invocation doctrine in Illinois

2012We noted that “representations on matters of opinion are insufficient to support the invocation of the doctrine of judicial estoppel.” Id. at 851-52 . ¶ 31 The opinion testimony at issue in this case is of a different type than the opinion only if they damaged the plaintiffs beyond the $3,200,000 the codefendants paid in settlements.

2012We agree with the circuit court that, as a matter of law, protecting the integrity of the court system compelled the application of judicial estoppel to the plaintiffs' claims in their 2007 complaint. ¶ 40 The opinion testimony at issue in this case is precisely the sort that stands for a representation of fact, as plainly urged by the plaintiffs in this medical malpractice case; the medical opinion testimony is substantially different from the fair market valuation of property at issue in Ceres Terminals to take this case out of its cautionary language that "representations on matters of opin

2015The parties dispute the applicable standard of review: the defendants arguing for abuse of discretion; the plaintiffs urging us to apply de novo review. ¶ 41 Since we have said that judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine invoked by the court at its discretion (Runge, 234 Ill. 2d at 132 ; Jones, 223 Ill. 2d at 598 ; Caballero, 206 Ill. 2d at 80 ), it would seem to follow that we review a court’s invocation of the doctrine under the abuse-of-discretion standard (see Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Management System, Inc., 572 U.S. ___ , ___, 134 S. Ct. 1744, 1748 (2014) (noting that, “[t]rad

2015The parties dispute the applicable standard of review: the defendants arguing for abuse of discretion; the plaintiffs urging us to apply de novo review. ¶ 41 Since we have said that judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine invoked by the court at its discretion (Runge, 234 Ill. 2d at 132 ; Jones, 223 Ill. 2d at 598 ; Caballero, 206 Ill. 2d at 80 ), it would seem to follow that we review a court’s invocation of the doctrine under the abuse-of-discretion standard (see Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Management System, Inc., 572 U.S. ___ , ___, 134 S. Ct. 1744, 1748 (2014) (noting that, “[t]rad

2015The parties dispute the applicable standard of review: the defendants arguing for abuse of discretion; the plaintiffs urging us to apply de novo review. ¶ 41 Since we have said that judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine invoked by the court at its discretion (Runge, 234 Ill. 2d at 132 ; Jones, 223 Ill. 2d at 598 ; Caballero, 206 Ill. 2d at 80 ), it would seem to follow that we review a court’s invocation of the doctrine under the abuse-of-discretion standard (see Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Management System, Inc., 572 U.S. ___ , ___, 134 S. Ct. 1744, 1748 (2014) (noting that, “[t]rad

2015The parties dispute the applicable standard of review: the defendants arguing for abuse of discretion; the plaintiffs urging us to apply de novo review. ¶ 41 Since we have said that judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine invoked by the court at its discretion (Runge, 234 Ill. 2d at 132 ; Jones, 223 Ill. 2d at 598 ; Caballero, 206 Ill. 2d at 80 ), it would seem to follow that we review a court’s invocation of the doctrine under the abuse-of-discretion standard (see Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Management System, Inc., 572 U.S. ___ , ___, 134 S. Ct. 1744, 1748 (2014) (noting that, “[t]rad

2015The parties dispute the applicable standard of review: the defendants arguing for abuse of discretion; the plaintiffs urging us to apply de novo review. ¶ 41 Since we have said that judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine invoked by the court at its discretion (Runge, 234 Ill. 2d at 132 ; Jones, 223 Ill. 2d at 598 ; Caballero, 206 Ill. 2d at 80 ), it would seem to follow that we review a court’s invocation of the doctrine under the abuse-of-discretion standard (see Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Management System, Inc., 572 U.S. ___ , ___, 134 S. Ct. 1744, 1748 (2014) (noting that, “[t]rad

2015The parties dispute the applicable standard of review: the defendants arguing for abuse of discretion; the plaintiffs urging us to apply de novo review. ¶ 41 Since we have said that judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine invoked by the court at its discretion (Runge, 234 Ill. 2d at 132 ; Jones, 223 Ill. 2d at 598 ; Caballero, 206 Ill. 2d at 80 ), it would seem to follow that we review a court’s invocation of the doctrine under the abuse-of-discretion standard (see Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Management System, Inc., 572 U.S. ___ , ___, 134 S. Ct. 1744, 1748 (2014) (noting that, “[t]rad

2006When an agency interprets its own regulation, the agency’s interpretation is controlling unless “ ‘plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.’ ” Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 , 137 L.

2006When an agency interprets its own regulation, the agency’s interpretation is controlling unless “ ‘plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.’ ” Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 , 137 L.

2006In Luedemann I, we considered the State's invocation of the doctrine "both improper and unnecessary." Luedemann I, 357 Ill.

2006In Luedemann I, we considered the State’s invocation of the doctrine “both improper and unnecessary.” Luedemann I, 357 Ill.

2002JUSTICE KILBRIDE, dissenting: The majority’s invocation of the waiver doctrine is as misplaced here as it was in People v. Jackson, 199 Ill. 2d 286 (2002).

2002Justice KILBRIDE joins in this dissent. *1072 Dissent Upon Denial of Rehearing Justice KILBRIDE, dissenting: The majority's invocation of the waiver doctrine is as misplaced here as it was in People v. Jackson, 199 Ill.2d 286 , 263 Ill.

2002As this court has recently and clearly stated: “ ‘Waiver of a constitutional right is valid only if it is clearly established that there was “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right ***.” ’ People v. Johnson, 75 Ill. 2d 180, 187 (1979), quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 82 L.

2002As this court has recently and clearly stated: “ ‘Waiver of a constitutional right is valid only if it is clearly established that there was “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right ***.” ’ People v. Johnson, 75 Ill. 2d 180, 187 (1979), quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 82 L.

2001Since the general rule is admission to bail, the State, if it seeks to invoke the exception to the rule, must bear the burden of going forward with the evidence to produce facts to warrant the invocation of the exception.” Steigler, 250 A.2d at 382-83 .

2001Since the general rule is admission to bail, the State, if it seeks to invoke the exception to the rule, must bear the burden of going forward with the evidence to produce facts to warrant the invocation of the exception." Steigler , 250 A.2d at 382-83 .

1973“Fundamental fairness,” if applicable to this record at all, would require the invocation of the rule enunciated in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 , 91 L.

1973“Fundamental fairness,” if applicable to this record at all, would require the invocation of the rule enunciated in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 , 91 L.

2025Reimer, Inc., 2013 IL App (1st) 120106, ¶ 48 . ¶ 41 In this case, defendants argue that Miller’s email “was not an action to remedy nor even a promise to do so.” Defendants argue that the complaint does not allege that defendants took any “affirmative steps to remedy the property damage *** as legally required for *** the invocation of the doctrine of estoppel.” Plaintiff replies J.S.

2012We noted that "representations on matters of opinion are insufficient to support the invocation of the doctrine of judicial estoppel." Id. at 851-52, 200 Ill.

2012We agree with the circuit court that, as a matter of law, protecting the integrity of the court system compelled the application of judicial estoppel to the plaintiffs' claims in their 2007 complaint. ¶ 40 The opinion testimony at issue in this case is precisely the sort that stands for a representation of fact, as plainly urged by the plaintiffs in this medical malpractice case; the medical opinion testimony is substantially different from the fair market valuation of property at issue in Ceres Terminals to take this case out of its cautionary language that "representations on matters of opin

2004Gabriel, 228 Ill.

1994(See United States v. Siegel (N.D.Ill.1979), 472 F.Supp. 440 , 442 n. 4 (the doctrine of judicial estoppel "does not apply where the prior statement is merely an expression of opinion or legal conclusion"); United States v. Certain Land and Interests in Property (M.D.Tenn.1964), 225 F.Supp. 338, 341 ("prior statements * * * will not be binding if shown to have been mistakenly or inconsiderately made, or if they were merely expressions of opinion or legal conclusions"); see also Comment, Judicial Estoppel: The Refurbishing of a Judicial Shield, 55 Geo.

1993App. 3d 136, 140 , 456 N.E.2d 224 .) The invocation of the doctrine of unclean hands is within the trial court’s discretion and its application has not been favored by the courts.

1993(Jaffe, 119 Ill.

1992Tate (1921), 206 Ala. 349 , 89 So. 742 , that the invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination in a defendant’s answer to a complaint, because it was not a denial of the allegation, would normally result in a default judgment.

1992Tate (1921), 206 Ala. 349 , 89 So. 742 , that the invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination in a defendant’s answer to a complaint, because it was not a denial of the allegation, would normally result in a default judgment.

1990App. 3d 443 , 337 N.E.2d 40 ), we find that the errors alleged here, either singularly or cumulatively, are insufficient to justify the invocation of the rule.

1989(People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d at 198 .) While we recognize that this court will address questions such as those raised by the defendant under the plain error exception, we do not believe the invocation of that doctrine to be appropriate under the facts of the case at bar.

1977The majority further places great reliance upon Dingman v. People (1869), 51 Ill. 277 , for the invocation of the doctrine of repeal by, implication to the instant case.

1977The majority further places great reliance upon Dingman v. People (1869), 51 Ill. 277 , for the invocation of the doctrine of repeal by implication to the instant case.