judicial estoppel doctrine in Maryland

2006The doctrine of judicial estoppel, or estoppel by admission, has been elucidated in a historical context by Judge Alan Wilner, writing for this Court in Eagan v. Calhoun, 347 Md. 72 , 698 A.2d 1097 (1997): Maryland has long recognized the doctrine of estoppel by admission, derived from the rule laid down by the English Court of Exchequer in Cave v. Mills, that `a man shall not be allowed to blow hot and cold, to claim at one time and deny at another.' In Stone v. Stone [, 230 Md. 248 , 186 A.2d 590 (1962)] and Wilson Brothers v. Cooey [, 251 Md. 350 , 247 A.2d 395 (1968)], we adopted the state

2006The doctrine of judicial estoppel, or estoppel by admission, has been elucidated in a historical context by Judge Alan Wilner, writing for this Court in Eagan v. Calhoun, 347 Md. 72 , 698 A.2d 1097 (1997): Maryland has long recognized the doctrine of estoppel by admission, derived from the rule laid down by the English Court of Exchequer in Cave v. Mills, that `a man shall not be allowed to blow hot and cold, to claim at one time and deny at another.' In Stone v. Stone [, 230 Md. 248 , 186 A.2d 590 (1962)] and Wilson Brothers v. Cooey [, 251 Md. 350 , 247 A.2d 395 (1968)], we adopted the state

2003Nevertheless, she urges us to conclude that her prior representations in the domestic case were not made with the requisite intent to mislead. 9 In support of Vogel’s claim that application of the judicial estoppel doctrine requires intentional misconduct, appellant *710 relies, inter alia, on Wilson v. Stanbury, 118 Md.App. 209 , 702 A.2d 436 (1997).

2003Nevertheless, she urges us to conclude that her prior representations in the domestic case were not made with the requisite intent to mislead. 9 In support of Vogel’s claim that application of the judicial estoppel doctrine requires intentional misconduct, appellant *710 relies, inter alia, on Wilson v. Stanbury, 118 Md.App. 209 , 702 A.2d 436 (1997).

2024Generally, the doctrine of judicial estoppel “prevents ‘a party who successfully pursued a position in a prior legal proceeding from asserting a contrary position in a later proceeding.’” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Roane v. Washington Cnty.

2024Generally, the doctrine of judicial estoppel “prevents ‘a party who successfully pursued a position in a prior legal proceeding from asserting a contrary position in a later proceeding.’” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Roane v. Washington Cnty.

2006Fund Corp., 86 Md.App. 1, 20-21 , 585 A.2d 238 (1991) (both discussing doctrine of judicial estoppel).

2006Fund Corp., 86 Md.App. 1, 20-21 , 585 A.2d 238 (1991) (both discussing doctrine of judicial estoppel).

2006DISCUSSION Judicial Estoppel Kramer v. Globe Brewing Co., 175 Md. 461 , 2 A.2d 634 (1938), is the seminal case in Maryland adopting the doctrine of judicial estoppel.

2006DISCUSSION Judicial Estoppel Kramer v. Globe Brewing Co., 175 Md. 461 , 2 A.2d 634 (1938), is the seminal case in Maryland adopting the doctrine of judicial estoppel.

2006In Middlebrook Tech, LLC v. Moore, 157 Md.App. 40 , 849 A.2d 63 (2004), we said: Three factors "typically inform the decision whether to apply” the doctrine of judicial estoppel in a particular case: whether the party's later position is clearly inconsistent with its earlier position; whether the party succeeded in persuading the court in the earlier matter to accept its position, so that judicial acceptance of the contrary position in the later matter would create the perception that one of the courts had been misled; and whether the party seeking to assert the inconsistent position in the la

2006In Middlebrook Tech, LLC v. Moore, 157 Md.App. 40 , 849 A.2d 63 (2004), we said: Three factors "typically inform the decision whether to apply” the doctrine of judicial estoppel in a particular case: whether the party's later position is clearly inconsistent with its earlier position; whether the party succeeded in persuading the court in the earlier matter to accept its position, so that judicial acceptance of the contrary position in the later matter would create the perception that one of the courts had been misled; and whether the party seeking to assert the inconsistent position in the la

2004The doctrine of judicial estoppel “precludes a party who ... secured a judgment in his or her favor from assuming a contrary position in another action simply because his or her interests have changed.” Mathews v. Underwood-Gary, 133 Md.App. 570, 579 , 758 A.2d 1019 (2000), aff'd on other grounds, 366 Md. 660 , 785 A.2d 708 (2001) (quotation *63 marks and citation omitted).

2004The doctrine of judicial estoppel “precludes a party who ... secured a judgment in his or her favor from assuming a contrary position in another action simply because his or her interests have changed.” Mathews v. Underwood-Gary, 133 Md.App. 570, 579 , 758 A.2d 1019 (2000), aff'd on other grounds, 366 Md. 660 , 785 A.2d 708 (2001) (quotation *63 marks and citation omitted).

2003In Sedlack, 134 F.3d 219 , the Fourth Circuit recognized intent to mislead the court as an element in the judicial estoppel analysis.

2000Moreover, the purpose of the judicial estoppel doctrine is arguably applicable to the summary judgment context, namely, to "prevent a party from ‘playing fast and loose’ with the courts and [to] 'protect the essential integrity of the judicial process.' ” Id. (quoting Allen v. Zurich Ins.

2018Standard of Review We explained in Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Shea , 415 Md. 1 , 14-15, 997 A.2d 768 , 775-76 (2010) (quoting Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Delawter , 403 Md. 243 , 256-57, 941 A.2d 1067 , 1076 (2008) ), that [a] court's role in reviewing an administrative agency adjudicatory decision is narrow; it is limited to determining if there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the agency's findings and conclusions, and to determine if the administrative decision is premised upon an erroneous conclusion of law.

2018Standard of Review We explained in Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Shea , 415 Md. 1 , 14-15, 997 A.2d 768 , 775-76 (2010) (quoting Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Delawter , 403 Md. 243 , 256-57, 941 A.2d 1067 , 1076 (2008) ), that [a] court's role in reviewing an administrative agency adjudicatory decision is narrow; it is limited to determining if there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the agency's findings and conclusions, and to determine if the administrative decision is premised upon an erroneous conclusion of law.

2018Standard of Review We explained in Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Shea , 415 Md. 1 , 14-15, 997 A.2d 768 , 775-76 (2010) (quoting Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Delawter , 403 Md. 243 , 256-57, 941 A.2d 1067 , 1076 (2008) ), that [a] court's role in reviewing an administrative agency adjudicatory decision is narrow; it is limited to determining if there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the agency's findings and conclusions, and to determine if the administrative decision is premised upon an erroneous conclusion of law.

2018Standard of Review We explained in Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Shea , 415 Md. 1 , 14-15, 997 A.2d 768 , 775-76 (2010) (quoting Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Delawter , 403 Md. 243 , 256-57, 941 A.2d 1067 , 1076 (2008) ), that [a] court's role in reviewing an administrative agency adjudicatory decision is narrow; it is limited to determining if there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the agency's findings and conclusions, and to determine if the administrative decision is premised upon an erroneous conclusion of law.

2009I concur in the affirmance of the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals; however, I write separately only to note that I would reach that conclusion solely upon the judicial estoppel analysis in the Majority opinion (Maj. op. at 672-78, 980 A.2d at 464-68 ).

2006Co., 166 Md.App. 321, 340 , 888 A.2d 1189 (2005), this Court summarized the doctrine of judicial estoppel as follows: [T]he doctrine of judicial estoppel ... prohibits a litigant from “blowing hot and cold,” by taking one position that is accepted by one court and advocating a completely contrary position in another court, to try to gain advantage.

2006Co., 166 Md.App. 321, 340 , 888 A.2d 1189 (2005), this Court summarized the doctrine of judicial estoppel as follows: [T]he doctrine of judicial estoppel ... prohibits a litigant from “blowing hot and cold,” by taking one position that is accepted by one court and advocating a completely contrary position in another court, to try to gain advantage.

2006Finally, likening the case to another New Jersey domestic case in which the doctrine of judicial estoppel was applied, the court observed: [The wife’s] knowing and voluntary acceptance of a settlement that she stated was a fair compromise bars her from proceeding with her malpractice claim. [She] entered into the second settlement admittedly aware of the discovery deficiencies leading up to the settlement.... [T]o allow [her] to now sue [her first lawyer] for malpractice would afford her the ability to potentially profit from litigation positions that are “clearly inconsistent and uttered to o

2006Finally, likening the case to another New Jersey domestic case in which the doctrine of judicial estoppel was applied, the court observed: [The wife’s] knowing and voluntary acceptance of a settlement that she stated was a fair compromise bars her from proceeding with her malpractice claim. [She] entered into the second settlement admittedly aware of the discovery deficiencies leading up to the settlement.... [T]o allow [her] to now sue [her first lawyer] for malpractice would afford her the ability to potentially profit from litigation positions that are “clearly inconsistent and uttered to o

2006Finally, likening the case to another New Jersey domestic case in which the doctrine of judicial estoppel was applied, the court observed: [The wife’s] knowing and voluntary acceptance of a settlement that she stated was a fair compromise bars her from proceeding with her malpractice claim. [She] entered into the second settlement admittedly aware of the discovery deficiencies leading up to the settlement.... [T]o allow [her] to now sue [her first lawyer] for malpractice would afford her the ability to potentially profit from litigation positions that are “clearly inconsistent and uttered to o

2006Finally, likening the case to another New Jersey domestic case in which the doctrine of judicial estoppel was applied, the court observed: [The wife’s] knowing and voluntary acceptance of a settlement that she stated was a fair compromise bars her from proceeding with her malpractice claim. [She] entered into the second settlement admittedly aware of the discovery deficiencies leading up to the settlement.... [T]o allow [her] to now sue [her first lawyer] for malpractice would afford her the ability to potentially profit from litigation positions that are “clearly inconsistent and uttered to o

2006The doctrine of judicial estoppel, or estoppel by admission, has been elucidated in a historical context by Judge Alan Wilner, writing for this Court in Eagan v. Calhoun, 347 Md. 72 , 698 A.2d 1097 (1997): Maryland has long recognized the doctrine of estoppel by admission, derived from the rule laid down by the English Court of Exchequer in Cave v. Mills, that `a man shall not be allowed to blow hot and cold, to claim at one time and deny at another.' In Stone v. Stone [, 230 Md. 248 , 186 A.2d 590 (1962)] and Wilson Brothers v. Cooey [, 251 Md. 350 , 247 A.2d 395 (1968)], we adopted the state

2006The doctrine of judicial estoppel, or estoppel by admission, has been elucidated in a historical context by Judge Alan Wilner, writing for this Court in Eagan v. Calhoun, 347 Md. 72 , 698 A.2d 1097 (1997): Maryland has long recognized the doctrine of estoppel by admission, derived from the rule laid down by the English Court of Exchequer in Cave v. Mills, that `a man shall not be allowed to blow hot and cold, to claim at one time and deny at another.' In Stone v. Stone [, 230 Md. 248 , 186 A.2d 590 (1962)] and Wilson Brothers v. Cooey [, 251 Md. 350 , 247 A.2d 395 (1968)], we adopted the state

2003App. 260, 273 , 824 A.2d 1031 (2003) (stating that the doctrine of judicial estoppel “is only applicable in cases where the party has successfully pursued one theory, but then asserts a second, contrary theory, in another action.”); Mathews v. Underivood-Gary, 133 Md.App. 570, 579 , 758 A.2d 1019 (2000), aff'd., 362 Md. 187 , 763 A.2d 734 (2001).