invocation privilege in District of Columbia

2025Dick Co. v. Marr, 95 F. Supp. 83, 101 (S.D.N.Y. 1950))); accord McCormick on Evidence § 92 nn.8, 14 (9th ed.). 79 After the first set of alleged threats, Mr. Harvey told the court that he might “have an ethical issue” and asked for time to speak to “Bar Counsel,” seemingly referring to the D.C.

2025Even if there is an assertion that there is no privilege because the crime-fraud exception applies, the attorney is required to give notice to the client.”); Republic Gear Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 381 F.2d 551, 556 (2d Cir. 1967) (holding in a case involving the invocation of the privilege on behalf of a former client that, “[n]ot only may an attorney invoke the privilege [o]n his client’s behalf when the client is not a party to the proceeding in which disclosure is sought, . . . but he should do so, for he is ‘duty-bound to raise the claim in any proceeding in order to protect communication

2021M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310, 312 (D.C. 1971).

2004We concluded that the invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination had been scrupulously honored and that the statements were not the product of interrogation, see id. at 1028, reasoning that the sergeant’s words were consistent with his stated intention to “process” the suspect.

2004See id. at 1029.

2003See, e.g., Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 697 , 116 S.Ct. 1657 , 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996) (holding that ultimate determinations of probable cause and reasonable suspicion in the Fourth Amendment context are mixed questions that should be reviewed de novo); Littlejohn, 705 A.2d at 1082 (holding the appropriateness of a witness’s invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination to be a mixed question subject to de novo review).

2003“In reviewing the trial court’s resolution of a mixed question of fact and law, we consider, among other things, whether the issue to be decided *899 more closely resembles one of fact or of law, and whether the trial court or the appellate court is in a better position to render the decision with the higher degree of accuracy.” Id.

2003See, e.g., Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 697 , 116 S.Ct. 1657 , 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996) (holding that ultimate determinations of probable cause and reasonable suspicion in the Fourth Amendment context are mixed questions that should be reviewed de novo); Littlejohn, 705 A.2d at 1082 (holding the appropriateness of a witness’s invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination to be a mixed question subject to de novo review).

2003See, e.g., Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 697 , 116 S.Ct. 1657 , 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996) (holding that ultimate determinations of probable cause and reasonable suspicion in the Fourth Amendment context are mixed questions that should be reviewed de novo); Littlejohn, 705 A.2d at 1082 (holding the appropriateness of a witness’s invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination to be a mixed question subject to de novo review).

1994"Discretion signifies choice." Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 361 (D.C.1979).

1994“Discretion signifies choice.” Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 361 (D.C.1979).

1994See, e.g., Jaggers, supra, 482 A.2d at 793 .

1994See, e.g., Jaggers, supra, 482 A.2d at 793 .

1992See State v. Williams, 239 N.J.Super. 620, 626 , 571 A.2d 1358, 1362 (App.Div.1990).

1992See State v. Williams, 239 N.J.Super. 620, 626 , 571 A.2d 1358, 1362 (App.Div.1990).

1988Mobley v. Southern Railway, 418 A.2d 1044, 1047 (D.C.1980).

1976See Haven v. Randolph, supra; Brown v. Keaveny, supra, 117 U.S.App.D.C. at 119, 326 F.2d at 662 (Wright, J., dissenting).