invocation doctrine in Oregon

2020But let’s just make clear on the record that the State has constitutional obligations both in the 10 State v. Weaver state and federal system, and under Brady [v. Maryland, 373 US 83 , 83 S Ct 1194 , 10 L Ed 2d 215 (1963)], of course, to provide any exculpatory information to the defendant, and we have done that in this case.” After addressing defendant’s argument that the plea agree- ment indicated that the state was suppressing exculpatory evidence, the state turned to the rules of evidence, arguing that, for purposes of OEC 513, the plea agreement was the equivalent of an invocation of priv

2020But let’s just make clear on the record that the State has constitutional obligations both in the 10 State v. Weaver state and federal system, and under Brady [v. Maryland, 373 US 83 , 83 S Ct 1194 , 10 L Ed 2d 215 (1963)], of course, to provide any exculpatory information to the defendant, and we have done that in this case.” After addressing defendant’s argument that the plea agree- ment indicated that the state was suppressing exculpatory evidence, the state turned to the rules of evidence, arguing that, for purposes of OEC 513, the plea agreement was the equivalent of an invocation of priv

2018It is thus consistent with Owens , which *485 characterized the right to confront a witness as a procedural right rather than a substantive one insofar as it held that a court is not required to assess the substantive reliability of hearsay statements when the declarant "is present at trial and subject to unrestricted cross-examination." 484 U.S. at 560 , 108 S.Ct. 838 .

2018It is thus consistent with Owens , which *485 characterized the right to confront a witness as a procedural right rather than a substantive one insofar as it held that a court is not required to assess the substantive reliability of hearsay statements when the declarant "is present at trial and subject to unrestricted cross-examination." 484 U.S. at 560 , 108 S.Ct. 838 .

2014See Nelson, 318 Or at 104 (under issue-preclusion doctrine, a prior decision “may preclude relitigation of the issue” (emphasis added)); State v. Romanov, 210 Or App 198, 202 , 149 P3d 1224 (2006), rev den, 342 Or 633 (2007) (“Issue preclusion can prevent * * * the relitigation of a factual issue decided in a prior proceeding.” (Emphasis added.)).

2014See Nelson, 318 Or at 104 (under issue-preclusion doctrine, a prior decision “may preclude relitigation of the issue” (emphasis added)); State v. Romanov, 210 Or App 198, 202 , 149 P3d 1224 (2006), rev den, 342 Or 633 (2007) (“Issue preclusion can prevent * * * the relitigation of a factual issue decided in a prior proceeding.” (Emphasis added.)).

2014See Nelson, 318 Or at 104 (under issue-preclusion doctrine, a prior decision “may preclude relitigation of the issue” (emphasis added)); State v. Romanov, 210 Or App 198, 202 , 149 P3d 1224 (2006), rev den, 342 Or 633 (2007) (“Issue preclusion can prevent * * * the relitigation of a factual issue decided in a prior proceeding.” (Emphasis added.)).

1996However, because of the defendant's strong interest in confronting his accusers and the prosecutor's duty to provide a fair trial for the defendant and protect the defendant's constitutional rights, the prosecutor's invocation of this exception cannot be granted routinely." Id. at 354-55 , 594 P.2d 823 (citation omitted; footnote omitted).

1996However, because of the defendant's strong interest in confronting his accusers and the prosecutor's duty to provide a fair trial for the defendant and protect the defendant's constitutional rights, the prosecutor's invocation of this exception cannot be granted routinely." Id. at 354-55 , 594 P.2d 823 (citation omitted; footnote omitted).

1996As noted above, the state first argues that defendant's confrontation rights were not violated because, it asserts, "[c]onfrontation is a trial right * * * that is only remotely implicated, if at all, in this context." The state reasons that availability is an issue that is committed to the trial court "for a neutral determination, rather than to the adversarial process." From that premise, the state argues that defendant's confrontation rights did not attach at a pretrial availability hearing, because there was no "confrontation." The state reasons that it "would have been premature at the pr

1996As noted above, the state first argues that defendant's confrontation rights were not violated because, it asserts, "[c]onfrontation is a trial right * * * that is only remotely implicated, if at all, in this context." The state reasons that availability is an issue that is committed to the trial court "for a neutral determination, rather than to the adversarial process." From that premise, the state argues that defendant's confrontation rights did not attach at a pretrial availability hearing, because there was no "confrontation." The state reasons that it "would have been premature at the pr

1984The requirements for the application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel were established in Bahler v. Fletcher, 257 Or 1 , 474 P2d 329 (1970), in which the court expressed approval of the following: “ ‘* * * [T]here are but two necessary requirements for the invocation of the doctrine of collateral estoppel.

1984The requirements for the application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel were established in Bahler v. Fletcher, 257 Or 1 , 474 P2d 329 (1970), in which the court expressed approval of the following: “ ‘* * * [T]here are but two necessary requirements for the invocation of the doctrine of collateral estoppel.

1970The New York Court of Appeals' summary in Schwartz v. Public Administrator, 24 N.Y.2d 65 , 298 N.Y.S.2d 955 , 246 N.E.2d 725 (1969), succinctly states its views, in which we concur, as follows: "Although we have not previously said so, it is now evident that New York has adopted the full and fair opportunity test in applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel. * * * New York Law has now reached the point where there are but two necessary requirements for the invocation of the doctrine of collateral estoppel.

1970The New York Court of Appeals' summary in Schwartz v. Public Administrator, 24 N.Y.2d 65 , 298 N.Y.S.2d 955 , 246 N.E.2d 725 (1969), succinctly states its views, in which we concur, as follows: "Although we have not previously said so, it is now evident that New York has adopted the full and fair opportunity test in applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel. * * * New York Law has now reached the point where there are but two necessary requirements for the invocation of the doctrine of collateral estoppel.

1914As well said by Justice Grant in Brown v. Evans, 149 Mich. 431 ( 112 N. W. 1079 ): < í There must be evidence of such facts and circumstances, times, and places, and associations together as would naturally lead a man of ordinary care and prudence to the conclusion that such parties were having illicit sexual intercourse.” The sentiment of this court was admirably expressed by Mr. Chief Justice Moore, in State v. Eggleston, 45 Or. 346 ( 77 Pac. 738 ), and approved in State v. La More, 53 Or. 261 ( 99 Pac. 417 ), in this language: “Positive evidence of the commission of adultery is rarely possi

1914As well said by Justice Grant in Brown v. Evans, 149 Mich. 431 ( 112 N. W. 1079 ): < í There must be evidence of such facts and circumstances, times, and places, and associations together as would naturally lead a man of ordinary care and prudence to the conclusion that such parties were having illicit sexual intercourse.” The sentiment of this court was admirably expressed by Mr. Chief Justice Moore, in State v. Eggleston, 45 Or. 346 ( 77 Pac. 738 ), and approved in State v. La More, 53 Or. 261 ( 99 Pac. 417 ), in this language: “Positive evidence of the commission of adultery is rarely possi

1914As well said by Justice Grant in Brown v. Evans, 149 Mich. 431 ( 112 N. W. 1079 ): < í There must be evidence of such facts and circumstances, times, and places, and associations together as would naturally lead a man of ordinary care and prudence to the conclusion that such parties were having illicit sexual intercourse.” The sentiment of this court was admirably expressed by Mr. Chief Justice Moore, in State v. Eggleston, 45 Or. 346 ( 77 Pac. 738 ), and approved in State v. La More, 53 Or. 261 ( 99 Pac. 417 ), in this language: “Positive evidence of the commission of adultery is rarely possi

1914As well said by Justice Grant in Brown v. Evans, 149 Mich. 431 ( 112 N. W. 1079 ): < í There must be evidence of such facts and circumstances, times, and places, and associations together as would naturally lead a man of ordinary care and prudence to the conclusion that such parties were having illicit sexual intercourse.” The sentiment of this court was admirably expressed by Mr. Chief Justice Moore, in State v. Eggleston, 45 Or. 346 ( 77 Pac. 738 ), and approved in State v. La More, 53 Or. 261 ( 99 Pac. 417 ), in this language: “Positive evidence of the commission of adultery is rarely possi

1914As well said by Justice Grant in Brown v. Evans, 149 Mich. 431 ( 112 N. W. 1079 ): < í There must be evidence of such facts and circumstances, times, and places, and associations together as would naturally lead a man of ordinary care and prudence to the conclusion that such parties were having illicit sexual intercourse.” The sentiment of this court was admirably expressed by Mr. Chief Justice Moore, in State v. Eggleston, 45 Or. 346 ( 77 Pac. 738 ), and approved in State v. La More, 53 Or. 261 ( 99 Pac. 417 ), in this language: “Positive evidence of the commission of adultery is rarely possi

1898But the judgment was reversed by the supreme court ( 112 Ill. 263 ) , which held that the facts of the case did not warrant the invocation of the rule, because it was thought the general character of the plaintiff had not been assailed; and it was observed that “mere contradictions, or different versions by witnesses, do not justify the rule that he may call witnesses to support Ms character for truth. * * * Before he can do so, Ms general character must be at-attacked.” The rule is stated in Vernon v. Tucker, 30 Md. 456 -462, thus : “ Where the character of the witness is impeached by matter

1898But the judgment was reversed by the supreme court ( 112 Ill. 263 ) , which held that the facts of the case did not warrant the invocation of the rule, because it was thought the general character of the plaintiff had not been assailed; and it was observed that “mere contradictions, or different versions by witnesses, do not justify the rule that he may call witnesses to support Ms character for truth. * * * Before he can do so, Ms general character must be at-attacked.” The rule is stated in Vernon v. Tucker, 30 Md. 456 -462, thus : “ Where the character of the witness is impeached by matter