patriot Cinemas, Inc. v. General Cinema Corp., 834 F.2d 208, 215 (1st Cir. 1987) (“[I]t remains an open question whether the Massachusetts courts would employ judicial estoppel”), and Brown v. Gerstein, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 558 , 568 n.19 (1984) (“[T]he doctrine of judicial estoppel. . . has not yet been expressly recognized or defined by