26 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1949–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Baxter v. Palmigianogreen2 sentences2007See, e.g., Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318 , 96 S.Ct. 1551 , 47 L.Ed.2d 810 (1976) ("[T]he Fifth Amendment does not forbid adverse inferences against parties to civil actions when they refuse to testify in response to probative evidence offered against them[.]”). 2007See, e.g., Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318 , 96 S.Ct. 1551 , 47 L.Ed.2d 810 (1976) ("[T]he Fifth Amendment does not forbid adverse inferences against parties to civil actions when they refuse to testify in response to probative evidence offered against them[.]”). | 2 | 2 |
Rose v. Palm Beach Cty.green2 sentences2013The invocation of the doctrine is most eompel- ling when the judicial function at issue is the safe-guarding of fundamental rights.” Maas v. Olive, 992 So.2d 196, 204 (Fla.2008) (Olive II) (quoting Rose, 361 So.2d at 137 ). 2008Rose, 361 So.2d at 137 (footnote omitted). | 1 | 2 |
Rodriguez v. Stategreen1 sentence2025See Rodgers v. State, 948 So. 2d 655, 663 (Fla. 2006) (stating that “a defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause apply to the guilt phase, the penalty phase, and sentencing”); Rodriguez v. State, 753 So. 2d 29, 43 (Fla. 2000) (stating the “uncontroverted proposition that the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation applies to all three phases of the capital trial”). | 1 | 1 |
Rodgers v. Stategreen1 sentence2025See Rodgers v. State, 948 So. 2d 655, 663 (Fla. 2006) (stating that “a defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause apply to the guilt phase, the penalty phase, and sentencing”); Rodriguez v. State, 753 So. 2d 29, 43 (Fla. 2000) (stating the “uncontroverted proposition that the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation applies to all three phases of the capital trial”). | 1 | 1 |
Kerben v. Intercontinental Bankgreen1 sentence2023See Aguila v. Frederic, 306 So. 3d 1166 , 1172 n.6 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020) (“While the order under review departs from the essential requirements of law, our ruling is not intended to divest the trial court of discretion to effect any other remedy to properly address the concerns involved with the invocation of the privilege against self- incrimination, including the decision to allow for adverse inferences.”); see also Kerben v. Intercontinental Bank, 573 So. 2d 976, 978 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991) (“When a plaintiff in a civil action invokes the Fifth Amendment privilege, courts often dismiss the plainti | 1 | 1 |
Rainerman v. EAGLE NAT. BANK OF MIAMIgreen1 sentence2015The litigant's assertion of the privilege must be supported by a showing sufficient for the trial court to determine that the litigant has “reasonable grounds to believe that direct answers to deposition ... questions would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prove a crime against him.” Rainerman v. Eagle Nat’l Bank, 541 So.2d 740, 741 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). | 1 | 1 |
Mickell v. Stategreen1 sentence2013Cf. Mickell v. State, 41 So.3d 960, 961 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (noting the defendant’s invocation of the defense of necessity to a charge of driving while license revoked as a habitual offender where the defendant was transporting to the hospital a woman who was suffering from an asthma attack). | 1 | 1 |
Maas v. Olivegreen1 sentence2013The invocation of the doctrine is most eompel- ling when the judicial function at issue is the safe-guarding of fundamental rights.” Maas v. Olive, 992 So.2d 196, 204 (Fla.2008) (Olive II) (quoting Rose, 361 So.2d at 137 ). | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. Stategreen1 sentence2012See id. at 744 . | 1 | 1 |
Thomas v. Stategreen1 sentence2006Although rule 3.203(d)(4)(E) explicitly requires that a motion for an evidentiary hearing must be filed within sixty days of October 1, 2004, we have previously treated a mental retardation claim made in an appeal of a trial court's denial of postconviction relief and in a direct appeal of a death sentence to be an invocation of rule 3.203. [11] See Johnston v. State, No. SC03-824 *540 (order filed Dec. 17, 2004) (relinquishing jurisdiction to the circuit court for a determination of mental retardation pursuant to rule 3.203 in response to a claim made in the defendant's appeal of a trial cour | 1 | 1 |
Martin v. Wilsongreen1 sentence1997See Martin v. Wilson, 115 So.2d 573, 575 (Fla. 1st DCA 1959). | 1 | 1 |
Roundtree v. Stategreen1 sentence1995See Roundtree, 661 So.2d at 1250 . | 1 | 1 |
White v. BOARD OF COUNTY COM'RSgreen1 sentence1989(Footnotes omitted.) Judge Lehan in his dissent in White suggests that the court may exercise its inherent power to depart from the statutory maximum "[w]hen legislatively-fixed attorney's fees become so out of line with reality that they materially impair the abilities of officers of the courts to fulfill their roles of defending the indigent and curtail the inherent powers of the courts to appoint attorneys to those roles." 524 So.2d at 431 (Lehan, J., dissenting). | 1 | 1 |
Scales v. Stategreen1 sentence1981Scales v. State, 13 Md. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Lipman v. Vanowen Realty Corp.
green
1 sentence2007In Maul v. State, 528 So.2d 1384 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988), the trial court excluded the entire testimony of a defense witness who, during a proffer, invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege as to critical questions involving the hit and run accident with which appellant was charged and convicted. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Opong-Mensah v. Stracener
green
1 sentence2006Although rule 3.203(d)(4)(E) explicitly requires that a motion for an evidentiary hearing must be filed within sixty days of October 1, 2004, we have previously treated a mental retardation claim made in an appeal of a trial court's denial of postconviction relief and in a direct appeal of a death sentence to be an invocation of rule 3.203. [11] See Johnston v. State, No. SC03-824 *540 (order filed Dec. 17, 2004) (relinquishing jurisdiction to the circuit court for a determination of mental retardation pursuant to rule 3.203 in response to a claim made in the defendant's appeal of a trial cour | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Porter v. Greer, Warden
green
1 sentence2006Although rule 3.203(d)(4)(E) explicitly requires that a motion for an evidentiary hearing must be filed within sixty days of October 1, 2004, we have previously treated a mental retardation claim made in an appeal of a trial court's denial of postconviction relief and in a direct appeal of a death sentence to be an invocation of rule 3.203. [11] See Johnston v. State, No. SC03-824 *540 (order filed Dec. 17, 2004) (relinquishing jurisdiction to the circuit court for a determination of mental retardation pursuant to rule 3.203 in response to a claim made in the defendant's appeal of a trial cour | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Demarigny v. Demarigny
green
2 sentences1997In deMarigny v. deMarigny, 43 So.2d 442 (Fla.1949) (en banc), Florida's Supreme Court used the doctrine of ejusdem generis to interpret a statute, stating: The only language of the statute upon which the appellant-petitioner could possibly bottom her bill for a declaratory decree would be the words "or other article, memorandum or instrument in writing." It is noted that such language is immediately preceded by the verbiage "by a municipal ordinance, contract, deed, will, franchise." A proper syntactical interpretation of the working of this statute requires the invocation of the principle of 1997Id. at 444 . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Wishart v. Laidlaw Tree Service, Inc.
green
1 sentence1997Our conclusion flows from our decision in Wishart v. Laidlaw Tree Service, Inc., 573 So.2d 183 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Latite Roofing Co., Inc. v. Urbanek
green
1 sentence1991Latite Roofing Co., Inc. v. Urbanek, 528 So.2d 1381 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Makemson v. Martin County
green
1 sentence1988The supreme court, in explaining why the statutory maximum was properly exceeded in Makemson , also referred to "the increasing complexity of some of today's cases... ." 491 So.2d at 1114 . | 1 | 1988–1988 |
The Riviera Club v. Belle Mead Development Corp.
green
2 sentences1985E.g., Riviera Club v. Belle Mead Development Corp., 141 Fla. 538 , 194 So. 783 (1939), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 655 , 59 S.Ct. 251 , 83 L.Ed. 424 (1938) (intervention by interested party matter of right); Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.230; 39 Fla.Jur.2d Parties §§ 27-30 (1982). 1 Moreover, since the motion was filed and heard before the entry of the final judgment, I do not understand the majority’s invocation of the rule, reflected in both cases it cites, Dickinson v. Segal, 219 So.2d 435 (Fla.1969) and Idacon, Inc. v. Hawes, 432 So.2d 759 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), that intervention may be denied if it is applied 1985E.g., Riviera Club v. Belle Mead Development Corp., 141 Fla. 538 , 194 So. 783 (1939), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 655 , 59 S.Ct. 251 , 83 L.Ed. 424 (1938) (intervention by interested party matter of right); Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.230; 39 Fla.Jur.2d Parties §§ 27-30 (1982). 1 Moreover, since the motion was filed and heard before the entry of the final judgment, I do not understand the majority’s invocation of the rule, reflected in both cases it cites, Dickinson v. Segal, 219 So.2d 435 (Fla.1969) and Idacon, Inc. v. Hawes, 432 So.2d 759 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), that intervention may be denied if it is applied | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Dickinson v. Segal
green
1 sentence1985E.g., Riviera Club v. Belle Mead Development Corp., 141 Fla. 538 , 194 So. 783 (1939), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 655 , 59 S.Ct. 251 , 83 L.Ed. 424 (1938) (intervention by interested party matter of right); Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.230; 39 Fla.Jur.2d Parties §§ 27-30 (1982). 1 Moreover, since the motion was filed and heard before the entry of the final judgment, I do not understand the majority’s invocation of the rule, reflected in both cases it cites, Dickinson v. Segal, 219 So.2d 435 (Fla.1969) and Idacon, Inc. v. Hawes, 432 So.2d 759 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), that intervention may be denied if it is applied | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Idacon, Inc. v. Hawes
green
1 sentence1985E.g., Riviera Club v. Belle Mead Development Corp., 141 Fla. 538 , 194 So. 783 (1939), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 655 , 59 S.Ct. 251 , 83 L.Ed. 424 (1938) (intervention by interested party matter of right); Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.230; 39 Fla.Jur.2d Parties §§ 27-30 (1982). 1 Moreover, since the motion was filed and heard before the entry of the final judgment, I do not understand the majority’s invocation of the rule, reflected in both cases it cites, Dickinson v. Segal, 219 So.2d 435 (Fla.1969) and Idacon, Inc. v. Hawes, 432 So.2d 759 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), that intervention may be denied if it is applied | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Doak v. Federal Land Bank
neutral
2 sentences1985E.g., Riviera Club v. Belle Mead Development Corp., 141 Fla. 538 , 194 So. 783 (1939), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 655 , 59 S.Ct. 251 , 83 L.Ed. 424 (1938) (intervention by interested party matter of right); Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.230; 39 Fla.Jur.2d Parties §§ 27-30 (1982). 1 Moreover, since the motion was filed and heard before the entry of the final judgment, I do not understand the majority’s invocation of the rule, reflected in both cases it cites, Dickinson v. Segal, 219 So.2d 435 (Fla.1969) and Idacon, Inc. v. Hawes, 432 So.2d 759 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), that intervention may be denied if it is applied 1985E.g., Riviera Club v. Belle Mead Development Corp., 141 Fla. 538 , 194 So. 783 (1939), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 655 , 59 S.Ct. 251 , 83 L.Ed. 424 (1938) (intervention by interested party matter of right); Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.230; 39 Fla.Jur.2d Parties §§ 27-30 (1982). 1 Moreover, since the motion was filed and heard before the entry of the final judgment, I do not understand the majority’s invocation of the rule, reflected in both cases it cites, Dickinson v. Segal, 219 So.2d 435 (Fla.1969) and Idacon, Inc. v. Hawes, 432 So.2d 759 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), that intervention may be denied if it is applied | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Rio Vista Hotel & Improvement Co. v. Belle Mead Development Corp.
neutral
1 sentence1985E.g., Riviera Club v. Belle Mead Development Corp., 141 Fla. 538 , 194 So. 783 (1939), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 655 , 59 S.Ct. 251 , 83 L.Ed. 424 (1938) (intervention by interested party matter of right); Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.230; 39 Fla.Jur.2d Parties §§ 27-30 (1982). 1 Moreover, since the motion was filed and heard before the entry of the final judgment, I do not understand the majority’s invocation of the rule, reflected in both cases it cites, Dickinson v. Segal, 219 So.2d 435 (Fla.1969) and Idacon, Inc. v. Hawes, 432 So.2d 759 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), that intervention may be denied if it is applied | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Talavera v. State
green
1 sentence1983Appellant's reliance on Talavera v. State, 227 So.2d 493 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969) as support for his claim that he was entitled to have the jury hear the witness invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege as to questions already determined by the court to call for answers in violation of the witness' claim is misplaced. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Royal v. State
green
1 sentence1977Royal v. State, 347 So.2d 742 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977). | 1 | 1977–1977 |
United States v. Ford
green
1 sentence1975Since the granting of immunity is not a judicial function, but it is an executive or legislative power, United States v. Ford, 1878, 99 U.S. 594 , 25 L.Ed. 399 ; Ullman v. United States, 1955, 350 U.S. 422 , 76 S.Ct. 497 , 100 L.Ed. 511 , a grant of immunity under a federal statute, as was given to the witnesses in Mason , virtually decides for the Court whether to permit the invocation of the privilege. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Alvord v. United States green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Ullmann v. United States
green
2 sentences1975Since the granting of immunity is not a judicial function, but it is an executive or legislative power, United States v. Ford, 1878, 99 U.S. 594 , 25 L.Ed. 399 ; Ullman v. United States, 1955, 350 U.S. 422 , 76 S.Ct. 497 , 100 L.Ed. 511 , a grant of immunity under a federal statute, as was given to the witnesses in Mason , virtually decides for the Court whether to permit the invocation of the privilege. 1975Since the granting of immunity is not a judicial function, but it is an executive or legislative power, United States v. Ford, 1878, 99 U.S. 594 , 25 L.Ed. 399 ; Ullman v. United States, 1955, 350 U.S. 422 , 76 S.Ct. 497 , 100 L.Ed. 511 , a grant of immunity under a federal statute, as was given to the witnesses in Mason , virtually decides for the Court whether to permit the invocation of the privilege. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Wider v. Carraway green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Griffin v. California green | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| Nelson v. State Ex Rel. Quigg green | 1 | 1949–1949 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.