stare decisis doctrine in Louisiana

1993In Hilton v. South Carolina Public Railways Commission, — U.S. -, -, 112 S.Ct. 560, 566 , 116 L.Ed.2d 560 (1991), the Court held that the doctrine of stare decisis, applied to a “longstanding statutory construction implicating important reliance interests”, prevailed over the “clear statement rule.” Applying the doctrine of stare decisis, the Court held that an employee of a state-owned railroad could bring an action against his employer under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA) in state court.

1993In Hilton v. South Carolina Public Railways Commission, — U.S. -, -, 112 S.Ct. 560, 566 , 116 L.Ed.2d 560 (1991), the Court held that the doctrine of stare decisis, applied to a “longstanding statutory construction implicating important reliance interests”, prevailed over the “clear statement rule.” Applying the doctrine of stare decisis, the Court held that an employee of a state-owned railroad could bring an action against his employer under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA) in state court.

1993The “longstanding statutory construction” which the Court relied upon stemmed from the then 28 year old case of Parden v. Terminal Railway of Alabama Docks, 377 U.S. 184 , 84 S.Ct. 1207 , 12 L.Ed.2d 233 (1964) (overruled in part by Welch, supra.), which held that when Congress enacted FELA, using the phrase “every common carrier by railroad” to describe the class of employers subject to its terms, it intended to include state-owned railroads.

1993The “longstanding statutory construction” which the Court relied upon stemmed from the then 28 year old case of Parden v. Terminal Railway of Alabama Docks, 377 U.S. 184 , 84 S.Ct. 1207 , 12 L.Ed.2d 233 (1964) (overruled in part by Welch, supra.), which held that when Congress enacted FELA, using the phrase “every common carrier by railroad” to describe the class of employers subject to its terms, it intended to include state-owned railroads.

2005Id. [17] Although Louisiana has never adopted the common law doctrine of stare decisis, it has followed the civilian doctrine of jurisprudence constante.

1981It is ironic that the common law sources upon which the court in Kline v. Eubanks, 109 La. 241 , 33 So. 211 (1902), relied have since been overruled in those states despite the stare decisis principle which prevails here and that we are the sole, or practically sole follower of the original jurisprudence that there is no such cause of action, even though we say that stare decisis does not control our decisions.

1981It is ironic that the common law sources upon which the court in Kline v. Eubanks, 109 La. 241 , 33 So. 211 (1902), relied have since been overruled in those states despite the stare decisis principle which prevails here and that we are the sole, or practically sole follower of the original jurisprudence that there is no such cause of action, even though we say that stare decisis does not control our decisions.

1958For this reason, where the decision of a tribunal is subject to review by one having superior authority over it for that purpose or the question determined may be passed upon by such tribunal in another case, the doctrine of stare decisis does not apply with full force until the same questions have been determined by the court of last resort. * * ” See also Calhoun Gold Mining Company v. Ajax Gold Mining Company, 27 Colo. 1 , 59 P. 607 , 50 L.R.A. 209 and Posados v. Warner Barnes and Company, 279 U.S. 340 , 49 S.Ct. 333 , 73 L.Ed. 729 .

1958For this reason, where the decision of a tribunal is subject to review by one having superior authority over it for that purpose or the question determined may be passed upon by such tribunal in another case, the doctrine of stare decisis does not apply with full force until the same questions have been determined by the court of last resort. * * ” See also Calhoun Gold Mining Company v. Ajax Gold Mining Company, 27 Colo. 1 , 59 P. 607 , 50 L.R.A. 209 and Posados v. Warner Barnes and Company, 279 U.S. 340 , 49 S.Ct. 333 , 73 L.Ed. 729 .

1958For this reason, where the decision of a tribunal is subject to review by one having superior authority over it for that purpose or the question determined may be passed upon by such tribunal in another case, the doctrine of stare decisis does not apply with full force until the same questions have been determined by the court of last resort. * *" See also Calhoun Gold Mining Company v. Ajax Gold Mining Company, 27 Colo. 1 , 59 P. 607 , 50 L.R.A. 209 and Posados v. Warner Barnes and Company, 279 U.S. 340 , 49 S.Ct. 333 , 73 L.Ed. 729 .

1958For this reason, where the decision of a tribunal is subject to review by one having superior authority over it for that purpose or the question determined may be passed upon by such tribunal in another case, the doctrine of stare decisis does not apply with full force until the same questions have been determined by the court of last resort. * * ” See also Calhoun Gold Mining Company v. Ajax Gold Mining Company, 27 Colo. 1 , 59 P. 607 , 50 L.R.A. 209 and Posados v. Warner Barnes and Company, 279 U.S. 340 , 49 S.Ct. 333 , 73 L.Ed. 729 .

1958While appearing to be obiter dicta, a somewhat similar doctrine is set forth in Allen v. State Board of Veterinarians, 72 R.I. 372 , 52 A.2d 131, 133 , decided by the Supreme Court of Rhode Island in 1947.

1958While appearing to be obiter dicta, a somewhat similar doctrine is set forth in Allen v. State Board of Veterinarians, 72 R.I. 372 , 52 A.2d 131, 133 , decided by the Supreme Court of Rhode Island in 1947.

1936It stands as a solemn adjudication by this court after such discussion and deliberation. * * * There is every reason why the doctrine of stare decisis *841 should apply; and so far at least as respects this commonwealth the case must be held as settling the correctness of the principle upon which the decision was based.” It is said in the prevailing opinion in this case that the majority opinion in the Erwin Case expressly overruled “the doctrine announced in the case of New Orleans Land Co. v. Board of Levee Commissioners of Orleans Levee District, 171 La. 718 , 132 So. 121 ,” and “that the c

1936It stands as a solemn adjudication by this court after such discussion and deliberation. * * * There is every reason why the doctrine of stare decisis *841 should apply; and so far at least as respects this commonwealth the case must be held as settling the correctness of the principle upon which the decision was based.” It is said in the prevailing opinion in this case that the majority opinion in the Erwin Case expressly overruled “the doctrine announced in the case of New Orleans Land Co. v. Board of Levee Commissioners of Orleans Levee District, 171 La. 718 , 132 So. 121 ,” and “that the c

1936The district judge found that conditions surrounding Grand Lake and Calcasieu Lake “are similar, though not identical.” Counsel for the plaintiff contend that under the doctrine of State v. Erwin, 173 La. 507 , 138 So. 84 , the land in question belongs to the riparian owner, or plaintiff; that even though the decision of the court in that case is erroneous and was rendered by a divided court, the rule announced therein is binding on this court under the doctrine of stare decisis, because the decision established a rule of property; and that this is particularly true, because an interpretation

1936The district judge found that conditions surrounding Grand Lake and Calcasieu Lake “are similar, though not identical.” Counsel for the plaintiff contend that under the doctrine of State v. Erwin, 173 La. 507 , 138 So. 84 , the land in question belongs to the riparian owner, or plaintiff; that even though the decision of the court in that case is erroneous and was rendered by a divided court, the rule announced therein is binding on this court under the doctrine of stare decisis, because the decision established a rule of property; and that this is particularly true, because an interpretation

1917Ann. 979 , Fruge v. Fulton, 120 La. 750 , 45 South. 595 , and Cunningham v. Steidman, 133 La. 44 , 62 South. 346 , to the effect that the claim of homestead exemption comes too late when asserted after the sale of the property under judicial process, and invokes the doctrine of stare decisis.

1917Ann. 979 , Fruge v. Fulton, 120 La. 750 , 45 South. 595 , and Cunningham v. Steidman, 133 La. 44 , 62 South. 346 , to the effect that the claim of homestead exemption comes too late when asserted after the sale of the property under judicial process, and invokes the doctrine of stare decisis.

1917Ann. 979 , Fruge v. Fulton, 120 La. 750 , 45 South. 595 , and Cunningham v. Steidman, 133 La. 44 , 62 South. 346 , to the effect that the claim of homestead exemption comes too late when asserted after the sale of the property under judicial process, and invokes the doctrine of stare decisis.

1917Ann. 979 , Fruge v. Fulton, 120 La. 750 , 45 South. 595 , and Cunningham v. Steidman, 133 La. 44 , 62 South. 346 , to the effect that the claim of homestead exemption comes too late when asserted after the sale of the property under judicial process, and invokes the doctrine of stare decisis.

1892Morgan, 3 La. 342 , from which counsel draws the conclusion that the later decisions are clearly erroneous and evidently founded on what he terms an obiter dictum of the court, expressed in State vs.