stare decisis doctrine in Massachusetts

2016See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Welosky, 276 Mass. 398, 400 (1931) ("It has been uniformly and many times held that such opinions, although necessarily the result of judicial examination and deliberation, are advisory in nature, given by the justices as individuals in their capacity as constitutional advisers of the other departments of government and without the aid of arguments, are not adjudications by the court, and do not fall within the doctrine of stare decisis.

2016See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Welosky, 276 Mass. 398, 400 (1931) (“It has been uniformly and many times held that such opinions, although necessarily the result of judicial examination and deliberation, are advisory in nature, given by the justices as individuals in their capacity as constitutional advisers of the other departments of government and without the aid of arguments, are not adjudications by the court, and do not fall within the doctrine of stare decisis.

1973Swan v. Superior Court, 222 Mass. 542, 545 .

1973Swan v. Superior Court, 222 Mass. 542, 545 .

2005There must be something more, above and beyond such a disagreement, that would justify some exception to the doctrine of stare decisis.” Stonehill College v. Massachusetts Comm’n Against Discrimination, 441 Mass. 549, 588 (2004) (Sosman, J., concurring).

1983“In accordance with our duty, we examine[d] the [questions reported by the single justice] anew, unaffected by the advisory opinion.” Lincoln v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 326 Mass. 313, 314 (1950).

1974In this context, then, it is well to repeat that Opinions of the Justices “ ‘are advisory in nature, given by the justices as individuals in their capacity as constitutional advisors of the other departments of government and without the aid of arguments, are not adjudications by the court, and do not fall within the doctrine of stare decisis.’ If the same question arises later in the course of litigation, it is the duty of the court to consider it anew, unaffected by the advisory opinion.” Opinion of the Justices, 341 Mass. 738, 748 (1960), quoting from Commonwealth v. Welosky, 276 Mass. 398,

1946See Mabardy v. McHugh, 202 Mass. 148, 151-152 ; Duncan v. New England Power Co. 250 Mass. 228, 234 .

1919The decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in the Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457, 553, 572, upholding in their entirety the legal tender acts of Congress and overruling Hepburn v. Gris-wold, 8 Wall. 601, 606 , wherein the same court had previously declared those acts unconstitutional with respect to certain classes of debts, give color to the contention that a statute once declared unconstitutional by a court of last resort may nevertheless at a later period be held enforceable because not in conflict with the fundamental law.