stare decisis doctrine in Utah

2014For an example of this, see the majority‘s discussion of Lochner, supra ¶¶ 32–36. 182 Wells, 681 P.2d at 206–07. 183 Supra ¶ 50. 184 Supra ¶ 50. 185 Supra ¶ 42 (acknowledging that ―[o]ur Wells decision adopted . . . a standard of heightened scrutiny . . . under the Utah Constitution‖). 186 See, e.g., Vorher v. Henriod, 2013 UT 10 , ¶ 13, 297 P.3d 614 (―Under the doctrine of stare decisis, a party asking us to overturn prior precedent has a substantial burden of persuasion. . . . [L]ong standing precedent should not be overruled except for the most compelling reasons.‖ (second alteration in ori

2014For an example of this, see the majority‘s discussion of Lochner, supra ¶¶ 32–36. 182 Wells, 681 P.2d at 206–07. 183 Supra ¶ 50. 184 Supra ¶ 50. 185 Supra ¶ 42 (acknowledging that ―[o]ur Wells decision adopted . . . a standard of heightened scrutiny . . . under the Utah Constitution‖). 186 See, e.g., Vorher v. Henriod, 2013 UT 10 , ¶ 13, 297 P.3d 614 (―Under the doctrine of stare decisis, a party asking us to overturn prior precedent has a substantial burden of persuasion. . . . [L]ong standing precedent should not be overruled except for the most compelling reasons.‖ (second alteration in ori

2014For an example of this, see the majority‘s discussion of Lochner, supra ¶¶ 32–36. 182 Wells, 681 P.2d at 206–07. 183 Supra ¶ 50. 184 Supra ¶ 50. 185 Supra ¶ 42 (acknowledging that ―[o]ur Wells decision adopted . . . a standard of heightened scrutiny . . . under the Utah Constitution‖). 186 See, e.g., Vorher v. Henriod, 2013 UT 10 , ¶ 13, 297 P.3d 614 (―Under the doctrine of stare decisis, a party asking us to overturn prior precedent has a substantial burden of persuasion. . . . [L]ong standing precedent should not be overruled except for the most compelling reasons.‖ (second alteration in ori

2014For an example of this, see the majority‘s discussion of Lochner, supra ¶¶ 32–36. 182 Wells, 681 P.2d at 206–07. 183 Supra ¶ 50. 184 Supra ¶ 50. 185 Supra ¶ 42 (acknowledging that ―[o]ur Wells decision adopted . . . a standard of heightened scrutiny . . . under the Utah Constitution‖). 186 See, e.g., Vorher v. Henriod, 2013 UT 10 , ¶ 13, 297 P.3d 614 (―Under the doctrine of stare decisis, a party asking us to overturn prior precedent has a substantial burden of persuasion. . . . [L]ong standing precedent should not be overruled except for the most compelling reasons.‖ (second alteration in ori

2014Contra supra ¶¶ 51–52 (asserting that the analysis in Wells, 681 P.2d at 206–07, was ―shaky‖ and ―should have‖ been done differently). 88 Cite as: 2014 UT 51 NEHRING, A.C.J., dissenting doubt upon the precedential value of Wells,188 a case that has been the law in Utah for thirty years. ¶141 In sum, I would evaluate Mr. Bolden‘s claim using strict scrutiny and would find that section 78B-6-121(3)(b) fails to satisfy that demanding standard because it is not narrowly tailored, nor does it achieve a compelling government interest.

2014Contra supra ¶¶ 51–52 (asserting that the analysis in Wells, 681 P.2d at 206–07, was ―shaky‖ and ―should have‖ been done differently). 88 Cite as: 2014 UT 51 NEHRING, A.C.J., dissenting doubt upon the precedential value of Wells,188 a case that has been the law in Utah for thirty years. ¶141 In sum, I would evaluate Mr. Bolden‘s claim using strict scrutiny and would find that section 78B-6-121(3)(b) fails to satisfy that demanding standard because it is not narrowly tailored, nor does it achieve a compelling government interest.

2021If this is in fact what is driving the majority, see supra ¶ 25 n.6, it needs to justify its decision to reverse our holdings in Utah Transit Authority, 2012 UT 75 , ¶¶ 17–18, 27, In re Gestational Agreement, 2019 UT 40, ¶ 12 , 449 P.3d 69 , and others under our doctrine of stare decisis.

2019I see no basis for calling that decision into question here. 70 Cite as: 2019 UT 40 Lee, A.C.J. concurring States, 219 U.S. 346 , 356–58 (1911).

2021If this is in fact what is driving the majority, see supra ¶ 25 n.6, it needs to justify its decision to reverse our holdings in Utah Transit Authority, 2012 UT 75 , ¶¶ 17–18, 27, In re Gestational Agreement, 2019 UT 40, ¶ 12 , 449 P.3d 69 , and others under our doctrine of stare decisis.

2021Our statement in Lafferty did not rely on ―weak authorities‖ or ―weak precedent.‖ Id. 20 Cite as: 2021 UT 14 Opinion of the Court ¶¶ 25, 26.

2020Both parties recognize the supreme court’s statement as dicta, with Greyhound specifically acknowledging in its brief that the “statement was arguably not necessary to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Greyhound I.” 20190523-CA 23 2020 UT App 144 Greyhound Lines v. UTA binding authority or precedent within the stare decisis rule”).

2020“Obiter dicta refers to a remark or expression of opinion that a court uttered as an aside,” and includes statements, such as the one at issue here, that were “made by a court for use in argument, illustration, analogy or suggestion.” Ortega, 2016 UT App 131 , ¶ 14 n.4 (quotation simplified); see also Beaver County v. Home Indem.

2020In Thomas v. Hillyard, 2019 UT 29, ¶ 18 , 445 P.3d 521 , for example, we overruled Jensen v. Young, 2010 UT 67 , 245 P.3d 731 , without invitation from the parties because we identified “two lines of cases” that had “taken inconsistent and confusing paths.” And in State v. Steed, 2015 UT 76, ¶ 8 , 357 P.3d 547 , we noted that a prior “articulation” of an element of our mootness exception in our past cases was “overly broad.” We thus “clarif[ied]” the “proper articulation” and “disavow[ed] any language in our prior cases stating otherwise”—again without invitation from the parties.

2020In Thomas v. Hillyard, 2019 UT 29, ¶ 18 , 445 P.3d 521 , for example, we overruled Jensen v. Young, 2010 UT 67 , 245 P.3d 731 , without invitation from the parties because we identified “two lines of cases” that had “taken inconsistent and confusing paths.” And in State v. Steed, 2015 UT 76, ¶ 8 , 357 P.3d 547 , we noted that a prior “articulation” of an element of our mootness exception in our past cases was “overly broad.” We thus “clarif[ied]” the “proper articulation” and “disavow[ed] any language in our prior cases stating otherwise”—again without invitation from the parties.

2020But the ―doctrine of stare decisis . . . is neither mechanical nor rigid as it relates to courts of last resort.‖ State v. Guard, 2015 UT 96, ¶ 33 , 371 P.3d 1 (citation omitted). ¶42 With these principles in mind, our respect for precedent means we value and implement the text of our past opinions as far as it can logically go.

2020But the ―doctrine of stare decisis . . . is neither mechanical nor rigid as it relates to courts of last resort.‖ State v. Guard, 2015 UT 96, ¶ 33 , 371 P.3d 1 (citation omitted). ¶42 With these principles in mind, our respect for precedent means we value and implement the text of our past opinions as far as it can logically go.

2020If we have no basis for questioning the “reasoning on which the precedent was originally based,” id., we have no need to consider other factors of relevance to our stare decisis inquiry. ______________________________________________________________________________ 12 See Dipoma v. McPhie, 2001 UT 61, ¶ 18 , 29 P.3d 1225 (noting that an alternative basis for affirmance must be “apparent from the record”); Francis v. State, 2010 UT 62, ¶ 21 , 248 P.3d 44 (noting that we “may affirm a decision of the district court on alternate grounds” but emphasizing that “it falls to the party seeking the ben

2020If we have no basis for questioning the “reasoning on which the precedent was originally based,” id., we have no need to consider other factors of relevance to our stare decisis inquiry. ______________________________________________________________________________ 12 See Dipoma v. McPhie, 2001 UT 61, ¶ 18 , 29 P.3d 1225 (noting that an alternative basis for affirmance must be “apparent from the record”); Francis v. State, 2010 UT 62, ¶ 21 , 248 P.3d 44 (noting that we “may affirm a decision of the district court on alternate grounds” but emphasizing that “it falls to the party seeking the ben

2020If we have no basis for questioning the “reasoning on which the precedent was originally based,” id., we have no need to consider other factors of relevance to our stare decisis inquiry. ______________________________________________________________________________ 12 See Dipoma v. McPhie, 2001 UT 61, ¶ 18 , 29 P.3d 1225 (noting that an alternative basis for affirmance must be “apparent from the record”); Francis v. State, 2010 UT 62, ¶ 21 , 248 P.3d 44 (noting that we “may affirm a decision of the district court on alternate grounds” but emphasizing that “it falls to the party seeking the ben

2020If we have no basis for questioning the “reasoning on which the precedent was originally based,” id., we have no need to consider other factors of relevance to our stare decisis inquiry. ______________________________________________________________________________ 12 See Dipoma v. McPhie, 2001 UT 61, ¶ 18 , 29 P.3d 1225 (noting that an alternative basis for affirmance must be “apparent from the record”); Francis v. State, 2010 UT 62, ¶ 21 , 248 P.3d 44 (noting that we “may affirm a decision of the district court on alternate grounds” but emphasizing that “it falls to the party seeking the ben

2020In Thomas v. Hillyard, 2019 UT 29, ¶ 18 , 445 P.3d 521 , for example, we overruled Jensen v. Young, 2010 UT 67 , 245 P.3d 731 , without invitation from the parties because we identified “two lines of cases” that had “taken inconsistent and confusing paths.” And in State v. Steed, 2015 UT 76, ¶ 8 , 357 P.3d 547 , we noted that a prior “articulation” of an element of our mootness exception in our past cases was “overly broad.” We thus “clarif[ied]” the “proper articulation” and “disavow[ed] any language in our prior cases stating otherwise”—again without invitation from the parties.

2020In Thomas v. Hillyard, 2019 UT 29, ¶ 18 , 445 P.3d 521 , for example, we overruled Jensen v. Young, 2010 UT 67 , 245 P.3d 731 , without invitation from the parties because we identified “two lines of cases” that had “taken inconsistent and confusing paths.” And in State v. Steed, 2015 UT 76, ¶ 8 , 357 P.3d 547 , we noted that a prior “articulation” of an element of our mootness exception in our past cases was “overly broad.” We thus “clarif[ied]” the “proper articulation” and “disavow[ed] any language in our prior cases stating otherwise”—again without invitation from the parties.

2020In Thomas v. Hillyard, 2019 UT 29, ¶ 18 , 445 P.3d 521 , for example, we overruled Jensen v. Young, 2010 UT 67 , 245 P.3d 731 , without invitation from the parties because we identified “two lines of cases” that had “taken inconsistent and confusing paths.” And in State v. Steed, 2015 UT 76, ¶ 8 , 357 P.3d 547 , we noted that a prior “articulation” of an element of our mootness exception in our past cases was “overly broad.” We thus “clarif[ied]” the “proper articulation” and “disavow[ed] any language in our prior cases stating otherwise”—again without invitation from the parties.

2020In Thomas v. Hillyard, 2019 UT 29, ¶ 18 , 445 P.3d 521 , for example, we overruled Jensen v. Young, 2010 UT 67 , 245 P.3d 731 , without invitation from the parties because we identified “two lines of cases” that had “taken inconsistent and confusing paths.” And in State v. Steed, 2015 UT 76, ¶ 8 , 357 P.3d 547 , we noted that a prior “articulation” of an element of our mootness exception in our past cases was “overly broad.” We thus “clarif[ied]” the “proper articulation” and “disavow[ed] any language in our prior cases stating otherwise”—again without invitation from the parties.

2020In the latter circumstance, we are more openly implicating the central underpinnings of the doctrine of stare decisis—reliance interests of parties and the public. 39 See (asking whether “any of the standards set forth in our cases [should] be refined or reformulated in any way”); Supplemental Briefing Order (Aug. 20, 2018), Lujan, 2020 UT 5 (asking whether “our decision in State v. Ramirez [should] be overruled if it runs counter to the original understanding of due process” or if the “factors set forth in that decision [are] . . . subject to revision or refinement”). 39 Even then, recent pre

2019Fin., Inc. v. Salt Lake Cty. , 948 P.2d 771 , 775 (Utah 1997) (affirming Hackford factors considered in overruling precedent concerning statutory interpretation); Dep't of Human Servs. v. Jacoby , 1999 UT App 52 , ¶ 19, 975 P.2d 939 (noting that in interpreting a statute, "we consider not only the legislative intent but also the gloss judicial precedent attaches to the statute" (citing Hackford , 740 P.2d at 1283 )); accord Perry v. State , 357 Md. 37 , 741 A.2d 1162 , 1195 (1999) ("[C]onsiderations of stare decisis weigh heavily in the area of statutory construction, especially where the legi

2019Fin., Inc. v. Salt Lake Cty. , 948 P.2d 771 , 775 (Utah 1997) (affirming Hackford factors considered in overruling precedent concerning statutory interpretation); Dep't of Human Servs. v. Jacoby , 1999 UT App 52 , ¶ 19, 975 P.2d 939 (noting that in interpreting a statute, "we consider not only the legislative intent but also the gloss judicial precedent attaches to the statute" (citing Hackford , 740 P.2d at 1283 )); accord Perry v. State , 357 Md. 37 , 741 A.2d 1162 , 1195 (1999) ("[C]onsiderations of stare decisis weigh heavily in the area of statutory construction, especially where the legi

2019Fin., Inc. v. Salt Lake Cty. , 948 P.2d 771 , 775 (Utah 1997) (affirming Hackford factors considered in overruling precedent concerning statutory interpretation); Dep't of Human Servs. v. Jacoby , 1999 UT App 52 , ¶ 19, 975 P.2d 939 (noting that in interpreting a statute, "we consider not only the legislative intent but also the gloss judicial precedent attaches to the statute" (citing Hackford , 740 P.2d at 1283 )); accord Perry v. State , 357 Md. 37 , 741 A.2d 1162 , 1195 (1999) ("[C]onsiderations of stare decisis weigh heavily in the area of statutory construction, especially where the legi

2019See Hackford v. Utah Power & Light Co. , 740 P.2d 1281 , 1283 (Utah 1987) (Zimmerman, J.) (noting that in determining whether to overturn a prior decision, "[t]he answer must take into account the fact that we are not dealing with an interpretation of the common law ... [;] [r]ather we are dealing with an interpretation of a statute"); id. at 1288 (Howe, J., concurring in result) ("The doctrine of stare decisis , weighty in any context, is especially so in matters of statutory construction." (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)), superseded on other grounds by

2019See Hackford v. Utah Power & Light Co. , 740 P.2d 1281 , 1283 (Utah 1987) (Zimmerman, J.) (noting that in determining whether to overturn a prior decision, "[t]he answer must take into account the fact that we are not dealing with an interpretation of the common law ... [;] [r]ather we are dealing with an interpretation of a statute"); id. at 1288 (Howe, J., concurring in result) ("The doctrine of stare decisis , weighty in any context, is especially so in matters of statutory construction." (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)), superseded on other grounds by