stare decisis doctrine in Georgia

2020Under the doctrine of stare decisis, courts generally stand by their prior decisions, because doing so “promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.” Duke v. State, 306 Ga. 171, 183-184 ( 829 SE2d 348 ) (2019) (punctuation omitted) (citing State v. Hudson, 293 Ga. 656, 661 ( 748 SE2d 910 ) (2013)).

2020Under the doctrine of stare decisis, courts generally stand by their prior decisions, because doing so “promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.” Duke v. State, 306 Ga. 171, 183-184 ( 829 SE2d 348 ) (2019) (punctuation omitted) (citing State v. Hudson, 293 Ga. 656, 661 ( 748 SE2d 910 ) (2013)).

2024See Olevik v. State, 302 Ga. 228, 244 (2) (c) (iv) (806 SE2d 505) (2017) (“Under the doctrine of stare decisis, courts generally stand by their prior decisions[.]” (emphasis added)); Rollf v. Carter, 298 Ga. 557, 559 (784 SE2d 341) (2016) (decisions by the Court of Appeals are not binding on this Court).

2024See Olevik v. State, 302 Ga. 228, 244 (2) (c) (iv) (806 SE2d 505) (2017) (“Under the doctrine of stare decisis, courts generally stand by their prior decisions[.]” (emphasis added)); Rollf v. Carter, 298 Ga. 557, 559 (784 SE2d 341) (2016) (decisions by the Court of Appeals are not binding on this Court).

2019Whether the holdings of Gary and its progeny should be squarely overruled is a question that would require a consideration of the doctrine of stare decisis, see State v. Jackson, 287 Ga. 646, 658 (5) ( 697 SE2d 757 ) (2010), but that is not a question that we must answer to resolve this case.

2019Whether the holdings of Gary and its progeny should be squarely overruled is a question that would require a consideration of the doctrine of stare decisis, see State v. Jackson, 287 Ga. 646, 658 (5) ( 697 SE2d 757 ) (2010), but that is not a question that we must answer to resolve this case.

2022See Nalls v. State, 304 Ga. 168, 179 (815 SE2d 38) (2018) (“Before we overrule our incorrectly decided case law on this point, we must consider whether stare decisis counsels us not to.”); Ramos v. Louisiana, ___ U.S. ___, ___ (140 SCt 1390, 1412, 206 LE2d 583) (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part) (“[A]pplying the doctrine of stare decisis, this Court ordinarily adheres to precedent, but sometimes 31 overrules precedent.

2022See Nalls v. State, 304 Ga. 168, 179 ( 815 SE2d 38 ) (2018) (“Before we overrule our incorrectly decided case law on this point, we must consider whether stare decisis counsels us not to.”); Ramos v. Louisiana, — U.S. —, — ( 140 SCt 1390, 1412 , 206 LE2d 583) (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part) (“[A]pplying the doctrine of stare decisis, this Court ordinarily adheres to precedent, but sometimes overrules precedent.

2022See, e.g., Frett v. State Farm Employee Workers’ Comp., 309 Ga. 44, 60 (3) (c) (844 SE2d 749) (2020) (overruling 85-year-old statutory precedent to which stare decisis applied with more force). 32 The remaining stare decisis factors all weigh in favor of overruling our self-incrimination precedent.

2022Id. at 62 n.15 (majority opinion) (citations omitted). 12 All of the parties and amici who have weighed in on the stare decisis analysis of this Court’s cases creating the out-of-time appeal procedural vehicle agree that those precedents are unsound.

2017We turn next to the remaining stare decisis factors — the age of the precedent, the reliance it has induced, and its workability See Woodard, 296 Ga. at 812 . (a) First, the local-ordinance requirement is “ ‘neither ancient nor entrenched.’ ” Southall v. State, 300 Ga. 462, 468 (1) ( 796 SE2d 261 ) (2017) (citation omitted).

2017We turn next to the remaining stare decisis factors — the age of the precedent, the reliance it has induced, and its workability See Woodard, 296 Ga. at 812 . (a) First, the local-ordinance requirement is “ ‘neither ancient nor entrenched.’ ” Southall v. State, 300 Ga. 462, 468 (1) ( 796 SE2d 261 ) (2017) (citation omitted).

2020See Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC, 576 U. S. 446, 455 ( 135 SCt 2401 , 192 LE2d 463) (2015) (‘stare decisis has consequence only to the extent it sustains incorrect decisions; correct judgments have no need for that principle to prop them up’)”).

2020See Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC, 576 U. S. 446, 455 ( 135 SCt 2401 , 192 LE2d 463) (2015) (‘stare decisis has consequence only to the extent it sustains incorrect decisions; correct judgments have no need for that principle to prop them up’)”).

2022See Nalls v. State, 304 Ga. 168, 179 (815 SE2d 38) (2018) (“Before we overrule our incorrectly decided case law on this point, we must consider whether stare decisis counsels us not to.”); Ramos v. Louisiana, ___ U.S. ___, ___ (140 SCt 1390, 1412, 206 LE2d 583) (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part) (“[A]pplying the doctrine of stare decisis, this Court ordinarily adheres to precedent, but sometimes 31 overrules precedent.

2022See Nalls v. State, 304 Ga. 168, 179 ( 815 SE2d 38 ) (2018) (“Before we overrule our incorrectly decided case law on this point, we must consider whether stare decisis counsels us not to.”); Ramos v. Louisiana, — U.S. —, — ( 140 SCt 1390, 1412 , 206 LE2d 583) (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part) (“[A]pplying the doctrine of stare decisis, this Court ordinarily adheres to precedent, but sometimes overrules precedent.

2024Under the doctrine of stare decisis, we consider whether to retain incorrect precedent by balancing “the importance of having the question decided against the importance of having it decided right.” State v. Burns, 306 Ga. 117, 123 (2) ( 829 SE2d 367 ) (2019) (citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original).

2024Under the doctrine of stare decisis, we consider whether to retain incorrect precedent by balancing “the importance of having the question decided against the importance of having it decided right.” State v. Burns, 306 Ga. 117, 123 (2) (829 SE2d 367) (2019) (citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original).

2023See Gilliam v. State, 312 Ga. 60, 62 (860 SE2d 543) (2021) (“Under the doctrine of stare decisis, we generally stand by our prior decisions to promote the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, foster reliance on judicial decisions, and contribute to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.” (cleaned up)).

2023See Gilliam v. State, 312 Ga. 60, 62 (860 SE2d 543) (2021) (“Under the doctrine of stare decisis, we generally stand by our prior decisions to promote the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, foster reliance on judicial decisions, and contribute to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.” (cleaned up)).

2023As we explain more below, Taylor’s claim fails because she cannot show that a Georgia jury in 1798 would have been authorized to award the kind of punitive damages she seeks 20 Although neither party has asked us to reconsider Nestlehutt, amicus curiae the Attorney General of Georgia—without engaging in a stare decisis analysis—has asked that we overrule the portion of Nestlehutt holding that a right to a jury trial has “an attendant right to the award of the full measure of damages . . . as determined by the jury,” 286 Ga. at 735, arguing that the right to a jury trial protects only the proce

2023Accordingly, I respectfully dissent in Division III of the majority opinion. (a) If this issue of whether the General Assembly can circumscribe a jury’s determination of damages must be decided based on the scope of the constitutional right to a jury trial as it existed when Georgia first protected the right, according to our holding in Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C. v. Nestlehutt, 286 Ga. 731 (691 SE2d 218) (2010), 73 we must be guided by foundational 73 I accept that departing from the analytical framework set out in Nestlehutt would require a stare decisis analysis.

2019See Worthen v. State , 304 Ga. 862 , 869, 823 S.E.2d 291 (2019).

2019See Worthen v. State , 304 Ga. 862 , 869, 823 S.E.2d 291 (2019).

2015See Jones v. State, 220 Ga. App. 784, 785-786 ( 470 SE2d 326 ) (1996). 18 The final and most important factor in the stare decisis analysis – the soundness of the precedent’s reasoning – cuts most strongly against retaining Heard.

2015See Jones v. State, 220 Ga. App. 784, 785-786 ( 470 SE2d 326 ) (1996). 18 The final and most important factor in the stare decisis analysis – the soundness of the precedent’s reasoning – cuts most strongly against retaining Heard.

2012Co., 269 Ga. 611, 613 ( 502 SE2d 226 ) (1998) (reversing Court of Appeals, in part, based upon its failure to adhere to doctrine of stare decisis).

2012Co., 269 Ga. 611, 613 ( 502 SE2d 226 ) (1998) (reversing Court of Appeals, in part, based upon its failure to adhere to doctrine of stare decisis).

2024In any event, we need not resolve these concerns here given our conclusion that the conflict with United States Supreme Court precedent requires us to overrule our decisions applying the “three Boykin rights” approach to guilty pleas. 16 These decisions include Nash, 271 Ga. 281 , Britt, 274 Ga. 611 , Arnold, 282 Ga. 66 , Hawes, 281 Ga. 822 , Sutton, 283 Ga. 28 , Wilson, 288 Ga. 779 , Tyner, 289 Ga. 592 , Lejeune II, 299 Ga. 546 , Foskey v. Battle, 277 Ga. 480 ( 591 SE2d 802 ) (2004), Pullium v. State, 278 Ga. 354 ( 602 SE2d 833 ) (2004), Baisden v. State, 279 Ga. 702 ( 620 SE2d 369 ) (2005),

2024In any event, we need not resolve these concerns here given our conclusion that the conflict with United States Supreme Court precedent requires us to overrule our decisions applying the “three Boykin rights” approach to guilty pleas. 16 These decisions include Nash, 271 Ga. 281, Britt, 274 Ga. 611, Arnold, 282 Ga. 66, Hawes, 281 Ga. 822, Sutton, 283 Ga. 28, Wilson, 288 Ga. 779, Tyner, 289 Ga. 592, Lejeune II, 299 Ga. 546, Foskey v. Battle, 277 Ga. 480 (591 SE2d 802) (2004); Pulliam v. State, 278 Ga. 354 (602 SE2d 833) (2004), Baisden v. State, 279 Ga. 702 (620 SE2d 369) (2005), Johnson v. Smi

2022We Affirm the Judgment of the Court of Appeals Applying Reid here, Alexander has not carried his burden of showing a reasonable probability that the outcome of his trial would 11 Because we conclude that Reid was correctly decided, “it is unnecessary for us to consider whether we should retain that decision under the doctrine of stare decisis.” Elliott v. State, 305 Ga. 179, 209 n.21 (III) (C) (ii) (824 SE2d 265) (2019). 26 have been different but for his counsel’s failure to object to the closure of the courtroom during the witnesses’ trial testimony.

2022We Affirm the Judgment of the Court of Appeals Applying Reid here, Alexander has not carried his burden of showing a reasonable probability that the outcome of his trial would 11 Because we conclude that Reid was correctly decided, “it is unnecessary for us to consider whether we should retain that decision under the doctrine of stare decisis.” Elliott v. State, 305 Ga. 179, 209 n.21 (III) (C) (ii) (824 SE2d 265) (2019). 26 have been different but for his counsel’s failure to object to the closure of the courtroom during the witnesses’ trial testimony.

2019See Lejeune v. McLaughlin, 296 Ga. 291 (2) ( 766 SE2d 803 ) (2014). 2 We do not mean to be understood to say that all Georgia rules of evidence (or other applicable statutes) pass muster under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments in all circumstances, but only that those provisions do not require that all false allegation evidence categorically be admitted without regard for the rules of evidence. 13 Under the doctrine of stare decisis, courts generally stand by their prior decisions, because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters relian

2019See Lejeune v. McLaughlin, 296 Ga. 291 (2) ( 766 SE2d 803 ) (2014). 2 We do not mean to be understood to say that all Georgia rules of evidence (or other applicable statutes) pass muster under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments in all circumstances, but only that those provisions do not require that all false allegation evidence categorically be admitted without regard for the rules of evidence. 13 Under the doctrine of stare decisis, courts generally stand by their prior decisions, because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters relian

2017We turn next to the remaining stare decisis factors — the age of the precedent, the reliance it has induced, and its workability See Woodard, 296 Ga. at 812 . (a) First, the local-ordinance requirement is “ ‘neither ancient nor entrenched.’ ” Southall v. State, 300 Ga. 462, 468 (1) ( 796 SE2d 261 ) (2017) (citation omitted).

2017See Woodard, 296 Ga. at 812 . (a) First, the local-ordinance requirement is “‘neither ancient nor entrenched.’” Southall v. State, 300 Ga. 462, 468 (1) ( 796 SE2d 261 ) (2017) (citation omitted).

2006Co., 254 Ga. 684, 686 ( 333 SE2d 835 ) (1985).

2006Co., 254 Ga. 684, 686 ( 333 SE2d 835 ) (1985).

2024Today is not that day. 11 Two notable exceptions to this trend include Ritter v. State, 272 Ga. 551, 553 (2) (532 SE2d 692) (2000), and Smith v. State, 292 Ga. 620, 622 (3) (740 SE2d 158) (2013), both of which viewed the common law as allowing trial courts to modify their interlocutory rulings and orders before final judgment. 24

2024Today is not that day. 11 Two notable exceptions to this trend include Ritter v. State, 272 Ga. 551, 553 (2) (532 SE2d 692) (2000), and Smith v. State, 292 Ga. 620, 622 (3) (740 SE2d 158) (2013), both of which viewed the common law as allowing trial courts to modify their interlocutory rulings and orders before final judgment. 24