45 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1922–2024 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Risk Managers International, Inc. v. Stategreen2 sentences2007See Cramer v. Sheppard , 140 Tex. 271 , 167 S.W.2d 147, 155 (1942); Risk Managers Int'l, Inc. v. State , 858 S.W.2d 567, 570 (Tex.App.-Austin 1993, writ denied). 2007See Cramer v. Sheppard, 140 Tex. 271 , 167 S.W.2d 147, 155 (1942); Risk Managers Int’l, Inc. v. State, 858 S.W.2d 567, 570 (Tex.App.-Austin 1993, writ denied). | 6 | 6 |
Cramer v. Sheppardgreen2 sentences2007See Cramer v. Sheppard, 140 Tex. 271 , 167 S.W.2d 147, 155 (1942); Risk Managers Int’l, Inc. v. State, 858 S.W.2d 567, 570 (Tex.App.-Austin 1993, writ denied). 2007See Cramer v. Sheppard, 140 Tex. 271 , 167 S.W.2d 147, 155 (1942); Risk Managers Int’l, Inc. v. State, 858 S.W.2d 567, 570 (Tex.App.-Austin 1993, writ denied). | 6 | 6 |
Oregon v. Kennedygreen2 sentences2006Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 673 , 102 S.Ct. 2083 (explaining that the "intentional goading” standard was designed to protect a defendant whose motion for mistrial could not fairly be considered a result of his own free will; "in such a case, the defendant’s valued right to complete his trial before the first jury would be a hollow shell if the inevitable motion for mistrial were held to prevent a later invocation of the bar of double jeopardy in all circumstances”). . 2006Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 673 , 102 S.Ct. 2083 (explaining that the "intentional goading” standard was designed to protect a defendant whose motion for mistrial could not fairly be considered a result of his own free will; "in such a case, the defendant’s valued right to complete his trial before the first jury would be a hollow shell if the inevitable motion for mistrial were held to prevent a later invocation of the bar of double jeopardy in all circumstances”). . | 5 | 8 |
Bauder v. Statered2 sentences2006Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 153 at 176 (2d ed. 1994) (setting out both the relevance theory of insurance inclining a party toward negligence and the prejudice theory that juries will be more likely to find liability because of insurance coverage); see also AccuBanc Mortgage Corp. v. Drummonds, 938 S.W.2d 135, 151-52 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1996, writ denied). [41] 146 S.W.3d at 253. [42] Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 673 (explaining that the "intentional goading" standard was designed to protect a defendant whose motion for mistrial could not fairly be considered a result of his own free will; "in su 2003If an appellate court doubts that a mistrial was "required" by the prosecutor's actions, then it may be reasonable to conclude that the prosecutor was not consciously aware of the likelihood that his conduct would require a mistrial. [46] See Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 673 , 102 S.Ct. 2083 (explaining that the "intentional goading" standard was designed to protect a defendant whose motion for mistrial could not fairly be considered a result of his own free will; "[i]n such a case, the defendant's valued right to complete his trial before the first jury would be a hollow shell if the inevitable motio | 2 | 4 |
Montejo v. Louisianagreen2 sentences2012See Montejo, 556 U.S. at 787 , 129 S.Ct. at 2086 (stating that “antibadgering” by police officers is the rationale of Edwards), id. at 2087 (rejecting Montejo’s proposed rule that would prevent “police-initiated interrogation entirely once the Sixth Amendment right” to counsel attaches), id. at 2089 (purpose of Jackson rule, like that of Edwards, "is to preclude the State from badgering defendants into waiving their previously asserted rights"). . 2012See Montejo, 556 U.S. at 787 , 129 S.Ct. at 2086 (stating that “antibadgering” by police officers is the rationale of Edwards), id. at 2087 (rejecting Montejo’s proposed rule that would prevent “police-initiated interrogation entirely once the Sixth Amendment right” to counsel attaches), id. at 2089 (purpose of Jackson rule, like that of Edwards, "is to preclude the State from badgering defendants into waiving their previously asserted rights"). . | 2 | 2 |
Johnson v. Stategreen2 sentences2011Johnson , 803 S.W.2d at 282 ; see also Benitez , 5 S.W.3d at 920 . 2011See Johnson , 803 S.W.2d at 283 (conducting harm analysis under former Rule of Appellate Procedure 81(b)(2)). | 2 | 2 |
Standard Fire Insurance Co. v. Reesegreen2 sentences2008See Reese, 584 S.W.2d at 839-40 . 2008See Reese, 584 S.W.2d at 839-40 . | 2 | 2 |
Weinbaum v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2001See United States v. Little, 567 F.2d 346, 351 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Edwards, 366 F.2d 853, 870 (2d Cir. 1966); United States v. Terry, 362 F.2d 914, 917 (6th Cir. 1966 ); Weinbaum v. United States, 184 F.2d 330, 331 (9th Cir. 1950); see also First Heights Bank, FSB v. Gutierrez, 852 S.W.2d 596, 615 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1993, writ denied) (holding that, in civil case, trial court properly instructed jury to disregard invocation of right against self-incrimination in videotaped deposition played before jury by one who invoked privilege but then withdrew his answer and was tried 2001See United States v. Little , 567 F.2d 346, 351 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Edwards , 366 F.2d 853, 870 (2d Cir. 1966); United States v. Terry , 362 F.2d 914, 917 (6th Cir. 1966 ); Weinbaum v. United States , 184 F.2d 330, 331 (9th Cir. 1950); see also First Heights Bank, FSB v. Gutierrez , 852 S.W.2d 596, 615 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1993, writ denied) (holding that, in civil case, trial court properly instructed jury to disregard invocation of right against self-incrimination in videotaped deposition played before jury by one who invoked privilege but then withdrew his answer and was | 2 | 2 |
First Heights Bank, FSB v. Gutierrezgreen2 sentences2001See United States v. Little, 567 F.2d 346, 351 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Edwards, 366 F.2d 853, 870 (2d Cir. 1966); United States v. Terry, 362 F.2d 914, 917 (6th Cir. 1966 ); Weinbaum v. United States, 184 F.2d 330, 331 (9th Cir. 1950); see also First Heights Bank, FSB v. Gutierrez, 852 S.W.2d 596, 615 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1993, writ denied) (holding that, in civil case, trial court properly instructed jury to disregard invocation of right against self-incrimination in videotaped deposition played before jury by one who invoked privilege but then withdrew his answer and was tried 2001See United States v. Little , 567 F.2d 346, 351 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Edwards , 366 F.2d 853, 870 (2d Cir. 1966); United States v. Terry , 362 F.2d 914, 917 (6th Cir. 1966 ); Weinbaum v. United States , 184 F.2d 330, 331 (9th Cir. 1950); see also First Heights Bank, FSB v. Gutierrez , 852 S.W.2d 596, 615 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1993, writ denied) (holding that, in civil case, trial court properly instructed jury to disregard invocation of right against self-incrimination in videotaped deposition played before jury by one who invoked privilege but then withdrew his answer and was | 2 | 2 |
United States v. John Thomas Terrygreen2 sentences2001See United States v. Little, 567 F.2d 346, 351 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Edwards, 366 F.2d 853, 870 (2d Cir. 1966); United States v. Terry, 362 F.2d 914, 917 (6th Cir. 1966 ); Weinbaum v. United States, 184 F.2d 330, 331 (9th Cir. 1950); see also First Heights Bank, FSB v. Gutierrez, 852 S.W.2d 596, 615 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1993, writ denied) (holding that, in civil case, trial court properly instructed jury to disregard invocation of right against self-incrimination in videotaped deposition played before jury by one who invoked privilege but then withdrew his answer and was tried 2001See United States v. Little , 567 F.2d 346, 351 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Edwards , 366 F.2d 853, 870 (2d Cir. 1966); United States v. Terry , 362 F.2d 914, 917 (6th Cir. 1966 ); Weinbaum v. United States , 184 F.2d 330, 331 (9th Cir. 1950); see also First Heights Bank, FSB v. Gutierrez , 852 S.W.2d 596, 615 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1993, writ denied) (holding that, in civil case, trial court properly instructed jury to disregard invocation of right against self-incrimination in videotaped deposition played before jury by one who invoked privilege but then withdrew his answer and was | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Robert Edwards, Max Jakob, John J. Lombardozzi and Milton Parnessgreen2 sentences2001See United States v. Little, 567 F.2d 346, 351 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Edwards, 366 F.2d 853, 870 (2d Cir. 1966); United States v. Terry, 362 F.2d 914, 917 (6th Cir. 1966 ); Weinbaum v. United States, 184 F.2d 330, 331 (9th Cir. 1950); see also First Heights Bank, FSB v. Gutierrez, 852 S.W.2d 596, 615 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1993, writ denied) (holding that, in civil case, trial court properly instructed jury to disregard invocation of right against self-incrimination in videotaped deposition played before jury by one who invoked privilege but then withdrew his answer and was tried 2001See United States v. Little , 567 F.2d 346, 351 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Edwards , 366 F.2d 853, 870 (2d Cir. 1966); United States v. Terry , 362 F.2d 914, 917 (6th Cir. 1966 ); Weinbaum v. United States , 184 F.2d 330, 331 (9th Cir. 1950); see also First Heights Bank, FSB v. Gutierrez , 852 S.W.2d 596, 615 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1993, writ denied) (holding that, in civil case, trial court properly instructed jury to disregard invocation of right against self-incrimination in videotaped deposition played before jury by one who invoked privilege but then withdrew his answer and was | 2 | 2 |
United States v. James E. Little, United States of America v. I. L. Vaughngreen2 sentences2001See United States v. Little, 567 F.2d 346, 351 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Edwards, 366 F.2d 853, 870 (2d Cir. 1966); United States v. Terry, 362 F.2d 914, 917 (6th Cir. 1966 ); Weinbaum v. United States, 184 F.2d 330, 331 (9th Cir. 1950); see also First Heights Bank, FSB v. Gutierrez, 852 S.W.2d 596, 615 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1993, writ denied) (holding that, in civil case, trial court properly instructed jury to disregard invocation of right against self-incrimination in videotaped deposition played before jury by one who invoked privilege but then withdrew his answer and was tried 2001See United States v. Little , 567 F.2d 346, 351 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Edwards , 366 F.2d 853, 870 (2d Cir. 1966); United States v. Terry , 362 F.2d 914, 917 (6th Cir. 1966 ); Weinbaum v. United States , 184 F.2d 330, 331 (9th Cir. 1950); see also First Heights Bank, FSB v. Gutierrez , 852 S.W.2d 596, 615 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1993, writ denied) (holding that, in civil case, trial court properly instructed jury to disregard invocation of right against self-incrimination in videotaped deposition played before jury by one who invoked privilege but then withdrew his answer and was | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Dinitzgreen2 sentences2009Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 673 , 102 S.Ct. 2083 (citing United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 611 , 96 S.Ct. 1075 , 47 L.Ed.2d 267 (1976)). 2009Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 673 , 102 S.Ct. 2083 (citing United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 611 , 96 S.Ct. 1075 , 47 L.Ed.2d 267 (1976)). | 1 | 2 |
Ex Parte Petersongreen2 sentences2006Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 153 at 176 (2d ed. 1994) (setting out both the relevance theory of insurance inclining a party toward negligence and the prejudice theory that juries will be more likely to find liability because of insurance coverage); see also AccuBanc Mortgage Corp. v. Drummonds, 938 S.W.2d 135, 151-52 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1996, writ denied). [41] 146 S.W.3d at 253. [42] Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 673 (explaining that the "intentional goading" standard was designed to protect a defendant whose motion for mistrial could not fairly be considered a result of his own free will; "in su 2006Ex parte Peterson, 117 S.W.3d at 817 . | 1 | 2 |
Texas Capital Securities, Inc. v. Sandefergreen1 sentence2024Sec., Inc. v. Sandefer, 58 S.W.3d 760, 773 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. denied) (jury was entitled to draw negative inferences from a witness’s invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination and the refusal to answer deposition questions). | 1 | 1 |
Evans v. City of Chicagogreen1 sentence2024State for the Protection of P.B. v. V.T., 575 S.W.3d 921, 927 (Tex. App.—Austin 2019, no pet.) (citing Evans v. City of Chicago, 513 F.3d 735, 741 (7th Cir. 2008)). | 1 | 1 |
Walters, William Kylegreen1 sentence2024Walters v. State, 359 S.W.3d 212, 215, 216 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
State for Protection of P. B. v. v. T.green1 sentence2024State for the Protection of P.B. v. V.T., 575 S.W.3d 921, 927 (Tex. App.—Austin 2019, no pet.) (citing Evans v. City of Chicago, 513 F.3d 735, 741 (7th Cir. 2008)). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Certain Real Property and Premises Known Asgreen1 sentence2019Id. at 83. 7 After the FDIC took receivership of a bank that failed after its guarantor refused to pay its claim under a fidelity bond, it stepped into the bank’s place in the three-week jury trial on the fidelity bond. 45 F.3d at 973 . | 1 | 1 |
Upton v. Stategreen1 sentence2018App. 1991) (“[I]n this case, there was no violation of the rule because the evidence showed that the Deuchers had not yet come forward on the first day of trial; they were not known to be witnesses, and were not covered by the invocation of the rule on the first day.”). 7 Even in the absence of a per se rule that a court can never abuse its discretion in permitting the testimony of a witness in violation of the Rule when the witness testifies only at the punishment phase, we agree with our sister courts that, at the very least, “the admission of testimony related to something other than guilt | 1 | 1 |
McInnes v. Yamaha Motor Corp., USAgreen1 sentence2015This testimony, adduced by the appellant himself on these topics, militates any claim of harm in this case from Baxter and Oswald testifying on these same matters despite the invocation of the rule. –5– Dist.] 1995), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 937 S.W.2d 444 (Tex. 1996); see also McInnes v. Yahama Motor Corp., U.S.A., 673 S.W.2d 185, 187 (Tex. 1984) (fact that excluded deposition was on file with trial court and part of appellate record not sufficient to make it proper bill of exception). | 1 | 1 |
Benitez v. Stategreen1 sentence2011Johnson , 803 S.W.2d at 282 ; see also Benitez , 5 S.W.3d at 920 . | 1 | 1 |
AccuBanc Mortgage Corp. v. Drummondsgreen1 sentence2006Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 153 at 176 (2d ed. 1994) (setting out both the relevance theory of insurance inclining a party toward negligence and the prejudice theory that juries will be more likely to find liability because of insurance coverage); see also AccuBanc Mortgage Corp. v. Drummonds, 938 S.W.2d 135, 151-52 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1996, writ denied). [41] 146 S.W.3d at 253. [42] Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 673 (explaining that the "intentional goading" standard was designed to protect a defendant whose motion for mistrial could not fairly be considered a result of his own free will; "in su | 1 | 1 |
| Donnelly v. DeChristoforogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ullmann v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| General Motors Corp. v. Saenzgreen | 1 | 1 |
| GMC v. Saenz on Behalf of Saenzgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Russell G. Labbe, Sr. v. Louis M. Berman, Etc.green | 1 | 1 |
| John Hugh Melton v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Nixon v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Puga v. Donna Fruit Co., Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Ex Parte Millergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Philipowski v. Spencergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
McQuarrie v. Stategreen1 sentence2015But see McQuarrie v. State, 380 S.W.3d 145, 154 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ex Parte Bauder
green
2 sentences2003If an appellate court doubts that a mistrial was "required" by the prosecutor's actions, then it may be reasonable to conclude that the prosecutor was not consciously aware of the likelihood that his conduct would require a mistrial. [46] See Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 673 , 102 S.Ct. 2083 (explaining that the "intentional goading" standard was designed to protect a defendant whose motion for mistrial could not fairly be considered a result of his own free will; "[i]n such a case, the defendant's valued right to complete his trial before the first jury would be a hollow shell if the inevitable motio 2003If an appellate court doubts that a mistrial was "required" by the prosecutor's actions, then it may be reasonable to conclude that the prosecutor was not consciously aware of the likelihood that his conduct would require a mistrial. [46] See Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 673 , 102 S.Ct. 2083 (explaining that the "intentional goading" standard was designed to protect a defendant whose motion for mistrial could not fairly be considered a result of his own free will; "[i]n such a case, the defendant's valued right to complete his trial before the first jury would be a hollow shell if the inevitable motio | 2 | 2003–2003 |
Stanford v. Butler
green
2 sentences2001Nor are we persuaded by the Comptroller's invocation of the rule of departmental construction laid down in Stanford v. Butler , 181 S.W.2d at 273 . 2001Nor are we persuaded by the Comptroller's invocation of the rule of departmental construction laid down in Stanford v. Butler , 181 S.W.2d at 273 . | 2 | 2001–2001 |
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, in Its Corporate Capacity v. Fidelity & Deposit Company of Maryland
green
1 sentence2019Id. at 83. 7 After the FDIC took receivership of a bank that failed after its guarantor refused to pay its claim under a fidelity bond, it stepped into the bank’s place in the three-week jury trial on the fidelity bond. 45 F.3d at 973 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Continental Coffee Products Co. v. Cazarez
green
1 sentence2015This testimony, adduced by the appellant himself on these topics, militates any claim of harm in this case from Baxter and Oswald testifying on these same matters despite the invocation of the rule. –5– Dist.] 1995), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 937 S.W.2d 444 (Tex. 1996); see also McInnes v. Yahama Motor Corp., U.S.A., 673 S.W.2d 185, 187 (Tex. 1984) (fact that excluded deposition was on file with trial court and part of appellate record not sufficient to make it proper bill of exception). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson
green
2 sentences2015Gibbons makes no argument for why the invocation of rule 199.4 was not sufficient to raise an objection under that section or for how she was 88 Id. 89 See id. 2015Gibbons makes no argument for why the invocation of rule 199.4 was not sufficient to raise an objection under that section or for how she was 88 Id. 89 See id. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Thomas, Heather
green
1 sentence2015Even if there was in this case a remote possibility that Appellant intended to waive his previously preserved complaints from the voir dire proceedings, or that the trial court understood him to have intended such a waiver, that “contingency is [not] likely enough to justify the absolute and unforgiving application of a rule [requiring the court of appeals to find] that [counsel’s] statement of ‘no objection’ [should] operate to forfeit [any] claim of error that [may have] already been assiduously preserved[.]” Thomas, 408 S.W.3d at 885 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| State v. Lee green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Exxon Corp. v. Shuttlesworth green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Joseph Gartner San Fratello v. United States green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Miranda v. Arizona green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Grunewald v. United States green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| United States v. Apfelbaum green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Cooper v. State neutral | 1 | 1973–1973 |
| United States v. United States Coin & Currency green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| cluster 297607 green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Sewell v. State green | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| Peter v. First Nat. Bank of La Grange green | 1 | 1938–1938 |
| Bender v. Brooks green | 1 | 1922–1922 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.