stare decisis doctrine in Illinois

2016As this court recognized in Sharpe: “ ‘The doctrine of stare decisis “expresses the policy of the courts to stand by precedents and not to disturb settled points.” Neff v. George, 364 Ill. 306, 308-09 (1939), overruled on other grounds by Tuthill v. Rendelman, 387 Ill. 321 (1944).

2016The State claims that a departure from stare decisis is warranted because: the law holding that a victim’s identity is an essential allegation is poorly reasoned and arbitrary; online court records subject victims to widespread public disclosure and potential invasions of privacy; and identifying the victim in a charging instrument is unnecessary to provide defendants with notice and to safeguard against double jeopardy. ¶ 26 “The doctrine of stare decisis ‘expresses the policy of the courts to stand by precedents and not to disturb settled points.’ ” Vitro v. Mihelcic, 209 Ill. 2d 76, 81 (200

2025Obiter dicta “as a general rule [are] not binding as authority or precedent within the stare decisis rule.” Cates v. Cates, 156 Ill. 2d 76, 80 (1993). ¶ 22 We disagree with the dicta in Smith and hold that both section 6-303(d-1) of the Vehicle Code and section 31-1(a-5) of the Criminal Code set mandatory minimum sentences, although both sections make the sentence mandatory only if the court chooses to sentence the defendant to a term of imprisonment.

2018See Cates v. Cates , 156 Ill. 2d 76 , 80, 189 Ill.Dec. 14 , 619 N.E.2d 715 (1993) (distinguishing obiter dicta from the more precedentially valuable judicial dicta ). ¶ 27 Obiter dicta , "as a general rule is not binding as authority or precedent within the stare decisis rule." Id.

2004The doctrine of stare decisis “is the means by which courts ensure that the law will not merely change erratically, but will develop in a principled and intelligible fashion.” Chicago Bar Ass’n v. Illinois State Board of Elections, 161 Ill. 2d 502, 510 (1994).

2002The doctrine of stare decisis “is the means by which courts ensure that the law will not merely change erratically, but will develop in a principled and intelligible fashion *** [apart from] the proclivities of individuals.” Chicago Bar Ass’n v. Illinois State Board of Elections, 161 Ill. 2d 502, 510 (1994) .

2020Our supreme court has explained the role stare decisis is to play in our judicial process as follows: “The doctrine of stare decisis ‘expresses the policy of the courts to stand by precedents and not to disturb settled points.’ [Citation.] This doctrine ‘is the means by which courts ensure that the law will not merely change erratically, but will develop in a principled and intelligible fashion.’ [Citation.] Stare decisis enables both the people and the bar of this state ‘to rely upon [the supreme court’s] decisions with assurance that they will not be lightly overruled.’ [Citation.]” Vitro v.

2016Instead, we observe that the Conte majority considered the plain and unambiguous language of the subcontract as providing that the subcontractor would be paid only 14 1-15-1697 if the contractor is paid "and thus ensure[d] that each contracting party [bore] the risk of loss only for its own work." BMD Contractors, 679 F.3d at 649 . ¶ 27 The Contractor argues that the Subcontractor "asks this Court to 'disavow' Conte [citation] and to instead adopt a new set of principles whereby conditions precedent will not be enforced if they are outside the control of the obligee or if the language of the c

2024Now, under People v. Davidson, the appropriate question is “whether a reasonable person under the - 30 - 2024 IL App (2d) 190243-U circumstances would find the physical contact insulting or provoking in nature.” 2023 IL 127538, ¶ 16 (citing Williams, 2020 IL App (4th) 180554 , ¶ 50)). ¶ 76 We believe that our decision in Ward I was consistent with settled precedent and faithful to the doctrine of stare decisis, which “expresses the policy of the courts to stand by precedents and not to disturb settled points.” People v. Colon, 225 Ill. 2d 125, 145 (2007) (quoting People v. Caballes, 221 Ill. 2

2010Under the doctrine of stare decisis, this court’s prior decisions should not be overturned absent “good cause” or “compelling reasons.” People v. Colon, 225 Ill. 2d 125, 146 (2007).

2023An appellate court is “not bound” by an earlier appellate-court opinion and may “part company with that decision without offending the doctrine of stare decisis.” O’Casek, 229 Ill. 2d at 440 .

2015See O'Casek v. Children's Home & Aid Society of Illinois, 229 Ill. 2d 421, 440 (2008) (under the doctrine of stare decisis, "the opinion of one district, division, or panel of the appellate court is not binding on other districts, divisions, or panels"). 3 The main similarity between criminal prosecutions and municipal ordinance violation prosecutions in this context occurs so rarely that it is essentially theoretical.

2024Now, under People v. Davidson, the appropriate question is “whether a reasonable person under the - 30 - 2024 IL App (2d) 190243-U circumstances would find the physical contact insulting or provoking in nature.” 2023 IL 127538, ¶ 16 (citing Williams, 2020 IL App (4th) 180554 , ¶ 50)). ¶ 76 We believe that our decision in Ward I was consistent with settled precedent and faithful to the doctrine of stare decisis, which “expresses the policy of the courts to stand by precedents and not to disturb settled points.” People v. Colon, 225 Ill. 2d 125, 145 (2007) (quoting People v. Caballes, 221 Ill. 2

2012See People v. Caballes, 221 Ill.2d 282, 289 , 303 Ill.Dec. 128 , 851 N.E.2d 26 (2006). ¶ 9 Preliminarily, we note that the State's arguments implicate the doctrine of stare decisis.

2016Yet that is precisely what the concurring justices are doing here. ¶ 94 In his dissent in People v. Mitchell, 189 Ill. 2d 312 (2000), Justice Freeman spoke passionately in defense of the stare decisis doctrine.

2016Yet that is precisely what the concurring justices are doing here. ¶ 94 In his dissent in People v. Mitchell, 189 Ill. 2d 312 (2000), Justice Freeman spoke passionately in defense of the stare decisis doctrine.

2016Instead, we observe that the Conte majority considered the plain and unambiguous language of the subcontract as providing that the subcontractor would be paid only if the contractor is paid “and thus ensure[d] that each contracting party [bore] the risk of loss 14 1-15-1697 only for its own work.” BMD Contractors, 679 F.3d at 649 . ¶ 27 The Contractor argues that the Subcontractor “asks this Court to ‘disavow’ Conte [citation] and to instead adopt a new set of principles whereby conditions precedent will not be enforced if they are outside the control of the obligee or if the language of the c

2016Instead, we observe that the Conte majority considered the plain and unambiguous language of the subcontract as providing that the subcontractor would be paid only 14 1-15-1697 if the contractor is paid "and thus ensure[d] that each contracting party [bore] the risk of loss only for its own work." BMD Contractors, 679 F.3d at 649 . ¶ 27 The Contractor argues that the Subcontractor "asks this Court to 'disavow' Conte [citation] and to instead adopt a new set of principles whereby conditions precedent will not be enforced if they are outside the control of the obligee or if the language of the c

2022The former is “not essential to the outcome of the case, is not an integral part of the opinion, and is generally not binding authority or precedent within the stare decisis rule.” Lebron v. Gottlieb Memorial Hospital, 237 Ill. 2d 217, 236 (2010).

2019“Obiter dictum is not essential to the outcome of the case, is not an integral part of the opinion, and is generally not binding authority or precedent within the stare decisis rule.” Lebron, 237 Ill. 2d at 236 .

2012The doctrine of stare decisis “expresses the policy of the courts to stand by precedents and not to disturb settled points.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Suarez, 224 Ill. 2d 37 at 49 (quoting People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d 481, 519 (2005), quoting Neff v. George, 364 Ill. 306, 308-09 (1936)).

2007See People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d 481, 519-20 , 839 N.E.2d 492 (2005), quoting Vitro v. Mihelcic, 209 Ill. 2d 76, 81-82 (2004) (“ ‘The doctrine of stare decisis “expresses the policy of the courts to stand by precedents and not to disturb settled points” [Citation.]’ ”).

2010The majority’s decision to overrule Palmer disregards this principle and reduces the doctrine of stare decisis to “nothing more than a pious cliche.” People v. Lewis, 88 Ill. 2d 129, 167 (1981) (Ryan, J., -27- concurring).

2010The majority’s decision to overrule Palmer disregards this principle and reduces the doctrine of stare decisis to “nothing more than a pious cliche.” People v. Lewis, 88 Ill. 2d 129, 167 (1981) (Ryan, J., concurring).

2010In other words, ‘ “a question once deliberately examined and decided should be considered as settled and closed to further argument” ’ (Wakulich v. Mraz, 203 Ill. 2d 223, 230 (2003), quoting Prall v. Burckhartt, 299 Ill. 19, 41 (1921)), so that the law will not change erratically, but will develop in a principled, intelligible fashion (People v. Mitchell, 189 Ill. 2d 312, 338 (2000)).” People v. Colon, 225 Ill. 2d 125, 145-46 (2007).

2010In other words, ‘ “a question once deliberately examined and decided should be considered as settled and closed to further argument” ’ (Wakulich v. Mraz, 203 Ill. 2d 223, 230 (2003), quoting Prall v. Burckhartt, 299 Ill. 19, 41 (1921)), so that the law will not change erratically, but will develop in a principled, intelligible fashion (People v. Mitchell, 189 Ill. 2d 312, 338 (2000)).” People v. Colon, 225 Ill. 2d 125, 145-46 (2007).

2025See Blumenthal v. Brewer, 2016 IL 118781, ¶ 61 (“Under the doctrine of stare decisis, when this court has declared the law on any point, it alone can overrule and modify its previous opinion, and the lower judicial tribunals are bound by such decision and it is the duty of such lower tribunals to follow such decision in similar cases.” (Emphasis in original and internal quotation marks omitted.)). ¶ 35 While we recognize some of respondent’s statements appear to have been broader than necessary for an as-applied finding, respondent has maintained that his finding was limited to the facts of pe

2023See Blumenthal v. Brewer, 2016 IL 118781, ¶ 61 , 69 N.E.3d 834 (stating that under the doctrine of stare decisis, appellate courts are bound by supreme court decisions on any point and must follow those decisions in similar cases).

2003“The doctrine of stare decisis ‘proceeds from the first principle of justice, that, absent powerful countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike.’ ” People v. Tisdel, 201 Ill. 2d 210, 228 (2002) (McMorrow, J., dissenting, joined by Freeman and Kilbride, JJ.), quoting 5 Am.

2003"The doctrine of stare decisis `proceeds from the first principle of justice, that, absent powerful countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike.'" People v. Tisdel, 201 Ill.2d 210, 228 , 266 Ill.Dec. 849 , 775 N.E.2d 921 (2002) (McMorrow, J., dissenting, joined by Freeman and Kilbride, JJ.), quoting 5 Am.Jur.2d Appellate Review § 599 (1995); see also People v. Mitchell, 189 Ill.2d 312, 363 , 245 Ill.Dec. 1 , 727 N.E.2d 254 (2000) (Freeman, J., dissenting, joined by Harrison, C.J., and McMorrow, J.) ("`"precedents and rules must be followed, unless flatly absurd or unjus

2019It has been observed: "The ratio decidendi of a case is 'the principle of law which is the basis of the actual decision and therefore, by virtue of the doctrine of stare decisis , the principle which subsequent courts, faced with a set of facts indistinguishable in any material particular from those in the precedent case, must apply to the decision of the subsequent case also.' [Citation.] *** [T]o determine the ratio decidendi of a case, a court must ascertain (1) what facts were considered material by the court in the prior case, and (2) 'what proposition of law justified that decision on th

2019It has been observed: “ ‘The ratio decidendi of a case is ‘the principle of law which is the basis of the actual decision and therefore, by virtue of the doctrine of stare decisis, the principle which subsequent courts, faced with a set of facts indistinguishable in any material particular from those in the precedent case, must apply to the decision of the subsequent case also.’ [Citation.] *** [T]o determine the ratio decidendi of a case, a court must ascertain (1) what facts were considered material by the court in the prior case, and (2) ‘what proposition of law justified that decision on t

2019Blumenthal v. Brewer , 2016 IL 118781 , ¶ 28, 410 Ill.Dec. 289 , 69 N.E.3d 834 (" ' "Where the Supreme Court has declared the law on any point, it alone can overrule and modify its previous opinion , and the lower judicial tribunals are bound by such decision and it is the duty of such lower tribunals to follow such decision in similar cases." ' " (Emphasis in original.) ), ¶ 61 ("Under the doctrine of stare decisis , when this court 'has declared the law on any point, it alone can overrule and modify its previous opinion .' " (Emphasis in original.) ); Rickey v. Chicago Transit Authority , 98

2019Blumenthal v. Brewer , 2016 IL 118781 , ¶ 28, 410 Ill.Dec. 289 , 69 N.E.3d 834 (" ' "Where the Supreme Court has declared the law on any point, it alone can overrule and modify its previous opinion , and the lower judicial tribunals are bound by such decision and it is the duty of such lower tribunals to follow such decision in similar cases." ' " (Emphasis in original.) ), ¶ 61 ("Under the doctrine of stare decisis , when this court 'has declared the law on any point, it alone can overrule and modify its previous opinion .' " (Emphasis in original.) ); Rickey v. Chicago Transit Authority , 98

2019The supreme court uses the qualifier "generally" because "[e]ven obiter dict [ a ] of a court of last resort can be tantamount to a decision and therefore binding in the absence of a contrary decision of that court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 282 , 334 Ill.Dec. 824 , 917 N.E.2d 899 ; see also People v. Williams , 204 Ill. 2d 191 , 207, 273 Ill.Dec. 250 , 788 N.E.2d 1126 (2003) ("But whether we characterize that portion of [our previous decision] as judicial or obiter dicta , it still should have guided the appellate court in this case."); Country Club Estates Condominium Ass'n

2019The supreme court uses the qualifier "generally" because "[e]ven obiter dict [ a ] of a court of last resort can be tantamount to a decision and therefore binding in the absence of a contrary decision of that court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 282 , 334 Ill.Dec. 824 , 917 N.E.2d 899 ; see also People v. Williams , 204 Ill. 2d 191 , 207, 273 Ill.Dec. 250 , 788 N.E.2d 1126 (2003) ("But whether we characterize that portion of [our previous decision] as judicial or obiter dicta , it still should have guided the appellate court in this case."); Country Club Estates Condominium Ass'n

2023“Obiter dictum refers to a remark or expression of opinion that a court uttered as an aside, and is generally not binding authority or precedent within the stare decisis rule.” Exelon Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 234 Ill. 2d 266, 277 (2009). -7- ¶ 29 Additionally, we addressed Wilmington in People v. Curry, 2013 IL App (4th) 120724 .

2019(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Exelon Corp. v. Department of Revenue , 234 Ill. 2d 266 , 277-78, 334 Ill.Dec. 824 , 917 N.E.2d 899 (2009). " Obiter dictum refers to a remark or expression of opinion that a court uttered as an aside, and is generally not binding authority or precedent within the stare decisis rule." (Emphasis added.) Id. at 277 , 334 Ill.Dec. 824 , 917 N.E.2d 899 .

1986A basic tenet of our legal system, the doctrine of stare decisis provides “ ‘[w]here the Supreme Court has declared the law on any point, it alone can overrule and modify its previous action, and the lower judicial tribunals are bound by such decision and it is the duty of such lower tribunals to follow such decision in similar cases.’ Agricultural Transportation Association v. Carpentier (1953), 2 Ill. 2d 19, 27 .” (Panchinsin v. The Enterprise Companies (1983), 117 Ill.

1983The doctrine of stare decisis — a basic tenet of our legal system (Hoffman v. Lehnhausen (1971), 48 Ill. 2d 323, 329 ) — provides that “[wjhere the Supreme Court has declared the law on any point, it alone can overrule and modify its previous action, and the lower judicial tribunals are bound by such decision and it is the duty of such lower tribunals to follow such decision in similar cases.” Agricultural Transportation Association v. Carpentier (1953), 2 Ill. 2d 19, 27 .

2020See Vilardo v. Barrington Community School District 220, 406 Ill.

2020See Vilardo v. Barrington Community School District 220, 406 Ill.

2010Tuite v. Corbitt, 224 Ill. 2d 490, 505 (2006).

2010Tuite v. Corbitt, 224 Ill. 2d 490, 505 (2006).

2016As this court recognized in Sharpe: “ ‘The doctrine of stare decisis “expresses the policy of the courts to stand by precedents and not to disturb settled points.” Neff v. George, 364 Ill. 306, 308-09 (1939), overruled on other grounds by Tuthill v. Rendelman, 387 Ill. 321 (1944).

2016The State claims that a departure from stare decisis is warranted because: the law holding that a victim’s identity is an essential allegation is poorly reasoned and arbitrary; online court records subject victims to widespread public disclosure and potential invasions of privacy; and identifying the victim in a charging instrument is unnecessary to provide defendants with notice and to safeguard against double jeopardy. ¶ 26 “The doctrine of stare decisis ‘expresses the policy of the courts to stand by precedents and not to disturb settled points.’ ” Vitro v. Mihelcic, 209 Ill. 2d 76, 81 (200

2016Unfortunately, today’s decision demonstrates that ‘[p]ower, not reason, is the new currency of this [c]ourt’s decisionmaking.’ Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 844 , 115 L.

2016Unfortunately, today’s decision demonstrates that ‘[p]ower, not reason, is the new currency of this [c]ourt’s decisionmaking.’ Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 844 , 115 L.

2012The doctrine of stare decisis “expresses the policy of the courts to stand by precedents and not to disturb settled points.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Suarez, 224 Ill. 2d 37 at 49 (quoting People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d 481, 519 (2005), quoting Neff v. George, 364 Ill. 306, 308-09 (1936)).

2010Suarez, 224 Ill. 2d at 50 .

2011See O'Casek v. Children's Home & Aid Society of Illinois, 229 Ill.2d 421, 440 , 323 Ill.Dec. 2 , 892 N.E.2d 994 (2008) (under the doctrine of stare decisis, "the opinion of one district, division, or panel of the appellate court is not binding on other districts, divisions, or panels").

2011See O'Casek v. Children's Home & Aid Society of Illinois, 229 Ill.2d 421, 440 , 323 Ill.Dec. 2 , 892 N.E.2d 994 (2008) (under the doctrine of stare decisis, "the opinion of one district, division, or panel of the appellate court is not binding on other districts, divisions, or panels").