judicial estoppel doctrine in Missouri

2011Fletcher further argues that the trial court erred in applying the doctrine of judicial estoppel because the Court failed to “ ‘inquire whether the party has succeeded in persuading a court to accept that party’s earlier position.’” Vinson, 243 S.W.3d at 422 (quoting Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 502 , 126 S.Ct. 1976 , 164 L.Ed.2d 749 (2006)).

2011Fletcher further argues that the trial court erred in applying the doctrine of judicial estoppel because the Court failed to “ ‘inquire whether the party has succeeded in persuading a court to accept that party’s earlier position.’” Vinson, 243 S.W.3d at 422 (quoting Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 502 , 126 S.Ct. 1976 , 164 L.Ed.2d 749 (2006)).

2023Traditionally, the doctrine of judicial estoppel has not been applied “when a party’s prior position was taken because of a good-faith mistake rather than as a part of a scheme to mislead and manipulate the court.” Loth, 354 S.W.3d at 638 .

2019Missouri, like other jurisdictions, has long recognized the doctrine of judicial estoppel, "which is said to be designed to preserve the dignity of the courts and insure order in judicial proceedings." Edwards v. Durham, 346 S.W.2d 90 , 100-101 (Mo. 1961).

2019Missouri, like other jurisdictions, has long recognized the doctrine of judicial estoppel, "which is said to be designed to preserve the dignity of the courts and insure order in judicial proceedings." Edwards v. Durham, 346 S.W.2d 90 , 100-101 (Mo. 1961).

2019See Imler, 451 S.W.3d at 292 (referring to the first factor as "the threshold essential to a judicial estoppel defense"); Vinson, 243 S.W.3d at 422 ("Having determined that Husband's initial stance did not conflict with his later stance, we need not discuss the remaining factors"); Minor v. Terry, 475 S.W.3d 124 , 134 (Mo. App. 2014) (ending its analysis after a determination the "two positions are not clearly inconsistent"). 7 Vacca cites no authority for his additional argument defendants were required to preserve the issue of judicial estoppel in their motion for directed verdict or for jud

2016Comm’n of Ohio, 281 U.S. 470, 475 , 50 S.Ct. 374 , 74 L.Ed. 972 (1930) (party entitled to raise question as to subject-matter jurisdiction “notwithstanding his prior inconsistent attitude”); Hansen v. Harper Excavating, Inc., 641 F.3d 1216, 1227-28 (10th Cir.2011) (decline to preclude ERISA standing under doctrine of judicial estoppel “by holding that a party may establish subject-matter jurisdiction based on complete preemption via judicial estoppel”); Carey v. Lincoln Loan Co., 342 Or. 530 , 157 P.3d 775 , 777 n. 2 (2007) (quoting Wink v. Marshall, 237 Or. 589 , 392 P.2d 768 (1964) (“Jurisdi

2016Comm’n of Ohio, 281 U.S. 470, 475 , 50 S.Ct. 374 , 74 L.Ed. 972 (1930) (party entitled to raise question as to subject-matter jurisdiction “notwithstanding his prior inconsistent attitude”); Hansen v. Harper Excavating, Inc., 641 F.3d 1216, 1227-28 (10th Cir.2011) (decline to preclude ERISA standing under doctrine of judicial estoppel “by holding that a party may establish subject-matter jurisdiction based on complete preemption via judicial estoppel”); Carey v. Lincoln Loan Co., 342 Or. 530 , 157 P.3d 775 , 777 n. 2 (2007) (quoting Wink v. Marshall, 237 Or. 589 , 392 P.2d 768 (1964) (“Jurisdi

2016Comm’n of Ohio, 281 U.S. 470, 475 , 50 S.Ct. 374 , 74 L.Ed. 972 (1930) (party entitled to raise question as to subject-matter jurisdiction “notwithstanding his prior inconsistent attitude”); Hansen v. Harper Excavating, Inc., 641 F.3d 1216, 1227-28 (10th Cir.2011) (decline to preclude ERISA standing under doctrine of judicial estoppel “by holding that a party may establish subject-matter jurisdiction based on complete preemption via judicial estoppel”); Carey v. Lincoln Loan Co., 342 Or. 530 , 157 P.3d 775 , 777 n. 2 (2007) (quoting Wink v. Marshall, 237 Or. 589 , 392 P.2d 768 (1964) (“Jurisdi

2016Comm’n of Ohio, 281 U.S. 470, 475 , 50 S.Ct. 374 , 74 L.Ed. 972 (1930) (party entitled to raise question as to subject-matter jurisdiction “notwithstanding his prior inconsistent attitude”); Hansen v. Harper Excavating, Inc., 641 F.3d 1216, 1227-28 (10th Cir.2011) (decline to preclude ERISA standing under doctrine of judicial estoppel “by holding that a party may establish subject-matter jurisdiction based on complete preemption via judicial estoppel”); Carey v. Lincoln Loan Co., 342 Or. 530 , 157 P.3d 775 , 777 n. 2 (2007) (quoting Wink v. Marshall, 237 Or. 589 , 392 P.2d 768 (1964) (“Jurisdi

2011Here, Plaintiffs assert that Bowman, Jr. was prejudiced because he “was forced to enter into a settlement because [Acceptance] refused to provide him with a defense as a result of its denial of coverage.” 8 Even assuming that Plaintiffs may *564 demonstrate prejudice via Bowman, Jr., we conclude that the doctrine of judicial estoppel does not apply to this case. 9 Finally, Plaintiffs do not attempt to assert on appeal that Acceptance’s conduct in sending these denial letters somehow constituted a “waiver” because they were neither “(1) an express waiver by the insurer or (2) conduct which clea

2008The doctrine of judicial estoppel provides that “[w]here a party assumes a certain position in a legal proceeding, and succeeds in maintaining that position, he may not thereafter, simply because his interests have changed, assume a contrary position, especially if it be to the prejudice of the party who has acquiesced in the position formerly taken by him.” Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489 , 126 S.Ct. 1976,1987 , 164 L.Ed.2d 749 (2006), quoting Davis v. Wakelee, 156 U.S. 680, 689 , 15 S.Ct. 555 , 39 L.Ed. 578 (1895).

2008The doctrine of judicial estoppel provides that “[w]here a party assumes a certain position in a legal proceeding, and succeeds in maintaining that position, he may not thereafter, simply because his interests have changed, assume a contrary position, especially if it be to the prejudice of the party who has acquiesced in the position formerly taken by him.” Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489 , 126 S.Ct. 1976,1987 , 164 L.Ed.2d 749 (2006), quoting Davis v. Wakelee, 156 U.S. 680, 689 , 15 S.Ct. 555 , 39 L.Ed. 578 (1895).