stare decisis doctrine in California

2026(See Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 [“[u]nder the doctrine of stare decisis, all tribunals exercising inferior jurisdiction are required to follow decisions of courts exercising superior jurisdiction”].) The Hardin court explained: “Under California law, special circumstance murder is a uniquely serious offense, punishable only by death or [LWOP].

2026(See Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 [doctrine of stare decisis].) 47. exterior fence of the Taft Union High School campus.” Cleveland alleged he reasonably relied on there being an assigned police officer on the premises; he entered with the belief that the premises would be free from guns and other prohibited weapons; and at no time was he advised that the assigned campus police officer would not be present.

2024(Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal (1941) 17 Cal.2d 280, 292 .) This is a fundamental rule of procedure “followed under the doctrine of stare decisis, and binding upon all courts.” (Id. at p. 293.) A court’s intervention before an administrative agency has resolved the claim constitutes jurisdictional interference.

2024(Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal (1941) 17 Cal.2d 280, 292 .) This is a fundamental rule of procedure “followed under the doctrine of stare decisis, and binding upon all courts.” (Id. at p. 293.) A court’s intervention before an administrative agency has resolved the claim constitutes jurisdictional interference.

1998This policy, known as the doctrine of stare decisis, “is based on the assumption that certainty, predictability and stability in the law are the major objectives of the legal system; i.e., that parties should be able to regulate their conduct and enter into relationships with reasonable assurance of the governing rules of law.” [Citation.] [ft It is likewise well established, however, that the foregoing policy is a flexible one which permits this court to reconsider, and ultimately to depart from, our own prior precedent in an appropriate case. [Citation.] As we stated in Cianci v. Superior Co

1998This policy, known as the doctrine of stare decisis, "is based on the assumption that certainty, predictability and stability in the law are the major objectives of the legal system; i.e., that parties should be able to regulate their conduct and enter into relationships with reasonable assurance of the governing rules of law." [Citation.] [¶] It is likewise well established, however, that the foregoing policy is a flexible one which permits this court to reconsider, and ultimately to depart from, our own prior precedent in an appropriate case. [Citation.] As we stated in Cianci v. Superior Co

2007This policy, known as the doctrine of stare decisis, ‘is based on the assumption that certainty, predictability and stability in the law are the major objectives of the legal system; i.e., that parties should be able to regulate their conduct and enter into relationships with reasonable assurance of the governing rules of law.’ [Citation.] [J[] It is likewise well established, however, that the foregoing policy is a flexible one which permits this court to reconsider, and ultimately to depart from, our own prior precedent in an appropriate case. [Citation.] As we stated in Cianci v. Superior C

2007This policy, known as the doctrine of stare decisis, ‘is based on the assumption that certainty, predictability and stability in the law are the major objectives of the legal system; i.e., that parties should be able to regulate their conduct and enter into relationships with reasonable assurance of the governing rules of law.’ [Citation.] [J[] It is likewise well established, however, that the foregoing policy is a flexible one which permits this court to reconsider, and ultimately to depart from, our own prior precedent in an appropriate case. [Citation.] As we stated in Cianci v. Superior C

2016(See, e.g., Summers v. Superior Court (1959) 53 Cal.2d 295, 298 [ 1 Cal.Rptr. 324 , 347 P.2d 668 ] [“estoppel may operate to confer jurisdiction over the parties” but cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction].) The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies “does not implicate subject matter jurisdiction but rather is a ‘procedural prerequisite’ ‘originally devised for convenience and efficiency’ and now ‘followed under the doctrine of stare decisis . . . .’ [Citation.] It is ‘jurisdictional’ only in the sense that a court’s failure to apply the rule in a situation where the issue has

2016(See, e.g., Summers v. Superior Court (1959) 53 Cal.2d 295, 298 [ 1 Cal.Rptr. 324 , 347 P.2d 668 ] [“estoppel may operate to confer jurisdiction over the parties” but cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction].) The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies “does not implicate subject matter jurisdiction but rather is a ‘procedural prerequisite’ ‘originally devised for convenience and efficiency’ and now ‘followed under the doctrine of stare decisis . . . .’ [Citation.] It is ‘jurisdictional’ only in the sense that a court’s failure to apply the rule in a situation where the issue has

1998This policy, known as the doctrine of stare decisis, “is based on the assumption that certainty, predictability and stability in the law are the major objectives of the legal system; i.e., that parties should be able to regulate their conduct and enter into relationships with reasonable assurance of the governing rules of law.” [Citation.] [ft It is likewise well established, however, that the foregoing policy is a flexible one which permits this court to reconsider, and ultimately to depart from, our own prior precedent in an appropriate case. [Citation.] As we stated in Cianci v. Superior Co

1998This policy, known as the doctrine of stare decisis, “is based on the assumption that certainty, predictability and stability in the law are the major objectives of the legal system; i.e., that parties should be able to regulate their conduct and enter into relationships with reasonable assurance of the governing rules of law.” [Citation.] [ft It is likewise well established, however, that the foregoing policy is a flexible one which permits this court to reconsider, and ultimately to depart from, our own prior precedent in an appropriate case. [Citation.] As we stated in Cianci v. Superior Co

1967Speaking generally, any acts which exceed the defined power of a court in any instance, whether that power be defined by *676 constitutional provisions, express statutory declaration, or rules developed by the courts and followed under the doctrine of stare decisis, are in excess of jurisdiction, in so far as that term is used to indicate that those acts may be restrained by prohibition or annulled on certiorari.’ ” (City & County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.2d 236, 243-244 [ 1 Cal.Rptr. 158 , 347 P.2d 294 ] ; Crittenden v. Superior Court, 61 Cal.2d 565 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 380 , 393

1967Speaking generally, any acts which exceed the defined power of a court in any instance, whether that power be defined by *676 constitutional provisions, express statutory declaration, or rules developed by the courts and followed under the doctrine of stare decisis, are in excess of jurisdiction, in so far as that term is used to indicate that those acts may be restrained by prohibition or annulled on certiorari.’ ” (City & County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.2d 236, 243-244 [ 1 Cal.Rptr. 158 , 347 P.2d 294 ] ; Crittenden v. Superior Court, 61 Cal.2d 565 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 380 , 393

1964In this context, of course, “ [I]t is not necessary that there be a lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or parties in the fundamental sense but only that there be a want or excess of the power of the court as defined by statute or by rules developed and followed under the doctrine of stare decisis.” (City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (1959) 51 Cal.2d 423, 429 [2] [ 333 P.2d 745 ]; Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal (1941) 17 Cal.2d 280, 288 [3]-291 [4] [ 109 P.2d 942 , 132 A.L.R. 715 ].) Here, because of the time limitations inherent in the subject legislation—rendered crucial

1964In this context, of course, “ [I]t is not necessary that there be a lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or parties in the fundamental sense but only that there be a want or excess of the power of the court as defined by statute or by rules developed and followed under the doctrine of stare decisis.” (City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (1959) 51 Cal.2d 423, 429 [2] [ 333 P.2d 745 ]; Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal (1941) 17 Cal.2d 280, 288 [3]-291 [4] [ 109 P.2d 942 , 132 A.L.R. 715 ].) Here, because of the time limitations inherent in the subject legislation—rendered crucial

1995This *93 policy, known as the doctrine of stare decisis, `is based on the assumption that certainty, predictability and stability in the law are the major objectives of the legal system; i.e., that parties should be able to regulate their conduct and enter into relationships with reasonable assurance of the governing rules of law.' (9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Appeal, § 758, at p. 726, and see cases cited.) "It is likewise well established, however, that the foregoing policy is sufficiently flexible to permit this court to reconsider, and ultimately to depart from, its own prior pre

1988This policy, known as the doctrine of stare decisis, "is based on the assumption that certainty, predictability and stability in the law are the major objectives of the legal system; i.e., that parties should be able to regulate their conduct and enter into relationships with reasonable assurance of the governing rules of law." (9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Appeal, § 758, p. 726, and see cases cited.) (3) It is likewise well established, however, that the foregoing policy is a flexible one which permits this court to reconsider, and ultimately to depart from, our own prior precedent

2012We established in In re Berry (1968) 68 Cal.2d 137, 147 [ 65 Cal.Rptr. 273 , 436 P.2d 273 ] (Berry), a case involving a misdemeanor contempt prosecution, that ‘the violation of an order in excess of the jurisdiction of the issuing court cannot produce a valid judgment of contempt [citations], and that the “jurisdiction” in question extends beyond mere subject matter or personal jurisdiction . . . .’ Rather, ‘ “any acts which exceed the defined power of a court in any instance, whether that power be defined by constitutional provision, express statutory declaration, or rules developed by the co

2012We established in In re Berry (1968) 68 Cal.2d 137, 147 [ 65 Cal.Rptr. 273 , 436 P.2d 273 ] (Berry), a case involving a misdemeanor contempt prosecution, that ‘the violation of an order in excess of the jurisdiction of the issuing court cannot produce a valid judgment of contempt [citations], and that the “jurisdiction” in question extends beyond mere subject matter or personal jurisdiction . . . .’ Rather, ‘ “any acts which exceed the defined power of a court in any instance, whether that power be defined by constitutional provision, express statutory declaration, or rules developed by the co

1998(See Latimer, supra, 5 Cal.4th 1203, 1213 ; see also Patterson v. McLean Credit Union (1989) 491 U.S. 164, 172-173 [ 109 S.Ct. 2363, 2370-2371 , 105 L.Ed.2d 132 ]; Board of Supervisors v. Local Agency Formation Com. (1992) 3 Cal.4th 903, 921 [ 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 245 , 838 P.2d 1198 ].) 7 In our view, the fundamental unsoundness of Geiger’s constitutional analysis outweighs any considerations which might favor its retention, despite its flaws, under the doctrine of stare decisis.

1998(See Latimer, supra, 5 Cal.4th 1203, 1213 ; see also Patterson v. McLean Credit Union (1989) 491 U.S. 164, 172-173 [ 109 S.Ct. 2363, 2370-2371 , 105 L.Ed.2d 132 ]; Board of Supervisors v. Local Agency Formation Com. (1992) 3 Cal.4th 903, 921 [ 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 245 , 838 P.2d 1198 ].) 7 In our view, the fundamental unsoundness of Geiger’s constitutional analysis outweighs any considerations which might favor its retention, despite its flaws, under the doctrine of stare decisis.

2024The trial court granted the motion to strike numerous issues based on Camarillo’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies. “‘Where an administrative remedy is provided by statute, this remedy must be exhausted before the courts will act.’” (Greene v. California Coastal Com. (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 1227 , 1237.) This rule “‘is not a matter of judicial discretion, but is a fundamental rule of procedure laid down by courts of last resort, followed under the doctrine of stare decisis, and binding upon all courts.’” (Citizens for Open Government v. City of Lodi (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 865, 874 .) T

2022Therefore, this alternative would have greater impacts overall than the proposed project.” Joshua has failed to demonstrate that he exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to this argument. “ ‘In brief, the rule [of the exhaustion of administrative remedies] is that where an administrative remedy is provided by statute, relief must be sought from the administrative body and this remedy exhausted before the courts will act.’ [Citation.] The rule is a jurisdictional prerequisite in the sense that it ‘is not a matter of judicial discretion, but is a fundamental rule of procedure laid d

1962The practical approach to the subject, therefore, is by classification rather than definition; i.e., the scope and meaning of the term will best be discovered by an examination of the situations in which problems of *74 jurisdiction are involved.” (1 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, § 1, p. 273.) The Supreme Court in the landmark case of Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal (1941) 17 Cal.2d 280 [ 109 P.2d 942 , 132 A.L.R. 715 ] amplifies this approach: 1 ‘ Speaking generally, any acts which exceed the defined power of a court in any instance, whether that power be defined by constitutional provision,

1962The practical approach to the subject, therefore, is by classification rather than definition; i.e., the scope and meaning of the term will best be discovered by an examination of the situations in which problems of *74 jurisdiction are involved.” (1 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, § 1, p. 273.) The Supreme Court in the landmark case of Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal (1941) 17 Cal.2d 280 [ 109 P.2d 942 , 132 A.L.R. 715 ] amplifies this approach: 1 ‘ Speaking generally, any acts which exceed the defined power of a court in any instance, whether that power be defined by constitutional provision,

2021Proc., § 410.10 [a “court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States”].) “A court does not necessarily act without subject matter jurisdiction merely by issuing a judgment going beyond the sphere of action prescribed by law. ‘Speaking generally, any acts which exceed the defined power of a court in any instance, whether that power be defined by constitutional provision, express statutory declaration, or rules developed by the courts and followed under the doctrine of stare decisis, are in excess of jurisdict

2021Proc., § 410.10 [a “court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States”].) “A court does not necessarily act without subject matter jurisdiction merely by issuing a judgment going beyond the sphere of action prescribed by law. ‘Speaking generally, any acts which exceed the defined power of a court in any instance, whether that power be defined by constitutional provision, express statutory declaration, or rules developed by the courts and followed under the doctrine of stare decisis, are in excess of jurisdict

2018It is not their function to attempt to overrule decisions of a higher court. [Citations.]" ( Auto Equity Sales , Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450 , 455, 20 Cal.Rptr. 321 , 369 P.2d 937 ( Auto Equity ).) The doctrine of stare decisis " 'is based on the assumption that certainty, predictability and stability in the law are the major objectives of the legal system *511 ....' [Citations.]" ( Peterson v. Superior Court (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1185 , 1195, 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 836 , 899 P.2d 905 .) "[A]ny acts which exceed the defined power of a court in any instance, whether that power be defined by

2018It is not their function to attempt to overrule decisions of a higher court. [Citations.]" ( Auto Equity Sales , Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450 , 455, 20 Cal.Rptr. 321 , 369 P.2d 937 ( Auto Equity ).) The doctrine of stare decisis " 'is based on the assumption that certainty, predictability and stability in the law are the major objectives of the legal system *511 ....' [Citations.]" ( Peterson v. Superior Court (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1185 , 1195, 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 836 , 899 P.2d 905 .) "[A]ny acts which exceed the defined power of a court in any instance, whether that power be defined by

2026While we do not “lightly” depart from past precedents, stare decisis nonetheless remains a “ ‘a flexible [policy].’ ” (People v. Mendoza (2000) 23 Cal.4th 896, 924 .) “[R]eexamination of precedent may become necessary when subsequent developments indicate an earlier decision was unsound, or has become ripe for reconsideration.” (In re Jaime P. (2006) 40 Cal.4th 128, 133 .) “ ‘This is especially so when [the issues under consideration] . . . relate[] to “matter[s] of continuing concern” to the community at large.’ ” (Moradi- Shalal, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 296.) 8 Although the LAPPL has not rai

2025While we do not “lightly” depart from past precedents, stare decisis nonetheless remains a “ ‘a flexible [policy].’ ” (People v. Mendoza (2000) 23 Cal.4th 896, 924 .) “[R]eexamination of precedent may become necessary when subsequent developments indicate an earlier decision was unsound, or has become ripe for reconsideration.” (In re Jaime P. (2006) 40 Cal.4th 128, 133 .) “ ‘This is especially so when [the issues under consideration] . . . relate[] to “matter[s] of continuing concern” to the community at large.’ ” (Moradi- Shalal, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 296.) 8 Although the LAPPL has not rai

2021Proc., § 410.10 [a “court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States”].) “A court does not necessarily act without subject matter jurisdiction merely by issuing a judgment going beyond the sphere of action prescribed by law. ‘Speaking generally, any acts which exceed the defined power of a court in any instance, whether that power be defined by constitutional provision, express statutory declaration, or rules developed by the courts and followed under the doctrine of stare decisis, are in excess of jurisdict

2021Proc., § 410.10 [a “court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States”].) “A court does not necessarily act without subject matter jurisdiction merely by issuing a judgment going beyond the sphere of action prescribed by law. ‘Speaking generally, any acts which exceed the defined power of a court in any instance, whether that power be defined by constitutional provision, express statutory declaration, or rules developed by the courts and followed under the doctrine of stare decisis, are in excess of jurisdict

2022“A concurring opinion does not constitute authority under the doctrine of stare decisis.” (People v. Superior Court (Persons) (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 191, 194 .) 8 reports.”]; People v. Delson (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 56, 63 [probation officer’s “recommendation is advisory only, provided in order to aid the sentencing court in determining an appropriate disposition, and may be rejected in its entirety”].) Simpson also cites the fact the trial court acknowledged a 16-month sentence “is in line with what this prosecutor’s [office] extends on cases of this type . . . .” But it is well-settled that the

1978(People v. Superior Court (Persons) (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 191, 193-194 [ 128 Cal.Rptr. 314 ].) As a concurring opinion does not constitute authority under the doctrine of stare decisis (id., at p. 194), the trial court properly denied appellant’s motion for preliminary hearing.