52 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1951–2025 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Beygreen2 sentences2024A-0803-20 14 Under New Jersey law, "[i]n the context of custodial interrogation, once a defendant clearly and unambiguously invokes his right to remain silent, interrogation must cease." State v. Maltese, 222 N.J. 525, 545 (2015). "[A]ny words or conduct that reasonably appear to be inconsistent with defendant's willingness to discuss his case with the police are tantamount to an invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination." State v. Alston, 204 N.J. 614, 622 (2011) (first alteration in original) (quoting State v. Bey (Bey II), 112 N.J. 123, 136 (1988)). 2024See State v. S.S., 229 N.J. 360, 383-84 (2017). "[A]ny words or conduct that reasonably appear to be inconsistent with defendant's willingness to discuss his case with the police are tantamount to an invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination." Ibid. (quoting State v. Bey (Bey II), 112 N.J. 123, 136 (1988)). | 6 | 11 |
State v. Michael A. Maltese (073584)green2 sentences2025Law enforcement officials, however, are not obliged to accept any words or conduct, no matter how ambiguous, as a conclusive indication that a suspect desires to terminate questioning. [Bey II, 112 N.J. at 136-37 .] A-0316-22 50 "Whether a suspect has invoked his right to remain silent requires analysis of the totality of the circumstances, including consideration of the suspect's words and conduct." State v. Maltese, 222 N.J. 525, 545 (2015) (citing State v. Diaz-Bridges, 208 N.J. 544, 568-69 (2012)). 2024A-0803-20 14 Under New Jersey law, "[i]n the context of custodial interrogation, once a defendant clearly and unambiguously invokes his right to remain silent, interrogation must cease." State v. Maltese, 222 N.J. 525, 545 (2015). "[A]ny words or conduct that reasonably appear to be inconsistent with defendant's willingness to discuss his case with the police are tantamount to an invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination." State v. Alston, 204 N.J. 614, 622 (2011) (first alteration in original) (quoting State v. Bey (Bey II), 112 N.J. 123, 136 (1988)). | 3 | 3 |
State v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2024As such, "a suspect who has 'nothing else to say,'" Johnson, 120 N.J at 281 (quoting Christopher, 824 F.2d at 836, 842 ), or who has indicated "he would have nothing to say," Bey I, 112 N.J. at 64, has "asserted the right to remain silent, thereby requiring the police immediately to stop questioning," Johnson, 120 N.J. at 281 . 2024If a "suspect's statement is susceptible A-1104-22 26 to two different meanings, the interrogating officer must cease questioning and 'inquire of the suspect as to the correct interpretation.'" Id. at 382-83 (quoting State v. Johnson, 120 N.J. 263, 283 (1990)); accord Maltese, 222 N.J. at 545 (finding that when a "suspect's invocation [of the right to remain silent] is 'ambiguous,' officers are 'required to stop the interrogation completely, or . . . ask only questions narrowly directed to determining whether defendant [is] willing to continue.'" (second alteration in original) (quoting Johnso | 2 | 4 |
State v. Diaz-Bridgesgreen2 sentences2025Law enforcement officials, however, are not obliged to accept any words or conduct, no matter how ambiguous, as a conclusive indication that a suspect desires to terminate questioning. [Bey II, 112 N.J. at 136-37 .] A-0316-22 50 "Whether a suspect has invoked his right to remain silent requires analysis of the totality of the circumstances, including consideration of the suspect's words and conduct." State v. Maltese, 222 N.J. 525, 545 (2015) (citing State v. Diaz-Bridges, 208 N.J. 544, 568-69 (2012)). 2022In determining whether a suspect has invoked their right to counsel, the court employs "a totality of the circumstances approach that focuses on the reasonable interpretation of defendant's words and behaviors." State v. Diaz- Bridges, 208 N.J. 544, 564 (2011). "[A]ny words or conduct that reasonably appear to be inconsistent with defendant's willingness to discuss his case with the police are tantamount to an invocation of the privilege against self- incrimination." Alston, 204 N.J. at 622 (quoting State v. Bey, 112 N.J. 123, 135 (1988)). "[B]ecause the right to counsel is so fundamental, an | 2 | 2 |
In Re Grand Jury Investigation. Appeal of United States of Americagreen2 sentences2010It has been noted most persuasively that [i]n determining whether a clergy-communicant privilege exists, we weigh Dean Wigmore’s four fundamental prerequisites for a privilege against the disclosure of communications: (1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed. (2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory-maintenance of the relation between the parties. (3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be sedulously fostered (4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosur 2010It has been noted most persuasively that [i]n determining whether a clergy-communicant privilege exists, we weigh *1140 Dean Wigmore's four fundamental prerequisites for a privilege against the disclosure of communications: (1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed. (2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties. (3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be sedulously fostered. (4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the di | 2 | 2 |
City of Hackensack v. Winnergreen2 sentences1986City of Hackensack v. Winner, 162 N.J.Super. 1, 27-28 (1978), mod. 82 N.J. 1 (1980) (emphasis added). 1985City of Hackensack v. Winner, 162 N.J. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Laganellagreen2 sentences1980In fact, he said to L.D. at the first proceeding, “The problem of course is that we don’t have the other side of the story, [L.], and if I decide this I’m really deciding it on your statements alone.” At the latter hearing he conceded that, “Unhappily I simply said, ‘Complaint dismissed.’ ” Immediately thereafter he endeavored to volunteer the reasons he had said this, but even then he couched this explanation only in terms of what these reasons “probably were.” In these circumstances we are satisfied that neither the formalistic expression of double jeopardy prohibitions in terms of a particu 1980In fact, he said to L.D. at the first proceeding, "The problem of course is that we don't have the other side of the story, [L.], and if I decide this I'm really deciding it on your statements alone." At the latter hearing he conceded that, "Unhappily I simply said, `Complaint dismissed.'" Immediately thereafter he endeavored to volunteer the reasons he had said this, but even then he couched this explanation only in terms of what these reasons "probably were." In these circumstances we are satisfied that neither the formalistic expression of double jeopardy prohibitions in terms of a particul | 2 | 2 |
State v. S.S.green2 sentences2025"In that light, '[a]ny words or conduct that reasonably appear to be inconsistent with defendant's willingness to discuss his case with the police are A-0316-22 51 tantamount to an invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination.'" Ibid. (quoting Bey II, 112 N.J. at 136). 2024See State v. S.S., 229 N.J. 360, 383-84 (2017). "[A]ny words or conduct that reasonably appear to be inconsistent with defendant's willingness to discuss his case with the police are tantamount to an invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination." Ibid. (quoting State v. Bey (Bey II), 112 N.J. 123, 136 (1988)). | 1 | 4 |
State v. Wrightgreen2 sentences2022In determining whether a suspect has invoked their right to counsel, the court employs "a totality of the circumstances approach that focuses on the reasonable interpretation of defendant's words and behaviors." State v. Diaz- Bridges, 208 N.J. 544, 564 (2011). "[A]ny words or conduct that reasonably appear to be inconsistent with defendant's willingness to discuss his case with the police are tantamount to an invocation of the privilege against self- incrimination." Alston, 204 N.J. at 622 (quoting State v. Bey, 112 N.J. 123, 135 (1988)). "[B]ecause the right to counsel is so fundamental, an 1988State v. Wright, 97 N.J. 113 , 120 n. 4 (1984) (quoting United States v. Riggs, 537 F.2A 1219, 1222 (4th Cir.1976)).] Any words or conduct that reasonably appear to be inconsistent with defendant’s willingness to discuss his case with the police are tantamount to an invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination. | 1 | 4 |
State v. Alstongreen2 sentences2024A-0803-20 14 Under New Jersey law, "[i]n the context of custodial interrogation, once a defendant clearly and unambiguously invokes his right to remain silent, interrogation must cease." State v. Maltese, 222 N.J. 525, 545 (2015). "[A]ny words or conduct that reasonably appear to be inconsistent with defendant's willingness to discuss his case with the police are tantamount to an invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination." State v. Alston, 204 N.J. 614, 622 (2011) (first alteration in original) (quoting State v. Bey (Bey II), 112 N.J. 123, 136 (1988)). 2022In determining whether a suspect has invoked their right to counsel, the court employs "a totality of the circumstances approach that focuses on the reasonable interpretation of defendant's words and behaviors." State v. Diaz- Bridges, 208 N.J. 544, 564 (2011). "[A]ny words or conduct that reasonably appear to be inconsistent with defendant's willingness to discuss his case with the police are tantamount to an invocation of the privilege against self- incrimination." Alston, 204 N.J. at 622 (quoting State v. Bey, 112 N.J. 123, 135 (1988)). "[B]ecause the right to counsel is so fundamental, an | 1 | 2 |
Knorr v. Smealgreen2 sentences2012See Knorr v. Smeal, 178 N.J. 169, 181 , 836 A.2d 794 (2003) (citation omitted). 2012See Knorr v. Smeal, 178 N.J. 169, 181 , 836 A.2d 794 (2003) (citation omitted). | 1 | 2 |
Lefkowitz v. Cunninghamgreen1 sentence2025See Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 805 (1977) (“[S]ince the test is whether the testimony might later subject the witness to criminal prosecution, the privilege is available to a witness in a civil proceeding, as well as to a defendant in a criminal prosecution.”); see also State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 101 (1997) (noting that, consistent with the federal standard, New Jersey permits the invocation of the privilege in civil proceedings). | 1 | 1 |
State v. PZgreen1 sentence2025See Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 805 (1977) (“[S]ince the test is whether the testimony might later subject the witness to criminal prosecution, the privilege is available to a witness in a civil proceeding, as well as to a defendant in a criminal prosecution.”); see also State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 101 (1997) (noting that, consistent with the federal standard, New Jersey permits the invocation of the privilege in civil proceedings). | 1 | 1 |
Kenneth W. Hardwick v. Richard L. Duggergreen1 sentence2024As such, "a suspect who has 'nothing else to say,'" Johnson, 120 N.J at 281 (quoting Christopher, 824 F.2d at 836, 842 ), or who has indicated "he would have nothing to say," Bey I, 112 N.J. at 64, has "asserted the right to remain silent, thereby requiring the police immediately to stop questioning," Johnson, 120 N.J. at 281 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Muhammadgreen1 sentence2023A suspect's invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination "cannot be used against [them] in a criminal trial." State v. Muhammad, 182 N.J. 551, 558 (2005). | 1 | 1 |
Flagg v. Essex County Prosecutorgreen1 sentence2017Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hartleygreen2 sentences2012Thus, “[a]ny words or conduct that reasonably appear to be inconsistent with defendant’s willingness to discuss his ease with the police are tantamount to an invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination.” Id. at 136, 548 A.2d 887 (emphasis added). 2012Thus, "[a]ny words or conduct that reasonably appear to be inconsistent with defendant's willingness to discuss his case with the police are tantamount to an invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination." Id. at 136, 548 A. 2d 887 (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Amanda Mitchell, AKA Amanda Foster, Amanda Mitchellgreen1 sentence2006The danger must be "real and appreciable," rather than of an "imaginary and unsubstantial character, having reference to some extraordinary and barely possible contingency." [ In the Matter of Ippolito, 145 N.J.Super. 262, 266-67 , 367 A. 2d 883 (App.Div. 1976) (quoting In re Pillo, 11 N.J. 8, 19 , 93 A. 2d 176 (195[2])), rev'd on other grounds, 75 N.J. 435 , 383 A. 2d 117 (1978) (citation omitted).] The Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination protects two distinct rights for testifying individuals: The Amendment not only protects the individual against being involuntarily calle | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Bogusgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Horon Holding Corp. v. McKenziegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Investment Company Institute v. Campgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. George A. Riggsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Vogt Ex Rel. Vogt v. Borough of Belmargreen | 1 | 1 |
| Untermann v. Untermanngreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
McWane Cast Iron Pipe Corp. v. McDowell-Wellman Engineering Co.
green
2 sentences1995In McWane, the trial-level court refused to stay or dismiss a second-filed Delaware action on the basis that the movant had not proven “the various elements prerequisite to an invocation of the doctrine of forum non conveniens under our cases.” Id. at 282 . 1995In McWane, the trial-level court refused to stay or dismiss a second-filed Delaware action on the basis that the movant had not proven "the various elements prerequisite to an invocation of the doctrine of forum non conveniens under our cases." Id. at 282 . | 2 | 1995–1995 |
State v. Locklear
green
2 sentences1980In fact, he said to L.D. at the first proceeding, “The problem of course is that we don’t have the other side of the story, [L.], and if I decide this I’m really deciding it on your statements alone.” At the latter hearing he conceded that, “Unhappily I simply said, ‘Complaint dismissed.’ ” Immediately thereafter he endeavored to volunteer the reasons he had said this, but even then he couched this explanation only in terms of what these reasons “probably were.” In these circumstances we are satisfied that neither the formalistic expression of double jeopardy prohibitions in terms of a particu 1980In fact, he said to L.D. at the first proceeding, "The problem of course is that we don't have the other side of the story, [L.], and if I decide this I'm really deciding it on your statements alone." At the latter hearing he conceded that, "Unhappily I simply said, `Complaint dismissed.'" Immediately thereafter he endeavored to volunteer the reasons he had said this, but even then he couched this explanation only in terms of what these reasons "probably were." In these circumstances we are satisfied that neither the formalistic expression of double jeopardy prohibitions in terms of a particul | 2 | 1980–1980 |
State v. Laganella
green
2 sentences1980In fact, he said to L.D. at the first proceeding, “The problem of course is that we don’t have the other side of the story, [L.], and if I decide this I’m really deciding it on your statements alone.” At the latter hearing he conceded that, “Unhappily I simply said, ‘Complaint dismissed.’ ” Immediately thereafter he endeavored to volunteer the reasons he had said this, but even then he couched this explanation only in terms of what these reasons “probably were.” In these circumstances we are satisfied that neither the formalistic expression of double jeopardy prohibitions in terms of a particu 1980Super. 268, 284 (App.Div. 1976), app. dism. 74 N.J. 256 (1976), militates against the second complaint here or justifies its suppression. | 2 | 1980–1980 |
Town of Essex v. New England Telegraph Company of Massachusetts
neutral
2 sentences1962Town of Essex v. New England Telegraph Co., 239 U. S. 313 , 36 S. Ct. 102 , 60 L. 1962Town of Essex v. New England Telegraph Co., 239 U. S. 313 , 36 S. Ct. 102 , 60 L. | 2 | 1954–1962 |
State v. Barone
green
2 sentences2018Similarly, in State v. Barone , 147 N.J. 599 , 689 A.2d 132 (1997), the Court upheld a trial court's decision to conduct an evidentiary *236 hearing concerning a defendant's invocation of an immunity, despite the fact that a federal court had previously addressed immunity issues at a hearing without the State's participation. 2018Similarly, in State v. Barone , 147 N.J. 599 , 689 A.2d 132 (1997), the Court upheld a trial court's decision to conduct an evidentiary *236 hearing concerning a defendant's invocation of an immunity, despite the fact that a federal court had previously addressed immunity issues at a hearing without the State's participation. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Campione v. Adamar of New Jersey, Inc.
green
1 sentence2017We review a court's invocation of the doctrine for an abuse of discretion and will not reverse a court's decision unless it was "made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established practices, or rested on an impermissible basis." Ibid. (quoting Flagg v. Essex Cty. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. K.P.S. and State v. Carmini Laloo
green
2 sentences2015A. Earlier this term, in K.P.S., supra, the Court addressed the application of the law of the case doctrine in the context of appellate review of a criminal case. 221 N.J. at 270 , 112 A.3d 579 . *493 We concluded that the doctrine had little, if any, vitality in that context and disapproved the invocation of the doctrine to resolve a criminal appeal. 2015A. Earlier this term, in K.P.S., supra, the Court addressed the application of the law of the case doctrine in the context of appellate review of a criminal case. 221 N.J. at 270 , 112 A.3d 579 . *493 We concluded that the doctrine had little, if any, vitality in that context and disapproved the invocation of the doctrine to resolve a criminal appeal. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Martini
green
2 sentences2012The words used by a suspect are not to be viewed in a vacuum, but rather in "the full context in which they were spoken." State v. Roman, 382 N.J.Super. 44, 64 , 887 A. 2d 715 (App.Div.2005) (citing State v. Martini, 131 N.J. 176, 231-32 , 619 A. 2d 1208 (1993)). 2012The words used by a suspect are not to be viewed in a vacuum, but rather in "the full context in which they were spoken." State v. Roman, 382 N.J.Super. 44, 64 , 887 A. 2d 715 (App.Div.2005) (citing State v. Martini, 131 N.J. 176, 231-32 , 619 A. 2d 1208 (1993)). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
State v. Roman
green
2 sentences2012The words used by a suspect are not to be viewed in a vacuum, but rather in "the full context in which they were spoken." State v. Roman, 382 N.J.Super. 44, 64 , 887 A. 2d 715 (App.Div.2005) (citing State v. Martini, 131 N.J. 176, 231-32 , 619 A. 2d 1208 (1993)). 2012The words used by a suspect are not to be viewed in a vacuum, but rather in "the full context in which they were spoken." State v. Roman, 382 N.J.Super. 44, 64 , 887 A. 2d 715 (App.Div.2005) (citing State v. Martini, 131 N.J. 176, 231-32 , 619 A. 2d 1208 (1993)). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Lubliner v. BD. OF ALCOHOLIC BEV. CON., CITY OF PATERSON
green
2 sentences2010The general requirements for the invocation of this principle are a final judgment by a court or tribunal of competent jurisdiction, identity of issues, parties and cause of action and thing sued for." Lubliner v. Paterson Bd. of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 33 N.J. 428, 435 , 165 A. 2d 163 (1960). 2010The general requirements for the invocation of this principle are a final judgment by a court or tribunal of competent jurisdiction, identity of issues, parties and cause of action and thing sued for." Lubliner v. Paterson Bd. of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 33 N.J. 428, 435 , 165 A. 2d 163 (1960). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| In Re Ippolito green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| In Re Pillo green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Ullmann v. United States green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Mitchell v. United States
green
2 sentences2006The danger must be "real and appreciable," rather than of an "imaginary and unsubstantial character, having reference to some extraordinary and barely possible contingency." [ In the Matter of Ippolito, 145 N.J.Super. 262, 266-67 , 367 A. 2d 883 (App.Div. 1976) (quoting In re Pillo, 11 N.J. 8, 19 , 93 A. 2d 176 (195[2])), rev'd on other grounds, 75 N.J. 435 , 383 A. 2d 117 (1978) (citation omitted).] The Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination protects two distinct rights for testifying individuals: The Amendment not only protects the individual against being involuntarily calle 2006The danger must be "real and appreciable," rather than of an "imaginary and unsubstantial character, having reference to some extraordinary and barely possible contingency." [ In the Matter of Ippolito, 145 N.J.Super. 262, 266-67 , 367 A. 2d 883 (App.Div. 1976) (quoting In re Pillo, 11 N.J. 8, 19 , 93 A. 2d 176 (195[2])), rev'd on other grounds, 75 N.J. 435 , 383 A. 2d 117 (1978) (citation omitted).] The Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination protects two distinct rights for testifying individuals: The Amendment not only protects the individual against being involuntarily calle | 1 | 2006–2006 |
In Re Ippolito
green
2 sentences2006The danger must be "real and appreciable," rather than of an "imaginary and unsubstantial character, having reference to some extraordinary and barely possible contingency." [ In the Matter of Ippolito, 145 N.J.Super. 262, 266-67 , 367 A. 2d 883 (App.Div. 1976) (quoting In re Pillo, 11 N.J. 8, 19 , 93 A. 2d 176 (195[2])), rev'd on other grounds, 75 N.J. 435 , 383 A. 2d 117 (1978) (citation omitted).] The Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination protects two distinct rights for testifying individuals: The Amendment not only protects the individual against being involuntarily calle 2006The danger must be "real and appreciable," rather than of an "imaginary and unsubstantial character, having reference to some extraordinary and barely possible contingency." [ In the Matter of Ippolito, 145 N.J.Super. 262, 266-67 , 367 A. 2d 883 (App.Div. 1976) (quoting In re Pillo, 11 N.J. 8, 19 , 93 A. 2d 176 (195[2])), rev'd on other grounds, 75 N.J. 435 , 383 A. 2d 117 (1978) (citation omitted).] The Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination protects two distinct rights for testifying individuals: The Amendment not only protects the individual against being involuntarily calle | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Kazin v. Kazin green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Heuer v. Heuer green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Independent Dairy Workers Union of Hightstown v. Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees Local No. 680 green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Matlack v. Arend green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| People v. Burton green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Kuzmiak v. Brookchester green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Clarke v. Securities Industry Assn. green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Cranberry Lake Quarry Co. v. Johnson green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| United States v. Leon green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Charlie Brown of Chatham, Inc. v. BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT FOR TOWNSHIP OF CHATHAM green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| City of Hackensack v. Winner green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Reilly v. Ozzard green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Summer Cottagers' Ass'n of Cape May v. City of Cape May green | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| STATE BY HIGHWAY COMM'R. v. Dilley green | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| Hall v. State green | 1 | 1965–1965 |
| Malloy v. Hogan green | 1 | 1965–1965 |
| Potter v. Borough of Metuchen green | 1 | 1961–1961 |
| Traphagen v. Mayor of Jersey City green | 1 | 1961–1961 |
| Montclair Trust Co. v. the Star Co. neutral | 1 | 1958–1958 |
| Cleary v. City of Camden green | 1 | 1951–1951 |
| Galbraith v. Busch green | 1 | 1951–1951 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.