122 California opinions name it 3 courts 1997–2026 44 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Jackson v. County of Los Angelesgreen2 sentences2026The doctrine serves a clear purpose: to protect the integrity of the judicial process.’ ” (Jackson v. County of Los Angeles (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 171, 181 .) “ ‘ “The doctrine of judicial estoppel, sometimes referred to as the doctrine of preclusion of inconsistent positions, is invoked to prevent a party from changing its position over the course of judicial proceedings when such positional changes have an adverse impact on the judicial process. . . . ‘The policies underlying preclusion of inconsistent positions are “general consideration[s] of the orderly administration of justice and regard 2025Second, the doctrine of judicial estoppel “precludes a party from obtaining an advantage by asserting one position, and then seeking a second advantage by asserting an incompatible position.” (Minish v. Hanuman Fellowship (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 437, 448-449 .) The doctrine generally applies when: “(1) the same party has taken two positions; (2) the positions were taken in judicial or quasi-judicial administrative proceedings; (3) the party was successful in asserting the first position (i.e., the tribunal adopted the position or accepted it as true); (4) the two positions are totally inconsist | 26 | 37 |
Aguilar v. Lernergreen2 sentences2023The doctrine of judicial estoppel, which is sometimes referred to as the “doctrine of ‘ “ ‘preclusion of inconsistent positions,’ ” ’ ” is designed to prevent litigants from gaining an “advantage by asserting one position [in litigation], and then seeking a second advantage by asserting an incompatible position.” (Minish v. Hanuman Fellowship (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 437, 448 (Minish); MW Erectors, Inc. v. Niederhauser Ornamental & Metal Works Co., Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 412, 422 (MW Erectors).) Preventing litigants from “ ‘ “ ‘ “playing ‘fast and loose with the courts’ ” ’ ” ’ ” (Minish, at p. 2023The doctrine of judicial estoppel, which is sometimes referred to as the “doctrine of ‘ “ ‘preclusion of inconsistent positions,’ ” ’ ” is designed to prevent litigants from gaining an “advantage by asserting one position [in litigation], and then seeking a second advantage by asserting an incompatible position.” (Minish v. Hanuman Fellowship (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 437, 448 (Minish); MW Erectors, Inc. v. Niederhauser Ornamental & Metal Works Co., Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 412, 422 (MW Erectors).) Preventing litigants from “ ‘ “ ‘ “playing ‘fast and loose with the courts’ ” ’ ” ’ ” (Minish, at p. | 14 | 24 |
MW Erectors, Inc. v. Niederhauser Ornamental & Metal Works Co.green2 sentences2025Second, the doctrine of judicial estoppel “precludes a party from obtaining an advantage by asserting one position, and then seeking a second advantage by asserting an incompatible position.” (Minish v. Hanuman Fellowship (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 437, 448-449 .) The doctrine generally applies when: “(1) the same party has taken two positions; (2) the positions were taken in judicial or quasi-judicial administrative proceedings; (3) the party was successful in asserting the first position (i.e., the tribunal adopted the position or accepted it as true); (4) the two positions are totally inconsist 2024The Trial Court Improperly Determined on Demurrer that Miyahara’s Actions Were Not the Result of Mistake or Inadvertence Miyahara concedes her original bankruptcy schedules did not list her present claim against Wells Fargo but argues that this was the result of mistake or inadvertence. “‘[T]he doctrine of judicial estoppel does not apply “when the prior position was taken because of a good faith mistake rather than as part of a scheme to mislead the court.” [Citation.] An inconsistent argument sufficient to invoke judicial estoppel must be attributable to intentional wrongdoing.’” (Haley v. D | 10 | 13 |
Levin v. Ligongreen2 sentences2023(Levin v. Ligon (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1456, 1484 [“ ‘ “the doctrine of judicial estoppel does not apply ‘when the prior position was taken because of a good faith mistake rather than as part of a scheme to mislead the court’ ” ’ ”]; Haley v. Dow Lewis Motors, Inc. (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 497, 509-510 [“ ‘An inconsistent argument sufficient to invoke judicial estoppel must be attributable to intentional wrongdoing’ ”].) Nor can we say that Newsom is seeking to employ an unfair strategy by challenging the jury instruction on count 13 on appeal. 2022There is no record evidence that either the trial court immediately below or the one that considered the Ex Parte Motion to Attach Assets ever relied in any way on Ernst’s reference to the Forbearance Agreement as “brief.” (See generally Levin v. Ligon (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1456, 1477 [“The pivotal issue is whether it can be established that the party succeeded in the first position or that the position was a basis or important to the [decision]”.) Regardless, this is not the kind of egregious case where judicial estoppel should be applied. | 4 | 6 |
Gottlieb v. Kestgreen2 sentences2024(See Gottlieb, supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 137 [“Nevertheless, one of the judicial estoppel factors— success in asserting the prior position—is not present: The bankruptcy court did not ‘adopt[] the [prior] position or accept[] it as true.’”]; accord, Hamilton v. Greenwich Investors XXVI, LLC (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1602, 1613 [“the court found the doctrine did not apply because ‘the bankruptcy court did not adopt or accept the truth of [plaintiff’s] position that [the debtor] did not have any legal claims’ and ‘the bankruptcy case was dismissed without confirmation of a plan of reorganization 2015The Santoses contend that Gottlieb is "very similar" to this case and note that the Gottlieb court concluded that the doctrine of judicial estoppel did not apply in that case because the "creditors were not harmed as the bankruptcy case was dismissed without a confirmation of a plan of reorganization." (Citing Gottlieb, supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at pp. 138-139.) However, in this case, unlike in Gottlieb, the Santoses' amended bankruptcy plan was confirmed by the bankruptcy court. | 4 | 4 |
Haley v. DOW LEWIS MOTORS, INC.green2 sentences2023(Levin v. Ligon (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1456, 1484 [“ ‘ “the doctrine of judicial estoppel does not apply ‘when the prior position was taken because of a good faith mistake rather than as part of a scheme to mislead the court’ ” ’ ”]; Haley v. Dow Lewis Motors, Inc. (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 497, 509-510 [“ ‘An inconsistent argument sufficient to invoke judicial estoppel must be attributable to intentional wrongdoing’ ”].) Nor can we say that Newsom is seeking to employ an unfair strategy by challenging the jury instruction on count 13 on appeal. 2016(Aguilar v. Lerner (2004) 32 Cal.4th 974, 986 (Aguilar).) The purpose of this doctrine is to prevent litigants from engaging in unfair strategies and “‘“playing ‘fast and loose with the courts.”’”’ (Haley v. Dow Lewis Motors, Inc. (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 497, 509 (Haley).) The doctrine of judicial estoppel applies when “‘(1) the same party has taken two positions; (2) the positions were taken in judicial or quasi-judicial administrative proceedings; (3) the party was successful in asserting the first position (i.e., the tribunal adopted the position or accepted it as true); (4) the two positions | 4 | 4 |
Minish v. Hanuman Fellowshipgreen2 sentences2025Second, the doctrine of judicial estoppel “precludes a party from obtaining an advantage by asserting one position, and then seeking a second advantage by asserting an incompatible position.” (Minish v. Hanuman Fellowship (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 437, 448-449 .) The doctrine generally applies when: “(1) the same party has taken two positions; (2) the positions were taken in judicial or quasi-judicial administrative proceedings; (3) the party was successful in asserting the first position (i.e., the tribunal adopted the position or accepted it as true); (4) the two positions are totally inconsist 2023The doctrine of judicial estoppel, which is sometimes referred to as the “doctrine of ‘ “ ‘preclusion of inconsistent positions,’ ” ’ ” is designed to prevent litigants from gaining an “advantage by asserting one position [in litigation], and then seeking a second advantage by asserting an incompatible position.” (Minish v. Hanuman Fellowship (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 437, 448 (Minish); MW Erectors, Inc. v. Niederhauser Ornamental & Metal Works Co., Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 412, 422 (MW Erectors).) Preventing litigants from “ ‘ “ ‘ “playing ‘fast and loose with the courts’ ” ’ ” ’ ” (Minish, at p. | 3 | 6 |
Drain v. Betz Laboratories, Inc.green2 sentences2006(Daar & Newman, supra, 129 Cal.App.4th at p. 491 .) He claims the record is devoid of any evidence of any wrongdoing on his part and he asserts, without providing any evidence, that Ligón has unclean hands with regard to her fiduciary duties to him with respect to his community property interests. 15 As discussed extensively ante, the doctrine of judicial estoppel “ ‘does not require reliance or prejudice before a party may invoke it.’ ” (Billmeyer v. Plaza Bank of Commerce, supra, 42 Cal.App.4th at p. 1092; see also Thomas v. Gordon, supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at p. 118 ; Drain, supra, 69 Cal.App. 2006(Daar & Newman, supra, 129 Cal.App.4th at p. 491 .) He claims the record is devoid of any evidence of any wrongdoing on his part and he asserts, without providing any evidence, that Ligón has unclean hands with regard to her fiduciary duties to him with respect to his community property interests. 15 As discussed extensively ante, the doctrine of judicial estoppel “ ‘does not require reliance or prejudice before a party may invoke it.’ ” (Billmeyer v. Plaza Bank of Commerce, supra, 42 Cal.App.4th at p. 1092; see also Thomas v. Gordon, supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at p. 118 ; Drain, supra, 69 Cal.App. | 3 | 5 |
Owens v. County of Los Angelesgreen2 sentences2021(In re Griffin (1967) 67 Cal.2d 343, 348 [parties may not “‘trifle with the courts’”]; see also Owens v. County of Los Angeles (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 107, 121 [discussing doctrine of judicial estoppel].) b. 2018The doctrine of judicial estoppel "prohibits a party from asserting a position in a legal proceeding that is contrary to a position he or she successfully asserted in the same or some earlier proceeding." ( Owens v. County of Los Angeles (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 107 , 121, 162 Cal.Rptr.3d 769 ( Owens ).) The elements of judicial estoppel are: " '(1) the same party has taken two positions; (2) the positions were taken in judicial or quasi-judicial administrative proceedings; (3) the party was successful in asserting the first position (i.e., the tribunal adopted the position or accepted it as tru | 3 | 3 |
Tuchscher Development Enterprises, Inc. v. San Diego Unified Port Districtgreen2 sentences2006Absent success in a prior proceeding, a party’s later inconsistent position introduces no ‘risk of inconsistent court determinations,’ . . . and thus poses little threat to judicial integrity.” (New Hampshire, supra, 532 U.S. at pp. 750-751, citations omitted; accord, ABF Capital Corp. v. Berglass (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 825, 832 [ 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 588 ]; Tuchscher Development Enterprises, Inc. v. San Diego Unified Port Dist. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1219, 1246 [ 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 57 ].) Recently, the high court held that judicial estoppel did not apply where the party to be estopped had not successf 2006Absent success in a prior proceeding, a party’s later inconsistent position introduces no ‘risk of inconsistent court determinations,’ . . . and thus poses little threat to judicial integrity.” (New Hampshire, supra, 532 U.S. at pp. 750-751, citations omitted; accord, ABF Capital Corp. v. Berglass (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 825, 832 [ 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 588 ]; Tuchscher Development Enterprises, Inc. v. San Diego Unified Port Dist. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1219, 1246 [ 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 57 ].) Recently, the high court held that judicial estoppel did not apply where the party to be estopped had not successf | 3 | 3 |
People v. Castillogreen2 sentences2024The judicial estoppel doctrine applies when “‘“‘“(1) the same party has taken two positions; (2) the positions were taken in judicial or quasi-judicial administrative proceedings; (3) the party was successful in asserting the first position (i.e., the tribunal adopted the position or accepted it as true); (4) the two positions are totally inconsistent; and (5) the first position was not taken as a result of ignorance, fraud, or mistake.”’”’” (People v. Castillo (2010) 49 Cal.4th 145, 155 .) The elements of judicial estoppel are not met here because the prosecution was not “successful in assert 2017“We do not invariably enforce the judicial estoppel doctrine merely because all of its elements are met. ‘[N]umerous decisions have made clear that judicial estoppel . . . is an equitable doctrine, and its application . . . is discretionary. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Castillo (2010) 49 Cal.4th 145, 156 .) Continental has not even argued that the trial court abused its discretion in this regard. | 2 | 8 |
Koo v. Rubio's Restaurants, Inc.green2 sentences2016We disagree. “‘Judicial estoppel precludes a party from gaining an advantage by taking one position, and then seeking a second advantage by taking an incompatible position. [Citations.] The doctrine’s dual goals are to maintain the integrity of the judicial system and to protect parties from opponents’ unfair strategies. [Citation.] Application of the doctrine is discretionary.’” (Koo v. Rubio’s Restaurants, Inc. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 719, 735 , fn. omitted.) The doctrine of judicial estoppel applies when “‘(1) the same party has taken two positions; (2) the positions were taken in judicial o 2013The dual goals of the doctrine of judicial estoppel ―‗are to maintain the integrity of the judicial system and to protect parties from opponents‘ unfair strategies. [Citation.] Application of the doctrine is discretionary. [Citation.]‘ [Citation.]‖ (Koo v. Rubio’s Restaurants, Inc., supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at p. 735 .) We cannot imagine a better case for the application of the doctrine. | 2 | 5 |
International Engine Parts, Inc. v. Feddersen & Co.green2 sentences2016In making that tactical decision he appears to have led the court to an erroneous 44 understanding of what event would trigger the prosecution’s right to such an examination and what the appropriate timing of such a motion would be.22 Similarly, under the doctrine of judicial estoppel, a party may be precluded “ ‘ “from changing its position over the course of judicial proceedings when such positional changes have an adverse impact on the judicial process.” ’ ” (International Engine Parts, Inc. v. Feddersen & Co. (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 345, 350 .) “ ‘ “Judicial estoppel is ‘intended to protect 2000"On December 27, 1997, Emitte Kuns told me that prior to the fire he had removed the batteries from the smoke detectors in the home because `they went off when they were cooking.'" The doctrine of judicial estoppel "`applies to preclude a party from assuming a position in a legal proceeding inconsistent with one previously asserted.'..." ( International Engine Parts, Inc. v. Feddersen & Co. (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 345, 350 , 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 178 .) "Judicial estoppel is most commonly applied to bar a party from making a factual assertion in a legal proceeding which directly contradicts an earlier | 2 | 4 |
Thomas v. Gordongreen2 sentences2010Assuming that the doctrine of judicial estoppel should be applied to an unsuccessful litigant only in the rare situation where the litigant has made an egregious attempt to manipulate the legal system, we agree with the trial court that ‘this is as egregious as it gets ....’” (Thomas v. Gordon, supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at p. 119 .) Thomas v. Gordon “involved a brazen admission of such egregious misconduct that it presented a rare situation where judicial estoppel should be applied even though the bankruptcy court did not rely on the debtor’s *849 nondisclosures.” (Gottlieb v. Kest, supra, 141 Cal 2006(Daar & Newman, supra, 129 Cal.App.4th at p. 491 .) He claims the record is devoid of any evidence of any wrongdoing on his part and he asserts, without providing any evidence, that Ligón has unclean hands with regard to her fiduciary duties to him with respect to his community property interests. 15 As discussed extensively ante, the doctrine of judicial estoppel “ ‘does not require reliance or prejudice before a party may invoke it.’ ” (Billmeyer v. Plaza Bank of Commerce, supra, 42 Cal.App.4th at p. 1092; see also Thomas v. Gordon, supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at p. 118 ; Drain, supra, 69 Cal.App. | 2 | 4 |
Billmeyer v. Plaza Bank of Commercegreen2 sentences2006As already noted, the dual purposes for applying the doctrine of judicial estoppel are “ ‘ “to maintain the integrity of the judicial system and to protect parties from opponents’ unfair strategies.” ’ ” (Aguilar v. Lerner, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 986 .) Thus, prejudice is irrelevant to a consideration of preserving the integrity of the judicial process, and “ ‘[t]he doctrine does not require reliance or prejudice before a party may invoke it.’ ” (Billmeyer v. Plaza Bank of Commerce (1995) 42 Cal.App.4th 1086, 1092 [ 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 119 ].) However, judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine, a 2006As already noted, the dual purposes for applying the doctrine of judicial estoppel are “ ‘ “to maintain the integrity of the judicial system and to protect parties from opponents’ unfair strategies.” ’ ” (Aguilar v. Lerner, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 986 .) Thus, prejudice is irrelevant to a consideration of preserving the integrity of the judicial process, and “ ‘[t]he doctrine does not require reliance or prejudice before a party may invoke it.’ ” (Billmeyer v. Plaza Bank of Commerce (1995) 42 Cal.App.4th 1086, 1092 [ 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 119 ].) However, judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine, a | 2 | 4 |
Hamilton v. Greenwich Investors XXVI, LLCgreen2 sentences2024(See Gottlieb, supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 137 [“Nevertheless, one of the judicial estoppel factors— success in asserting the prior position—is not present: The bankruptcy court did not ‘adopt[] the [prior] position or accept[] it as true.’”]; accord, Hamilton v. Greenwich Investors XXVI, LLC (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1602, 1613 [“the court found the doctrine did not apply because ‘the bankruptcy court did not adopt or accept the truth of [plaintiff’s] position that [the debtor] did not have any legal claims’ and ‘the bankruptcy case was dismissed without confirmation of a plan of reorganization 2015The doctrine of judicial estoppel precludes “‘a party from assuming a position in a legal proceeding inconsistent with one previously asserted.’” (Hamilton v. Greenwich Investors XXVI, LLC (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1602, 1610 (Hamilton).) In the bankruptcy context, when a debtor fails to disclose a claim likely to arise then judicial estoppel precludes the debtor from a subsequent attempt to pursue that claim. | 2 | 3 |
Cytodyn of New Mexico, Inc. v. Amerimmune Pharmaceuticals, Inc.green2 sentences2022The trial court did not address Filtzer’s judicial estoppel argument. 10 We apply the doctrine of judicial estoppel when “ ‘ “(1) the same party has taken two positions; (2) the positions were taken in judicial or quasi-judicial administrative proceedings; (3) the party was successful in asserting the first position (i.e., the tribunal adopted the position or accepted it as true); (4) the two positions are totally inconsistent; and (5) the first position was not taken as a result of ignorance, fraud, or mistake.” ’ ” (CytoDyn of New Mexico, Inc. v. Amerimmune Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (2008) 160 C 2022The trial court did not address Filtzer’s judicial estoppel argument. 10 We apply the doctrine of judicial estoppel when “ ‘ “(1) the same party has taken two positions; (2) the positions were taken in judicial or quasi-judicial administrative proceedings; (3) the party was successful in asserting the first position (i.e., the tribunal adopted the position or accepted it as true); (4) the two positions are totally inconsistent; and (5) the first position was not taken as a result of ignorance, fraud, or mistake.” ’ ” (CytoDyn of New Mexico, Inc. v. Amerimmune Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (2008) 160 C | 2 | 2 |
Ayala v. Dawsongreen2 sentences2022Moreover, Filtzer has not met his burden in showing that collateral estoppel should be applied “ ‘ “ ‘to prevent a party from changing its position over the course of judicial proceedings when such positional changes have an adverse impact on the judicial process. . . .’ ” ’ ” (Minish v. Hanuman Fellowship (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 437, 449 ; see also Ayala v. Dawson (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 1319, 1326 [holding that the burden is on party asserting doctrine].) There is no evidence of adverse impact on Filtzer or on the judicial process, nor does Filtzer even try to argue one. 12 In sum, the trial co 2022Moreover, Filtzer has not met his burden in showing that collateral estoppel should be applied “ ‘ “ ‘to prevent a party from changing its position over the course of judicial proceedings when such positional changes have an adverse impact on the judicial process. . . .’ ” ’ ” (Minish v. Hanuman Fellowship (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 437, 449 ; see also Ayala v. Dawson (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 1319, 1326 [holding that the burden is on party asserting doctrine].) There is no evidence of adverse impact on Filtzer or on the judicial process, nor does Filtzer even try to argue one. 12 In sum, the trial co | 2 | 2 |
Johnson v. GlaxoSmithKline, Inc.green2 sentences2020(See Johnson v. GlaxoSmithKline, Inc. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1497, 1513 [when " 'previous decision 102 rests on "different factual and legal foundation" [from] the issue . . . in the case at bar, collateral estoppel effect should be denied' "].)60 The judicial estoppel doctrine applies when: " '(1) the same party has taken two positions; (2) the positions were taken in judicial or quasi-judicial administrative proceedings; (3) the party was successful in asserting the first position (i.e., the tribunal adopted the position or accepted it as true); (4) the two positions are totally inconsistent 2020(See Johnson v. GlaxoSmithKline, Inc. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1497, 1513 [when " 'previous decision 102 rests on "different factual and legal foundation" [from] the issue . . . in the case at bar, collateral estoppel effect should be denied' "].)60 The judicial estoppel doctrine applies when: " '(1) the same party has taken two positions; (2) the positions were taken in judicial or quasi-judicial administrative proceedings; (3) the party was successful in asserting the first position (i.e., the tribunal adopted the position or accepted it as true); (4) the two positions are totally inconsistent | 2 | 2 |
| Scripps Clinic v. Superior Courtgreen | 2 | 2 |
| Kelsey v. Waste Managementgreen | 2 | 2 |
| ABF Capital Corp. v. Berglassgreen | 2 | 2 |
| Grady Allen v. Zurich Insurance Companygreen | 2 | 2 |
Blix Street Records, Inc. v. Cassidygreen2 sentences2024But by confirming the award and rejecting Mansoir’s petition to vacate it, the court effectively confirmed the award in the HOA’s favor, too. (§ 1286 [“If a petition or response under this chapter is duly served and filed, the court shall confirm the award as made”].) Thus, confirmation of the arbitrator’s award would seem to entitle the HOA 10 Additionally, judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine, so “whether it should be applied is a matter within the discretion of the trial court.” (Blix Street Records, Inc. v. Cassidy (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 39 , 46–47.) Mansoir does not contend, much le 2022“The doctrine of judicial estoppel, sometimes called the doctrine of ‘ “ ‘preclusion of inconsistent positions’ ” ’ [citation], ‘ “ ‘precludes a party from gaining an advantage by taking one position, and then seeking a second advantage by taking an incompatible position. [Citations.] The doctrine’s dual goals are to maintain the integrity of the judicial system and to protect parties from opponents’ unfair strategies.’ ” ’ ” (Blix Street Records, Inc. v. Cassidy (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 39, 47 [applying judicial estoppel to preclude party from disputing enforceability of a settlement agreement] | 1 | 8 |
The Swahn Group, Inc. v. Segalgreen2 sentences2023(See The Swahn Group, Inc. v. Segal (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 831, 841-843 [discussing doctrine of judicial estoppel].) Therefore, to prevent Koehler from being paid twice for the same work, it is necessary to offset/reimburse the fees already paid. 2022The trial court did not address Filtzer’s judicial estoppel argument. 10 We apply the doctrine of judicial estoppel when “ ‘ “(1) the same party has taken two positions; (2) the positions were taken in judicial or quasi-judicial administrative proceedings; (3) the party was successful in asserting the first position (i.e., the tribunal adopted the position or accepted it as true); (4) the two positions are totally inconsistent; and (5) the first position was not taken as a result of ignorance, fraud, or mistake.” ’ ” (CytoDyn of New Mexico, Inc. v. Amerimmune Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (2008) 160 C | 1 | 5 |
New Hampshire v. Mainegreen2 sentences2006Prior Success The third requirement for applying the doctrine of judicial estoppel is that “the party was successful in asserting the first position (i.e., the tribunal adopted the position or accepted it as true)[.j” (Jackson, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 183.) “Absent success in a prior proceeding, a party’s later inconsistent position introduces no ‘risk of inconsistent court determinations,’ [citation], and thus poses little threat to judicial integrity.” (New Hampshire v. Maine (2001) 532 U.S. 742, 750-751 [ 149 L.Ed.2d 968 , 121 S.Ct. 1808 ].) Levin maintains that the malpractice settleme 2006Prior Success The third requirement for applying the doctrine of judicial estoppel is that “the party was successful in asserting the first position (i.e., the tribunal adopted the position or accepted it as true)[.j” (Jackson, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 183.) “Absent success in a prior proceeding, a party’s later inconsistent position introduces no ‘risk of inconsistent court determinations,’ [citation], and thus poses little threat to judicial integrity.” (New Hampshire v. Maine (2001) 532 U.S. 742, 750-751 [ 149 L.Ed.2d 968 , 121 S.Ct. 1808 ].) Levin maintains that the malpractice settleme | 1 | 3 |
cluster 716614green2 sentences2011(Ryan Operations, supra, 81 F.3d at p. 357 .) The Third Circuit concluded that judicial estoppel would be inappropriate “as there is no evidence that [plaintiff] acted in bad faith.” (Id. at p. 362.) The court held that the doctrine of judicial estoppel does not apply “ ‘when the prior position was taken because of a good faith mistake rather than as part of a scheme to mislead the court.’ ” (Ibid.) The court explained that in Oneida Motor Freight, there was ample evidence from which an inference of deliberate manipulation could be drawn, namely, “Oneida had listed its $7.7 million debt to the 2011(Ryan Operations, supra, 81 F.3d at p. 357 .) The Third Circuit concluded that judicial estoppel would be inappropriate “as there is no evidence that [plaintiff] acted in bad faith.” (Id. at p. 362.) The court held that the doctrine of judicial estoppel does not apply “ ‘when the prior position was taken because of a good faith mistake rather than as part of a scheme to mislead the court.’ ” (Ibid.) The court explained that in Oneida Motor Freight, there was ample evidence from which an inference of deliberate manipulation could be drawn, namely, “Oneida had listed its $7.7 million debt to the | 1 | 3 |
MERCURY INTERACTIVE CORPORATION v. Kleingreen2 sentences2016“The doctrine of judicial estoppel applies when ‘(1) the same party has taken two positions; (2) the positions were taken injudicial or quasi-judicial administrative proceedings; (3) the party was successful in asserting the first position . . . ; (4) the two positions are totally inconsistent; and (5) the first position was not taken as a result of ignorance, fraud, or mistake.’ [Citation.]” (Mercury Interactive Corp. v. Klein (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 60, 85 [ 70 Cal.Rptr.3d 88 ], quoting Jackson v. County of Los Angeles (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 171, 183 [ 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 96 ].) Here, in the notice 2016“The doctrine of judicial estoppel applies when ‘(1) the same party has taken two positions; (2) the positions were taken injudicial or quasi-judicial administrative proceedings; (3) the party was successful in asserting the first position . . . ; (4) the two positions are totally inconsistent; and (5) the first position was not taken as a result of ignorance, fraud, or mistake.’ [Citation.]” (Mercury Interactive Corp. v. Klein (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 60, 85 [ 70 Cal.Rptr.3d 88 ], quoting Jackson v. County of Los Angeles (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 171, 183 [ 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 96 ].) Here, in the notice | 1 | 2 |
| California Coastal Commission v. Tahmassebigreen | 1 | 2 |
| Harriet Rissetto v. Plumbers and Steamfitters Local 343, a Business Entity, Form Unknown, Michael Beavers and Does 1-25, Inclusivegreen | 1 | 2 |
| Prilliman v. United Air Lines, Inc.green | 1 | 2 |
| Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Stowellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lange v. Schillinggreen | 1 | 1 |
| Newton v. Clemonsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Frei v. Daveygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Badie v. Bank of Americagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Brannan v. Lathrop Construction Associates, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Reid v. City of San Diegogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Applied Equipment Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
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| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
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Jogani v. Jogani
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2 sentences2025Second, the doctrine of judicial estoppel “precludes a party from obtaining an advantage by asserting one position, and then seeking a second advantage by asserting an incompatible position.” (Minish v. Hanuman Fellowship (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 437, 448-449 .) The doctrine generally applies when: “(1) the same party has taken two positions; (2) the positions were taken in judicial or quasi-judicial administrative proceedings; (3) the party was successful in asserting the first position (i.e., the tribunal adopted the position or accepted it as true); (4) the two positions are totally inconsist 2024(Jogani v. Jogani, supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 170 ; Daar & Newman v. VRL International, supra, 129 Cal.App.4th at p. 491 .) Consequently, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in declining to apply the doctrine of judicial estoppel. | 4 | 2015–2025 |
Rice v. Clark
green
2 sentences2024(See Bucur, at pp. 187–188.) 16 person alleged to have exerted undue influence had a confidential relationship with the testator; (2) the person actively participated in procuring the instrument’s preparation or execution; and (3) the person would benefit unduly by the testamentary instrument.” (Rice v. Clark (2002) 28 Cal.4th 89 , 96–97.) “If this presumption is activated, it shifts to the proponent of the [instrument] the burden of producing proof by a preponderance of evidence that the [instrument] was not procured by undue influence. 2024(See Bucur, at pp. 187–188.) 16 person alleged to have exerted undue influence had a confidential relationship with the testator; (2) the person actively participated in procuring the instrument’s preparation or execution; and (3) the person would benefit unduly by the testamentary instrument.” (Rice v. Clark (2002) 28 Cal.4th 89 , 96–97.) “If this presumption is activated, it shifts to the proponent of the [instrument] the burden of producing proof by a preponderance of evidence that the [instrument] was not procured by undue influence. | 2 | 2024–2024 |
Daar & Newman v. VRL International
green
2 sentences2024(Jogani v. Jogani, supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 170 ; Daar & Newman v. VRL International, supra, 129 Cal.App.4th at p. 491 .) Consequently, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in declining to apply the doctrine of judicial estoppel. 2006(Daar & Newman, supra, 129 Cal.App.4th at p. 491 .) He claims the record is devoid of any evidence of any wrongdoing on his part and he asserts, without providing any evidence, that Ligón has unclean hands with regard to her fiduciary duties to him with respect to his community property interests. 15 As discussed extensively ante, the doctrine of judicial estoppel “ ‘does not require reliance or prejudice before a party may invoke it.’ ” (Billmeyer v. Plaza Bank of Commerce, supra, 42 Cal.App.4th at p. 1092; see also Thomas v. Gordon, supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at p. 118 ; Drain, supra, 69 Cal.App. | 2 | 2006–2024 |
Gelfo v. Lockheed Martin Corporation
green
2 sentences2023“A judicial admission is a party’s unequivocal concession of the truth of a matter, and removes the matter as an issue in the case.” (Gelfo v. Lockheed Martin Corp. 15 (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 34, 48 .) The doctrine of judicial admissions is similar to the doctrine of judicial estoppel. 2023“A judicial admission is a party’s unequivocal concession of the truth of a matter, and removes the matter as an issue in the case.” (Gelfo v. Lockheed Martin Corp. 15 (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 34, 48 .) The doctrine of judicial admissions is similar to the doctrine of judicial estoppel. | 2 | 2023–2023 |
Rodgers v. Sargent Controls & Aerospace
green
2 sentences2020He relies on the District's submissions in Bryant, where it argued, among other things, that irrigating landowners possess an appurtenant, constitutionally protected property interest in the District's water rights and that "each individual landowner has a statutory 60 It does not appear that Abatti raised collateral estoppel in the superior court; although this could be a basis for forfeiture (Rodgers v. Sargent Controls & Aerospace (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 82, 89 ), we elect to address it. 2020He relies on the District's submissions in Bryant, where it argued, among other things, that irrigating landowners possess an appurtenant, constitutionally protected property interest in the District's water rights and that "each individual landowner has a statutory 60 It does not appear that Abatti raised collateral estoppel in the superior court; although this could be a basis for forfeiture (Rodgers v. Sargent Controls & Aerospace (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 82, 89 ), we elect to address it. | 2 | 2020–2020 |
M. Perez Co. v. Base Camp Condominiums Ass'n No. One
green
2 sentences2018No. One (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 456 , 465, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 563 .) The Third District concluded that its prior opinion did not make proper use of the doctrine of judicial estoppel. ( Id. at p. 469, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 563 .) It stated, "In sum, there is no sound policy or legal basis for the broad rule adopted by this court in International Billing Services . 2018No. One (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 456 , 465, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 563 .) The Third District concluded that its prior opinion did not make proper use of the doctrine of judicial estoppel. ( Id. at p. 469, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 563 .) It stated, "In sum, there is no sound policy or legal basis for the broad rule adopted by this court in International Billing Services . | 2 | 2018–2018 |
| Board of Pilot Commissioners v. Superior Court green | 2 | 2015–2015 |
| Jeanene Harlick v. Blue Shield of California green | 2 | 2014–2014 |
| Zedner v. United States green | 2 | 2006–2006 |
| Southmark Corp. v. Trotter, Smith & Jacobs green | 2 | 1999–1999 |
| People v. Watts green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| Raceway Ford Cases green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| People v. Cheeley green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Bell v. Wells Fargo Bank green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| People v. Mancebo green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Miller v. Bank of America green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Dreyer's Grand Ice Cream, Inc. v. County of Kern green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Eng v. Brown green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| People v. Jimenez green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Cal Sierra Dev., Inc. v. George Reed, Inc. green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Kerley v. Weber green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Chatfield v. Continental Building & Loan Ass'n green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Villanueva v. City of Colton green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Keener v. Jeld-Wen, Inc. green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Campion v. Old Republic Home Protection Co. green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Louis Eugene Russell v. Tom Rolfs, Superintendent green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corp. green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Rossiter v. Benoit green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Reynolds Metals Co. v. Alperson green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Elston v. Westport Insurance green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Nedlloyd Lines B v. v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.