30 Indiana opinions name it 3 courts 1921–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Marsillett v. Stategreen2 sentences2016Importantly, the doctrine of stare decisis requires that we apply “a principle of law which has been firmly established.” Snyder v. King et al., 958 N.E.2d 764, 776 (Ind.2011) (quoting Marsillett v. State, 495 N.E.2d 699, 704 (Ind.1986)). 2015The doctrine of stare decisis requires that we apply “a principle of law which has been firmly established.” Marsillett v. State, 495 N.E.2d 699, 704 (Ind. 1986). | 8 | 9 |
Snyder v. Kinggreen2 sentences2016That refusal simply reflects this Court’s commitment to the doctrine of stare decisis — that “a rule which has been deliberately declared should not be disturbed by the same court absent urgent reasons and a clear manifestation of error.” Clifton v. McCammack, 43 N.E.3d 213, 220 (Ind.2015) (quoting Snyder v. King, 958 N.E.2d 764, 776 (Ind. 2011)). 2016Importantly, the doctrine of stare decisis requires that we apply “a principle of law which has been firmly established.” Snyder v. King et al., 958 N.E.2d 764, 776 (Ind.2011) (quoting Marsillett v. State, 495 N.E.2d 699, 704 (Ind.1986)). | 3 | 3 |
Dailey v. Pughgreen2 sentences1961In the case of Daily v. Pugh (1925), 83 Ind. App. 431 , 131 N. E. 836 , the court in approving the rule an *448 nounced in the case of Avery v. Vail, supra, said in part: “. . . if the argument made and the authorities cited by appellants convinced us that the construction, of said §2994, supra, for which they contend was sustained by the better reason and the greater weight of authority, we would feel impelled nevertheless, to adhere to the construction placed on the same by this court in the case of Avery v. Vail, supra, by reason of the doctrine of stare decisis, so often declared and appli 1961In the case of Daily v. Pugh (1925), 83 Ind. App. 431 , 131 N. E. 836 , the court in approving the rule an *448 nounced in the case of Avery v. Vail, supra, said in part: “. . . if the argument made and the authorities cited by appellants convinced us that the construction, of said §2994, supra, for which they contend was sustained by the better reason and the greater weight of authority, we would feel impelled nevertheless, to adhere to the construction placed on the same by this court in the case of Avery v. Vail, supra, by reason of the doctrine of stare decisis, so often declared and appli | 1 | 3 |
Lincoln Utilities, Inc. v. Office of Utility Consumer Counselorgreen2 sentences2001Id. 1997Lincoln Utilities, Inc. v. Office of Utility Consumer Counselor, 661 N.E.2d 562, 565 (Ind.Ct.App.1996), trans. denied. | 1 | 2 |
Halteman Swim Club v. Duguidgreen1 sentence2024Halteman Swim Club v. Duguid, 757 N.E.2d 1017, 1021 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). | 1 | 1 |
Willis v. Westerfieldgreen1 sentence2018See Willis , 839 N.E.2d at 1186 ; Compton , 561 N.E.2d at 807 . 6 See, e.g. , Estate of Dyer v. Doyle , 870 N.E.2d 573 , 584 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (holding giving of sudden emergency instruction reversible error where trial court also erroneously allowed evidence of "faked left syndrome" upon which alleged emergency was based), trans. denied . | 1 | 1 |
Horn v. Hendricksongreen1 sentence2016Stare decisis “is a maxim of judicial restraint supported by compelling policy reasons of predictability that we should .be reluctant to disturb long-standing precedent, and a rule which has been deliberately declared should not be disturbed by the same court absent urgent reasons and a clear manifestation of error.” Id. (citation and internal quotations omitted). [17] Moreover, “it is not this court’s role to reconsider or declare invalid decisions of our supreme court.” Horn v. Hendrickson, 824 N.E.2d 690, 694 (Ind.Ct.App.2005). | 1 | 1 |
Emerson v. Stategreen1 sentence2016See Emerson v. State, 812 N.E.2d 1090, 1099 (Ind.Ct.App.2004) (explaining that “[t]he doctrine of stare decisis states that, when a court has once laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain set of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases where the facts are substantially the same”); C. | 1 | 1 |
Ray Clifton v. Ruby McCammackgreen1 sentence2016That refusal simply reflects this Court’s commitment to the doctrine of stare decisis — that “a rule which has been deliberately declared should not be disturbed by the same court absent urgent reasons and a clear manifestation of error.” Clifton v. McCammack, 43 N.E.3d 213, 220 (Ind.2015) (quoting Snyder v. King, 958 N.E.2d 764, 776 (Ind. 2011)). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Petitions to Transfer Appeals From Appellate Court to Supreme Courtgreen2 sentences2009In re Petition to Transfer Appeals, 202 Ind. 365 , 174 N.E. 812, 817 (1931). 2009In re Petition to Transfer Appeals, 202 Ind. 365 , 174 N.E. 812, 817 (1931). | 1 | 1 |
Nelson v. Parkergreen2 sentences1999Nevertheless, we find it appropriate to address our view on Aafco as it relates to the future of defamation law in Indiana. [8] See Nelson v. Parker, 687 N.E.2d 187, 190 (Ind. 1997) (recognizing the importance of settled rules in property law and that stability is desirable to predict outcomes); Marsillett v. State, 495 N.E.2d 699, 704 (Ind.1986) ("Under the doctrine of stare decisis, this Court adheres to a principle of law which has been firmly established. 1999See Nelson v. Parker, 687 N.E.2d 187, 190 (Ind. 1997) (recognizing the importance of settled rules in property law and that stability is desirable to predict outcomes); Marsillett v. State, 495 N.E.2d 699, 704 (Ind. 1986) ("Under the doctrine of stare decisis, this Court adheres to a principle of law which has been firmly established. | 1 | 1 |
Alwood v. Davisgreen2 sentences1997Indeed, over a decade ago, a panel of this court considered the large number of plaintiffs left without a remedy under the occurrence-based *1027 statute of limitations and said, "[w]e have not though, ruled out the possibility of deciding in a future case that this occurrence rule must be applied as though it was a discovery rule due to the questionable constitutionality of the occurrence rule." Alwood v. Davis, 411 N.E.2d 759, 761 (Ind.Ct. 1997Indeed, over a decade ago, a panel of this court considered the large number of plaintiffs left without a remedy under the occur rence-based statute of limitations and said, “[w]e have not though, ruled out the possibility of deciding in a future case that this occurrence rule must be applied as though it was a discovery rule due to the questionable constitutionality of the occurrence rule.” Atwood v. Davis, 411 N.E.2d 759, 761 (Ind.Ct. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Mileffgreen1 sentence1997See State v. Mileff, 520 N.E.2d 123, 126 (Ind.Ct.App.1988) (holding that pursuant to the doctrine of stare decisis, “when a court has once laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain set of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases where the facts are substantially the same”). | 1 | 1 |
Spier Ex Rel. Spier v. City of Plymouthgreen1 sentence1996Spier by Spier v. City of Plymouth, 593 N.E.2d 1255, 1261 (Ind.Ct.App.1992), Dailey v. Pugh, 83 Ind.App. 431, 437 , 131 N.E. 836, 838 (1921). | 1 | 1 |
Thacker v. Butlergreen1 sentence1971Thacker et al. v. Butler, Admr., et al. (1963), 134 Ind. App, 376, 184 N. E. 2d 894 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Martin Rispens & Son v. Hall Farms, Inc.
red
2 sentences2001Both Martin Rispens & Son v. Hall Farms, Inc., 621 N.E.2d 1078 (Ind. 1993), and Reed v. Central Soya Co., Inc., 621 N.E.2d 1069 (Ind.1993), compel the outcome in this case. 2001Because of the doctrine of stare decisis, I concur in the result reached by the majority. *492 Both Martin Rispens & Son v. Hall Farms, Inc., 621 N.E.2d 1078 (Ind. 1993), and Reed v. Central Soya Co., Inc., 621 N.E.2d 1069 (Ind.1993), compel the outcome in this case. | 2 | 2001–2001 |
Reed v. Central Soya Co., Inc.
green
2 sentences2001Both Martin Rispens & Son v. Hall Farms, Inc., 621 N.E.2d 1078 (Ind. 1993), and Reed v. Central Soya Co., Inc., 621 N.E.2d 1069 (Ind.1993), compel the outcome in this case. 2001Because of the doctrine of stare decisis, I concur in the result reached by the majority. *492 Both Martin Rispens & Son v. Hall Farms, Inc., 621 N.E.2d 1078 (Ind. 1993), and Reed v. Central Soya Co., Inc., 621 N.E.2d 1069 (Ind.1993), compel the outcome in this case. | 2 | 2001–2001 |
Compton v. Pletch
green
1 sentence2018See Willis , 839 N.E.2d at 1186 ; Compton , 561 N.E.2d at 807 . 6 See, e.g. , Estate of Dyer v. Doyle , 870 N.E.2d 573 , 584 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (holding giving of sudden emergency instruction reversible error where trial court also erroneously allowed evidence of "faked left syndrome" upon which alleged emergency was based), trans. denied . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Estate of Dyer v. Doyle
green
1 sentence2018See Willis , 839 N.E.2d at 1186 ; Compton , 561 N.E.2d at 807 . 6 See, e.g. , Estate of Dyer v. Doyle , 870 N.E.2d 573 , 584 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (holding giving of sudden emergency instruction reversible error where trial court also erroneously allowed evidence of "faked left syndrome" upon which alleged emergency was based), trans. denied . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Aafco Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Publications, Inc.
green
1 sentence1999Important policy considerations militate in favor of continuity and predictability in the law."). [9] See Aafco, 321 N.E.2d at 588-89 . | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Hadley v. State
green
1 sentence1996Although we feel compelled, by the doctrine of stare decisis, to follow our decision in Hadley, 636 N.E.2d 173 , we believe that the better practice would be for a trial court’s record to affirmatively reflect that a defendant has read and understood the “Initial Hearing Rights” form. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Lottie v. State
green
2 sentences1996Lottie v. State, 273 Ind. 529 , 406 N.E.2d 632 (Ind.1980), reh’g denied. 28.Hearsay message Over objection, the trial court admitted a written message penned by the victim Blosl as night shift manager. 1996Lottie v. State, 273 Ind. 529 , 406 N.E.2d 632 (Ind.1980), reh’g denied. 28.Hearsay message Over objection, the trial court admitted a written message penned by the victim Blosl as night shift manager. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Citizens Gas and Coke Utility v. Sloan
green
1 sentence1970Appellants do recognize the existence of three Indiana cases which have interpreted the applicable statutes since the 1933 amendment, Wilkins v. Leeds, 216 Ind. 508 , 25 N. E. 2d 442 (1940); City of Crown Point, *376 etc. v. Henderlong, et al., 137 Ind. App. 662 , 206 N. E. 2d 890 (1965), (Transfer denied); Citizens Gas and Coke Utility v. Sloan, supra. Appellants urge, however, that we ignore precedent, the doctrine of stare decisis, and accept their interpretation rather than those opinions which they assert are “arbitrarily stated” and “without supporting reasoning.” Acts 1957, ch. 313, § 1 | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Wilkins v. Leeds
green
2 sentences1970Appellants do recognize the existence of three Indiana cases which have interpreted the applicable statutes since the 1933 amendment, Wilkins v. Leeds, 216 Ind. 508 , 25 N. E. 2d 442 (1940); City of Crown Point, *376 etc. v. Henderlong, et al., 137 Ind. App. 662 , 206 N. E. 2d 890 (1965), (Transfer denied); Citizens Gas and Coke Utility v. Sloan, supra. Appellants urge, however, that we ignore precedent, the doctrine of stare decisis, and accept their interpretation rather than those opinions which they assert are “arbitrarily stated” and “without supporting reasoning.” Acts 1957, ch. 313, § 1 1970Appellants do recognize the existence of three Indiana cases which have interpreted the applicable statutes since the 1933 amendment, Wilkins v. Leeds, 216 Ind. 508 , 25 N. E. 2d 442 (1940); City of Crown Point, *376 etc. v. Henderlong, et al., 137 Ind. App. 662 , 206 N. E. 2d 890 (1965), (Transfer denied); Citizens Gas and Coke Utility v. Sloan, supra. Appellants urge, however, that we ignore precedent, the doctrine of stare decisis, and accept their interpretation rather than those opinions which they assert are “arbitrarily stated” and “without supporting reasoning.” Acts 1957, ch. 313, § 1 | 1 | 1970–1970 |
City of Crown Point v. Henderlong Lumber Co.
green
2 sentences1970Appellants do recognize the existence of three Indiana cases which have interpreted the applicable statutes since the 1933 amendment, Wilkins v. Leeds, 216 Ind. 508 , 25 N. E. 2d 442 (1940); City of Crown Point, *376 etc. v. Henderlong, et al., 137 Ind. App. 662 , 206 N. E. 2d 890 (1965), (Transfer denied); Citizens Gas and Coke Utility v. Sloan, supra. Appellants urge, however, that we ignore precedent, the doctrine of stare decisis, and accept their interpretation rather than those opinions which they assert are “arbitrarily stated” and “without supporting reasoning.” Acts 1957, ch. 313, § 1 1970Appellants do recognize the existence of three Indiana cases which have interpreted the applicable statutes since the 1933 amendment, Wilkins v. Leeds, 216 Ind. 508 , 25 N. E. 2d 442 (1940); City of Crown Point, *376 etc. v. Henderlong, et al., 137 Ind. App. 662 , 206 N. E. 2d 890 (1965), (Transfer denied); Citizens Gas and Coke Utility v. Sloan, supra. Appellants urge, however, that we ignore precedent, the doctrine of stare decisis, and accept their interpretation rather than those opinions which they assert are “arbitrarily stated” and “without supporting reasoning.” Acts 1957, ch. 313, § 1 | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Branham v. Lange
green
1 sentence1948If the appellants performed services for the State of Indiana under a contract of employment, which contract was not in violation of Section 1 of Article 3, as that instrument was construed in the case of Branham v. Lange, Auditor, etc. (1861), 16 Ind. 497 , then the construction placed on that section of the Constitution of Indiana by the majority opinion in this case, could not be held to impair such contractual rights. | 1 | 1948–1948 |
Harrow v. Myers
green
1 sentence1945Harrow v. Myers (1868), 29 Ind. 469 ; Dailey v. Pugh (1921), 83 Ind. App. 431 , 131 N. E. 836 ; Stewart v. Wells (1911), 47 Ind. App. 228 , 94 N. E. 235 . | 1 | 1945–1945 |
Stewart v. Wells
neutral
2 sentences1945Harrow v. Myers (1868), 29 Ind. 469 ; Dailey v. Pugh (1921), 83 Ind. App. 431 , 131 N. E. 836 ; Stewart v. Wells (1911), 47 Ind. App. 228 , 94 N. E. 235 . 1945Harrow v. Myers (1868), 29 Ind. 469 ; Dailey v. Pugh (1921), 83 Ind. App. 431 , 131 N. E. 836 ; Stewart v. Wells (1911), 47 Ind. App. 228 , 94 N. E. 235 . | 1 | 1945–1945 |
Willis v. Moore
neutral
1 sentence1944In Willis & Turner v. Moore & Davis (1924), 151 Tenn. 562 , 271 S. W. 736 , the court conceded that the precise question before it, one of practice, had not been directly decided but nevertheless said that the principles underlying the doctrine of stare decisis “would seem to war *410 rant the extension thereof to a construction which, although not directly decided, has been recognized by acquiescence and uniform adoption and practice over many years.” This court has applied the same rule with respect to another statute in Stout v. Board of Commissioners of Grant County (1886), 107 Ind. 343 , | 1 | 1944–1944 |
| Stout v. Board of Commissioners green | 1 | 1944–1944 |
Board of Commissioners v. Conner
green
2 sentences1944In Willis & Turner v. Moore & Davis (1924), 151 Tenn. 562 , 271 S. W. 736 , the court conceded that the precise question before it, one of practice, had not been directly decided but nevertheless said that the principles underlying the doctrine of stare decisis “would seem to war *410 rant the extension thereof to a construction which, although not directly decided, has been recognized by acquiescence and uniform adoption and practice over many years.” This court has applied the same rule with respect to another statute in Stout v. Board of Commissioners of Grant County (1886), 107 Ind. 343 , 1944In Willis & Turner v. Moore & Davis (1924), 151 Tenn. 562 , 271 S. W. 736 , the court conceded that the precise question before it, one of practice, had not been directly decided but nevertheless said that the principles underlying the doctrine of stare decisis “would seem to war *410 rant the extension thereof to a construction which, although not directly decided, has been recognized by acquiescence and uniform adoption and practice over many years.” This court has applied the same rule with respect to another statute in Stout v. Board of Commissioners of Grant County (1886), 107 Ind. 343 , | 1 | 1944–1944 |
| Hines v. Driver neutral | 1 | 1921–1921 |
| Pond v. Irwin green | 1 | 1921–1921 |
| Legler v. Paine green | 1 | 1921–1921 |
| Diamond Plate Glass Co. v. Knote neutral | 1 | 1921–1921 |
| Kinney v. Heuring neutral | 1 | 1921–1921 |
| Avery v. Vail neutral | 1 | 1921–1921 |
| Oliver Co. v. Louisville Realty Co. green | 1 | 1921–1921 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.