stare decisis doctrine in Texas

2020As a general rule the determination of a disputed issue of fact is not conclusive, under the doctrine of stare decisis, when the same issue later arises in another case between persons who are strangers to the record in the first suit. 374 S.W.2d 871, 875 (Tex. 1964). 82 In Lubbock County v. Trammel’s Lubbock Bail Bonds, the supreme court denied the intermediate courts the authority to disregard its precedent concerning when a cause of action accrues: It is not the function of a court of appeals to abrogate or modify established precedent.

2020But the language in article 11.25 is the same as when Baltimore was decided, and the Court of Criminal Appeals has never revisited the Baltimore decision. “[U]nder the doctrine of stare decisis[,] once ‘the highest court of the State having jurisdiction’ of a matter decides a ‘principle, rule or proposition of law,’ that court and all ‘other courts of lower rank’ must accept the decision as ‘binding precedent.’” Romero v. State, 331 S.W.3d 82, 86 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. ref’d) (Seymore, J., concurring) (quoting Swilley v. McCain, 374 S.W.2d 871, 875 (Tex. 1964) (emphasis add

2016Id. at 416 (citing Lubbock County, Tex. v. Trammel’s Lubbock Bail Bonds, 80 S.W.3d 580, 585 (Tex. 2002)). 10 Accordingly, to the extent'that TDFPS is requesting that we reconsider Fernandez and our decisions in Parra and Beltran, we decline to do so.

2012Lubbock County, Texas v. Trammel’s Lubbock Bail Bonds, 80 S.W.3d 580, 585 (Tex.2002).

2015See Weiner v. Wasson, 900 S.W.2d 316, 320 (Tex.1995) (“Generally, we adhere to our precedents for reasons of efficiency, fairness, and le *289 gitimacy.”); Gutierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312, 317 (Tex.1979) (doctrine of stare decisis “creates a strong presumption in favor of the established law”).

2015See Weiner v. Wasson, 900 S.W.2d 316, 320 (Tex. 1995) (“Generally, we adhere to our precedents for reasons of efficiency, fairness, and legitimacy.”); Gutierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312, 317 (Tex. 1979) (doctrine of stare decisis “creates a strong presumption in favor of the established law”).

2022App. 2019) (quoting Paulson v. State, 28 S.W.3d 570, 571 (Tex. Crim.

2019DISCUSSION Under the doctrine of stare decisis, courts should follow clearly established precedent on matters of law in order to “promote judicial efficiency and consistency, encourage reliance on judicial decisions, and contribute to the integrity of the judicial process.” Paulson v. State, 28 S.W.3d 570, 571 (Tex. Crim.

2015See Weiner v. Wasson, 900 S.W.2d 316, 320 (Tex.1995) (“Generally, we adhere to our precedents for reasons of efficiency, fairness, and le *289 gitimacy.”); Gutierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312, 317 (Tex.1979) (doctrine of stare decisis “creates a strong presumption in favor of the established law”).

2015See Weiner v. Wasson, 900 S.W.2d 316, 320 (Tex. 1995) (“Generally, we adhere to our precedents for reasons of efficiency, fairness, and legitimacy.”); Gutierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312, 317 (Tex. 1979) (doctrine of stare decisis “creates a strong presumption in favor of the established law”).

2004See Grapevine Excavation, Inc. v. Maryland Lloyds, 35 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tex.2000) ("Adhering to precedent fosters efficiency, fairness, and legitimacy.").

2004See Grapevine Excavation, Inc. v. Maryland Lloyds , 35 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tex. 2000) (“Adhering to precedent fosters efficiency, fairness, and legitimacy.”).

2003Under the doctrine of stare decisis , we are bound by our own precedent “unless the strongest reasons exist for changing it.” Messina v. State , 904 S.W.2d 178, 181 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1995, no pet.) Because Appellant has not articulated any such reasons, we continue to follow Lopez , Anderson , and Alvarez .

2003Under the doctrine of stare decisis , we are bound by our own precedent "unless the strongest reasons exist for changing it." Messina v. State , 904 S.W.2d 178, 181 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1995, no pet.) Because Appellant has not articulated any such reasons, we continue to follow Lopez , Anderson , and Alvarez .

2016Therefore, as we recognized in Texas Dept. of Aging & Disability Servs. v. Bel *658 tran, 350 S.W.3d 410 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2011, pet. denied), the Supreme Court has already spoken on this issue not onee, but twice, and “[ujnder the doctrine of stare decisis, it is not our function to abrogate or modify established precedent,” as that function lies solely with the Texas Supreme Court.

2012Having considered these same arguments, we also determine that Fernandez remains good law which binds this Court.3 See Beltran, 350 S.W.3d at 416 (“Under the doctrine of stare decisis, it is not our function to abrogate or modify established precedent. . . .

2019See Abbott v. City of L.A., 326 P.2d 484 , 494–95 (Cal. 1958) (en banc) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Friendswood Dev., 576 S.W.2d at 29 (“The doctrine of [s]tare decisis has been and should be strictly followed by this Court in cases involving established rules of property rights.”); Southland Royalty Co. v. Humble Oil & Ref.

2015Indus., Inc., 576 S.W.2d 21, 29 (Tex.1978) (stating that “[t]he doctrine of stare decisis has been and should be strictly followed by this Court in cases involving established rules of property rights,” but giving effect to subsequent changes in legislative policy); see also Southland Royalty Co. v. Humble Oil & Ref.

2015“Stare decisis has its greatest force in cases construing statutes, partly because our errors may be corrected by statutory amendments.” Fiess v. State Farm Lloyds, 202 S.W.3d 744, 749 (Tex.2006).

2015“Stare decisis has its greatest force in cases construing statutes, partly because our errors may be corrected by statutory amendments.” Fiess v. State Farm Lloyds, 202 S.W.3d 744, 749 (Tex. 2006).

2015It is well-settled Texas law that there is no constitutional or statutory authority permitting a direct appeal from an order granting or denying “shock probation” or from an order modifying or refusing to modify the conditions of “shock probation.” See, e.g., Houlihan v. State, 579 S.W.2d 213, 215-216 (Tex. Crim.

2015It is well-settled Texas law that there is no constitutional or statutory authority permitting a direct appeal from an order granting or denying “shock probation” or from an order modifying or refusing to modify the conditions of “shock probation.” See, e.g., Houlihan v. State, 579 S.W.2d 213, 215-216 (Tex. Crim.

2015The Court in McNatt v. State, 188 S.W.3d 198, 201 (Tex. Crim.

2015The Court in McNatt v. State, 188 S.W.3d 198, 201 (Tex. Crim.

2012That function lies solely with the Texas Supreme Court.”); Petco Animal Supplies, Inc. v. Schuster, 144 S.W.3d 554, 565 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, no pet.) (“As an intermediate court, we are not free to mold Texas law as we see fit but must instead follow the precedents of the Texas Supreme Court unless and until the high court overrules them or the Texas Legislature supersedes them by statute.”).

2012That function lies solely with the Texas Supreme Court."); Petco Animal Supplies, Inc. v. Schuster , 144 S.W.3d 554, 565 (Tex. App.--Austin 2004, no pet.) ("As an intermediate court, we are not free to mold Texas law as we see fit but must instead follow the precedents of the Texas Supreme Court unless and until the high court overrules them or the Texas Legislature supersedes them by statute.").

2005See McGlothlin v. State , 896 S.W.2d 183, 188-89 (Tex. Crim.

1998See McGlothlin v. State, 896 S.W.2d 183, 188-189 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 882 , 116 S.Ct. 219 , 133 L.Ed.2d 150 (1995); Wheatfall v. State, 882 S.W.2d 829, 843 (Tex.Crim.App.1994), ce rt. denied, 513 U.S. 1086 , 115 S.Ct. 742 , 130 L.Ed.2d 644 (1995); Garrett v. State, 851 S.W.2d 853, 862-863 (Tex.Crim.App.1993) (Campbell, J., dissenting). .

2003See also Vega v. State , 84 S.W.3d 613, 625 (Tex. Crim.

2003See also Vega v. State , 84 S.W.3d 613, 625 (Tex. Crim.

1999See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 , 112 S.Ct. 2791, 2808 , 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992) (doctrine of stare decisis is not an "inexorable command,” is not applicable in cases in which a prior judicial ruling should come to be seen so clearly as error that its enforcement is for that very reason doomed, and consideration of whether to apply the doctrine should be given to whether prior decision is subject to a type of reliance that would lend a special hardship to the consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation) (citations omitte

1999See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 , 112 S.Ct. 2791, 2808 , 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992) (doctrine of stare decisis is not an "inexorable command,” is not applicable in cases in which a prior judicial ruling should come to be seen so clearly as error that its enforcement is for that very reason doomed, and consideration of whether to apply the doctrine should be given to whether prior decision is subject to a type of reliance that would lend a special hardship to the consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation) (citations omitte

1994Ex parte Porter, 827 S.W.2d 324, 329 (Tex.Cr.App.1992) (Baird, J., dissenting); and, Richardson v. State, 879 S.W.2d 874, 885 (Tex.Cr.App.1993) (Baird, J., dissenting).

1992See, Ex Parte Porter, 827 S.W.2d 324 , 327 (Tex.Cr.App.1992) (Baird, J., dissenting).

2006For this reason, we are to adhere to settled rules of law “unless there exists the strongest reasons for chang[e].” Benavides, 290 S.W. at 740-41 .

1927The Commission of Appeals in Benavides v. Garcia, 290 S. W. 739 , speaking of the effect of a former opinion by the court of Civil Appeals ( 283 S. W. 611 ), in which the provisions of a will were construed, says: “This conclusion is not predicated upon any theory or rule of res adjudicata or estoppel whatever.- It is rather based upon the doctrine of stare decisis, which as a matter of public policy and sound legal administration requires the courts in the decision of cases to observe a proper respect for the prior decisions of the highest court.

2021See Texas Propane Gas Assn. v. City of Houston, 622 S.W.3d 791 , 806 (Tex. 2021) (Blacklock, J., concurring and dissenting) quoting City of Los Angeles, California v. Patel, 576 U.S. 409, 429-30 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Under the doctrine of stare decisis, that court’s reasoning—to the extent 6 that it is necessary to the holding—will, as a logical consequence of the opinion, effectively control outcomes in future cases raising similar legal questions.”) (internal quotes omitted, cleaned up).

2021City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 576 U.S. 409 , 429–30 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting).

2015Co., 151 Tex. 324 , 249 S.W.2d 914, 916 (1952) (stating that when this Court reviews property rights, previously established rules “should not be changed in the absence of other controlling circumstances, even though good reasons might be given for a different holding”) (quoting Tanton v. State Nat’l Bank of El Paso, 125 Tex. 16 , 79 S.W.2d 833, 834 (1935)); cf. Marcus Cable Assocs., L.P. v. Krohn, 90 S.W.3d 697, 702 (Tex.2002) (acknowledging “[t]he emphasis our law places upon ... important public policies by promoting certainty in land transactions”).

2015Co., 151 Tex. 324 , 249 S.W.2d 914, 916 (1952) (stating that when this Court reviews property rights, previously established rules “should not be changed in the absence of other controlling circumstances, even though good reasons might be given for a different holding”) (quoting Tanton v. State Nat’l Bank of El Paso, 125 Tex. 16 , 79 S.W.2d 833, 834 (1935)); cf. Marcus Cable Assocs., L.P. v. Krohn, 90 S.W.3d 697, 702 (Tex.2002) (acknowledging “[t]he emphasis our law places upon ... important public policies by promoting certainty in land transactions”).

2015Co., 151 Tex. 324 , 249 S.W.2d 914, 916 (1952) (stating that when this Court reviews property rights, previously established rules “should not be changed in the absence of other controlling circumstances, even though good reasons might be given for a different holding”) (quoting Tanton v. State Nat’l Bank of El Paso, 125 Tex. 16 , 79 S.W.2d 833, 834 (1935)); cf. Marcus Cable Assocs., L.P. v. Krohn, 90 S.W.3d 697, 702 (Tex.2002) (acknowledging “[t]he emphasis our law places upon ... important public policies by promoting certainty in land transactions”).

2015Co., 151 Tex. 324 , 249 S.W.2d 914, 916 (1952) (stating that when this Court reviews property rights, previously established rules “should not be changed in the absence of other controlling circumstances, even though good reasons might be given for a different holding”) (quoting Tanton v. State Nat’l Bank of El Paso, 125 Tex. 16 , 79 S.W.2d 833, 834 (1935)); cf. Marcus Cable Assocs., L.P. v. Krohn, 90 S.W.3d 697, 702 (Tex.2002) (acknowledging “[t]he emphasis our law places upon ... important public policies by promoting certainty in land transactions”).

1994Ex parte Porter, 827 S.W.2d 324, 329 (Tex.Cr.App.1992) (Baird, J., dissenting); and, Richardson v. State, 879 S.W.2d 874, 885 (Tex.Cr.App.1993) (Baird, J., dissenting).

1993Majority op., 879 S.W.2d at 884 . [4] In Gearheart v. State, 81 Tex.Crim. 540 , 197 S.W. 187, 188-189 (App.1917), we explained the doctrine of stare decisis: ... when a rule has been once deliberately adopted and declared and uniformly followed, it should not be abandoned except upon the most urgent reasons. [5] Even as appellant contended his disadvantage childhood warranted a penalty less than death, the State contended the same evidence required an affirmative answer to the second statutory punishment issue.