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20 Missouri opinions name it 2 courts 1903–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Missouri courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Baxter v. Palmigianogreen2 sentences2011Long v. Askren, 874 S.W.2d 466, 471 (Mo.App.1994). ‘“The prevailing rule is that the Fifth Amendment does not forbid adverse inferences against parties to civil actions when they refuse to testify in response to probative evidence against them: the Amendment ‘does not preclude the inference where the privilege is claimed by a party to a civil cause.’ ” Johnson v. Missouri Bd. of Nursing Adm’rs, 130 S.W.3d 619, 629 (Mo.App.2004) (quoting Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318 , 96 S.Ct. 1551 , 47 L.Ed.2d 810 (1976)). “ ‘In civil eases, a witness’ invocation of his privilege against self-incrim 2011Long v. Askren, 874 S.W.2d 466, 471 (Mo.App.1994). ‘“The prevailing rule is that the Fifth Amendment does not forbid adverse inferences against parties to civil actions when they refuse to testify in response to probative evidence against them: the Amendment ‘does not preclude the inference where the privilege is claimed by a party to a civil cause.’ ” Johnson v. Missouri Bd. of Nursing Adm’rs, 130 S.W.3d 619, 629 (Mo.App.2004) (quoting Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318 , 96 S.Ct. 1551 , 47 L.Ed.2d 810 (1976)). “ ‘In civil eases, a witness’ invocation of his privilege against self-incrim | 1 | 3 |
McGrath v. St. Louis Transit Co.green2 sentences1925We have gone over this question thoroughly in several recent cases. [McGrath v. Transit Co., 197 Mo. 97 ; Orcutt v. Century Building Co., 201 Mo. 424 ; Roscoe v. Metropolitan Street Railway Co., 202 Mo. 576 ; Price v. Metropolitan Street Railway Co., 220 Mo. l.c. 453 et seq.]" In the case at bar, respondent bottoms her recovery upon certain alleged specific acts of negligence, one of which is that appellant "negligently permitted and caused current in dangerous and deadly amount to pass over the wires and through the equipment into said home." The burden rested upon respondent to prove the spe 1921See, also, McGrath v. Transit Co., 197 Mo. 97 , 94 S.W. 872 ; Orcutt v. Century Building Company, 201 Mo. 424 , 99 S. W 1062; Roscoe v. Metropolitan Street Railway Company, *174 202 Mo. 576 , 101 S. W. 32 ; Price v. Metropolitan Street-Railway Company, 220 Mo. l. c. 453, 119 S. W. 932 .] As to this assignment of error, however, the respondent though denying that the charge of negligence is specific, contends that, in any event, the evidence supports the charge that.the defendant “negligently suspended and maintained” this flag pole, since the evidence shows that the pole was torn from its fast | 1 | 3 |
Johnson v. Missouri Board of Nursing Administratorsgreen2 sentences2011Long v. Askren, 874 S.W.2d 466, 471 (Mo.App.1994). ‘“The prevailing rule is that the Fifth Amendment does not forbid adverse inferences against parties to civil actions when they refuse to testify in response to probative evidence against them: the Amendment ‘does not preclude the inference where the privilege is claimed by a party to a civil cause.’ ” Johnson v. Missouri Bd. of Nursing Adm’rs, 130 S.W.3d 619, 629 (Mo.App.2004) (quoting Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318 , 96 S.Ct. 1551 , 47 L.Ed.2d 810 (1976)). “ ‘In civil eases, a witness’ invocation of his privilege against self-incrim 2004Id. | 1 | 2 |
State ex rel. Long v. Askrengreen1 sentence2011Long v. Askren, 874 S.W.2d 466, 471 (Mo.App.1994). ‘“The prevailing rule is that the Fifth Amendment does not forbid adverse inferences against parties to civil actions when they refuse to testify in response to probative evidence against them: the Amendment ‘does not preclude the inference where the privilege is claimed by a party to a civil cause.’ ” Johnson v. Missouri Bd. of Nursing Adm’rs, 130 S.W.3d 619, 629 (Mo.App.2004) (quoting Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318 , 96 S.Ct. 1551 , 47 L.Ed.2d 810 (1976)). “ ‘In civil eases, a witness’ invocation of his privilege against self-incrim | 1 | 1 |
United States v. William D. White and Terry L. Kenogreen1 sentence2004Third, “although inferences based on the assertion of the privilege are permissible, the entry of judgment based only on the invocation of the privilege and ‘without regard to the other evidence’ exceeds constitutional bounds.” LaSalle Bank, 54 F.3d at 391 (quoting Baxter, 425 U.S. at 318 , 96 S.Ct. at 1558 ); see also United States v. White, 589 F.2d 1283, 1287 (5th Cir.1979); Koester v. Am. | 1 | 1 |
Lappe and Associates, Inc. v. Palmengreen1 sentence1993“In civil cases, a witness’ invocation of his privilege against self-incrimination justifies an inference that, if he had answered the question truthfully, the answer would have been unfavorable to him.” Lappe & Assoc., Inc. v. Palmen, 811 S.W.2d 468, 471 (Mo.App.1991). | 1 | 1 |
Hayes v. Stategreen1 sentence1991Matter of K.A.P., 760 S.W.2d 553, 554 (Mo.App.1988). | 1 | 1 |
Menees v. Cowgillgreen2 sentences1978The Illinois complaint filed by Wesley makes no mention of equitable adoption; it alleged no facts which would support the invocation of that doctrine; it alleged, many times, that Wesley was the son of the testator, not that he should be declared to be the son or that the testator and his privies should be estopped to deny the relationship. “[W]e can not agree to the contention that there can be an adoption by contract and performance without either compliance with ‘the statutory formalities required by law relating to the adoption of children,’ or a decree of a court of equity based upon equ 1978The Illinois complaint filed by Wesley makes no mention of equitable adoption; it alleged no facts which would support the invocation of that doctrine; it alleged, many times, that Wesley was the son of the testator, not that he should be declared to be the son or that the testator and his privies should be estopped to deny the relationship. “[W]e can not agree to the contention that there can be an adoption by contract and performance without either compliance with ‘the statutory formalities required by law relating to the adoption of children,’ or a decree of a court of equity based upon equ | 1 | 1 |
Matthew Massimo v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1977If he can change his mind, then the police are entitled to ask him if he has changed his mind, but * * * they cannot attempt to persuade him to do so and * * * they may not continue to question him after he claims his rights.” See also Massimo v. United States, 463 F.2d 1171, 1174 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. den., 409 U.S. 1117 , 93 S.Ct. 920 , 34 L.Ed.2d 700 (1973), where it was stated that “The police have the privilege of ‘asking a defendant to reconsider his refusal to answer questions,’ United States v. Collins, 462 F.2d 792 (2d Cir. 1972).” In Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 102, 104 , 96 S.C | 1 | 1 |
Michigan v. Mosleygreen2 sentences1977If he can change his mind, then the police are entitled to ask him if he has changed his mind, but * * * they cannot attempt to persuade him to do so and * * * they may not continue to question him after he claims his rights.” See also Massimo v. United States, 463 F.2d 1171, 1174 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. den., 409 U.S. 1117 , 93 S.Ct. 920 , 34 L.Ed.2d 700 (1973), where it was stated that “The police have the privilege of ‘asking a defendant to reconsider his refusal to answer questions,’ United States v. Collins, 462 F.2d 792 (2d Cir. 1972).” In Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 102, 104 , 96 S.C 1977If he can change his mind, then the police are entitled to ask him if he has changed his mind, but * * * they cannot attempt to persuade him to do so and * * * they may not continue to question him after he claims his rights.” See also Massimo v. United States, 463 F.2d 1171, 1174 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. den., 409 U.S. 1117 , 93 S.Ct. 920 , 34 L.Ed.2d 700 (1973), where it was stated that “The police have the privilege of ‘asking a defendant to reconsider his refusal to answer questions,’ United States v. Collins, 462 F.2d 792 (2d Cir. 1972).” In Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 102, 104 , 96 S.C | 1 | 1 |
State v. Evans and Blankenbakergreen2 sentences1975State v. Caffey, 457 S.W.2d 657, 660 (Mo.1970); State v. Evans, 324 Mo. 159 , 23 S.W.2d 152, 155 (1929). 1975State v. Caffey, 457 S.W.2d 657, 660 (Mo.1970); State v. Evans, 324 Mo. 159 , 23 S.W.2d 152, 155 (1929). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Caffeygreen1 sentence1975State v. Caffey, 457 S.W.2d 657, 660 (Mo.1970); State v. Evans, 324 Mo. 159 , 23 S.W.2d 152, 155 (1929). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Missouri. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Orcutt v. Century Building Co.
green
2 sentences1925We have gone over this question thoroughly in several recent cases. [McGrath v. Transit Co., 197 Mo. 97 ; Orcutt v. Century Building Co., 201 Mo. 424 ; Roscoe v. Metropolitan Street Railway Co., 202 Mo. 576 ; Price v. Metropolitan Street Railway Co., 220 Mo. l.c. 453 et seq.]" In the case at bar, respondent bottoms her recovery upon certain alleged specific acts of negligence, one of which is that appellant "negligently permitted and caused current in dangerous and deadly amount to pass over the wires and through the equipment into said home." The burden rested upon respondent to prove the spe 1921See, also, McGrath v. Transit Co., 197 Mo. 97 , 94 S.W. 872 ; Orcutt v. Century Building Company, 201 Mo. 424 , 99 S. W 1062; Roscoe v. Metropolitan Street Railway Company, *174 202 Mo. 576 , 101 S. W. 32 ; Price v. Metropolitan Street-Railway Company, 220 Mo. l. c. 453, 119 S. W. 932 .] As to this assignment of error, however, the respondent though denying that the charge of negligence is specific, contends that, in any event, the evidence supports the charge that.the defendant “negligently suspended and maintained” this flag pole, since the evidence shows that the pole was torn from its fast | 3 | 1916–1925 |
Sparks v. Sparks
green
2 sentences1997There the appellate court noted that the reason some form of judicial response is appropriate following the invocation of the privilege is “to eliminate any undue advantage which might flow from the ability to conceal pertinent evidence.” Id. at 567 . 1990While no comparable policy consideration applies to the invocation of the privilege by a defendant, dragged into court involuntarily, nevertheless fundamental fairness requires that a plaintiff be afforded some remedy lest a defendant defeat the claim by concealment.” Id. | 2 | 1990–1997 |
Pointer v. Mountain Railway Construction Co.
green
2 sentences1921And this is true although he might have pleaded negligence generally and by an invocation of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur had a recovery upon making proper proof.” [Pointer v. Mountain Railway Company, 269 Mo. 104 , l. c. 114, 189 S. W. 805 . 1921And this is true although he might have pleaded negligence generally and by an invocation of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur had a recovery upon making proper proof.” [Pointer v. Mountain Railway Company, 269 Mo. 104 , l. c. 114, 189 S. W. 805 . | 2 | 1921–1947 |
Roscoe v. Metropolitan Street Railway Co.
green
2 sentences1925We have gone over this question thoroughly in several recent cases. [McGrath v. Transit Co., 197 Mo. 97 ; Orcutt v. Century Building Co., 201 Mo. 424 ; Roscoe v. Metropolitan Street Railway Co., 202 Mo. 576 ; Price v. Metropolitan Street Railway Co., 220 Mo. l.c. 453 et seq.]" In the case at bar, respondent bottoms her recovery upon certain alleged specific acts of negligence, one of which is that appellant "negligently permitted and caused current in dangerous and deadly amount to pass over the wires and through the equipment into said home." The burden rested upon respondent to prove the spe 1921See, also, McGrath v. Transit Co., 197 Mo. 97 , 94 S.W. 872 ; Orcutt v. Century Building Company, 201 Mo. 424 , 99 S. W 1062; Roscoe v. Metropolitan Street Railway Company, *174 202 Mo. 576 , 101 S. W. 32 ; Price v. Metropolitan Street-Railway Company, 220 Mo. l. c. 453, 119 S. W. 932 .] As to this assignment of error, however, the respondent though denying that the charge of negligence is specific, contends that, in any event, the evidence supports the charge that.the defendant “negligently suspended and maintained” this flag pole, since the evidence shows that the pole was torn from its fast | 2 | 1921–1925 |
State v. Bannister
green
1 sentence2020“A request for counsel bars further interrogation until an attorney is present, unless the accused in the interim voluntarily initiates discussion.” See State v. Bannister, 680 S.W.2d 141 , 147–48 (Mo. banc 1984) (citing Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 , 484–85 (1981)) (emphasis added). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Edwards v. Arizona
green
1 sentence2020“A request for counsel bars further interrogation until an attorney is present, unless the accused in the interim voluntarily initiates discussion.” See State v. Bannister, 680 S.W.2d 141 , 147–48 (Mo. banc 1984) (citing Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 , 484–85 (1981)) (emphasis added). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State Ex Rel. Munn v. McKelvey
green
1 sentence2016The invocation of the privilege creates "a rebuttable presumption [that the] answer might tend to incriminate” the subject and rebuttal requires "a demonstration by the questioner that the answer cannot possibly have a tendency to incriminate the witness.” Id. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Koester v. American Republic Investments
green
1 sentence2004Republic Invs., Inc., 11 F.3d 818 , 823-24 (8th Cir.1993). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Harwell v. Harwell
green
1 sentence1988Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318 , 96 S.Ct. 1551, 1558 , 47 L.Ed.2d 810, 821 (1976); In re Monnig, 638 S.W.2d 782 (Mo.App.1982); Harwell v. Harwell, 355 S.W.2d 137 (Mo.App.1962). | 1 | 1988–1988 |
In Re Monnig
green
1 sentence1988Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318 , 96 S.Ct. 1551, 1558 , 47 L.Ed.2d 810, 821 (1976); In re Monnig, 638 S.W.2d 782 (Mo.App.1982); Harwell v. Harwell, 355 S.W.2d 137 (Mo.App.1962). | 1 | 1988–1988 |
United States v. Ray Allen Collins
green
1 sentence1977If he can change his mind, then the police are entitled to ask him if he has changed his mind, but * * * they cannot attempt to persuade him to do so and * * * they may not continue to question him after he claims his rights.” See also Massimo v. United States, 463 F.2d 1171, 1174 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. den., 409 U.S. 1117 , 93 S.Ct. 920 , 34 L.Ed.2d 700 (1973), where it was stated that “The police have the privilege of ‘asking a defendant to reconsider his refusal to answer questions,’ United States v. Collins, 462 F.2d 792 (2d Cir. 1972).” In Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 102, 104 , 96 S.C | 1 | 1977–1977 |
State v. McDonald
green
2 sentences1977If he can change his mind, then the police are entitled to ask him if he has changed his mind, but * * * they cannot attempt to persuade him to do so and * * * they may not continue to question him after he claims his rights.” See also Massimo v. United States, 463 F.2d 1171, 1174 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. den., 409 U.S. 1117 , 93 S.Ct. 920 , 34 L.Ed.2d 700 (1973), where it was stated that “The police have the privilege of ‘asking a defendant to reconsider his refusal to answer questions,’ United States v. Collins, 462 F.2d 792 (2d Cir. 1972).” In Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 102, 104 , 96 S.C 1977If he can change his mind, then the police are entitled to ask him if he has changed his mind, but * * * they cannot attempt to persuade him to do so and * * * they may not continue to question him after he claims his rights.” See also Massimo v. United States, 463 F.2d 1171, 1174 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. den., 409 U.S. 1117 , 93 S.Ct. 920 , 34 L.Ed.2d 700 (1973), where it was stated that “The police have the privilege of ‘asking a defendant to reconsider his refusal to answer questions,’ United States v. Collins, 462 F.2d 792 (2d Cir. 1972).” In Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 102, 104 , 96 S.C | 1 | 1977–1977 |
People v. Pittman
green
2 sentences1977If he can change his mind, then the police are entitled to ask him if he has changed his mind, but * * * they cannot attempt to persuade him to do so and * * * they may not continue to question him after he claims his rights.” See also Massimo v. United States, 463 F.2d 1171, 1174 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. den., 409 U.S. 1117 , 93 S.Ct. 920 , 34 L.Ed.2d 700 (1973), where it was stated that “The police have the privilege of ‘asking a defendant to reconsider his refusal to answer questions,’ United States v. Collins, 462 F.2d 792 (2d Cir. 1972).” In Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 102, 104 , 96 S.C 1977If he can change his mind, then the police are entitled to ask him if he has changed his mind, but * * * they cannot attempt to persuade him to do so and * * * they may not continue to question him after he claims his rights.” See also Massimo v. United States, 463 F.2d 1171, 1174 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. den., 409 U.S. 1117 , 93 S.Ct. 920 , 34 L.Ed.2d 700 (1973), where it was stated that “The police have the privilege of ‘asking a defendant to reconsider his refusal to answer questions,’ United States v. Collins, 462 F.2d 792 (2d Cir. 1972).” In Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 102, 104 , 96 S.C | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Massimo v. United States
green
2 sentences1977If he can change his mind, then the police are entitled to ask him if he has changed his mind, but * * * they cannot attempt to persuade him to do so and * * * they may not continue to question him after he claims his rights.” See also Massimo v. United States, 463 F.2d 1171, 1174 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. den., 409 U.S. 1117 , 93 S.Ct. 920 , 34 L.Ed.2d 700 (1973), where it was stated that “The police have the privilege of ‘asking a defendant to reconsider his refusal to answer questions,’ United States v. Collins, 462 F.2d 792 (2d Cir. 1972).” In Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 102, 104 , 96 S.C 1977If he can change his mind, then the police are entitled to ask him if he has changed his mind, but * * * they cannot attempt to persuade him to do so and * * * they may not continue to question him after he claims his rights.” See also Massimo v. United States, 463 F.2d 1171, 1174 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. den., 409 U.S. 1117 , 93 S.Ct. 920 , 34 L.Ed.2d 700 (1973), where it was stated that “The police have the privilege of ‘asking a defendant to reconsider his refusal to answer questions,’ United States v. Collins, 462 F.2d 792 (2d Cir. 1972).” In Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 102, 104 , 96 S.C | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Hillen v. Hawaii State Prison Superintendent
green
1 sentence1977If he can change his mind, then the police are entitled to ask him if he has changed his mind, but * * * they cannot attempt to persuade him to do so and * * * they may not continue to question him after he claims his rights.” See also Massimo v. United States, 463 F.2d 1171, 1174 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. den., 409 U.S. 1117 , 93 S.Ct. 920 , 34 L.Ed.2d 700 (1973), where it was stated that “The police have the privilege of ‘asking a defendant to reconsider his refusal to answer questions,’ United States v. Collins, 462 F.2d 792 (2d Cir. 1972).” In Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 102, 104 , 96 S.C | 1 | 1977–1977 |
People v. White
green
1 sentence1977If he can change his mind, then the police are entitled to ask him if he has changed his mind, but * * * they cannot attempt to persuade him to do so and * * * they may not continue to question him after he claims his rights.” See also Massimo v. United States, 463 F.2d 1171, 1174 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. den., 409 U.S. 1117 , 93 S.Ct. 920 , 34 L.Ed.2d 700 (1973), where it was stated that “The police have the privilege of ‘asking a defendant to reconsider his refusal to answer questions,’ United States v. Collins, 462 F.2d 792 (2d Cir. 1972).” In Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 102, 104 , 96 S.C | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Commonwealth v. Youngblood
green
2 sentences1977If he can change his mind, then the police are entitled to ask him if he has changed his mind, but * * * they cannot attempt to persuade him to do so and * * * they may not continue to question him after he claims his rights.” See also Massimo v. United States, 463 F.2d 1171, 1174 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. den., 409 U.S. 1117 , 93 S.Ct. 920 , 34 L.Ed.2d 700 (1973), where it was stated that “The police have the privilege of ‘asking a defendant to reconsider his refusal to answer questions,’ United States v. Collins, 462 F.2d 792 (2d Cir. 1972).” In Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 102, 104 , 96 S.C 1977If he can change his mind, then the police are entitled to ask him if he has changed his mind, but * * * they cannot attempt to persuade him to do so and * * * they may not continue to question him after he claims his rights.” See also Massimo v. United States, 463 F.2d 1171, 1174 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. den., 409 U.S. 1117 , 93 S.Ct. 920 , 34 L.Ed.2d 700 (1973), where it was stated that “The police have the privilege of ‘asking a defendant to reconsider his refusal to answer questions,’ United States v. Collins, 462 F.2d 792 (2d Cir. 1972).” In Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 102, 104 , 96 S.C | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Yelton v. State
green
1 sentence1977If he can change his mind, then the police are entitled to ask him if he has changed his mind, but * * * they cannot attempt to persuade him to do so and * * * they may not continue to question him after he claims his rights.” See also Massimo v. United States, 463 F.2d 1171, 1174 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. den., 409 U.S. 1117 , 93 S.Ct. 920 , 34 L.Ed.2d 700 (1973), where it was stated that “The police have the privilege of ‘asking a defendant to reconsider his refusal to answer questions,’ United States v. Collins, 462 F.2d 792 (2d Cir. 1972).” In Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 102, 104 , 96 S.C | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Price v. Metropolitan Street Railway Co. green | 1 | 1921–1921 |
| Thompson v. Newell green | 1 | 1915–1915 |
| Armstrong v. Medbury green | 1 | 1908–1908 |
| Bretz v. Matney neutral | 1 | 1903–1903 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.