stare decisis doctrine in Hawaii

2023Nevertheless, “there is no necessity or sound legal reason to perpetuate an error under the doctrine of stare decisis.” State v. Garcia, 96 Hawai‘i 200, 206, 29 P.3d 919, 925 (2001) (quoting Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 65 Haw. 641 , 653 n.10, 658 P.2d 287 , 297 n.10 (1982)).

2023The statutory analysis in Mahaʻulepu is flawed, and “there is no necessity or sound legal reason to perpetuate an error under the doctrine of stare decisis.” Garcia, 96 Hawai‘i at 206, 29 P.3d at 925 . 21 *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** Mahaʻulepu held that golf courses on class A and B agricultural land can be authorized by special use permit under HRS §§ 205-4.5(b) and 205-6, despite the fact that golf courses are not a permitted use on class B agricultural land under HRS § 205-4.5(a)(6).

2024The doctrine of stare decisis is a “principle of self-restraint on courts with respect to the overruling of prior decisions.” Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 65 Haw. 641 , 653 n.10, 658 P.2d 287 , 297 n.10 (1982) (citation omitted).

2024The doctrine of stare decisis is a “principle of self-restraint on courts with respect to the overruling of prior decisions.” Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 65 Haw. 641 , 653 n.10, 658 P.2d 287 , 297 n.10 (1982) (citation omitted).

2008See State v. Brantley, 99 Hawai'i 463, 479 , 56 P.3d 1252, 1268 (2002) (Acoba, J., dissenting) (“[S]tare decisis ensures that the law will not merely change erratically and permits society to presume that bedrock principles are founded in the law rather than in the proclivities of individuals.” (Quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 , 109 S.Ct. 2363 , 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989) (citations and quotation marks omitted).)).

2008See State v. Brantley, 99 Hawai`i 463, 479, 56 P.3d 1252, 1268 (2002) (Acoba, J., dissenting) ("[S]tare decisis ensures that the law will not merely change erratically and permits society to presume that bedrock principles are founded in the law rather than in the proclivities of individuals." (Quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 , 109 S.Ct. 2363 , 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989) (citations and quotation marks omitted).)).

2024See Ahn, 126 Hawaiʻi at 10, 265 P.3d at 479 .

2024See Ahn, 126 Hawaiʻi at 10, 265 P.3d at 469 (“There is no necessity or sound legal reason to perpetuate an error under the doctrine of stare decisis.”) (cleaned up).

2002Under the doctrine of stare decisis, Jumila's construction of § 134-6(a) was applicable and binding on trial courts. "[W]here a [legal] principle has been passed upon by the court of last resort, it is the duty of all inferior tribunals to adhere to the decision, without regard to their views as to its propriety, until the decision has been reversed or overruled by the court of last resort or altered by legislative enactment." State by Price v. Magoon, 75 Haw. 164, 186 , 858 P.2d 712, 723 (quoting Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 65 Haw. 641, 653 , 658 P.2d 287, 297 (1982) (citations omitted), reconsider

2002Under the doctrine of stare decisis, Jumila's construction of § 134-6(a) was applicable and binding on trial courts. "[W]here a [legal] principle has been passed upon by the court of last resort, it is the duty of all inferior tribunals to adhere to the decision, without regard to their views as to its propriety, until the decision has been reversed or overruled by the court of last resort or altered by legislative enactment." State by Price v. Magoon, 75 Haw. 164, 186 , 858 P.2d 712, 723 (quoting Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 65 Haw. 641, 653 , 658 P.2d 287, 297 (1982) (citations omitted), reconsider

2023The doctrine is “subordinate to legal reasons and justice and we should not be unduly hesitant to overrule a former decision when to do so would bring about what is considered manifest justice.” Ariyoshi, 65 Haw. at 653 n.10, 658 P.2d at 297 n.10 (quoting McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 54 Haw. 174, 180 , 504 P.2d 1330, 1335 (1973)).

2023The doctrine is “subordinate to legal reasons and justice and we should not be unduly hesitant to overrule a former decision when to do so would bring about what is considered manifest justice.” Ariyoshi, 65 Haw. at 653 n.10, 658 P.2d at 297 n.10 (quoting McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 54 Haw. 174, 180 , 504 P.2d 1330, 1335 (1973)).

1994Thus, the doctrine of stare decisis does not apply, and the cases regarding legislative inaction are not directly applicable, On the other hand, under the “law of the case” doctrine, “a determination of a question of law made by an appellate court in the course of an action becomes ‘the law of the case’ and may not be disputed by a reopening of the question at a later stage of litigation.” Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 65 Haw. 641 , 652 n. 9, 658 P.2d 287 , 297 n. 9 (1982) (quoting Glover v. Fong, 42 Haw. 560, 578 (1958)), reconsideration denied, 66 Haw. 528 , 726 P.2d 1183 (1983).

1994On the other hand, under the "law of the case" doctrine, "a determination of a question of law made by an appellate court in the course of an action becomes `the law of the case' and may not be disputed by a reopening of the question at a later stage of litigation." Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 65 Haw. 641 , 652 n. 9, 658 P.2d 287 , 297 n. 9 (1982) (quoting Glover v. Fong, 42 Haw. 560, 578 (1958)), reconsideration denied, 66 Haw. 528 , 726 P.2d 1133 (1983).

2025See State v. Kekuewa, 114 Hawai‘i 411, 419, 163 P.3d 1148, 1156 (2007) (“ While 37 *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** ‘there is no necessity or sound legal reason to perpetuate an error under the doctrine of stare decisis’ . . . a court should ‘not depart from the doctrine of stare decisis without some compelling justification.’”).

2025See State v. Kekuewa, 114 Hawai‘i 411, 419, 163 P.3d 1148, 1156 (2007) (“ While 37 *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** ‘there is no necessity or sound legal reason to perpetuate an error under the doctrine of stare decisis’ . . . a court should ‘not depart from the doctrine of stare decisis without some compelling justification.’”).

2010Here, as in Sinagoga , the sentencing court’s consideration of the “kinds of sentences [that were] available,” HRS § 706-606(3), in this ease “was implicit in the court’s [ultimately imposed] sentence of incarceration.” Sinagoga, 81 Hawai'i at 428 , 918 P.2d at 235 ; see also State v. Lau, 73 Haw. 259, 260 , 831 P.2d 523, 523 (1992) (reasonably inferring from a review of the record that the sentencing court did consider the sentencing alternatives). 3 Thus, the absence of the sentencing court’s explicit statement that it considered all sentencing options, including the option plainly provided

2010Here, as in Sinagoga , the sentencing court’s consideration of the “kinds of sentences [that were] available,” HRS § 706-606(3), in this ease “was implicit in the court’s [ultimately imposed] sentence of incarceration.” Sinagoga, 81 Hawai'i at 428 , 918 P.2d at 235 ; see also State v. Lau, 73 Haw. 259, 260 , 831 P.2d 523, 523 (1992) (reasonably inferring from a review of the record that the sentencing court did consider the sentencing alternatives). 3 Thus, the absence of the sentencing court’s explicit statement that it considered all sentencing options, including the option plainly provided

2010Here, as in Sinagoga , the sentencing court’s consideration of the “kinds of sentences [that were] available,” HRS § 706-606(3), in this ease “was implicit in the court’s [ultimately imposed] sentence of incarceration.” Sinagoga, 81 Hawai'i at 428 , 918 P.2d at 235 ; see also State v. Lau, 73 Haw. 259, 260 , 831 P.2d 523, 523 (1992) (reasonably inferring from a review of the record that the sentencing court did consider the sentencing alternatives). 3 Thus, the absence of the sentencing court’s explicit statement that it considered all sentencing options, including the option plainly provided

2010Here, as in Sinagoga , the sentencing court’s consideration of the “kinds of sentences [that were] available,” HRS § 706-606(3), in this ease “was implicit in the court’s [ultimately imposed] sentence of incarceration.” Sinagoga, 81 Hawai'i at 428 , 918 P.2d at 235 ; see also State v. Lau, 73 Haw. 259, 260 , 831 P.2d 523, 523 (1992) (reasonably inferring from a review of the record that the sentencing court did consider the sentencing alternatives). 3 Thus, the absence of the sentencing court’s explicit statement that it considered all sentencing options, including the option plainly provided

2010Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 311-12 , 103 S.Ct. 3001 , 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983) (Burger, C.J., dissenting, joined by White, Rehnquist, and O’Connor, JJ.) (quoting City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 , 103 S.Ct. 2481, 2487 , 76 L.Ed.2d 687 (1983)) (emphases added).

2010Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 311-12 , 103 S.Ct. 3001 , 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983) (Burger, C.J., dissenting, joined by White, Rehnquist, and O’Connor, JJ.) (quoting City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 , 103 S.Ct. 2481, 2487 , 76 L.Ed.2d 687 (1983)) (emphases added).

2008See State v. Brantley, 99 Hawai`i 463, 479, 56 P.3d 1252, 1268 (2002) (Acoba, J., dissenting) ("[S]tare decisis ensures that the law will not merely change erratically and permits society to presume that bedrock principles are founded in the law rather than in the proclivities of individuals." (Quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 , 109 S.Ct. 2363 , 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989) (citations and quotation marks omitted).)).

2008See State v. Brantley, 99 Hawai`i 463, 479, 56 P.3d 1252, 1268 (2002) (Acoba, J., dissenting) ("[S]tare decisis ensures that the law will not merely change erratically and permits society to presume that bedrock principles are founded in the law rather than in the proclivities of individuals." (Quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 , 109 S.Ct. 2363 , 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989) (citations and quotation marks omitted).)).

2004He authored the opinion of the court in State v. Haanio, 94 Hawai'i 405, 413-14 , 16 P.3d 246, 254-55 (2001), in which this court, sua sponte, exploited its disagreement with the interpretation of the Intermediate Court of Appeals of the rule set out in State v. Kupau, 76 Hawai'i 387 , 879 P.2d 492 (1994), in order to create an "opportunity to reexamine" the Kupau rule and to overrule it.

2004He authored the opinion of the court in State v. Haanio, 94 Hawai'i 405, 413-14 , 16 P.3d 246, 254-55 (2001), in which this court, sua sponte, exploited its disagreement with the interpretation of the Intermediate Court of Appeals of the rule set out in State v. Kupau, 76 Hawai'i 387 , 879 P.2d 492 (1994), in order to create an "opportunity to reexamine" the Kupau rule and to overrule it.

2002See also People v. Haynes, 61 Cal. App.4th 1282 , 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 143, 153 (1998) ("[T]he doctrine of stare decisis compels lower court tribunals to follow the Supreme Court whatever reason the intermediate tribunals might have for not wishing to do so.").

2002See also People v. Haynes, 61 Cal. App.4th 1282 , 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 143, 153 (1998) ("[T]he doctrine of stare decisis compels lower court tribunals to follow the Supreme Court whatever reason the intermediate tribunals might have for not wishing to do so.").

1973If there is a contention in an action between strangers to the record that a principle for which a prior decision stands is erroneous, operates unjustly or against public interest, or is otherwise objectionable, and such contention is well taken, the court which rendered the decision may overrule it. * * * When a decision is overruled, it does not mean that the adjudication of the rights and obligations of the parties to the record is nullified; it only means that the legal principle contained in the decision will not be applied in the determination of a cause of action or issue in an action b

1973If there is a contention in an action between strangers to the record that a principle for which a prior decision stands is erroneous, operates unjustly or against public interest, or is otherwise objectionable, and such contention is well taken, the court which rendered the decision may overrule it. * * * When a decision is overruled, it does not mean that the adjudication of the rights and obligations of the parties to the record is nullified; it only means that the legal principle contained in the decision will not be applied in the determination of a cause of action or issue in an action b