judicial estoppel doctrine in Illinois

2006“The doctrine of judicial estoppel provides that when a party assumes a certain position in a legal proceeding, that party is estopped from assuming a contrary position in a subsequent legal proceeding.” People v. Coffin, 305 Ill.

2006"The doctrine of judicial estoppel provides that when a party assumes a certain position in a legal proceeding, that party is estopped from assuming a contrary position in a subsequent legal proceeding." People v. Coffin, 305 Ill.

2025We need not resolve this question, as regardless we reject the invocation of the doctrine of judicial estoppel. ¶ 34 The doctrine of judicial estoppel “promote[s] the truth and * * * protect[s] the integrity of the court system by preventing litigants from deliberately shifting positions to suit the exigencies of the moment.” Bidani v. Lewis, 285 Ill.

2019For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court’s award of summary judgment in favor of defendants. ¶ 70 The doctrine of judicial estoppel provides that “ ‘a party who assumes a particular position in a legal proceeding is estopped from assuming a contrary position in a subsequent legal proceeding.’ ” Barack Ferrazzano Kirschbaum Perlman & Nagelberg v. Loffredi, 342 Ill. - 18 - App. 3d 453, 460 (2003) (quoting Bidani v. Lewis, 285 Ill.

2026The appeal before this Court is a continuation of the proceedings before the appellate court and the proceedings before the circuit court.” Jones, 223 Ill. 2d at 598 (emphasis in original).

2025Id.

2023Id. ¶ 37 (citing People v. Runge, 234 Ill. 2d 68, 132 (2009), People v. Jones, 223 Ill. 2d 569, 598 (2006), and People v. Caballero, 206 Ill. 2d 65, 80 (2002)). ¶ 23 However, even where the above prerequisites are found, the party’s inconsistent positions must have resulted from an “intent to deceive or mislead,” rather than “inadvertence or mistake.” Id. ¶ 47 (citing Jaeger v. Clear Wing Productions, Inc., 465 F. Supp. 2d 879, 882 (S.D.

2019Some courts will only apply the doctrine of judicial estoppel where there is -8- evidence of “deliberate” omission, “cold manipulation” or a “scheme to mislead the court.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Jaeger v. Clear Wing Productions, Inc., 465 F. Supp. 2d 879, 882 (S.D.

1994The necessary corollary of the application of this doctrine, however, is that the trial court's role as fact finder is eliminated. ( Levinson v. U.S. (7th Cir.1992), 969 F.2d 260 .) Accordingly, courts have warned that the doctrine of judicial estoppel is "an extraordinary one which should be applied with caution [citation], because it `precludes a contradictory position without examining the truth of either statement.' [Citation.]" Scott v. Land Span Motor, Inc., 781 F.Supp. at 1119 ; Teledyne Industries, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 911 F.2d at 1218 ("judicial estoppel is applied with caution to avoid

1994(Levinson v. United States (7th Cir. 1992), 969 F.2d 260 .) Accordingly, courts have warned that the doctrine of judicial estoppel is "an extraordinary one which should be applied with caution [citation], because it 'precludes a contradictory position without examining the truth of either statement.’ ” Scott v. Land Span Motor, Inc., 781 F. Supp. at 1119 , quoting Teledyne Industries, Inc. v. NLRB, 911 F.2d at 1218 ("judicial estoppel is applied with caution to avoid impinging on the truth-seeking function of the court because the doctrine precludes a contradictory position without examining t

2018For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court's award of summary judgment in favor of defendants. ¶ 70 The doctrine of judicial estoppel provides that " 'a party who assumes a particular position in a legal proceeding is estopped from assuming a contrary position in a subsequent legal proceeding.' " Barack Ferrazzano Kirschbaum Perlman & Nagelberg v. Loffredi , 342 Ill.

2018For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court’s award of summary judgment in favor of defendants. ¶ 70 The doctrine of judicial estoppel provides that “ ‘a party who assumes a particular position in a legal proceeding is estopped from assuming a contrary position in a subsequent legal proceeding.’ ” Barack Ferrazzano Kirschbaum Perlman & Nagelberg v. Loffredi, 342 Ill.

2026People v. Jackson, 2022 IL 127256, ¶ 21 ; People v. Sebby, 2017 IL 119445 , ¶ 49. ¶ 32 The doctrine of judicial estoppel “provides that a party who assumes a particular position in a legal proceeding is estopped from assuming a contrary position in a subsequent legal proceeding.” People v. Caballero, 206 Ill. 2d 65, 80 (2002) (Internal quotations and citation omitted).

2026“Five elements are generally required for the doctrine of judicial estoppel to apply: the party to be estopped must have (1) taken two positions, (2) that are factually inconsistent, (3) in separate judicial or quasi-judicial administrative proceedings, (4) intending for the trier of fact to accept the truth of the facts alleged, and (5) have succeeded in the first proceeding and received some benefit from it.” Id. ¶ 33 “This doctrine is an extraordinary one that should be applied with caution.” In re Estate of Ivy, 2019 IL App (1st) 181691 , ¶ 76.

2025“The party to be estopped must have (1) taken two positions, (2) that are factually inconsistent, (3) in separate judicial or quasi-judicial administrative proceedings, (4) intending for the trier of fact to accept the truth of the facts alleged, and (5) have succeeded in the first proceeding and received some benefit from it.” Seymour, 2015 IL 118432, ¶ 37 (citing Runge, 234 Ill. 2d at 132 ).

2015People v. Runge, 234 Ill. 2d 68, 132 (2009). ¶ 115 Michael contends that the doctrine of judicial estoppel precludes Kimberly from asserting at trial that she created the 529 bank account for her stepson’s benefit, and then when the trial court is no longer looking, take the money back for her own benefit. ¶ 116 Michael argues that at trial, Kimberly took the position that she created the account for the benefit of Erik.

2026App. 3d 1046, 1052 (2006) (the allegedly inconsistent positions “were not made in separate proceedings, as required for the doctrine of judicial estoppel to apply.”; Horwitz v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 319 Ill.

2006See Horwitz v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 319 Ill.

2017See In re Detention of Duke, 2013 IL App (1st) 121722, ¶ 11 (“A section 2-619 dismissal is reviewed de novo. [Citation.] We may affirm the dismissal of a complaint on any ground that is apparent from the record. [Citation.]”).

2017See In re Detention of Duke, 2013 IL App (1st) 121722, ¶ 11 (“A section 2-619 dismissal is reviewed de novo. [Citation.] We may affirm the dismissal of a complaint on any ground that is apparent from the record. [Citation.]”).

2026“Judicial estoppel applies in a judicial proceeding when litigants take a position, benefit from that position, and then seek to take a contrary position in a later proceeding.” Id. ¶ 79 Five prerequisites are generally required before a court may invoke the doctrine of judicial estoppel: “The party to be estopped must have (1) taken two positions, (2) that are factually inconsistent, (3) in separate judicial or quasi-judicial administrative proceedings, (4) intending for the trier of fact to accept the truth of the facts alleged, and (5) have succeeded in the first proceeding and received som

2025The Illinois Supreme Court “has identified five prerequisites as ‘generally required’ before a court may invoke the doctrine of judicial estoppel.” Seymour v. Collins, 2015 IL 118432, ¶ 37 .

1994App. 1977), 557 S.W.2d 144 (unsworn claims forms filed with Industrial Accident Board and unsworn statements made during the course of a prehearing conference did not give rise to judicial estoppel).) The oath factor should still remain an element for the trial court to consider in the exercise of its discretion (In re Cassidy, 892 F.2d at 642 ; Scott v. Land Span Motor, Inc., 781 F. Supp. at 1119 ), when determining whether the doctrine of judicial estoppel should be applied in a given instance.

1994(Levinson v. United States (7th Cir. 1992), 969 F.2d 260 .) Accordingly, courts have warned that the doctrine of judicial estoppel is "an extraordinary one which should be applied with caution [citation], because it 'precludes a contradictory position without examining the truth of either statement.’ ” Scott v. Land Span Motor, Inc., 781 F. Supp. at 1119 , quoting Teledyne Industries, Inc. v. NLRB, 911 F.2d at 1218 ("judicial estoppel is applied with caution to avoid impinging on the truth-seeking function of the court because the doctrine precludes a contradictory position without examining t

2003The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has explained that the doctrine of judicial estoppel is "intended to prevent the perversion of the judicial process. [Citation.] It is to be applied where 'intentional self-contradiction is being used as a means of obtaining unfair advantage in a forum designed for suitors seeking justice,' [citation], to prevent litigants from 'playing fast and loose with the courts.'" In re Cassidy , 892 F.2d 637, 641 (7th Cir. 1990), quoting Scarano v. Central R.

1994App. 1977), 557 S.W.2d 144 (unsworn claims forms filed with Industrial Accident Board and unsworn statements made during the course of a prehearing conference did not give rise to judicial estoppel).) The oath factor should still remain an element for the trial court to consider in the exercise of its discretion (In re Cassidy, 892 F.2d at 642 ; Scott v. Land Span Motor, Inc., 781 F. Supp. at 1119 ), when determining whether the doctrine of judicial estoppel should be applied in a given instance.

2003The Galena Park court ruled that defendant's two positions were inconsistent and affirmed the circuit court's finding under the doctrine of judicial estoppel. 183 Ill.

2003The Galena Park court ruled that defendant’s two positions were inconsistent and affirmed the circuit court’s finding under the doctrine of judicial estoppel. 183 Ill.

2017Law Offices of Nye & Associates, Ltd., 2012 IL App (2d) 110804, ¶ 21 (citing Quintas, 395 Ill.

2017Law Offices of Nye & Associates, Ltd., 2012 IL App (2d) 110804, ¶ 21 (citing Quintas, 395 Ill.

2016See People v. Jones, 223 Ill. 2d 569, 598 (2006) (State was not judicially estopped from changing its position on whether surcharge under section 5-9-1.1(c) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-9-1.1(c) (West 2004)) for a spinal research fund was a ‘fee’ rather than a ‘fine’ because these positions were ‘legally inconsistent,’ not ‘factually inconsistent’); Cress v. Recreation Services, Inc., 341 Ill.

2016See People v. Jones, 223 Ill. 2d 569, 598 (2006) (State was not judicially estopped from changing its position on whether surcharge under section 5-9-1.1(c) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-9-1.1(c) (West 2004)) for a spinal research fund was a ‘fee’ rather than a ‘fine’ because these positions were ‘legally inconsistent,’ not ‘factually inconsistent’); Cress v. Recreation Services, Inc., 341 Ill.

2015App. 3d 941, 948 (2010). ¶ 59 "Our courts have identified five elements necessary for judicial estoppel to apply: (1) the party must have taken two positions; (2) the positions must be factually inconsistent; (3) the positions were taken in separate judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (4) the person intended the trier of fact to accept the truth of the facts alleged; and (5) the party succeeded in the first proceeding and received some benefit therefrom." Id. ¶ 60 "Judicial estoppel applies to statements of fact and not to legal opinions or conclusions." Id. at 949 ; see also McNamee v. Sa

2015App. 3d 941, 948 (2010). ¶ 59 “Our courts have identified five elements necessary for judicial estoppel to apply: (1) the party must have taken two positions; (2) the positions must be factually inconsistent; (3) the positions were taken in separate judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (4) the person intended the trier of fact to accept the truth of the facts alleged; and (5) the party succeeded in the first proceeding and received some benefit therefrom.” Id. ¶ 60 “Judicial estoppel applies to statements of fact and not to legal opinions or conclusions.” Id. at 949 ; see also McNamee v. Sa

2015The plaintiff maintains that because the defendant emphasized that it had not been a party to the settlement agreement when successfully moving to sever the instant case from the plaintiff's cause against Deep Rock, the defendant should not now be allowed to claim that it is entitled to the benefits of the agreement. ¶ 58 "Under the doctrine of judicial estoppel, a party who takes a particular position in a legal proceeding is estopped from taking a contrary position in a subsequent legal 24 proceeding." Maniez v. Citibank, F.S.B., 404 Ill.

2015The plaintiff maintains that because the defendant emphasized that it had not been a party to the settlement agreement when successfully moving to sever the instant case from the plaintiff’s cause against Deep Rock, the defendant should not now be allowed to claim that it is entitled to the benefits of the agreement. ¶ 58 “Under the doctrine of judicial estoppel, a party who takes a particular position in a legal proceeding is estopped from taking a contrary position in a subsequent legal proceeding.” Maniez v. Citibank, F.S.B., 404 Ill.

2012We noted that “representations on matters of opinion are insufficient to support the invocation of the doctrine of judicial estoppel.” Id. at 851-52 . ¶ 31 The opinion testimony at issue in this case is of a different type than the opinion only if they damaged the plaintiffs beyond the $3,200,000 the codefendants paid in settlements.

2012We agree with the circuit court that, as a matter of law, protecting the integrity of the court system compelled the application of judicial estoppel to the plaintiffs' claims in their 2007 complaint. ¶ 40 The opinion testimony at issue in this case is precisely the sort that stands for a representation of fact, as plainly urged by the plaintiffs in this medical malpractice case; the medical opinion testimony is substantially different from the fair market valuation of property at issue in Ceres Terminals to take this case out of its cautionary language that "representations on matters of opin

2004People v. Wisbrock, 223 Ill.App.3d 173, 175 , 165 Ill.Dec. 334 , 584 N.E.2d 513, 515 (1991).

2004People v. Wisbrock, 223 Ill.

2025See Davis v. Pace Suburban Bus Division of the Regional Transportation Authority, 2021 IL App (1st) 200519, ¶ 27 . -6- No. 1-23-2209 ¶ 23 We need not choose which of these doctrines applies, because the salient point is that the Kelley defendants do not address the issue at all, even though it was the sole basis for the circuit court’s ruling.

2021Davis, 2021 IL App (1st) 200519, ¶ 66 .

2024Construction Systems, Inc. v. FagelHaber, LLC, 2015 IL App (1st) 141700, ¶ 38 (citing Ceres Terminals, Inc. v. Chicago City Bank & Trust Co., 259 Ill.

2021The heightened burden of proof is a reflection that the doctrine of judicial estoppel is an “ ‘extraordinary one which should be applied with caution.’ ” Id. (quoting Construction Systems, Inc. v. FagelHaber, LLC, 2015 IL App (1st) 141700, ¶ 38 ).