judicial estoppel doctrine in Alabama

2014See, e.g., Ex parte First Alabama Bank, 883 So. 2d 1236, 1241 (Ala. 2003) ("'The doctrine of judicial estoppel "applies to preclude a party 19 The plaintiffs explain that this initial position was taken by all parties based on the continued existence of EAG, LLC, in public records. 51 1110423 from assuming a position in a legal proceeding inconsistent with one previously asserted."'" (quoting Jinright v. Paulk, 758 So. 2d 553, 555 (Ala. 2000), quoting in turn Selma Foundry & Supply Co. v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 598 So. 2d 844, 846 (Ala. 1992))).

2014See, e.g., Ex parte First Alabama Bank, 883 So.2d 1236, 1241 (Ala.2003) (‘“The doctrine of judicial estoppel “applies to preclude a party from assuming a position in a legal proceeding inconsistent with one previously asserted.” ’ ” (quoting Jinright v. Paulk, 758 So.2d 553, 555 (Ala.2000), quoting in turn Selma Foundry & Supply Co. v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 598 So.2d 844, 846 (Ala.1992))).

2014See, e.g., Ex parte First Alabama Bank, 883 So. 2d 1236, 1241 (Ala. 2003) ("'The doctrine of judicial estoppel "applies to preclude a party 19 The plaintiffs explain that this initial position was taken by all parties based on the continued existence of EAG, LLC, in public records. 51 1110423 from assuming a position in a legal proceeding inconsistent with one previously asserted."'" (quoting Jinright v. Paulk, 758 So. 2d 553, 555 (Ala. 2000), quoting in turn Selma Foundry & Supply Co. v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 598 So. 2d 844, 846 (Ala. 1992))).

2014See, e.g., Ex parte First Alabama Bank, 883 So.2d 1236, 1241 (Ala.2003) (‘“The doctrine of judicial estoppel “applies to preclude a party from assuming a position in a legal proceeding inconsistent with one previously asserted.” ’ ” (quoting Jinright v. Paulk, 758 So.2d 553, 555 (Ala.2000), quoting in turn Selma Foundry & Supply Co. v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 598 So.2d 844, 846 (Ala.1992))).

2014See, e.g., Ex parte First Alabama Bank, 883 So. 2d 1236, 1241 (Ala. 2003) ("'The doctrine of judicial estoppel "applies to preclude a party 19 The plaintiffs explain that this initial position was taken by all parties based on the continued existence of EAG, LLC, in public records. 51 1110423 from assuming a position in a legal proceeding inconsistent with one previously asserted."'" (quoting Jinright v. Paulk, 758 So. 2d 553, 555 (Ala. 2000), quoting in turn Selma Foundry & Supply Co. v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 598 So. 2d 844, 846 (Ala. 1992))).

2014See, e.g., Ex parte First Alabama Bank, 883 So.2d 1236, 1241 (Ala.2003) (‘“The doctrine of judicial estoppel “applies to preclude a party from assuming a position in a legal proceeding inconsistent with one previously asserted.” ’ ” (quoting Jinright v. Paulk, 758 So.2d 553, 555 (Ala.2000), quoting in turn Selma Foundry & Supply Co. v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 598 So.2d 844, 846 (Ala.1992))).

2013Discussion Judicial Estoppel “ ‘The doctrine of judicial estoppel “applies to preclude a party from assuming a position in a legal proceeding inconsistent with one previously asserted.” ’ ” Ex parte First Alabama Bank, 883 So.2d 1236, 1241 (Ala.2003) (quoting Jinright v. Paulk, 758 So.2d 553, 555 (Ala.2000), quoting in turn Selma Foundry & Supply Co. v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 598 So.2d 844, 846 (Ala.1992), quoting in turn Oneida Motor Freight, Inc. v. United Jersey Bank, 848 F.2d 414, 419 (3d Cir.1988)).

2008Boudreau next asserts an argument based on the doctrine of judicial es-toppel. “ ‘The doctrine of judicial estoppel “applies to preclude a party from assuming a position in a legal proceeding inconsistent with one previously asserted.” ’ ” Ex parte First Alabama Bank, 883 So.2d 1236, 1241 (Ala.2003) (quoting Jinright v. Paulk, 758 So.2d 553, 555 (Ala.2000), quoting in turn Selma Foundry & Supply Co. v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 598 So.2d 844, 846 (Ala.1992), quoting in turn Oneida Motor Freight, Inc. v. United Jersey *501 Bank, 848 F.2d 414 (3d Cir.1988)).

2014After holding that the bankruptcy trustee was in fact the real party in interest, 52 So. 3d at 491-92 , this Court 19 1130342, 1130357 considered what effect the doctrine of judicial estoppel should have in the case: "'In Ex parte First Alabama Bank, [ 883 So. 2d 1236 (Ala. 2003),] this Court "embrace[d] the factors set forth in New Hampshire v. Maine[, 532 U.S. 742 , 121 S.Ct. 1808 , 149 L.Ed.2d 968 (2001),] and join[ed] the mainstream of jurisprudence in dealing with the doctrine of judicial estoppel."' Middleton v. Caterpillar Indus., Inc., 979 So. 2d 53, 60 (Ala. 2007) (quoting Ex parte Fi

2014After holding that the bankruptcy trustee was in fact the real party in interest, 52 So.3d at 491-92 , this Court considered what effect the doctrine of judicial estoppel should have in the case: “ ‘In Ex parte First Alabama Bank, [ 883 So.2d 1236 (Ala.2003),] this Court “embrace[d] the factors set forth in New Hampshire v. Maine [, 532 U.S. 742 , 121 S.Ct. 1808 , 149 L.Ed.2d 968 (2001),] and join[ed] the mainstream of jurisprudence in dealing with the doctrine of judicial estoppel.” ’ Middleton v. Caterpillar Indus., Inc., 979 So.2d 53, 60 (Ala.2007) (quoting Ex parte First Alabama Bank, 883

2014See, e.g., Luna v. Dominion Bank of Middle Tennessee, Inc., 631 So.2d 917, 919 (Ala.1993) (“The doctrine of judicial estoppel applies, where a debtor in bankruptcy proceedings fails to disclose any claim that may be presented in a nonbankruptcy contest, to estop the debtor from presenting the claim.”).

2014See Hamm, 52 So.3d at 498 (citing Jinright v. Paulk, 758 So.2d 553, 559 (Ala.2000), for the proposition that “among the questions of fact essential to a determination of the applicability of the doctrine of judicial estoppel is ‘whether a debtor who is engaged in bankruptcy proceedings knew or should have known about claims or causes of action that should be disclosed as assets’ ”), and Luna, 631 So.2d at 919 (“[The plaintiff] further contends that the doctrine of judicial estoppel should not be applied to him because, he says, he was unaware of his claims against [the defendant] until after h

2003Co., 667 F.2d 1162, 1166 (4th Cir.1982).) However, the United States Supreme Court did identify several factors as informative in determining the applicability of the doctrine of judicial estoppel. 532 U.S. at 750-51 , 121 S.Ct. 1808 .

2003Co. , 667 F.2d 1162 , 1166 (4th Cir. 1982).) However, the United States Supreme Court did identify several factors as informative in determining the applicability of the doctrine of judicial estoppel. 532 U.S. at 750 -51 , 121 S.Ct. 1808 .

2014After holding that the bankruptcy trustee was in fact the real party in interest, 52 So.3d at 491-92 , this Court considered what effect the doctrine of judicial estoppel should have in the case: “ ‘In Ex parte First Alabama Bank, [ 883 So.2d 1236 (Ala.2003),] this Court “embrace[d] the factors set forth in New Hampshire v. Maine [, 532 U.S. 742 , 121 S.Ct. 1808 , 149 L.Ed.2d 968 (2001),] and join[ed] the mainstream of jurisprudence in dealing with the doctrine of judicial estoppel.” ’ Middleton v. Caterpillar Indus., Inc., 979 So.2d 53, 60 (Ala.2007) (quoting Ex parte First Alabama Bank, 883

2014After holding that the bankruptcy trustee was in fact the real party in interest, 52 So.3d at 491-92 , this Court considered what effect the doctrine of judicial estoppel should have in the case: “ ‘In Ex parte First Alabama Bank, [ 883 So.2d 1236 (Ala.2003),] this Court “embrace[d] the factors set forth in New Hampshire v. Maine [, 532 U.S. 742 , 121 S.Ct. 1808 , 149 L.Ed.2d 968 (2001),] and join[ed] the mainstream of jurisprudence in dealing with the doctrine of judicial estoppel.” ’ Middleton v. Caterpillar Indus., Inc., 979 So.2d 53, 60 (Ala.2007) (quoting Ex parte First Alabama Bank, 883

2018See Jimmy Day Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. Smith , 964 So.2d 1 , 9 (Ala. 2007) (" ' "[I]t is not the function of this Court to do a party's legal research or to make and address legal arguments for a party based on undelineated general propositions not supported by sufficient authority or argument." ' Butler v. Town of Argo , 871 So.2d 1 , 20 (Ala. 2003) (quoting Dykes v. Lane Trucking, Inc., 652 So.2d 248 , 251 (Ala. 1994) ).").

2018See Jimmy Day Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. Smith , 964 So.2d 1 , 9 (Ala. 2007) (" ' "[I]t is not the function of this Court to do a party's legal research or to make and address legal arguments for a party based on undelineated general propositions not supported by sufficient authority or argument." ' Butler v. Town of Argo , 871 So.2d 1 , 20 (Ala. 2003) (quoting Dykes v. Lane Trucking, Inc., 652 So.2d 248 , 251 (Ala. 1994) ).").

2018See Jimmy Day Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. Smith , 964 So.2d 1 , 9 (Ala. 2007) (" ' "[I]t is not the function of this Court to do a party's legal research or to make and address legal arguments for a party based on undelineated general propositions not supported by sufficient authority or argument." ' Butler v. Town of Argo , 871 So.2d 1 , 20 (Ala. 2003) (quoting Dykes v. Lane Trucking, Inc., 652 So.2d 248 , 251 (Ala. 1994) ).").

2018See Jimmy Day Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. Smith , 964 So.2d 1 , 9 (Ala. 2007) (" ' "[I]t is not the function of this Court to do a party's legal research or to make and address legal arguments for a party based on undelineated general propositions not supported by sufficient authority or argument." ' Butler v. Town of Argo , 871 So.2d 1 , 20 (Ala. 2003) (quoting Dykes v. Lane Trucking, Inc., 652 So.2d 248 , 251 (Ala. 1994) ).").

2018See Jimmy Day Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. Smith , 964 So.2d 1 , 9 (Ala. 2007) (" ' "[I]t is not the function of this Court to do a party's legal research or to make and address legal arguments for a party based on undelineated general propositions not supported by sufficient authority or argument." ' Butler v. Town of Argo , 871 So.2d 1 , 20 (Ala. 2003) (quoting Dykes v. Lane Trucking, Inc., 652 So.2d 248 , 251 (Ala. 1994) ).").

2018See Jimmy Day Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. Smith , 964 So.2d 1 , 9 (Ala. 2007) (" ' "[I]t is not the function of this Court to do a party's legal research or to make and address legal arguments for a party based on undelineated general propositions not supported by sufficient authority or argument." ' Butler v. Town of Argo , 871 So.2d 1 , 20 (Ala. 2003) (quoting Dykes v. Lane Trucking, Inc., 652 So.2d 248 , 251 (Ala. 1994) ).").

2016See, e.g,, White Tiger Graphics, Inc. v. Clemons, 88 So.3d 908, 911 (Ala.Civ.App.2012); Edwards v. McCord, 461 So.2d 1319, 1320 (Ala.1984)(“ ‘It may be laid down as a general proposition that, where a party assumes a certain position in a legal proceeding, and succeeds in maintaining that position, he may not thereafter, simply because his interests have changed, assume a contrary position, especially if it be to the prejudice of the party who has acquiesced in the position formerly taken by him.’ ” (quoting Davis v. Wakelee, 156 U.S. 680, 689 , 15 S.Ct 555 , 39 L.Ed. 578 (1895))).

1996Edwards v. McCord , 461 So.2d 1319 , 1320 (Ala. 1984).

2016See, e.g,, White Tiger Graphics, Inc. v. Clemons, 88 So.3d 908, 911 (Ala.Civ.App.2012); Edwards v. McCord, 461 So.2d 1319, 1320 (Ala.1984)(“ ‘It may be laid down as a general proposition that, where a party assumes a certain position in a legal proceeding, and succeeds in maintaining that position, he may not thereafter, simply because his interests have changed, assume a contrary position, especially if it be to the prejudice of the party who has acquiesced in the position formerly taken by him.’ ” (quoting Davis v. Wakelee, 156 U.S. 680, 689 , 15 S.Ct 555 , 39 L.Ed. 578 (1895))).

2013In White Tiger Graphics, Inc. v. Clemons, 88 So.3d 908, 911 (Ala.Civ.App.2012), a majority of this court indicated its willingness to apply the doctrine of judicial estoppel in an appropriate workers’ compensation case.

2015We have held, though, “a prosecutor can make inconsistent arguments at the separate trials of co-defendants without violating the due process clause.” Beathard v. Johnson, 177 F.3d 340, 348 (5th Cir.1999); see also Nichols v. Scott, 69 F.3d 1255, 1272 (5th Cir.1995) ("Two things, however, may be said about the rather amorphous doctrine of judicial estoppel.

2015We have held, though, “a prosecutor can make inconsistent arguments at the separate trials of co-defendants without violating the due process clause.” Beathard v. Johnson, 177 F.3d 340, 348 (5th Cir.1999); see also Nichols v. Scott, 69 F.3d 1255, 1272 (5th Cir.1995) (“Two things, however, may be said about the rather amorphous doctrine of judicial estoppel.

2015We have held, though, “a prosecutor can make inconsistent arguments at the separate trials of co-defendants without violating the due process clause.” Beathard v. Johnson, 177 F.3d 340, 348 (5th Cir.1999); see also Nichols v. Scott, 69 F.3d 1255, 1272 (5th Cir.1995) ("Two things, however, may be said about the rather amorphous doctrine of judicial estoppel.

2015We have held, though, “a prosecutor can make inconsistent arguments at the separate trials of co-defendants without violating the due process clause.” Beathard v. Johnson, 177 F.3d 340, 348 (5th Cir.1999); see also Nichols v. Scott, 69 F.3d 1255, 1272 (5th Cir.1995) (“Two things, however, may be said about the rather amorphous doctrine of judicial estoppel.

2014After holding that the bankruptcy trustee was in fact the real party in interest, 52 So.3d at 491-92 , this Court considered what effect the doctrine of judicial estoppel should have in the case: “ ‘In Ex parte First Alabama Bank, [ 883 So.2d 1236 (Ala.2003),] this Court “embrace[d] the factors set forth in New Hampshire v. Maine [, 532 U.S. 742 , 121 S.Ct. 1808 , 149 L.Ed.2d 968 (2001),] and join[ed] the mainstream of jurisprudence in dealing with the doctrine of judicial estoppel.” ’ Middleton v. Caterpillar Indus., Inc., 979 So.2d 53, 60 (Ala.2007) (quoting Ex parte First Alabama Bank, 883

2014See Hamm, 52 So.3d at 498 (citing Jinright v. Paulk, 758 So.2d 553, 559 (Ala.2000), for the proposition that “among the questions of fact essential to a determination of the applicability of the doctrine of judicial estoppel is ‘whether a debtor who is engaged in bankruptcy proceedings knew or should have known about claims or causes of action that should be disclosed as assets’ ”), and Luna, 631 So.2d at 919 (“[The plaintiff] further contends that the doctrine of judicial estoppel should not be applied to him because, he says, he was unaware of his claims against [the defendant] until after h

2010See Ex parte First Alabama Bank, 883 So.2d 1236, 1246 (Ala.2003) (overruling Porter v. Jolly, 564 So.2d 434 (Ala.1990), and cases consistent with Porter regarding the requirements to show judicial estop-pel).

2010See Ex parte First Alabama Bank, 883 So.2d 1236, 1246 (Ala.2003) (overruling Porter v. Jolly, 564 So.2d 434 (Ala.1990), and cases consistent with Porter regarding the requirements to show judicial estoppel).

2007The primary purpose of the doctrine of judicial estoppel is to protect the integrity of our judicial system from those who may play "`fast and loose with the courts.'" Consolidated Stores, Inc. v. Gargis, 686 So.2d 268, 276 (Ala.Civ.App.1996) (quoting Muellner v. Mars, Inc., 714 F.Supp. 351, 356 (N.D.Ill.1989)).

2000See Consolidated Stores, Inc. v. Gargis , 686 So.2d 268 (Ala.Civ.App. 1996) (holding the doctrine applicable where prior inconsistent position was asserted in a Social Security disability hearing). 4 The doctrine of judicial estoppel is inapplicable in this case for several reasons.

2006The Lumpkins rely upon the following statement of the law in Carver v. Foster, 928 So.2d 1017, 1027-28 (Ala.2005): “‘[T]he doctrine of judicial estoppel “applies to preclude a party from assuming a position in a legal proceeding inconsistent with one previously asserted.” ’ Selma Foundry & Supply Co. v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 598 So.2d 844, 846 (Ala.1992) (quoting Oneida Motor Freight, Inc. v. United Jersey Bank, 848 F.2d 414, 419 (3d Cir.1988)). ‘The law is settled in Alabama that a party who has, with knowledge of the facts, assumed a particular position in a judicial proceeding is estopp

2006MURDOCK, J., concurs in the result, with writing. 1 11 U.S.C. § 727 (a)(2)(A) provides that a debtor will be granted a discharge in bankruptcy unless the debtor, among other things, makes a transfer with the intent to "hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor" within one year of filing for bankruptcy. 2 "`[T]he doctrine of judicial estoppel "applies to preclude a party from assuming a position in a legal proceeding inconsistent with one previously asserted."'" Carver v. Foster , 928 So.2d 1017 , 1027 (Ala. 2005) (citations and quotations omitted.) Based on the arguments that Fred advanced to the t

2003See Federal Land Bank of New Orleans v. First Nat'l Bank of Scottsboro, 237 Ala. 84 , 185 So. 414, 417 (1938); see also Stover v. Alabama Farm Bureau Ins.

2003See Federal Land Bank of New Orleans v. First Nat'l Bank of Scottsboro, 237 Ala. 84 , 185 So. 414, 417 (1938); see also Stover v. Alabama Farm Bureau Ins.

2000The doctrine of judicial estoppel "requires a determination that (1) the positions asserted are in fact inconsistent, and (2) the inconsistency would allow a party to benefit from deliberate manipulation of the courts." Chandler v. Samford Univ., 35 F.Supp.2d 861, 863 (N.D.Ala.1999).

2000Chandler , 35 F. Supp.2d at 863 -64 .

2014As such, [the debtor's] disclosure upon re-opening the bankruptcy estate deserves no favor.'" 52 So. 3d at 495 (quoting Barger v. City of Cartersville, Ga., 348 F.3d 1289, 1297 (11th Cir. 2003)). 24 1130342, 1130357 Anderson next argues that the doctrine of judicial estoppel should not have been applied against her because, she argues, she will gain no unfair advantage if she is allowed to pursue her action against the Jackson Hospital defendants in that the first $28,000 of any judgment awarded would go to those entities holding her discharged debt.

2010Norfolk Southern contends that Barger v. City of Cartersville, Ga., 348 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir.2003), demonstrates that the doctrine of judicial estoppel should apply even when the bankruptcy trustee is eventually substituted as the real party in interest.

2007The primary purpose of the doctrine of judicial estoppel is to protect the integrity of our judicial system from those who may play "`fast and loose with the courts.'" Consolidated Stores, Inc. v. Gargis, 686 So.2d 268, 276 (Ala.Civ.App.1996) (quoting Muellner v. Mars, Inc., 714 F.Supp. 351, 356 (N.D.Ill.1989)).

1996Big Lots cites Muellner v. Mars, Inc. , 714 F. Supp. 351 (N.D.Ill. 1989), in support.

2006The Lumpkins rely upon the following statement of the law in Carver v. Foster, 928 So.2d 1017, 1027-28 (Ala.2005): “‘[T]he doctrine of judicial estoppel “applies to preclude a party from assuming a position in a legal proceeding inconsistent with one previously asserted.” ’ Selma Foundry & Supply Co. v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 598 So.2d 844, 846 (Ala.1992) (quoting Oneida Motor Freight, Inc. v. United Jersey Bank, 848 F.2d 414, 419 (3d Cir.1988)). ‘The law is settled in Alabama that a party who has, with knowledge of the facts, assumed a particular position in a judicial proceeding is estopp

2005"The law is settled in Alabama that a party who has, with knowledge of the facts, assumed a particular position in a judicial proceeding is estopped from assuming a position inconsistent to the first one to the prejudice of an adverse party." Russell v. Russell , *Page 1028 404 So.2d 662 , 665 (Ala. 1981).

2025Furthermore, to the extent that the intervenors argue that the doctrine of judicial estoppel applies, we have held that "jurisdiction over the subject matter of a proceeding cannot be conferred by estoppel." Alves v. Board of Educ. for Guntersville, 922 So. 2d 129, 134 (Ala. Civ.