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8 Rhode Island opinions name it 2 courts 2002–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Rhode Island courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Knappgreen2 sentences2018The doctrine of “stare decisis is important because [r]espect for precedent promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.” Knapp, 700 N.W.2d at 924 (Wilcox, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted); see also Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265-66 (1986). 2018The doctrine of "stare decisis is important because [r]espect for precedent promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process." Knapp , 700 N.W.2d at 924 (Wilcox, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted); see also Vasquez v. Hillery , 474 U.S. 254 , 265-66, 106 S.Ct. 617 , 88 L.Ed.2d 598 (1986). | 2 | 2 |
Vasquez v. Hillerygreen2 sentences2018The doctrine of "stare decisis is important because [r]espect for precedent promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process." Knapp , 700 N.W.2d at 924 (Wilcox, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted); see also Vasquez v. Hillery , 474 U.S. 254 , 265-66, 106 S.Ct. 617 , 88 L.Ed.2d 598 (1986). 2018The doctrine of "stare decisis is important because [r]espect for precedent promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process." Knapp , 700 N.W.2d at 924 (Wilcox, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted); see also Vasquez v. Hillery , 474 U.S. 254 , 265-66, 106 S.Ct. 617 , 88 L.Ed.2d 598 (1986). | 2 | 2 |
Johnston Ambulatory Surgical Associates, Ltd. v. Nolangreen2 sentences2014Applying Sundlun and CRMC to Plaintiffs’ Education Clause Claim It is appropriate at this juncture to note that, “[u]nder the doctrine of stare decisis, ‘courts should adopt the reasoning of earlier judicial decisions if the same points arise again in litigation.’ ” State v. Werner, 865 A.2d 1049, 1056 (R.I. 2005) (quoting Johnston Ambulatory Surgical Associates, Ltd. v. Nolan, 755 A.2d 799, 807 (R.I.2000)). 2006Under the doctrine of stare decisis, "courts should adopt the reasoning of earlier judicial decisions if the same points arise again in litigation." Id. | 1 | 3 |
State v. Wernergreen2 sentences2014Applying Sundlun and CRMC to Plaintiffs’ Education Clause Claim It is appropriate at this juncture to note that, “[u]nder the doctrine of stare decisis, ‘courts should adopt the reasoning of earlier judicial decisions if the same points arise again in litigation.’ ” State v. Werner, 865 A.2d 1049, 1056 (R.I. 2005) (quoting Johnston Ambulatory Surgical Associates, Ltd. v. Nolan, 755 A.2d 799, 807 (R.I.2000)). 2006State v. Werner, 865 A.2d 1049 , 1056 (R.I. 2005). 4 While Mr. Gagnon may not have shown prejudice, the State's documents fail to address another obvious query: Why did it take 23 years to indict Mr. Gagnon? | 1 | 2 |
Pastore v. Samsongreen1 sentence2014We have previously stated that “this Court always makes a concerted effort to adhere to existing legal precedent.” Pastore v. Samson, 900 A.2d 1067, 1077 (R.I.2006). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Weloskygreen2 sentences2009For example, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts unanimously wrote as follows in Commonwealth v. Welosky, 276 Mass. 398 , 177 N.E. 656 (1931): "When die same questions [as had earlier been the subject of our advisory opinion] are raised in litigation, the justices then composing the court are bound sedulously to guard against any influence flowing from the previous consideration, to examine the subject anew in the light of arguments presented by parties without reliance upon the views theretofore expressed, and to give the case the most painstaking and impartial study and determination 2009For example, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts unanimously wrote as follows in Commonwealth v. Welosky, 276 Mass. 398 , 177 N.E. 656 (1931): "When die same questions [as had earlier been the subject of our advisory opinion] are raised in litigation, the justices then composing the court are bound sedulously to guard against any influence flowing from the previous consideration, to examine the subject anew in the light of arguments presented by parties without reliance upon the views theretofore expressed, and to give the case the most painstaking and impartial study and determination | 1 | 1 |
Daniel J. GATELY, Et Al., Plaintiffs, Appellees, v. COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, Et Al., Defendants, Appellantsgreen1 sentence2008See Gately v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts , 2 F.3d 1221 (1 st Cir. 1993). | 1 | 1 |
Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinoisgreen2 sentences2002See Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409, 424 , 106 S.Ct. 1922, 1930-31 , 90 L.Ed.2d 413, 426 (1986) (holding that, in the area of statutory construction, the legislature is capable of overruling the Court’s interpretation of the statute, and therefore stare decisis is entitled to a strong presumption); see also NLRB v. International Longshoremen’s Association, AFL-CIO, 473 U.S. 61, 84 , 105 S.Ct. 3045, 3058 , 87 L.Ed.2d 47, 64 (1985) (“we should follow the normal presumption of stare decisis in cases of statutory interpretation”); Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 2002See Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409, 424 , 106 S.Ct. 1922, 1930-31 , 90 L.Ed.2d 413, 426 (1986) (holding that, in the area of statutory construction, the legislature is capable of overruling the Court’s interpretation of the statute, and therefore stare decisis is entitled to a strong presumption); see also NLRB v. International Longshoremen’s Association, AFL-CIO, 473 U.S. 61, 84 , 105 S.Ct. 3045, 3058 , 87 L.Ed.2d 47, 64 (1985) (“we should follow the normal presumption of stare decisis in cases of statutory interpretation”); Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, | 1 | 1 |
Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs.green2 sentences2002In doing so, I recognize that the doctrine of stare decisis “has more force in statutory analysis than in constitutional adjudication because, in the former situation, [the Legislature] can correct our mistakes through legislation.” Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 668 , 695, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2038 , 56 L.Ed.2d 611, 638 (1978). 2002In doing so, I recognize that the doctrine of stare decisis “has more force in statutory analysis than in constitutional adjudication because, in the former situation, [the Legislature] can correct our mistakes through legislation.” Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 668 , 695, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2038 , 56 L.Ed.2d 611, 638 (1978). | 1 | 1 |
National Labor Relations Board v. International Longshoremen's Ass'ngreen2 sentences2002See Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409, 424 , 106 S.Ct. 1922, 1930-31 , 90 L.Ed.2d 413, 426 (1986) (holding that, in the area of statutory construction, the legislature is capable of overruling the Court’s interpretation of the statute, and therefore stare decisis is entitled to a strong presumption); see also NLRB v. International Longshoremen’s Association, AFL-CIO, 473 U.S. 61, 84 , 105 S.Ct. 3045, 3058 , 87 L.Ed.2d 47, 64 (1985) (“we should follow the normal presumption of stare decisis in cases of statutory interpretation”); Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 2002See Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409, 424 , 106 S.Ct. 1922, 1930-31 , 90 L.Ed.2d 413, 426 (1986) (holding that, in the area of statutory construction, the legislature is capable of overruling the Court’s interpretation of the statute, and therefore stare decisis is entitled to a strong presumption); see also NLRB v. International Longshoremen’s Association, AFL-CIO, 473 U.S. 61, 84 , 105 S.Ct. 3045, 3058 , 87 L.Ed.2d 47, 64 (1985) (“we should follow the normal presumption of stare decisis in cases of statutory interpretation”); Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, | 1 | 1 |
Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc.green2 sentences2002See Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409, 424 , 106 S.Ct. 1922, 1930-31 , 90 L.Ed.2d 413, 426 (1986) (holding that, in the area of statutory construction, the legislature is capable of overruling the Court’s interpretation of the statute, and therefore stare decisis is entitled to a strong presumption); see also NLRB v. International Longshoremen’s Association, AFL-CIO, 473 U.S. 61, 84 , 105 S.Ct. 3045, 3058 , 87 L.Ed.2d 47, 64 (1985) (“we should follow the normal presumption of stare decisis in cases of statutory interpretation”); Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 2002See Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409, 424 , 106 S.Ct. 1922, 1930-31 , 90 L.Ed.2d 413, 426 (1986) (holding that, in the area of statutory construction, the legislature is capable of overruling the Court’s interpretation of the statute, and therefore stare decisis is entitled to a strong presumption); see also NLRB v. International Longshoremen’s Association, AFL-CIO, 473 U.S. 61, 84 , 105 S.Ct. 3045, 3058 , 87 L.Ed.2d 47, 64 (1985) (“we should follow the normal presumption of stare decisis in cases of statutory interpretation”); Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Rhode Island. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. Frank J. TRABUCCO, Et Al., Defendants, Appellees
green
2 sentences2008"Rather, when its [doctrine of stare decisis] application is deemed appropriate, the doctrine is broad in impact, reaching strangers to the earlier litigation." EEOC v. Trabucco , 791 F.2d 1 , 2 (1st Cir. 1986). 2008As the First Circuit Court of Appeals went on to explain: The essential principles of stare decisis may be described as follows: (1) an issue of law must have been heard and decided; (2) if "an issue is not argued, or though argued is ignored by the court, or is reserved, the decision does not constitute a precedent to be followed"; (3) "a decision is . . . stare decisis despite the contention that the court was *Page 7 not properly instructed by counsel on the legislative history, or that the argument was otherwise insufficient"; (4) a decision may properly be overruled if "seriously out of k | 1 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Werner
green
1 sentence2005In yet another case involving the oft-litigated criminal career of Keith Werner, we did, however, articulate that “[ajlthough stare decisis serves a profoundly important purpose in our legal system, this court believes that overruling precedent is justified if the motivating purpose is to eliminate inconsistency and anomalous results.” State v. Werner, 615 A.2d 1010 (R.I.1992) 8 (reversing a Superi- or Court decision granting Werner’s pretrial motion to suppress evidence seized from an automobile without a warrant after the Johnny Ray’s Bar incident). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.