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7 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1968–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Corralesgreen2 sentences2018Because “jurors tend to view a witness’ invocation of the privilege as a ‘clear confession of crime,’” Corrales, 138 Ariz. at 590 (internal quotation omitted), J.V.’s exercise of the privilege in response to pointed questions regarding his immigration status and involvement in drug trafficking likely undermined his credibility. 2016Although wide latitude is given during closing arguments for counsel to comment on the evidence and argue all reasonable inferences therefrom, McDaniel, 136 Ariz. at 197 , it is misconduct for the prosecutor to build his case out of inferences arising from a witness’s invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination, Corrales, 138 Ariz. at 591 (citations omitted). ¶12 Here, the prosecutor directed the jury’s attention to Shauna’s absence on multiple occasions to highlight that Cross’s testimony was uncorroborated, and in a manner suggesting Cross had chosen not to call Shauna as a witnes | 2 | 2 |
State v. Hughesgreen2 sentences2016Even assuming the nature of the violation is fundamental, see State v. Hughes, 193 Ariz. 72, 86, ¶ 63 (1998) (noting an improper comment regarding the invocation of the privilege against self- incrimination, whether direct or indirect, violates state and federal constitutional law) (citing State v. Jordan, 80 Ariz. 193, 199 (1956)); Corrales, 138 Ariz. at 591 , “[p]rosecutorial misconduct is harmless error if we can find beyond a reasonable doubt that it did not contribute to or affect the verdict.” Hughes, 193 Ariz. at 80 , ¶ 32 (citing State v. Towery, 186 Ariz. 168, 185 (1996), and State v. 2016Even assuming the nature of the violation is fundamental, see State v. Hughes, 193 Ariz. 72, 86, ¶ 63 (1998) (noting an improper comment regarding the invocation of the privilege against self- incrimination, whether direct or indirect, violates state and federal constitutional law) (citing State v. Jordan, 80 Ariz. 193, 199 (1956)); Corrales, 138 Ariz. at 591 , “[p]rosecutorial misconduct is harmless error if we can find beyond a reasonable doubt that it did not contribute to or affect the verdict.” Hughes, 193 Ariz. at 80 , ¶ 32 (citing State v. Towery, 186 Ariz. 168, 185 (1996), and State v. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Jordangreen1 sentence2016Even assuming the nature of the violation is fundamental, see State v. Hughes, 193 Ariz. 72, 86, ¶ 63 (1998) (noting an improper comment regarding the invocation of the privilege against self- incrimination, whether direct or indirect, violates state and federal constitutional law) (citing State v. Jordan, 80 Ariz. 193, 199 (1956)); Corrales, 138 Ariz. at 591 , “[p]rosecutorial misconduct is harmless error if we can find beyond a reasonable doubt that it did not contribute to or affect the verdict.” Hughes, 193 Ariz. at 80 , ¶ 32 (citing State v. Towery, 186 Ariz. 168, 185 (1996), and State v. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Towerygreen1 sentence2016Even assuming the nature of the violation is fundamental, see State v. Hughes, 193 Ariz. 72, 86, ¶ 63 (1998) (noting an improper comment regarding the invocation of the privilege against self- incrimination, whether direct or indirect, violates state and federal constitutional law) (citing State v. Jordan, 80 Ariz. 193, 199 (1956)); Corrales, 138 Ariz. at 591 , “[p]rosecutorial misconduct is harmless error if we can find beyond a reasonable doubt that it did not contribute to or affect the verdict.” Hughes, 193 Ariz. at 80 , ¶ 32 (citing State v. Towery, 186 Ariz. 168, 185 (1996), and State v. | 1 | 1 |
Buzard v. Griffingreen2 sentences1968Allowance of an adverse inference in a civil action from the invocation of this privilege is sound in theory, see 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2272(e) at 439 (McNaughton Revision 1961) ; Model Code of Evidence, Rule 233; Udall, Arizona Law of Evidence § 91, at 137-139; and McCormick on Evidence § 80, at 163-164, and has been approved in this state, Buzard v. Griffin, 89 Ariz. 42, 48 , 358 P.2d 155, 158 (1960) (though under the “peculiar circumstances” of that case, it was held the adverse inference “vanished and was extinguished” when Buzard took the stand at the trial and testified fully on the matt 1968Allowance of an adverse inference in a civil action from the invocation of this privilege is sound in theory, see 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2272(e) at 439 (McNaughton Revision 1961) ; Model Code of Evidence, Rule 233; Udall, Arizona Law of Evidence § 91, at 137-139; and McCormick on Evidence § 80, at 163-164, and has been approved in this state, Buzard v. Griffin, 89 Ariz. 42, 48 , 358 P.2d 155, 158 (1960) (though under the “peculiar circumstances” of that case, it was held the adverse inference “vanished and was extinguished” when Buzard took the stand at the trial and testified fully on the matt | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Arizona Coffee Shops, Inc. v. Phoenix Downtown Parking Ass'n
green
2 sentences1985An action to accelerate and foreclose a mortgage being an equitable proceeding, Arizona Coffee Shops v. Phoenix Downtown Parking Ass’n, 95 Ariz. 98 , 387 P.2d 801 (1963), it is not enough to allege merely that the acceleration clause has been violated. 1985An action to accelerate and foreclose a mortgage being an equitable proceeding, Arizona Coffee Shops v. Phoenix Downtown Parking Ass’n, 95 Ariz. 98 , 387 P.2d 801 (1963), it is not enough to allege merely that the acceleration clause has been violated. | 2 | 1971–1985 |
State v. McDaniel
green
1 sentence2016Although wide latitude is given during closing arguments for counsel to comment on the evidence and argue all reasonable inferences therefrom, McDaniel, 136 Ariz. at 197 , it is misconduct for the prosecutor to build his case out of inferences arising from a witness’s invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination, Corrales, 138 Ariz. at 591 (citations omitted). ¶12 Here, the prosecutor directed the jury’s attention to Shauna’s absence on multiple occasions to highlight that Cross’s testimony was uncorroborated, and in a manner suggesting Cross had chosen not to call Shauna as a witnes | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Bible
green
1 sentence2016Even assuming the nature of the violation is fundamental, see State v. Hughes, 193 Ariz. 72, 86, ¶ 63 (1998) (noting an improper comment regarding the invocation of the privilege against self- incrimination, whether direct or indirect, violates state and federal constitutional law) (citing State v. Jordan, 80 Ariz. 193, 199 (1956)); Corrales, 138 Ariz. at 591 , “[p]rosecutorial misconduct is harmless error if we can find beyond a reasonable doubt that it did not contribute to or affect the verdict.” Hughes, 193 Ariz. at 80 , ¶ 32 (citing State v. Towery, 186 Ariz. 168, 185 (1996), and State v. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Vineyard v. Empire MacH. Co., Inc.
green
2 sentences1981Its reliance on Vineyard v. Empire Machinery Company, Inc., 119 Ariz. 502 , 581 P.2d 1152 (App. 1978), is misplaced. 1981Its reliance on Vineyard v. Empire Machinery Company, Inc., 119 Ariz. 502 , 581 P.2d 1152 (App. 1978), is misplaced. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
State v. Romero
green
2 sentences1973Since, however, the granting of the sequestration of witnesses is a matter within the discretion of the trial court [State v. Romero, 85 Ariz. 263 , 336 P.2d 366 (1959)], and the judge could have refused the invocation of the rule, a fortiori he could excuse a partial violation of it, especially where, as here, the county attorney avowed that he had not coached the witnesses or attempted to use the occasion to reconcile any conflicts. 1973Since, however, the granting of the sequestration of witnesses is a matter within the discretion of the trial court [State v. Romero, 85 Ariz. 263 , 336 P.2d 366 (1959)], and the judge could have refused the invocation of the rule, a fortiori he could excuse a partial violation of it, especially where, as here, the county attorney avowed that he had not coached the witnesses or attempted to use the occasion to reconcile any conflicts. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.